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Critical Reflections and a New Point of Departure
Chin- Chuan Lee
various attempts (Curran & Park, 2000; thussu, 2009; Wang, 2011) have 
been made in recent years to “de- Westernize” or “internationalize” me-
dia studies. What justifies another volume seeking to “internationalize” 
what is purported to be the most “internationalized” subfield in the whole 
gamut of media and communication studies? in short, it is because inter-
national communication as a field of inquiry actually is not very “interna-
tionalized.” but why should we fix our horizon on “international” instead 
of, say, “intercultural” communication, or the even trendier “global” com-
munication? first, it should be acknowledged that nation- states remain 
central to any theories and practice of the contemporary world order, and 
that international communication is always (but not completely) inter-
mixed with intercultural communication. second, international processes 
obviously are increasingly globalized. however, we wish to emphasize a 
double- bind fact: if democracy is to survive in the post- communist world, 
as alain touraine (1997) maintains, it must “somehow protect the power 
of the nation- state at the same time as it limits that power,” for only the 
state “has sufficient means to counterbalance the global corporate wield-
ers of money and information.”
Perusing three major handbooks as signposts immediately discloses 
that international communication has led a relatively marginal existence 
in the pantheon of media and communication studies. the more gener-
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ous treatment was given in what was legitimately claimed to be the most 
comprehensive anthology, Handbook of Communication (1973), which ran 
over 1,000 pages under the eminent editorship of ithiel de sola Pool and 
Wilbur schramm. six out of 31 chapters (approximately one- fifth), all writ-
ten by political scientists, addressed in whole or in part selected issues of 
international communication. all the topics nonetheless concentrated on 
vital Cold War concerns of the united states: international propaganda, 
third World modernization, communication systems in primitive societies, 
and Communist/totalitarian communication systems. there was a sequel 
after a lapse of 14 years, the Handbook of Communication Science, edited by 
Charles berger and steven Chaffee (1987). amid its self- congratulatory 
claim to the self- sufficient status of “communication science,” this volume 
turned cripplingly inward- looking. showing little welcoming gesture to so-
cial scientists from other sister disciplines, it devoted only one chapter to 
cross- cultural comparisons, and none to substantive issues of international 
communication. an updated Handbook of Communication Science, edited by 
berger, roloff, and roskos- ewaldsen (2010), devoted only one token chap-
ter out of 29 to “intercultural communication.” What comes to mind is local 
tv news practice in the united states of covering “the world in a minute.”
surely international matters deserve more time, space, and concerted 
attention. Why have they been so neglected in our field? asserting the 
hard- nosed presumption that “science” is of universal applicability, those 
defining the field through these influential anthologies did not seem to 
believe that cross- cultural, national, or systemic differences should mat-
ter. the world amounted, ontologically and epistemologically, to america 
writ large. this prevailing stream of (un)consciousness was widely shared 
among most members of the u.s. social science community for decades, 
following on Lerner’s conviction (1958) that the entire developing world 
was emulating the american model in a linear progression to moderniza-
tion. Moreover, well into the 1980s, even as scholars of communication 
sought to define their realm as one of overweening importance, the field’s 
vision seemed to be narrowing. even a cursory glance at the table of con-
tents of the three defining volumes shows an inexorable move toward the 
process of what geertz (1963) calls “involution,” characterized by greater 
self- absorption, isolationism, internal development, and parochialism— 
and this in spite of the vast and rapid march of globalizing processes “out 
there.” under the pretense of science (more aptly, scientism), the succeed-
ing generations of editors have embraced a far narrower horizon of global 
landscape than their mentors.
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at long last, however, the critique of Cold War perspectives that ac-
companied political ferment of the 1960s and 1970s, the progress of critical 
cultural approaches to inquiry in the 1980s and 1990s, and above all the 
growing participation of international scholars in international commu-
nication inquiry have generated a search for new directions. We hope this 
book can contribute to this movement.
Why Internationalizing “International Communication”?
in this introductory chapter i shall refer to the “West” as a generic term to 
make first- stroke comparisons with the “non- West,” bearing in mind that 
the West is larger than the united states and both “the West” and “the 
non- West” are internally full of notable variations and conflicts.1 in other 
words, we are at this point more interested in understanding the “between 
variances” than the “within variances.” yet media studies remain, to borrow 
from Jeremy tunstall (1977), largely “american” or anglo- american, and 
the erosion of this dominance has been glacial. as a field of inquiry born 
out of the u.s. context of the 1950s, international communication still ad-
dresses the world largely through the prism of middle- class america, and 
the narrow agenda that prevailed for so long— focusing on Cold War pro-
paganda, third World development, political campaigns, and consumer 
persuasion— continues to exert its influence through the topics, methods, 
questions, and very vocabularies of our studies. as Colin sparks sums up 
in his chapter, “Lasswell, Lippmann and bernays in the first generation, 
and Lerner and schramm in the second, were all deeply concerned with 
the ways in which states used the resources of propaganda both to secure 
internal consent and to undermine the support available to their enemies.”
if we were to follow C. Wright Mills’s (1959) call for the “sociologi-
cal imagination,” we should stand firm to reject any attempts to balkanize 
media studies into domestic and international turfs, because in principle all 
significant questions should be situated in the cross- nexus of comparative 
(world) and temporal (historical) contexts. but that is not how the aca-
demic division of labor or the bureaucratic ethos usually operate. in reality, 
international communication has been taken as a conceptual extension or 
empirical application of u.s. communication. furthermore, it has provided 
territory for scholarly colonization: as early as six decades ago, Lazarsfeld 
(1952– 53) foresaw that “the domestic area will not have many opportuni-
ties” in the years to come and postulated that international research could 
be a fertile land to “open up new and exciting subjects for investigation.” 
4 •  internationalizing “international communication”
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rather than taking advantage of the widened window of opportunity to 
produce “local knowledge” (geertz, 1983) of general relevance and also 
in a comparative light, international communication more often than not 
has acted as an overseas testing station of u.s. or, secondarily, european 
worldviews.
Moreover, aside from fixating on a narrow range of conceptual prob-
lems, mainstream scholarship in our field has long promoted a positivistic 
methodology that in its extreme form has especially detrimental implica-
tions for international communication studies. hard- core positivists as-
sume that specificities can and should be subsumed into generality, but 
they seem comfortable with the fact that the supposed “generality” tends 
to be grounded in a specific u.s. cultural soil or european setting. the 
“West” is being generalized if not universalized, while the “exceptions” and 
outliers are explained away and cross- cultural meanings homogenized to 
the extent of defying the rigor of comparative logic. for many, systemic 
differences do not seem to be pertinent in the way of impinging on concep-
tualization or, for that matter, on the relationships between concepts and 
their empirical referents (smelser, 1976). nor is there room for any serious 
discourse about the crossing of cultural boundaries.
Worse yet, much of the non- West has been socialized to adopt trun-
cated versions of Pax americana’s notion of international communication. 
u.s.- cum- international communication is taken for granted by way of the 
hegemonic process, with an army of non- Western disciples eagerly pro-
moting, embracing, and reproducing the generalized model and wisdom 
from their Western tutors. the popularity of “diffusion of innovation” 
(rogers, 2003), which comprised streams of overseas projects trying to 
copy or replicate models born in the specific settings of iowa, ohio, or 
new york, was celebrated as a seminal cross- cultural achievement.
how much has the situation been improved? invited just recently to 
offer comments on papers presented by asian Phd students at a research 
symposium, i asked the audience to judge whether we were witnessing 
a colored, colonized, asian map of u.s. research trajectories. “Where is, 
for example, Korea— or singapore— in scripting the scholarly agendas?” i 
asked. “is there a real place to account for cultural flow and interaction?” 
stunned to hear my remarks, most students did not seem to possess the 
kind of cultural awareness needed to feel anything was wrong with lifting 
a page from the u.s. research directory, asking the same set of technical 
(even trivial) questions, adopting the same conceptual frameworks, and im-
itating the same research techniques down to minute details. What could 
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be faulted, they must have wondered, given that their vaunted display of 
sophisticated skills was, after all, coached by advanced Western authorities? 
and this is hardly an isolated encounter.
there is no reason to reject a concept or theory out of hand simply on 
account of its cultural origin, but it surely is unwise to buy into any theory 
without reflecting on its built- in premises and limitations. it is one thing to 
import or apply certain Western models as a critical choice because some 
problems are appropriate for more generalized lenses. it is quite another 
to unquestioningly accept a whole set of specific worldviews, problematics, 
and core agendas to serve a field boldly called “international communica-
tion.” at stake is the “subject position” of academic and cultural inquirers: 
Who get to ask what kind of questions? Why shouldn’t we treasure the 
right to ask original questions that are most important to us instead of sub-
mitting indigenous data or evidence only to further fuel the Western- cum- 
universal theories? this is a case of academic hegemony par excellence 
that naturalizes the process of ideological transfer and practical emulation. 
hegemony in the gramscian sense is never equal or simply coerced, but 
based in part on acts of mutual consent and willing collaboration between 
the intellectual patron and client, resulting in ideological conditioning in 
such a way that the fact of domination is unrecognized, accepted, or taken 
for granted. hegemony rules unabated unless its fundamental and often 
hidden assumptions are openly exposed and questioned.
if the trajectory is depressing, the past also yields lessons that can fur-
ther our attempts to promote wiser, more enlightened, and more cos-
mopolitan approaches to scholarship. We believe that the imperative of 
academic autonomy must be founded on active, open, and mutually re-
spectful interaction with cultural currents of thought and interests from 
other traditions. symbolizing a critical moment of cultural awakening, this 
volume intends to do just that and, further, to present alternative and criti-
cal discourses about the study of international communication. it is time to 
develop a more complex and integrated framework of multiculturalism and 
globalism as a new point of departure. all our contributors have long been 
immersed in rich intercultural or diasporic experiences, which stuart hall 
depicts as being “familiar strangers” between cultures who “know both 
places intimately” but are “not wholly of either place” (Chen, 1996, p. 490). 
represented in this volume are a group of distinguished scholars from dif-
ferent generations and from an array of diverse cultural backgrounds— 
argentinian, italian, dutch, american, british, swedish, belgian, israeli, 
indian, and Chinese— who have either received advanced training in the 
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West or affiliated with major Western universities during various periods 
of their careers. such “in- between” cross- cultural experiences form an es-
sential part of intellectual biography and capital for them to traverse mul-
tiple borders and to dialectically negotiate and synthesize the insider’s per-
spectives with the outsider’s perspectives (Merton, 1972), thereby enabling 
them to emerge from critical reflections with refreshing views on where 
the field has come from and whither it goes.
Origin and Paradigm Shift
from the outset, international communication research has been affiliated 
with power and the nation- state, and most particularly with u.s. foreign 
policy interests and objectives. setting the tone was harold Lasswell (1927) 
in an early work on propaganda technique during World War i. some 15 
years later, social scientists were called on to advise the office of War in-
formation of the u.s. government in fighting nazi propaganda during 
World War ii, a war that paved the way for the rise of the united states to 
world hegemony. no sooner had the world war ended than the Cold War 
ensued, lasting for half a century. in this ideologically polarized world, in 
which the united states perceived itself as “a righter of wrongs around the 
world, in pursuit of tyranny, in defense of freedom no matter the place or 
cost” (said, 1993, p. 5), propaganda concerns loomed ever larger.
in retrospect, however, the neo- imperial impetus driving u.s. commu-
nication studies was not the only dynamic. the field actually was devel-
oping in different institutional settings for different purposes, taking two 
parallel yet rather separate trajectories. one stream of academic pedigree 
could be traced back to the university of Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s, 
where urban sociologists (such as robert Park and herbert blumer) under 
the influence of pragmatism (John dewey) and symbolic interactionism 
(george herbert Mead) pursued their fascination with the integrative role 
of the media in the building of community amid large- scale social transfor-
mation produced by industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. the 
preeminence of Chicago sociology in u.s. studies of mass communication 
was replaced in the 1950s by the structural- functionalist school of sociol-
ogy and social psychology led by robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld at 
Columbia university. at this juncture, domestic communication research 
came to acquire another character, tenet, and direction as the Columbia 
researchers turned their primary attention to investigating how the media 
instrumentally altered voter intention or consumer behavior. overall they 
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were collectively frustrated to discover, time and again, that the media did 
not live up to the theorized expectation of swaying the public’s attitudes 
and behaviors, but only served to reinforce their existing predispositions. 
as a result, bernard berelson (1959), a member of the Columbia group, 
was on the verge of announcing a funeral for communication research. the 
transition from Chicago’s to Columbia’s emphasis (Czitrom, 1982, pp. 91– 
146; hardt, 1992, pp. 31– 122) has far- reaching implications that provide a 
domestic counterpoint to the international focus of this essay.
in contrast, coming from a different set of political and intellectual con-
cerns, post– World War ii international communication research came to 
revolve around a circle of Mit political sociologists who were decidedly 
cold warriors: ithiel de sola Pool, daniel Lerner, and Lucian W. Pye. When 
Columbia researchers lamented, on the domestic front, the media’s “null ef-
fects” in the 1960s, the Mit scholars did just the opposite: they enthusi-
astically promoted, albeit abroad, an image of omnipotent media capable 
of shaping international propaganda and stimulating third World develop-
ment. as an interesting chapter in the sociology of knowledge, how do we 
account for these diametrically opposing views of media power between 
the Columbia and Mit schools of thought? Was the discrepancy caused 
by different ecological conditions of propaganda— for example, what La-
zarsfeld and Merton (1971) referred to as monopolization, canalization, 
and supplementation of mass communication— at home and abroad? to 
what extent did this gap arise from differing notions of media power? the 
Columbia group was intent on capturing the manifest, micro- level atti-
tude and behavior change exerted by the media on individuals or groups 
in the short run. Conversely, the Mit group displayed supreme confidence 
in advocating the cumulative role of the media in cultivating macro- level 
ideological consciousness and triggering social transformation in the long 
haul. still, how can Columbia’s narrowly conceived empirical findings in 
the u.s. setting be reconciled with Mit’s broadly speculative advocacy in 
the thick of the Cold War?
the Mit- based international communication research was primarily 
informed by modernization theory, as conceived by american social scien-
tists with the active encouragement of the u.s. government. such an ap-
proach gained popularity alongside the post- war ascendancy of american 
political, military, and commercial expansion in the world (tipps, 1973). 
initiated at Columbia and finished at Mit, Lerner’s The Passing of Tradi-
tional Society (1958) was generally considered the key baseline work in the 
area of international development communication. Lerner insisted that 
8 •  internationalizing “international communication”
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Western countries were simply holding up a mirror for what the develop-
ing world aspired to become on the road to modernization, setting out 
the vision of the universal relevance of Western experiences. Pye (1963) 
followed suit, editing an important volume on the role of communication 
in facilitating political development, while Pool (1973) and his students 
invested enormous energy in the study of the Communist media systems 
of China and the soviet union. for want of quality empirical studies in the 
international realm, Wilbur schramm (1964) started with Lerner’s thesis 
and extrapolated from the Columbia group’s hodge- podge findings to offer 
policy advice to an international audience; his unesCo- sponsored Mass 
Media and National Development was greeted by many third World plan-
ners as something of a development “bible.”
through the 1960s and 1970s, from stanford and later the east- West 
Center, schramm fostered cross- institutional collaboration between two 
coasts across the continent, working closely with Mit’s Lerner, Pye, and 
Pool on “development communication” (Pye, 1963; Lerner & schramm, 
1967; Pool & schramm, 1973; schramm & Lerner, 1976). as the next gen-
eration of scholars began to elaborate on modernization theory, one vari-
ant that emerged preeminent was diffusion of innovations. synthesizing 
the tradition of news diffusion studies with their origin in new york and 
that of agricultural diffusion studies from the farm belt of iowa, rogers 
(2003) elevated the diffusion model to international status by transplanting 
it to various overseas outposts. in the field of international communication, 
this thesis provoked by far the largest number of empirical studies abroad 
in replication of its u.s. origins. Looking back, it may be said that mod-
ernization theory (especially the versions of Lerner, schramm, and rog-
ers) owed its popularity during the heyday of east- West conflict in part to 
the illusory charm it offered the elite in poor third World countries— the 
promise of simplistic solutions to tough problems. in his chapter Jan ser-
vaes, among others, has criticized modernization theory for (a) a lack of 
empirical support; (b) behavioristic and positivistic biases; (c) conceptual 
inadequacy; (d) insensitivity to social context; (e) Western centrism; and 
(f) being ahistorical. all these flaws, so glaringly evident with the benefit of 
hindsight, went overlooked at the time.
as the east- West conflict mixed uneasily with emerging south- north 
tensions in the 1970s, Latin americanists proposed various strains of 
“dependency” perspectives as a formidable challenge to the moderniza-
tion formula. in a thoughtful review essay, Palma (1978) summarizes and 
compares three main perspectives from this movement: (a) the theory of 
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“development of underdevelopment” (a. g. frank); (b) “growth without 
development” (o. sunkel); and (c) “dependent development” (f. h. Car-
doso). With the east- West conflict unabated, the united states continued 
to spread the gospel of modernization to the third World as a main strat-
egy to deter Communism. Meanwhile, on the south- north dimension, the 
united states found itself blamed and held responsible by poor nations for 
the unequal control and distribution of the world’s economic and informa-
tion resources. the resulting antagonism was in large part what prompted 
the united states to withdraw from unesCo in 1984 (an absence lasting 
until 2003); President ronald reagan had no stomach or patience for the 
heated “new international information and communication order” debate 
in which the united states was chief villain.
of the three perspectives, “growth without development” proved of 
minor importance, but the implications of theoretical and methodological 
divergences between “development of underdevelopment” and “dependent 
development” were most profound. Methodologically, frank as a politi-
cal economist proposed a formal theory of underdevelopment, which was 
almost a mirror image of modernization theory it sought to debunk. Car-
doso, a Weberian historical sociologist who years later became president of 
brazil, rejected formalized theory and instead preferred to use dependency 
as a methodology to account historically for the open- ended and concrete 
situations of underdevelopment— indeed, Cardoso (1977) criticized u.s. 
scholars for consuming dependency as a formal theory in frank’s positiv-
istic terms.
frank theorized that Latin america was incorporated into the interna-
tional capitalist system, in which the world center through external condi-
tioning of local economies created entrenched conditions of underdevel-
opment for the periphery. rejecting frank’s exclusive attention on external 
conditions, Cardoso argued that it was important to grasp “the political 
alliances, the ideologies, and the movement of structures within the depen-
dent countries” and to analyze how these forces “internalized” the external. 
he concluded that at least some countries (such as brazil) in the semi- 
periphery were able to develop their economies concurrent with continued 
dependence on the international capitalist structure.
the implications surely are worth revisiting in the age of globaliza-
tion; yet the influence of dependency perspectives on international com-
munication research has been sparse and uneven. herbert i. schiller (1976) 
was perhaps the best- known critic of cultural imperialism to have drawn, 
albeit rather cursorily, on frank’s theory of underdevelopment as well as 
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on immanuel Wallerstein’s world- system theory. otherwise, the theoreti-
cal alliance and intellectual flow between radical u.s./european political 
economists with their third World (in this case, Latin american) coun-
terparts remained weak and minimal. amid the almost total absence of 
analysis written in english on “dependent development” of media and cul-
ture, salinas and Paldan (1979) provided a notable exception. even among 
members of the like- minded critical Marxist camp, first World and third 
World scholars were divided by a veritable gulf in interests, concerns, and 
orientations. the divide had obvious material underpinnings, of course: 
when radical british scholars were occupied with the erosion of the “pub-
lic sphere” (including public service broadcasting) caused by thatcherism, 
Latin american scholars had to grapple with pressing issues of economic 
survival and structural dependence. it is rather startling that raymond 
Williams’s brilliant work on Marxist cultural theory and analysis (Williams, 
1977) was oriented primarily toward the history and geography of social 
formation in britain without connecting explicitly to the wider histori-
cal and international context of imperialism. it took someone like edward 
said (1993) to fill this significant void, paving the foundation for the post- 
colonial work that should form a point of departure for much of the third 
World analysis. stuart hall, another main figure of british cultural studies, 
also waited until rather late in his career to start addressing the identity 
issues related to the race and ethnicity of his own Jamaican immigrant 
background (Chen, 1996).
in his chapter for this volume, tsan- Kuo Chang performs an interest-
ing frequency count of keyword combinations in the title of journal articles 
over time, providing a rough index of major “paradigms” and paradigm 
change. such keywords as “modernization,” “imperialism” and “depen-
dency” came into significant use in the 1970s. in the 1980s, two significant 
clusters appeared: imperialism/dependency and modernization/depen-
dency. What these clusters mean is murky, but an educated guess might 
point to two camps: while the radical perspective linked imperialism to 
dependency, the pluralist perspective pitted modernization against depen-
dency. not until the 1990s did “globalization” come into vogue. by the 
1990s, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the rise of neoliberal 
ideology and rhetoric of a new world order, “globalization” rapidly rose in 
prominence, with “dependency” sinking to relative obscurity in academic 
discourses. Moreover, the close affinity of “globalization” with “modern-
ization” suggests the almost unchecked ascendancy of neoliberalism in the 
post– Cold War milieu. Peter dahlgren succinctly notes in his chapter that 
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the theoretical traditions of globalization (from social sciences) and post- 
colonialism (from the humanities) have had relatively little encounter with 
each other, when in fact they should be very much entwined.
in reconstructing the neoliberal world order after the conclusion of 
the Cold War, said (1993, p. xvii) remarks that the united states has dis-
played “its redolent self- congratulation, unconcealed triumphalism, and its 
grave proclamation of responsibility.” Meanwhile, culture, political values 
and foreign policies have been reframed euphemistically in terms of “soft 
power” (nye, 1990, 2004)— that is, ostensibly no longer dependent on the 
hard power of economic prowess and military might. Celebrants canonize 
liberalism as having prevailed over other competing systems and ideologies, 
ushering in a new era euphorically characterized as “the end of history” 
(fukuyama, 1992). at the same time, however, the united states is urged to 
bolster its “soft power” in order to win the war of public diplomacy (nye, 
2008) and to prevail in the supposed “clash of civilizations” (huntington, 
1993). it seems that earlier proponents of modernization theory such as 
huntington have not really changed their position, despite the veneer of 
seemingly different sets of rhetoric. Like the modernization project, the 
current soft power and “civilizing” missions are still geared toward advanc-
ing the vital interests of Washington. the wars in iraq and afghanistan, as 
they contrarily sapped vital resources from an ailing economy, have flown 
in the face of naïve and wishful predictions about the united states reaping 
a “peace dividend.”
Chang’s chapter begs a big question: What accounts for the contexts 
in which such shifts in keyword combinations take place? Chang is no fan 
of “cultural imperialism” and attributes its long life cycle to “group think.” 
he favors Castell’s concepts of “network society” and “network state,” 
but as benson discusses in his chapter, whether this optimistic version of 
technological determinism can be taken at face value is an open question. 
it is about time: vigorous debates on globalization and anti- globalization 
discourses have occurred in other social science disciplines (held & Mc-
grew, 2007), but technological dazzle evidently is mesmerizing enough to 
significantly mute such voices in the field of international communication. 
after all, “network society” does not take anything away from the realities 
of global domination.
What counting these terms reminds us is that academic fads come and 
go, moving in tandem with the reigning political environment. no one is 
arguing for keeping a vulgar theory of cultural imperialism, but the con-
cept still deserves intellectual currency as long as global domination per-
12 •  internationalizing “international communication”
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sists. the chapter by Colin sparks is a clarion call to resurrect the relevance 
of cultural imperialism as an explanatory framework. not that competing 
discourses will die away; but the field needs juxtaposition, new arguments, 
and energetic debates. as alfred Whitehead (1925) once said, “the clash of 
doctrines is not a disaster, it is an opportunity.”
Hegemony
in starting his project on the intellectual history of the twentieth century, 
Peter Watson (2001) sought input from scholarly specialists on the intel-
lectual thought of the non- Western world. Much to his amazement, almost 
all of them— experts on the history and cultures of india, China, Japan, 
south and Central africa, and the arab world— concurred that during the 
century nothing matching the achievements of the Western world had 
come out of non- Western contexts. since the nineteenth century, all these 
old civilizations had fallen short in their varied and rushed attempts to re-
spond to the challenges and ramifications of Western cultural imperialism, 
leaving a legacy of “cultural shock” that still lingers.
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, China declined from 
what had been a closed yet seemingly self- sufficient and proud empire to 
semi- colonial status and humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese 
colonial powers. early modernists at the outset of the twentieth century 
(such as yan fu, Zhang binglin, and Liu shipei), shocked into searching for 
Western prescriptions, thought they had found answers in Charles darwin, 
thomas huxley, and herbert spencer. (it was said that China’s intellectual 
elite revered Western scholars as gods and their treatises as sacred— an 
exaggerated portrayal but symbolic of the cultural mind- set of the era.) 
With China’s indigenous identity shattered, these seekers came to accept 
the claim that all civilizations must obey the “scientific” iron law of social 
evolutionism, in which only the fittest could survive at each stage along a 
trajectory of linear development. Liu shipei (1884– 1919), the first to trans-
late the Communist Manifesto into Chinese, stands out as a vivid example of 
this Westernized worldview: he declared that Western countries, already at 
the “modern” stage, thus enjoyed stability, whereas China was still loitering 
in the “pre- modern” stage with its precarious cycles of chaos. Chinese in-
tellectuals seeking to reinterpret Chinese canonical texts in light of West-
ern body of knowledge firmly believed that China was lagging behind the 
West by an entire historical chapter.
With several notable exceptions, the next generation of modernists— 
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many of whom had been educated in the West— took an equally if not 
more radical approach toward their traditional Chinese heritage. the 
intellectual cohort of the 1920s acquired a more intimate and nuanced 
understanding of the West and shifted the targets of admiration to such 
contemporary figures as John dewey, bertrand russell, and harold Laski, 
along with the late Karl Marx, whose translated texts were beginning to 
circulate in China. the emblematic figure of anti- traditional enlighten-
ment, Lu Xun, advised young people to read nothing but Western books, 
holding that Chinese books were so out of touch with reality as to be inca-
pacitating. the liberal intellectual hu shi was equally anti- traditional, but 
returning from the united states armed with dewey’s “scientific method,” 
he energized a short- lived but vigorous revolution in the study of Chi-
nese classics. Many others who had internalized the ethos, paradigms, 
and exemplars of Western scholarship likewise reoriented their studies of 
China’s history, geography, literature, and society with remarkable accom-
plishments. in this period, intellectuals who firmly rooted their interests in 
the fertile ground of indigenous texts and experiences but systematically 
dissected their subjects with the theoretical and methodological advances 
adapted from the West went a long way toward integrating and enriching 
both cultural traditions. it is not surprising that many “masterpieces” pro-
duced during that transitory golden age (1920s– 1940s) are being reissued 
with a vengeance, to widespread accolades from today’s Chinese academic 
community.
the contours of this brief intellectual history (see yu, 2007, pp. 272– 91) 
have notable implications. first, China’s loss of self- confidence in the face 
of Western cultural assaults has been keenly felt, but is by no means unique 
or exceptional. otherwise, Watson (2001) would have gladly given a pride 
of place to what were generally regarded as seminal intellectual contribu-
tions from indian, Japanese, islamic or african (i.e., except Chinese) civili-
zations. Western hegemony is undeniably a universal fact. second, Western 
cultural supremacy has permeated every field of modern scholarship, with 
the active collaboration of local elites in third World countries. although 
this influence may provoke little epistemological concern in the natural 
sciences, it is obvious cause for consternation in the humanities and so-
cial sciences, where cultural premises and values are deemed of cardinal 
import. for a young and immature field of study called international com-
munication, what this means is that scholars everywhere must learn from 
the West, then unlearn, and proceed to relearn with the West. Most vital 
of all, we must seek feasible ways to cross cultural borders and achieve 
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truly multicultural interaction. We need to develop agendas for expanded 
south- north and south- south dialogue with such aims in mind.
at the same time, scholars hoping to make these breakthroughs are still 
encumbered with social darwinist postulates about the required “stages” 
through which each civilization must pass. this perspective finds its latter- 
day incarnations in modernization theory and also in Marxist doctrine— 
both carriers of old ideas in different guises. according to modernization 
theory, the media played a critical role in stimulating empathy to facilitate 
the passing of “traditional” society through the “transitional” phase to at-
tain the “modern” threshold (Lerner, 1958). Marxist dogma about “stages” 
of history has not plagued our field simply because Western Marxists are 
not particularly interested in media, but it certainly frustrated several gen-
erations of Chinese academics in other fields; into the 1970s, historians 
strapped into ideological straitjackets still were trying futilely to determine 
when feudal and capitalist “stages” had begun and ended so as to substanti-
ate the official claim that new China had surpassed all other earlier stages 
to enter the more advanced stage of socialism. even worse than the im-
pediments to understanding, of course, was the great damage to lives and 
careers wreaked by this academic charade.
Finding a New Point of Departure
Modernization theory is a prime example of the theoretical and method-
ological failings of trying to mimic the natural sciences in the social sci-
ences. now discredited but not abandoned, the assumptions of moderniza-
tion theory are still widespread in academic literature; inglehart and his 
associates (inglehart and Welzel, 2005; norris and inglehart, 2009), for 
example, represent major recent attempts at reviving modernization theory 
in “globalized” terms. the quest to establish universally valid “laws” of hu-
man society with little regard for cultural values and variations thankfully, 
however, seems to be running out of steam. the development of micro- 
history, the interest in “local knowledge” among anthropologists (follow-
ing geertz, 1983), and the challenges of epistemological reflexivity posed 
by continental european thought (such as phenomenology and hermeneu-
tics) are all ways of reckoning, if belatedly, with the important dimensions 
of empathetic understanding and subjective consciousness in the study of 
humanity. by now it seems obvious that no culture or theory is one size 
that fits all. at the same time, the “local” cannot be parochial; rather, it is 
dialectically interactive with the “global.” the recognition that few places 
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are culturally homogeneous anymore and that everyone must contend 
with the emerging motifs of multi- ethnic and multi- cultural complexities 
has reached to the very heights of Western academia itself. in a matter 
of decades, for instance, the movement to incorporate non- Western and 
non- white authors into the u.s. university canon has been spearheaded by 
stanford university and the ivy League.
in this volume, concern with the local and global and their interrela-
tionship extends beyond geography to theory, method, and epistemology. 
Contributors are seeking new approaches to “cosmopolitan theories”— by 
which we mean a constellation or system of interlinking concepts that, 
through continuous cycles of creative synthesis from global perspectives, is 
provisionally accepted as having robust explanatory power. such theories 
are neither fixed nor a priori Western; rather, they are open to constant 
contestation and dynamic change. scholars of international communica-
tion need the cultural confidence and epistemological autonomy to make 
their mark on global or cosmopolitan theory, which necessarily will entail 
borrowing, recasting, or reconceptualizing Western theories— the more 
the better, whatever help us elucidate and analyze rich local experiences 
and connect them to broader processes, whatever broaden our horizons 
and expand our repertoire, as long as we are not beholden to any purported 
final arbiter of universal truth. and in the event no suitable theories are 
available, we are obliged or challenged to create new ones.
as i point out later in this volume, connecting the local with the global 
does not give us license to abuse local experiences to fit or validate global 
theories; instead, we should use “global” theories to help illuminate local 
experiences. My chapter argues for adopting an approach that commences 
with reflecting on the internal logic and context of local experiences, grad-
ually moving up the ladder of abstraction, and meeting dynamically with 
what are considered suitable theories in the larger globalized contexts. 
thus, local experiences eventually may be endowed with broader and gen-
eral significance.
other contributors complement this project by combining thoughtful 
conceptual work with keen attention to specifics. as Luckmann (1978) ar-
gues, the logic of science is the logic of social science, but the explanatory 
aims are different: the structure of everyday life and the meanings of hu-
man action have to be interpreted reflexively and intersubjectively. it is also 
important to pay attention to different textures of the agency- structure 
interaction in different contexts: for example, when Western scholars seek 
to debunk the ideology of news professionalism as upholding the status 
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quo, this ideology may empower individual journalists in China and other 
authoritarian countries to make a difference (Lee, 2001).
in this spirit, drawing on empirical evidence from recent Chinese media 
studies, Judy Polumbaum tries in her chapter to borrow anthony gid-
dens’s theory of structuration as a starting point for conducting grounded 
research on the interaction between human agency and social structure. 
Moreover, she promotes Pierre bourdieu’s “field” of production as a frame-
work to look at how external forces may contribute to expanding or cir-
cumscribing the elastic range of possibilities, or how actors may fortify 
established interests, promote emerging social formation, or yield new cre-
ativities. for her, the primary goal of research is to gain rich insights into 
how the world really works rather than to test propositions in a positivistic 
manner of causal attribution.
silvio Waisbord begins by criticizing “area studies” for failing to con-
tribute to a common set of questions and unifying theories in international 
communication. Let it be recalled that in the immediate wake of the Cold 
War, the idea of terminating area studies and absorbing them into main-
stream disciplines of the humanities and social sciences gained some cur-
rency; but alarm over the u.s. shortage of area specialists on al Qaeda and 
afghanistan during the “war on terror” gave area studies new academic and 
institutional life. to me, it might make more sense to promote “area- based 
studies” that combine culturally contextualized area knowledge with theo-
retically informed pursuits. Waisbord advocates “cosmopolitan scholar-
ship” characterized by “sensitivity to comparative and global questions and 
approaches and engagement in globalized debates.” to this end, he recom-
mends three strategies: (a) analyzing neglected areas in order to rethink 
arguments and broaden analytical horizons; (b) conducting comparative 
research so as to provide more solid and nuanced theoretical conclusions; 
and (c) examining transborder flows and global questions. for each of the 
three strategies he also cites thought- provoking research topics.
Peter dahlgren proposes a broadened normative theory of “civic cos-
mopolitanism” to advance globalized democratic politics and to anchor the 
analysis of international communication. dahlgren argues that cosmopoli-
tanism is a necessary element for civic agency in the modern globalized 
world, and the character of the media is a precondition for such agency 
because without the media the ideal of democracy would not have been 
spread so far and so deep. he urges moving the cosmopolitan moral stance 
into concrete political praxis, for cosmopolitan citizenship has a responsi-
bility to engage with global others. While acknowledging a universalistic 
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core in globalized democratic politics, we should be sensitive to different 
modes of democratic praxis due to contingencies of circumstance. dahl-
gren concludes: “democratic civic agency needs to incorporate the cos-
mopolitan perspective and pay more attention to morality as an analytic 
dimension for understanding political agency as an expression of subjectiv-
ity. Cosmopolitanism needs to analytically further engage with the media, 
and look beyond moral categories to situated political practices.” how to 
translate this reflective piece of normative theory into empirical projects of 
sorts will be a big challenge.
rodney benson offers a critical comparative analysis of three european- 
influenced master terms— public sphere (Jürgen habermas), field (bour-
dieu), and network (Manuel Castells, bruno Latour)— and their implica-
tions for research in transnational or non- Western contexts. given his 
complex arguments, i can only highlight three salient points here. first, 
as benson argues, “as one moves from habermas/Peters and bourdieu on 
the one hand to Castells and especially Latour on the other hand the on-
tological accounts become more fluid, the epistemological accounts (to the 
extent they are elaborated) become more relativist, and the politics become 
more open- ended.” second, the public sphere project is most useful for 
internet democracy and in need of critical interrogation, but it draws a 
line in the sand against authoritarian projects. field theory holds some 
promise for investigating the processes of identity formation, the unequal 
distribution of resources, and the importance of symbolic and economic 
power. Castells retains an interest in power and democratic politics but 
his theory is too flexible and ahistorical, whereas Latour’s micro- empirical 
approach refuses the big picture. third, it would nonetheless be fruitful to 
draw upon and engage with any or all of these theories, but with reflexivity, 
to facilitate empirical research for international communication.
Writing from the perspective of cross- cultural and comparative literary 
studies, Zhang Longxi eloquently argues that the “translation” of mean-
ings within or between languages and cultures is a communicative act of 
border- crossing, a goal to which all cosmopolitan scholars have a moral re-
sponsibility, despite difficulties, to make a contribution. the cosmopolitan 
spirit assumes that “different peoples at great distances from one another 
with very different cultures and histories can understand each other and be 
brought together to form a common humanity.” he draws on the most fas-
cinating historical episodes of utopian and demonized representations of 
China in europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by the 
Jesuits (who saw China as the “european vision of Cathay” and Confucius 
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as the “patron saint” of the enlightenment) versus the Catholic Church 
(which fanned the “Chinese rites controversy”), to illustrate some of the is-
sues confronting east- West understanding. at the end of the day, he rejects 
as contradicting historical facts and textual evidence any formulations of 
dichotomized, essentialized, and opposite “modes of thinking” that are al-
leged to cause the incommensurability of cultural values and ideas between 
east and West.
for decades, the standard frame of reference for comparing media sys-
tems has been Four Theories of the Press (siebert, Peterson, & schramm, 
1956). despite its vast and long- standing influence, this framework has 
been criticized for its Cold War bias, Western centrism, and conceptual 
flaws (nerone, 1995; see also servaes’s chapter in this volume). almost fifty 
years later came the more thoughtful work of hallin and Mancini (2004), 
who compared four dimensions of media systems— the structure of media 
markets, professionalism, political parallelism, and the role of the state— 
across 18 advanced democracies in western europe and north america. 
they derived three Western models: (a) the north atlantic or liberal 
model; (b) the northern european or democratic corporatist model; and 
(c) the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model. hallin and Mancini 
(2012) further assembled a group of scholars from the non- Western world 
(China, brazil, russia, Poland, and south africa), whose case studies were 
intended to subject the original framework to critical scrutiny. the on-
going dialogue between the “most similar systems” of the Western world 
and the “most dissimilar systems” of the non- Western world is a fruitful 
experiment for conceptual improvement and theory building. as part of 
this extended discussion, Paulo Mancini maintains in his chapter that the 
polarized pluralist and especially hybridized models are more applicable 
to non- Western countries, where mass parties are not everyday experience 
and the media are instruments of state intervention and elite maneuvering. 
besides questioning the Western/non- Western dichotomy, it is always vital 
to ask what variables, dimensions, or indicators are valid for comparative 
research. if imposing such a concept and yardstick as “media profession-
alism” on the non- Western world is seen as unacceptable (as some may 
argue), what would be a valid alternative?
Michael Curtin observes in his chapter that there is no need to “in-
ternationalize” film studies because it has from the beginning been “in-
ternational,” with its origin in the likes of harold innis. this is at best an 
exception to the general pattern of intellectual parochialism and Western 
dominance; innis and other globalists are rarely in the bibliography for stu-
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dents of journalism and mass communication in the united states. Curtin 
proposes the concept of “media capitals,” which tend to be located in ma-
jor port cities with dense transnational networks of hybridized culture and 
cultural interaction, creative migration, and concentrated capital resources 
for production and distribution. he argues that the nation’s political capi-
tals, because of the entrenched institutions of censorship and clientelism, 
rarely emerge as media capitals— with the intriguing theoretical implica-
tion that political centrality means media/culture marginality. it should be 
noted that the historical antecedents of the empire and the legacy of post- 
colonial conditions may be instrumental in the shaping of “media capitals.” 
Moreover, these media capitals do not challenge the dominance of holly-
wood; hong Kong and Mumbai have become major film hubs, but few of 
their films make an impact beyond neighboring countries.
arvind rajapopal uses south asia as a site of communicative moder-
nity to offer a densely interpretive chapter on post- colonial visual culture. 
his central argument is that “[g]reater visibility in public does not ensure 
more rationality, nor does a greater density of information flow assure less 
violence or more democratization.” new media reactivate rather than sup-
plant or erase earlier media forms, and media expansion makes social di-
visions more visible instead of promoting unity. non- Western forms of 
“seeing” tend to validate, not disrupt, the existing rules of social space. 
Post- colonial visual culture extends a “split public” between religion and 
politics, without rendering either of them transparent to the other. While 
media spectacles are an extension of commodity logic in the West, they 
are only a site of heterogeneous factors brought together to enhance the 
marketability of the commodity in the post- colonial south asia.
Revisiting “Cultural Imperialism”
finally, i would like to revisit the enduring theme of culture/media imperi-
alism, by way of the provocative chapter by Colin sparks, because this topic 
invokes a host of interesting theoretical, ideological, and methodological 
debates. sparks does not like such terms as cultural imperialism or media 
imperialism, but argues that we should understand international commu-
nication as being shaped by the cultural consequences of imperialism. he 
is explicitly critical of capitalism as a force or source of imperialism. as a 
pronounced feature of the contemporary world system, he notes that states 
in the advanced countries tend to colonize international communication 
through direct or indirect uses of the media.
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to me, sparks’s argument speaks in important ways to the core issues of 
how we can assure this analysis is holistic on the one hand but not totalistic 
on the other. a holistic perspective does not reduce the whole to distinct 
parts; the whole is larger than the sum of parts, but this does not preclude 
or exclude a detailed analysis of the constituent formation. in other words, 
we cannot be content with viewing just the wood to the neglect of the 
trees, or vice versa; for aesthetic and ethical reasons we need a balanced 
landscape of the two elements to round up a fuller picture. schiller (1976), 
for example, attacked an assortment of tourism, advertising, public rela-
tions, entertainment, news media, and education in the united states as a 
neat package of “cultural imperialism.” it is laudable not to compartmen-
talize “cultural imperialism,” but this “abstract” and essentialized formu-
lation may risk moving dangerously close to being a totalistic discourse. 
as such, it may scorn any analyses of nuanced differences and the inter-
action between cultural genres, and looks unfavorably to anything short 
of utopian once- and- for- all solutions, such as waging a partial yet crucial 
resistance movement of cultural intifada and guerrilla wars. frank (1969) 
warned that Latin america had no choice other than “underdevelopment” 
or “revolution.” Likewise, schiller (1976) urged third World countries to 
extricate themselves from the international capitalist system as a precon-
dition for purging cultural imperialism. the prospect of mass extrication 
is, realistically speaking, so slim as to render any impatient and totalistic 
project most likely a recipe for inaction. equally important is the question 
of where third World countries should extricate themselves to? the sad 
fact is that extrication does not promise cultural independence— and inde-
pendence is not synonymous with liberation— as it is clear that before our 
eyes are so many post- imperialist third World countries run by national-
ist, chauvinistic, sectarian, or brutal regimes with the whole pathology of 
dictatorial power. i recall these seemingly ancient examples primarily in 
view of their contemporary resonances. even more important, how are we 
to understand and sort out the complex, highly contested, and often con-
tradictory meanings of “cultural consequences” in the way of multilayered 
structures, relationships, and interactions between media genres, content 
flow, transfer of institution and technology, ideological effect, and the all- 
encompassing “way of life”? it should also be kept in mind that no modern 
culture is self- sufficient, fully autonomous, or out of touch with others, as 
said (1993) and hall (1996) have emphasized the open, hybridized, and 
mutually interactive characters of modern culture.
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Imperialism with or without Final Guarantees?
sparks argues that “[s]hifts in economic power are usually accompanied by 
a shift in military power and a shift in cultural power.” this implies that 
the economic power of capitalism may precede and create certain cultural 
consequences of imperialism. three points can be briefly noted. first, if 
Michael Curtin is right in arguing that “media capitals” tend to be far away 
from the nation’s political centers and concentrated in rowdy port cities 
that are disdained by national elites, then the link between economic forces 
and political forces seems significantly weakened. We are at least reminded 
of these competing and yet inconclusive hypotheses. second, is economic 
power necessarily a “determining” locomotive of cultural power? the fact 
that Japan’s unparalleled international economic power in the 1970s and 
1980s was accompanied by its relatively weak presence of international cul-
tural power, plus as- yet dubious evidence on the emerging cases of China, 
india, and russia, makes me wonder if a nation’s ability to transform its 
economic power into cultural power is necessarily assured. third, most se-
riously, if we opt not to quarrel with sparks’s claim, the task remains one of 
fully conceptualizing where the analysis of capitalism’s imperialist cultural 
consequences should begin or end.
the intramural dispute between radical political economists and cul-
turalists seems to throw important light on this last question. Murdock 
and golding (1977, p. 17) started by taking theodor adorno, raymond 
Williams, and stuart hall to task for doing “a top- heavy analysis in which 
an elaborate autonomy of cultural forms balances insecurely on a sche-
matic account of economic forces shaping their production.” golding and 
Murdock (1991, p. 27) reiterated the central importance that should be ac-
corded to explaining “how the economic dynamics of production structure 
public discourse by promoting certain cultural forms over others.” their 
criticism has to be interpreted against Williams’s seminal work (1977) on 
Marxist cultural theory, which redefines the concept of “determination” 
not in terms of “reflection” but in terms of “mediation.” Williams further 
develops the concept of “mediation” to mean that the economic base may 
primarily “set the limits” (passively) and “exert pressures” (actively) on the 
ideological field. by the same token, stuart hall (1996) thinks of the “ma-
terialism” of Marxist theory in terms of “determination (of the cultural) 
by the economic in the first instance.” he criticizes political economists’ 
steadfast position with respect to “determination (of the cultural) by the 
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economic in the last instance” has long been “in the depository of the last 
dream or illusion of theoretical certainty” (italics in original).
hall (1996) characterizes his theoretical stance metaphorically as “Marx-
ism without final guarantees.” the material base is a point of departure for 
establishing “the open horizon of Marxist theorizing” (in hall’s terms), for 
defining the direction and setting the limits of cultural production. how-
ever, the actual processes and outcomes of cultural formation and counter- 
formation are more open- ended, more autonomous, and more intensely 
contested than what political economists would postulate— in fact, as hall 
maintains, the outcomes are “without guaranteed closures,” to the extent 
that the cultural may in some cases even depart from the contours of the 
economic. insofar as sparks (1996, p. 95) was critical of hall for not inves-
tigating the material base of thatcherism, we may reasonably understand 
him to be a defender of the “cultural imperialism with final guarantees” 
position, as determined by the logic of capitalism. With or without final 
guarantees, it is essential to specify and analyze a complex chain of con-
ceptual building blocks that straps global capitalism to the posited cultural 
consequences of imperialism. to this end, how profitable is it to draw on a 
rejuvenated version of, say, the historically interpretive framework of “de-
pendent development” that focuses on the dialectical interactions among 
the “triple alliance” of the state, the dominant classes, and the international 
capitalist structure (Cardoso & faletto, 1979; evans, 1979)? in the age of 
globalization, furthermore, how can cultural consequences react upon the 
material base?
Political Economy versus Audience Decoding
Cultural imperialism would seem to have enduring relevance as long as 
media globalization radiates from metropolitan centers— and indeed, from 
one primary center. despite the rise of regional hubs of cultural produc-
tion, media globalization still is hard to distinguish from americaniza-
tion. the united states is the only genuine global media exporter across 
a range of media, and home to media conglomerates that are both verti-
cally and horizontally integrated to span the entire spectrum of forms and 
genres. these conglomerates, built on the elusive benefits of synergy and 
the ephemeral icon of consumer choice, are either u.s.- owned outright 
(disney, time Warner, and viacom) or nominally “foreign” (sony, ber-
telsmann, vivendi- universal, and news Corporation) but with their most 
important operations and markets in the united states. these companies 
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compete and cooperate in an intertwined way: they set up cross owner-
ship, produce revenue sharing and joint ventures, engage in coproduction 
and co- purchasing, and swap local outlets (tunstall & Machin, 1999, pp. 
64– 66). entertainment is the priority; meanwhile, many scholars have ex-
pressed concern that journalism may be increasingly Mcdonaldized and 
trivialized, overwhelmed by the emphasis on infotainment, gossip, and 
scandal that pander to the instant gratification of mass consumers (e.g., 
gunther & Mughan, 2000).
none of the global conglomerates has been able to make the inroads 
it would desire in the China market. but all are trying, as international 
appetites for american- style cultural products become ever more vital to 
corporate survival. in this volume, Jaap van ginnenken presents a fasci-
nating case of a globalized media product— Avatar, the first 3- d mega- 
blockbuster— to illustrate how tried- and- tested hollywood formulas have 
re- emerged in new technological guise. he points out five well- worn co-
lonial motifs that endure despite all the technological dazzle, namely: (a) 
underdeveloped “virgin” land; (b) primitive national tribe; (c) indigenous 
natural worldviews; (d) imperial intervention; and (5) the beautiful native 
girl. it is tempting to interpret the Avatar phenomenon as the center of 
world capitalism imposing its particular system of manufactured cultural 
images, forms, and meanings on the world audience.
however, as Liebes and Katz (1993) have demonstrated, audiences 
negotiate with the media over meanings in accordance with their own 
cultural assumptions. van ginnenken likewise highlights the contradic-
tion between the control exercised over production and the “relative au-
tonomy” of meaning- making in reception. in short, focusing primarily on 
the political economy of media ownership and control without sufficient 
sensitivity to the process of audience decoding may result in overestimat-
ing the weight of cultural domination and homogenization. on the other 
hand, paying sole attention to audience decoding without situating it in 
the structural constraints of product availability as dictated by the logic 
of contemporary political economy may lead to minimizing the weight of 
cultural domination. once again, we face questions of agency- structure in-
teraction. once again, more empirical investigation is required.
Concluding Remarks
i begin this chapter by criticizing the parochial orientation of u.s. scholar-
ship that has distorted the study of international communication for de-
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cades, and the willing collaboration between the tutor and the tutored that 
has supported such academic hegemony. besides critiquing established ap-
proaches to studying media and communications outside anglo- american 
contexts, contributors to this volume have offered a way forward for study-
ing the issue of media and globalization.
We take seriously the continued relevance of nation- states while re-
maining attuned to the ways in which media and communications is now 
a thoroughly “globalized” space. We have examined different dimensions 
of the world- historical nature of media and communications: institutions 
and power, states and governance, policy and regulation; economic capi-
tal, political economy, and production of journalism, media, network, and 
culture industry; cultural geography, meaning, and public sphere; issues of 
identity, values and cosmopolitanism; and visual culture. furthermore, we 
have situated these issues of pertinence to international communication 
scholars in relation to questions of relevance to the field of media and com-
munications at large.
to suggest alternatives aimed at truly “internationalizing” international 
communication, we believe that the point of departure must be precisely 
the opposite of parochialism— - namely, a spirit of cosmopolitanism. in sum, 
we reject both america- writ- large views of the world and self- defeating 
mirror images that reject anything american or Western on the grounds 
of cultural incompatibility or even cultural superiority. scholars worldwide 
have a moral responsibility to foster global visions and mutual understand-
ing, which requires that we listen to one another patiently, try to put our-
selves in the shoes of others, and stand prepared to negotiate and con-
test painstakingly over language, meanings, evidence, and states of mind. 
Metaphorically, this forms symphonic harmony that is nonetheless made of 
cacophonic sounds. in this light, i might be forgiven for making a bolder 
claim that our ultimate goal is not only to internationalize “international 
communication” as a subfield, but rather that international communica-
tion will provide a vital force, site, and opportunity to revitalize the whole 
agenda and landscape of media and communication studies. this claim res-
onates with the classical spirit of “sociological imagination” (Mills, 1959) 
that calls for examining media and communication issues from global and 
historical perspectives.
should this volume give rise to the unfortunate yet inevitable impres-
sion of overemphasizing the conceptual and methodological flaws of u.s. 
scholarship, it is because only through critical reflection will any new be-
ginnings have a chance. My utmost admiration, nevertheless, goes to said 
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(1993), who framed his criticism of the culture of imperialism— along with 
third World resistance against the empire— in terms of the grand narra-
tives of enlightenment and emancipation. he did not countenance reaction 
driven by xenophobia or cultural nationalism. i recall as well the philoso-
pher who once described the meaning of philosophy to me as “having no 
knockout statements so the conversation can go on.” this is a good maxim 
for the enterprise we hope to foster— an ongoing dialogue in the cosmo-
politan spirit that tries to traverse borders, identify shared values, and reach 
common ground while respecting differences.
this book grows out of an international conference organized jointly 
by the department of Media and Communication and the Center for 
Communication research at the City university of hong Kong. Profes-
sor elihu Katz, as a living testimony of the development of both u.s. and 
international communication research for more than half a century, was 
invited to deliver the conference’s keynote address under the university’s 
distinguished Lecture program. Let the truth be told about the story of 
this remarkable career and life in his own words and in his own chapter by 
someone who has inspired us all.
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Note
 1. i owe a debt to Professor Judy Polumbaum for helping me to make this chap-





On Internationalizing  
“International Communication”
elihu Katz
When Professor Lee asked me to accept his invitation to open this con-
ference, i immediately agreed— that is, until he told me what it is about. 
Whereupon i demurred, protesting that i hardly know anything about 
international communication and certainly nothing about international-
izing it. CC persisted, however, and challenged me to reconsider my own 
research and writing and to decide which of us is right. We made a bet, so 
to speak, for which the cost (at least to me) is that i have spent the past six 
months trying to decide whether i have any standing in this field. he said 
that it would be oK, as an oldtimer, if i were to share whatever i found, 
even autobiographically. it occurred to me only later that CC might be 
worrying that he had asked the wrong person to write an introduction to 
his book on media imperialism (Lee, 1980) some thirty-five years ago!
so, let us do exactly that. in part 1 of what follows, i will unashamedly 
review what i think i have done that might qualify me in international 
communication, even if, at the time, i did not think of this work as explic-
itly international. i will do this chronologically, more or less, as if i were 
searching my Cv for keywords. following which, in part 2, i will try to 
make some observations about what, if anything, i have learned on this 
narcissistic safari, as i try to find meaning in the series of relevant projects 
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on which i shall report, and especially on their sequence. you’ll have to 
decide which of us won the bet, CC or me.
Part I
the place to begin, i think, is as a graduate student recruited by Paul La-
zarsfeld to join in analysis of a massive data set concerning public opinion 
and media use in four arab nations, plus greece and turkey. this was the 
study made famous by daniel Lerner (1958), then of Mit, under the title 
The Passing of Traditional Society, subtitled Modernizing the Middle East, and 
well remembered in several of the papers being presented at this confer-
ence. it was commissioned by the voice of america at the outset of the 
Cold War in the 1950s. My role in the project was a minor one (Katz, 1952) 
but i remember being impressed by Lerner’s introduction of the concept 
of “empathy,” which he attributed to the kind of media exposure that pro-
duced a substantive reply to a survey question such as, “What would you do 
if you were Prime Minister?” or what would you write about if you were 
editor of the local newspaper? rather than answering, as most people did, 
“Who me, editor of a newspaper?” there were other, more media- literate 
respondents who could imagine themselves in these roles. these were 
the newly modernizing individuals, Lerner argued, they had psychologi-
cal access to the world outside the village; they were the harbingers of a 
radical transformation. in his introduction to Lerner’s book (1958), da-
vid riesman translated “empathy,” somewhat skeptically perhaps, as “win-
dow shopping.” in separate papers, published later, Lazarsfeld (1952) and 
Charles glock (1952) spoke of the theoretical and methodological poten-
tial of extending communications research internationally.
during the same period, i began work on my dissertation which, ulti-
mately, appeared as Personal Influence, coauthored with Lazarsfeld (Katz & 
Lazarsfeld, 1955). the aim of the book was to redirect attention away from 
the power of the media to effect short- run change in opinions and attitudes 
and toward the more complex, and more sociological, interaction between 
mass media and interpersonal networks. ultimately, this “two- step flow of 
communication,” proposed by Lazarsfeld in the 1940s resulted in a revival 
of interest in the process of diffusion of innovation. rather than focus on 
individual change, diffusion research aimed to track the spread of change 
throughout a community over time (rogers, 1962; Katz, Levin & hamil-
ton, 1963). this shift in emphasis reconnected the mainstream search for 
the persuasive powers of the media with sister sciences interested in such 
Revised Pages
Window Shopping •  31
things as the spread of fashion, social movements, technological change, 
and epidemics. outstanding in this respect was the pioneering work of ru-
ral sociologists whose studies of the diffusion and adoption of new farm 
practices had been a continual concern (Katz, 1960). these sociologists 
then turned their attention to programs of initiating and evaluating proj-
ects of rural development overseas. their technological emphases com-
plemented the projects of development and modernization that occupied 
political science- oriented scholars at Mit, stanford, and elsewhere. both 
of these trends were rather ill- fated, in that they were criticized for being 
too self- serving of the Western powers that supported them, as this volume 
will remind us. yet, it led to the healthy realization that diffusion was a 
primordial process that is invoked to explain how Christianity, for example 
(stark, 1997) managed to make its way around the world long before there 
were media of mass communication.
a very different kind of international communication occupied me as 
i began to commute between the universities of Chicago and Jerusalem. 
together with brenda danet, then a student, later a colleague, we found 
interest in problems of intercultural communication between Western- 
style bureaucrats confronting the mass of new- immigrant clients who had 
arrived in israel from more traditional societies (Katz & danet, 1973). our 
observations came not from media content or from survey research, but 
from protocols of face to face encounters with customs officials, traffic 
policemen, health workers, and so on. anecdotally, at first, we found pas-
sengers bargaining with bus drivers over the fare, or arguing over proper 
behavior in a queue. We met health officers in well- baby clinics preaching 
family planning over the objections of their clients’ husbands. We studied 
the language of appealing to authority— implicitly invoking reciprocity, al-
truism, and norms— and learned much about how the representatives of 
these disparate cultures perceived each other.
after a few years in israel, somebody decided that i was just the right 
person to head the task force that would, finally, introduce television 
broadcasting. israelis had resisted the introduction of television for some 
years, until the so- called six days War convinced them that it was no use 
continuing to debate the pros and cons of tv, once the arab states had all 
established their own channels, and no less important, after israel began to 
realize that it was an occupying power. however unqualified i was, admin-
istratively and technologically, how could one decline this kind of invita-
tion? and i did not (Katz, 1971). i will not tell you this story, however, even 
though it involved an intercultural clash between me and what seemed to 
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me the suddenly alien culture of the Cbs capitalists who had been com-
missioned to help in the process. at the same time, it was the beginning of 
my love affair with the public broadcasting of the bbC. i am mentioning 
this episode not only for its intrinsic interest but because it was also a pre-
lude to a sequence of subsequent work that, finally, deserves to be labeled 
international communication research.
the first of the projects that followed my short career as an impresa-
rio was a grant from the ford foundation via the international institute 
of Communication to trace the transplantation of television broadcasting 
from the capitals of the West to the third World. the object was to observe 
the process whereby television “diffused” from the capitals of the West to 
what were then known as developing countries. in other words, i was given 
the opportunity to observe elsewhere what i myself had done in israel. My 
partner in this project was Professor george Wedell who, like me, had 
taken leave from his university (Manchester) to serve as first secretary gen-
eral of the independent broadcasting authority, britain’s newly established 
commercial channel. between us, and with the assistance of dov shinar 
and Michael Pilsworth, we studied the “promise” and the “performance” of 
television in twelve countries on three continents (Katz & Wedell, 1977). 
While the rhetoric of “promise” resounded with slogans relating to “na-
tional integration,” “cultural renaissance,” and “economic development,” 
we found, in the 1970s, that television broadcasting was narrowly concen-
trated in the major cities, and that the popular programs were american re-
runs. students of programming flow confirmed this pattern (nordenstreng 
& varis, 1974; tunstall, 1976; schiller, 1969) at the time, even though it 
would soon change, as the popularity of local programming overcame that 
of imported programs— although the formats of those programs may still 
originate elsewhere (cf. sorokin, 1941 on stimulus diffusion). We thought 
of naming our book Waiting for Kojak, but we lost our nerve.
research that accompanied these projects— economic and political— 
were equally subject to protests of self- interest and paternalism. here, too, 
there were loud outcries against “cultural imperialism.” several papers in 
this conference review the relabeling of these studies as modernization, 
then imperialism. it was alleged (schiller, 1969) that hollywood films and 
american sitcoms had created new forms of dependence, taking the place 
of colonialism and economic exploitation by the West against the rest. 
these debates led tamar Liebes and myself (Liebes & Katz, 1990) to un-
dertake a study of the cross- cultural “reception” of the u.s. nighttime soap 
opera Dallas. Dallas captivated audiences almost everywhere— although 
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there were a few exceptions, like Japan. our study organized focus groups 
(of three couples each) in six different sub- cultures to view episodes of the 
program in their own homes. We wanted to see whether viewers in the 
several subcultures varied from each other in their attitudes and under-
standings, and more generally whether there was evidence for or against 
the allegation of “cultural imperialism.” We called our book The Export of 
Meaning.
While blockbuster programs like Dallas bring the world together— 
albeit not at the same time— certain “media events,” such as the live broad-
casting of historic occasions, can do so even better, and what’s more, at one 
and the same time! this is the most dramatic attribute of the electronic 
media since the telegraph; it made possible being present and active in 
more than one place at the same time. this third of the three projects i 
want to describe was a partnership with daniel dayan of Paris that began 
in 1977 when anwar sadat of egypt came to talk peace with israel, and 
continued until 1992, when our book was published (dayan & Katz, 1992). 
it deals with a genre of television that fulfills the durkheimian function 
of integrating a nation or the world. it invites people everywhere to sit 
down with their closest others in celebration of a ceremonial occasion to 
which they are personally invited— almost like Christmas or thanksgiv-
ing or the Passover seder— with the knowledge that everybody else in the 
same society or the whole world is co- present. thus, israelis and egyptians 
cheered anwar sadat, whose three- day visit was broadcast live— linking 
the two countries via tv for the first time. Much of the Western world 
watched too, but it was ignored in the other arab states. nobody doubts 
that this rare example of media diplomacy contributed to the peace treaty 
that was signed shortly thereafter— but also to the subsequent assassina-
tion of President sadat. another classic example of this kind of interna-
tional communication is the live confrontation between John Paul ii and 
the Communist rulers of the Polish people. again, it is widely believed that 
this ceremonial visit of the first Polish pope— as broadcast live on Polish 
national television and, later, distributed on film— was a first push toward 
the dismantling of the eastern european regimes. not all “media events” 
are “conquests” of this kind, however. the olympics and the World Cup 
(Mondial) are “contests.” and the live broadcast of the Kennedy funeral 
or the funeral of Princess diana, which engaged the whole world, not as 
somebody else’s trauma but as our own. these are three different “scripts,” 
of course, but each is an interruption of routine— a broadcasting holiday, 
so to speak— that invites our participation and affirmation.
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Let me include mention of my paper on the coverage of the first gulf 
War (Katz, 1992). it applies as well to the massacre at tiananmen square. 
these events saw the emergence of media coverage aiming at a world au-
dience, not a national one. no less important, their reports were live and 
direct from the scenes of the action— from the roof in baghdad, if you 
recall. My point is that they circumvented the role of the editor who could 
give it context. We were offered an embedded view, so to speak, describing 
something to us and to the world, but without explaining under whose aus-
pices this was taking place. it was an ostensible beginning of “broadcasting 
without frontiers,” but it raised a new set of problems. it focused on the live 
broadcasting of popular protest.
i will conclude this list almost where it began by reporting on my 
membership n a recent project centering on communications and dias-
poras (Katz & blondheim, 2010). We tried to understand how “imagined 
communities” (with a dutiful nod to benedict anderson [1983]) held to-
gether, even in dispersion, and in the absence of any tangible contact with 
a remembered homeland. our focus was on the Jews, though we might 
equally have focused on the Chinese, because that was the case we knew 
best. More than imagination was involved, of course. there were economic 
and cultural ties— and premodern channels of communication that were 
invented and activated. and it seems more than coincidence that the Jews 
subsequently made major contributions to the establishment of media in-
stitutions, new and old, beginning with the telegraph (blondheim, 1994).
Part II
even if some of this is relevant to the theme of the conference, the real 
question is “What have i learned?” Let me try to answer, sometimes based 
on findings from these studies and experiences, sometimes based on the 
inspiration of calling them back into consciousness.
1. a first point to make, i think, is that international communication 
preceded national communication, rather than vice versa. as the his-
tory of diffusion research makes clear— the case of early Christianity, for 
example— messages moved freely across cultural divides and natural bor-
ders, long before these were organized into nations, and long before the 
era of mass communication. of course, problems of rhetoric, reception, 
and resistance prevailed even then.
2. indeed, it might be said that media and messages and, of course, lan-
guage served as building blocks for the consolidation of nations, as we learn 
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from scholars such as gabriel tarde (1898) and benedict anderson (1983), 
and their followers (such as Jaap van ginneken, 1992). translations of the 
bible into the spoken languages of different regions in europe reinforced 
the emergence of national entities.
3. once established, i think it is fair to say that nations did their best 
to interfere with the flow of communication across their borders. nations 
began to patrol the traffic in communications. internally, they tried to edu-
cate and entertain, to inform citizens of what they were expected to know 
and deny them what they were not expected to know, while externally they 
tried to use communication to expand empire as the ancient egyptians 
(innis, 1951) and modern- day hollywood have tried to do, or to disin-
form and defame their enemies. the international telecommunications 
union still allocates broadcasting frequencies and still attempts to control 
the reach of national signals, though that has become all but impossible in 
today’s age of satellites.
4. if technological theories of media can help explain the emergence 
of nation- states and mega- structures like the Protestant denominations 
(eisenstein, 1980), for example, the self- same theory should predict that 
the free flow of information— that is, the internationalization of interna-
tional communication— should contribute to the rise of global structures 
and the demise of nation- states. is this what we are now seeing as the for-
mer prerogatives of nations are being overruled by the globalization of 
human rights and of economics? Monroe Price (2002) and several of the 
volume’s chapters here (sparks, for one) suggest that it is too soon to make 
such generalizations, and that nations still exert sovereign power, and that 
they surrender sovereignty only under the umbrella of formal treaties. yet, 
the famous case— undocumented, i believe— of east germans tuning into 
the relative prosperity of germans on the other side of the Wall is a good 
example of international communication. it may not coincide with the the-
ory of “revolution of rising frustration” that developmentalist researchers 
have advised us to reject, but it comes pretty close.
5. even when messages reach their destinations, there is no assurance 
that they will be decoded as their senders intend. Most of the history of 
research on mass communication has been devoted to the study of effects, 
that is, the success of mass persuasion campaigns in the very short run. and, 
ironically, what we have to show is only how surprisingly ineffective the 
media are in this domain. even though we hardly believe it ourselves, the 
truth is that propaganda and advertising don’t persuade very well, either 
domestically or, a fortiori, internationally (schudson, 1984). if diffusion 
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research shows greater success, it is because it is more about things than 
about ideas and because research tends to report on things that take off 
rather than on failures. in any case, it is worth noting that persuasive effects, 
however much studied, are hardly the most interesting types of effects. if 
i invoke only my own experience with international projects, as reviewed 
here, i would highlight (1) the near- universal success of the bbC in gaining 
the trust of most of the world (from the study of arab countries); (2) that 
the institutionalization of broadcasting and likely the new media as well— 
administration, technology, content— look much alike the world over and 
that governments are losing control of the media to international interests 
who consort with them; (3) that communication and culture are rapidly 
superseding geography in the creation of international alliances (Kraidy & 
Khalil, 2009) even while breaking the national audience into segments and 
networks (turow, 2006; Katz, 1996). (4) that the critical abilities of view-
ers everywhere are more fully developed than is usually thought, but that 
the everyday of mutual understanding required for cross- cultural com-
munication still has a long way to go; (5) that exceptional “media events” 
can nevertheless gather the whole world together and unite it in a shared 
heartbeat as in the diana funeral or for a favorite football team; (6) that the 
live broadcasts of sadat and the pope prove that the media can sometimes 
contribute to peace and reconciliation, even while the same media can be 
used by nations and groups to terrorize the world as in 9/11— also a kind of 
“media event” (Katz & Liebes, 2007; dayan, 2009)— and as in the threats 
of President Mahmoud ahmadinejad.
6. Let me conclude where i began, by returning to Lerner’s concept of 
empathy and to riesman’s window shopping. recall that Lerner was pro-
posing that the media— those were the days of radio— affect moderniza-
tion by expanding individual horizons, inviting identification with thereto-
fore unfamiliar roles, and enlisting participation in a newly opened public 
sphere. Without spelling it out, Lerner was suggesting that a major effect 
of media exposure is identification with remote others and the trying on 
of new identities. in using, or perhaps misusing, the concept of empathy, 
he was pointing to the idea of identification, which, astonishingly, is almost 
altogether absent in the catalog of media effects. it is a central concept 
in cinema studies— who doesn’t identify with the stars?— but has been 
strangely missing in media studies. although the concept is too individu-
alistic to fully explain the developmental process, it also implies, indirectly, 
that the media contribute to the creation of polities and public spheres.
the concept of empathy has suddenly reappeared— sixty years later— in 
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connection with the new genre of communications research that deals with 
“distant suffering,” to quote Luc boltanski (1999). there is a sudden rush 
of interest in the emotional, cognitive, and, especially, moral aspects of 
mediated witnessing of widespread tragedy. under what conditions, these 
authors ask, do people rise to the challenge of doing something to right a 
wrong, or save a life, in response to what they see on the nightly news or 
learn about from the internet? When do people get up from their tv sets 
to demand that their governments intervene? When do people mobilize 
to donate money to cope with a far- away disaster? in the past, this ques-
tion had hardly been asked (ball- rokeach, rokeach, & grube, 1984 is an 
exception), and has resurfaced only now in the writings of authors such as 
ellis (2000), Peters (2001), Chouliaraki (2006), and in the collection edited 
by frosh and Pinchesvki (2009). it follows the unnerving assertions that 
there are “no more secrets,” as Meyrowitz (1985) has taught us, and now, 
even worse, that “there are no more excuses.” We have run out of ways of 
saying “i didn’t know!” it is in this connection that the concepts of “empa-
thy” and “compassion” have been resurrected in order to explain everyday 
arousal and action, and to revive the idea that the media have the power to 
empower.
i am not now thinking of media events, which bring the potential power 
of television into full view. i am thinking, rather, of the everyday effects— 
including those of the nightly news— that we dismissed as limited. Lazars-
feld found comfort in the idea that effects were limited, arguing that it 
was safer for democracy that broadcasters and their oligarchs cannot easily 
arouse listeners and viewers to do their bidding. sometimes we regret this, 
of course, as when we observe how difficult it is to induce people to stop 
smoking, for example. so perhaps we should applaud those of our col-
leagues who have refused to abandon studies of the conditions under which 
media can be effective in the short run, especially with respect to the suffer-
ing of others. is so- called compassion fatigue just another case of “limited 
effects” or are viewers actually motivated to respond but unable to identify 
the means that might enable them to do so (cf. Wiebe, 1951)? We should 
be asking again, as hallin and Mancini (1984) once did, whether there are 
cultural differences involved here. is it still true that while americans view 
the nightly news (or whatever news they view nowadays) that they have 
another beer and go off to sleep, while italians news viewers, upset by what 
they have just seen, don their overcoats and go off to the piazza to discuss it 
with their friends before going to register their feelings at the local offices 
of the political parties or trade unions? it is time to renew more problem- 
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oriented comparative studies that go beyond the structural emphases of the 
Columbia group, and beyond even the comparative work that the hallin/
Mancini team (2004) has done more recently. it is widely thought in the 
united states, for example, that the tragedy of haiti enlisted an unusually 
large outpouring of support in money and in services. is this true? is it 
equally true of other countries? how did this compare with the response 
to the east asian tsunami of several years ago, or the tragedies of darfur or 
Kosovo or rwanda? if there are big differences here, we should be asking 
about the parts played by media systems and media images along with dif-
ferences in cultural proximities and available means.
as far as images are concerned, iyengar and Kinder (1987) have sug-
gested in a study of the depiction of homelessness that the very personi-
fication of social problems that is characteristic of television leads viewers 
to conclude that the victim is to blame for his/her own plight, while the 
ostensibly cold statistics of homelessness are more likely to direct view-
ers’ attention to systemic problems. Paul slovic (1997), for one, disagrees. 
his experiments seem to show that an individual victim or person in need 
arouses more sympathy than a group of such people, or, a fortiori, a statis-
tic of their helplessness. and what of protest and revolution? have we any 
comparative evidence of arousal to action in defiance of oppression that 
can be attributed to the media? there seems to be some evidence from 
eastern europe in 1989, when large numbers of provincial Czechs took 
to the streets to express solidarity with their fellow countryman massed 
in Wenceslas square. More recent protests in Korea provide an addi-
tional example— but, by now, the new small media have entered the scene. 
Whether these new media are the new media of collective action is a mat-
ter of growing debate (see, e.g. gladwell, 2010).
david riesman’s somewhat cynical translation of empathy as “window 
shopping” is probably closer to the facts. it is a lot easier, of course, to 
tour the tragedies of the world with the ever dwindling number of foreign 
correspondents than to do anything about it. it is rather closely linked to 
Lazarsfeld and Merton’s (1948) “narcotizing dysfunction.” Limited effects, 
that is, is still the better bet. but even riesman’s more sober view goes some 
way to explaining the overthrow of the berlin Wall.
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International Communication Research  
and Its Production of Knowledge
tsan- Kuo Chang
a good theory should be seen as one perspective among others 
rather than as a catch- all explanation.
— Johan galtung (1990)
in a Public Opinion Quarterly article, Paul Lazarsfeld (1952– 53, p. 483) ar-
gued that “since the domestic area will not have many opportunities in the 
years to come, the new ideas in communications research . . . will have to 
be picked up and developed in the international field if they are not to be 
neglected altogether” (emphasis added). he went on to say that “there are 
certain comparative possibilities in the sphere of international communica-
tions research which will open up new and rather exciting subjects for inves-
tigation.” What Lazarsfeld suggested is that the new ideas might be better 
developed contextually, sociologically, historically, and methodologically 
outside u.s. research settings. although he did not elaborate, the new and 
exciting ideas certainly should include new concepts, new theories or new 
perspectives, and new ways of doing research as well as new knowledge 
and new insights. this has not been the case, however. While the body of 
studies of international communication has grown significantly over the 
past decades, the production and accumulation of knowledge have been 
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less impressive. in fact, the field has been regurgitating old ideas and stale 
perspectives without keeping abreast with the changes of the times.
since Lazarsfeld’s prognosis there has been little reflection on the state 
of the field of international communication research, which picks up where 
he had left off. With the growth of the literature in international com-
munication that had by the early 1980s reached “almost landslide propor-
tions” (hur, 1982, p. 531), the Lazarsfeld article appears to have been for-
gotten and mostly vanished from many ensuing studies on the structure 
and processes of international communication. stevenson sought to define 
international communication as a field in 1992, but made no reference to 
Lazarsfeld even though the latter’s insights and projection of the future 
direction of international communication research had more or less an-
ticipated what was to come 40 years later. this study has no intention to 
accord the Lazarsfeld article status as a milestone or a canonical text in 
international communication research. nevertheless, the article serves as 
a useful departure point to tackle the production of knowledge in interna-
tional communication research.
against the backdrop of the sociology of knowledge, this study is in-
formed by three perspectives to assess the extant literature in international 
communication research: Johan galtung’s life cycle of theories (1971), er-
ving goffman’s keying in frame analysis (1974), and thomas Kuhn’s “para-
digm testing” (1970). the assessment is not intended to be either a quan-
titative meta- analysis (Wolf, 1986) or a critical bibliographic or citation 
analysis of existing studies on international communication. as indicators 
of the state of mind in research, the data reported are used mainly to ex-
ternalize the arguments made within the context of the three perspectives. 
they help provide empirical answers to the conceptual questions, but by 
no means offer statistical tests of any hypothesis implied by the individual 
perspective or their combination.
the purpose of this study is threefold: first, to examine how the key 
concepts or theories in international communication research emerge and 
fluctuate over time; second, to determine the relationship between the 
modes of thinking in international communication research as manifested 
in the literature and the historical- social setting in which they occur; and 
third, to explore the group mind of international communication research-
ers as knowledge producers through their scholarly outputs as recorded in 
journal articles and books. as bearers of intellectual activities, international 
communication scholars and researchers constitute a professional group 
that carries certain epistemological interests in the world of cross- national 
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communication and occupies a specific position in knowledge production 
regarding what that world is, how it is to be observed, and why it turns out 
the way it does.
Sociology of Knowledge and  
International Communication Research
to determine the trajectory of international communication research that 
Lazarsfeld had charted for his successors over the past 60 years is to exam-
ine the mode of thought or the group mind of scholars who have come “to 
find expression in certain theories, doctrines, and intellectual movements” 
(Wirth, in Mannheim, 1936, p. xxviii) since his prognosis. although he was 
among the few towering figures who have established communications re-
search as a discipline and whose legacy continues to inspire or invoke de-
bates in the community of scholars,1 Lazarsfeld was not alone in his think-
ing. to paraphrase Mannheim (1936, p. 3), it is, strictly speaking, incorrect 
to say that the single scholar thinks and does research; rather, it is more 
correct to insist that he or she participates in thinking and doing further 
what other researchers have thought and done before. the sociology of 
knowledge perspective therefore provides a useful framework to compre-
hend the particular style of thought among international communication 
scholars in the historical- social setting.
because of “its concern with the role of knowledge and ideas in the 
maintenance or change of the social order,” as Wirth (1936, in Mannheim, 
1936, p. xxix, emphasis added) put it, the sociology of knowledge “is bound 
to devote considerable attention to the agencies or devices through which ideas 
are diffused and the degree of freedom of inquiry and expression that pre-
vails.” in social sciences research, the devices through which ideas are dif-
fused include predominantly books and journal articles that are published 
throughout the years, especially those that have been frequently cited in 
the literature. Quoting Merton (1967, pp. 36– 37), simonson (2006, p. 6) 
wrote, in the introduction to the november 2006 volume of the Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, that “any classic text 
worth reading is worth rereading periodically, for ‘what is communicated 
by the printed page’ changes as a result of changes in the readers and the 
worlds they inhabit.” the frame of reading and the interpretation of its 
content have been altered in ways that goffman called “breaking frame” 
(1974).
to some extent, the prognosis article is such a text. in discussing com-
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parative research opportunities, Lazarsfeld had anticipated what Katz and 
his colleague reported in The Export of Meaning (1990), indicating that 
there “can be little doubt that the meaning of news will be very different 
from one culture to another, and that we cannot know in advance what 
these variations will be” (Lazarsfeld 1952– 53, p. 486). substituting the tv 
show Dallas for the word “news,” this statement summarized succinctly 
what turns out to be the reception theory in cross- national research. re-
reading the article in the contemporary context adds a new perspective to 
Lazarsfeld’s excitement that we “should be grateful for the sudden upsurge 
of interest in international communications” when radio— the new me-
dium at that time— changed the media landscape.
since the mid- 1990s, the proliferation of nation- state- based 24/7 tv 
news channels has reconfigured the world of global media terrain beyond 
recognition or imagination. along with such well- established traditional 
channels as bbC and Cnn, the rise of al Jazeera as a formidable voice 
from the Middle east has been followed by a rush of countries to establish 
global channels through satellites to present the news from their own na-
tional perspectives: China’s CCtv- 9 (2000), russia today (2005), france 
24 (2006), iran’s Press tv (2007), Japan’s nhK World tv (2009), ven-
ezuela’s telesur (2010), and the CnC World (2010) of China’s Xinhua 
news agency. ranging from the democratic to authoritarian countries, 
these channels compete at the global level to serve as the voice of the host 
country and to report the world from its own vantage point. arguably, the 
emergence of these various brands of satellite tv outlets represents a form 
of media nationalism that seeks to claim a legitimate space in the global 
marketplace of ideas, not a form of media imperialism as was conceived in 
the old order when the u.s. brand roamed the world. as such, the play-
ing field of international communication has been leveled, changing not 
only the ways audiences may be exposed to the flow of news and other 
cultural products across national borders but also the rule of the game for 
the global media. the shift prompted tunstall (2008, p. 10) to declare that 
national and regional media are stronger than international media in his 
book The Media Were American: U.S. Mass Media in Decline.
if “what is communicated . . . changes as a result of changes in the read-
ers and the worlds they inhabit” (simonson, 2006, p. 6) and if “changes 
in communications alter cultures— expanding, changing, and destroying 
them” (greig, 2002, p. 225), then it is theoretically imperative to scrutinize 
how the changes in the global media environment have been reflected in 
the life cycle of existing concepts or theories central to the field of interna-
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tional communication inquiry. thanks to the penetration of the internet 
into every corner of the world, it is difficult to imagine that cultures every-
where are not affected by it in one way or another. for one thing, the intel-
lectual context of thinking and doing research has changed. When there is 
a conceptual shift, will the questions to be asked, the observation of facts, 
or the method of investigation remain unchanged? if the empirical has 
been transformed from one state of being to another, will the theoretical 
derived from the past observation continue to be relevant? Like cars and 
fashions, as galtung (1971, p. 93) argued in the early 1970s, theories “have 
their life- cycle, and whether the obsolescence is planned or not there will 
always be a time- lag in a structure with a pronounced difference between 
center and periphery. thus the tram workers in rio de Janeiro may carry 
banners supporting auguste Comte one hundred years after the center 
of the Center forgot who he was.” a compelling question is, why would 
Comte become known in a place several thousand miles away from his 
home base in the first place?
Life Cycle of Theories in International Communication Research
the life cycle of a theory is the autobiography of an idea through time 
and space. galtung’s comment on rio de Janeiro centered on the diffusion 
of theories between developed and developing/underdeveloped countries 
in academic research. explicitly, the hegemonic structure in international 
social science research has created an unequal setting in which peripheral 
countries suffer from the theories and methods imported from the core 
nations. Part of the reason is the deficiency of theories and methods devel-
oped in the Western countries that fail to take into account local knowl-
edge and experiences, not to mention the lack of awareness among the 
community of scholars of the intellectual need to understand the objects 
of their investigation (Curran & Park, 2000). in international communi-
cation research, the tendency to view “the rest of the world as a forgot-
ten understudy,” as Curran and Park (2000, p. 3) reckoned, has reached 
a plateau where “us- and uK- based media academics are beginning to 
feel embarrassed.” embarrassed they should be, because there is always a 
danger when groupthink or the absence of alternative perspectives crowds 
out competing explanations. in the context of group decision, one of the 
theoretical and epistemological issues involved in groupthink is the shift 
of conceptual cohesiveness from a multidimensional to a unitary construct 
and its power to affect the views of others (street, 1997). groupthink oc-
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curs not only because of individual attributes of members but also because 
of circumstances of their deliberations (neck & Moorhead, 1995). in so-
cial science inquiries, the body of literature certainly counts as part of the 
deliberative circumstances among researchers. in the case of international 
communication research, groupthink appears in the fact that, some 40 
years after its inception, the banner of cultural imperialism as a theory con-
tinues to be carried by scholars in many parts of the world, including Latin 
america (e.g., vilas, 2002) where the dependency theory was first formu-
lated to challenge the knowledge claim of the modernization perspective, 
even though the global media landscape has been greatly transformed.
in the 1980s, the thesis of cultural imperialism was considered by both 
its proponents and critics as a “dominant paradigm” in the field of inter-
national communication. Whether it has achieved a theoretical status as 
a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of the notion is debatable.2 for the lack 
of a better term, this study will use paradigm testing to address the issue 
of theoretical juxtaposition as explications in international communication 
research. as will be discussed later, the proposition of paradigm testing as 
an analytical design does not necessarily imply the existence of competing 
paradigms in international communication inquiry. nor does it attempt 
to provide a critical test of the validity of different theories involved in 
the historical and empirical context. a number of scholars and research-
ers have offered insightful critiques and challenges to the conceptual in-
adequacy and epistemological weakness of cultural imperialism in various 
texts (Chadha & Kavoori, 2000; Curran & Park, 2000; Curtin, 2007; fejes, 
1981; fortner, 1993; golding & harris, 1997; hamm & smandych, 2005; 
Lee, 1980; Lee, 1988; McPhail, 2002, 2010; roach, 1997; salwen, 1991; 
thussu, 2006; tomlinson, 1991; Wang, servaes, & goonasekera, 2000).
in this study, the concept of cultural imperialism is taken as is, not what 
it may refer to. it is the concept itself that is being historically examined, 
not its content. the thesis is used as a case to exemplify the life cycle of 
theories in international communication research. the survey of its gen-
esis and application as a key concept and theory in international communi-
cation is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive, of its general footprint in 
the literature. although the exact origin of the idea of cultural imperialism3 
is difficult to pinpoint, it is commonly accepted that it was first proposed in 
the late 1960s as a theoretical articulation to address the structure and pro-
cesses of the domination of u.s. media at the expense of other countries’ 
indigenous media industry in the international arena. from africa to Latin 
america, there has been no shortage of theoretical and empirical studies 
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that seek to uncover the structural factors underlying such an imperialistic 
configuration and its implications for international relations.
since the 1960s, the world’s media setting has evolved dramatically 
both within and between countries. the internet and its surrounding digi-
tal communication technologies have particularly created new opportuni-
ties and challenges to the traditional media in areas of content production, 
distribution, and consumption. over the past decades, countries around 
the world have witnessed the end of the Cold War between the two super-
powers, the collapse of communism in eastern europe, the breakup of the 
soviet union, the demise of the new World information and Communi-
cation order, and the widespread of the internet as a powerful democratic 
platform for civil society and global communication. in light of these so-
ciopolitical and technological transformations, the thesis of cultural impe-
rialism4 apparently exhibits a remarkable shelf life with no sign of abating 
(see table 1). facts come and go. any theory that has endured for more 
than four decades in a field of intellectual inquiry does not exist by itself in 
a philosophical vacuum. it must be perpetuated by those who continue to 
see its relevance and centrality to the contemporary world.
theories have power (alford & friedland, 1985). take modernization 
in international communication research in the 1950s and the 1960s. the 
power of modernization theory can be characterized, according to alford 
and friedland (1985), as follows: policy impact (a driving force of national 
development); interpretation of actions (internal, as opposed to external, 
solutions to underdevelopment); arousing consciousness of social groups 
(creating empathy in peasants); hegemony over categories of language 
(modern vs. traditional as frames); and demarcation of boundaries between 
the public and the private (ownership and regulation of media systems). as 
will be shown later, displacing modernization, the thesis of cultural impe-
rialism has shaped the way journalists come to perceive the international 
reality.
table 1 offers a snapshot of the enduring power of the thesis of cultural 
imperialism over time. in international communication, the year 1969 is 
a milestone, both conceptual and technological. Conceptually, herbert 
schiller published an influential book entitled Mass Communications and 
American Empire. his central argument is that “[t]he emerging imperial net-
work of american economics and finance utilizes the communications me-
dia for its defense and entrenchment wherever it exists already and for its 
expansion to locale where it hopes to become active” (1969, p. 3, emphasis 
added). the linkage between the u.s. economic and finance system and 
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its media system at the international level sets the stage for the notion of 
cultural imperialism to emerge as it soon began to spread in the literature.
if schiller broke the ground, then Wells (1972) plowed the field. even-
tually, tunstall (1977) paved the way for the expansion of cultural imperi-
alism thesis in international communication research. although critical of 
the original ideas of schiller and Wells and their evidence, tunstall nev-
ertheless helped accentuate the thesis. While he questioned the claim of 
the cultural imperialism thesis “that authentic, traditional and local culture 
in many parts of the world is being battered out of existence by the indis-
criminate dumping of large quantities of slick commercial and media prod-
ucts, mainly from the united states” (tunstall, 1977, p. 57), he accepted 
tabLe 1. the Life- Cycle of Cultural imperialism in international Communication 
research
Citing text Cited texta
McPhail (2010) schiller (1969), tunstall (1977)
Chakravartty & Zhao (2008) tunstall (1977)
Kamalipour (2007) dorfman & Mattelart (1975), schiller (1969), 
tunstall (1977), Wells (1972)
thussu (2006) boyd- barrett (1977), dorfman & Mattelart 
(1975), galtung (1971), schiller (1969), 
tunstall (1977), Wells (1972)
hamm & smandych (2005) galtung (1971), schiller (1969)
McPhail (2002) tunstall (1977)
thussu (2000) boyd- barrett (1977), dorfman & Mattelart 
(1975), galtung (1971), schiller (1969), 
tunstall (1977), Wells (1972)
fortner (1993)
Lee (1980), schiller (1971), tunstall (1977)
frederick (1993) boyd- barrett (1977), Lee (1980), schiller 
(1971)
tomlinson (1991) fejes (1981), Lee (1980), dorfman & Mat-
telart (1975), tunstall (1977)
fejes (1986) Lee (1980), schiller (1971), tunstall (1977)
Lee (1980) boyd- barrett (1977), schiller (1969), tunstall 
(1977), Wells (1972)
tunstall (1977) schiller (1969), Wells (1972)
aboth the citing and cited texts are chosen for the purpose of illustration only. they are not meant to 
suggest they are the most cited texts in the field. the citing texts are selected to show the life- cycle or 
timeframe. the cited texts include only those published in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that are considered 
central to the knowledge production of cultural imperialism as a thesis. the entries do not imply that the 
citing texts include no recent publications, especially those published during the past three decades; nor do 
they suggest that other books published between 1960s and 1980s were not consulted by various authors 
and editors. some of the cited texts were used by the authors in the edited volumes, not necessarily by the 
editors.
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that “the anglo- american media are connected with imperialism, british 
imperialism” (p. 63). With a question mark after the words “Media imperi-
alism?” in chapter 2, tunstall challenged the broad stroke of cultural impe-
rialism by offering his own conceptualization. as will be discussed later, it 
is a matter of conceptual abstraction or rekeying, with the concept involved 
being located at different levels and implying different units of analysis.
since its publication, tunstall’s 1977 book began to take on a life of its 
own. from the late 1970s to 2010, as shown in table 1, the book has been 
obligingly cited, often in connection with the works by schiller (1969), 
Wells (1972), and dorfman and Mattelart (1975). i don’t intend to engage 
in any deliberation over which work is more influential in the field of inter-
national communication research. a compelling question is how the con-
cept of cultural imperialism has persisted over time in academic research 
and journalistic practices. if we agree that the thesis of cultural imperial-
ism was specifically presented by schiller in 1969, its shelf life has been 
extended consistently in many journal articles and books during the past 
four decades, suggesting that it is still very much alive today. What is most 
intriguing is that by 2008, tunstall apparently had abandoned the thesis of 
cultural imperialism in favor of what he called new nationalism in his book 
The Media Were American: U.S. Mass Media in Decline (tunstall, 2008, p. 
344). yet, citing tunstall in 2010, McPhail opted for the 1977 book, not the 
2008 one, as if nothing had happened, when tunstall had couched the 2008 
book out of his earlier conceptual frame and into another.
the year 1969 was also significant in international communication not 
because of schiller’s book but because of a major milestone that was mostly 
overshadowed by the landing of the first man on the moon. arPanet, 
the world’s first packet switching network created by bbn (bolt, beranek 
and newman), went online in october 1969, connecting four computers at 
uCLa, uC santa barbara, stanford, and university of utah in the united 
states. it was the predecessor of today’s internet although the scale was 
much smaller and its use was restricted to the united states only. since 
then, the number of computers connected to the internet has grown from 
four to hundreds of thousands worldwide at a speed and pace unimagi-
nable, as shown by the mind- boggling tangled web mapped by the u.s. 
Company Lumeta in 2004. by april 2008, the internet had expanded to 
over 450,000 nodes, with many more top- level domains and nodes added 
on a regular basis. it means countries around the world are now highly 
interconnected and interdependent. in light of this structural transforma-
tion, as Chang (2010, p. 12) argued, the field of international communica-
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tion research requires new perspectives that go “beyond extant theories 
that were developed some 40 years ago.” he singled out cultural imperial-
ism as one such theory “that seems to be largely rooted in the territorial 
and physical relevance of an old media landscape” (p. 12).
When schiller published his 1969 book, the international media land-
scape was indeed dominated by american multinational corporations. in 
tunstall’s view, “a non- american way out of the media box is difficult to 
discover because it is an american, or anglo- american, built box. The only 
way out is to construct a new box, and this, with the possible exception of the 
Chinese, no nation seems keen to do” (1977, p. 63, emphasis added). he 
was both right and wrong. he was right because a new media box has actu-
ally been built that is non- american (e.g., al Jazeera or CnC World); he 
was wrong because other than China many countries are now capable of 
building their own media boxes (e.g., russia, iran, Japan, and venezuela). 
this is probably why, in The Media Were American, tunstall spent a sig-
nificant amount of space tracing the emerging national media centers and 
their challenges to u.s. media domination, hence setting up the basis for 
the proposition that the u.s. mass media have been in decline since 1950. 
throughout the book, however, what is not spoken tends to speak louder 
than what is said. in the genealogy of knowledge production, it is telling 
that in The Media Are American, tunstall went to great lengths defining 
media imperialism and tackling its consequences; three decades later, the 
word imperialism is not even indexed in The Media Were American. not 
until the last part is it mentioned in passing in the context of nationalism 
vs. imperialism (p. 344).
similar to his earlier declaration of The Media Are American, tunstall’s 
proclamation of The Media Were American explicitly announces the demise 
of an old order that has been replaced by a new one with a fresh set of 
national media systems and international arrangements of market rela-
tions. given the growth of nation- state- based satellite tv channels, the 
u.s. media indeed no longer take the high command in the global me-
dia marketplace, let alone exercising their supreme authority in content 
production and dissemination. tunstall discussed this new pecking order 
mostly against the backdrop of cultural and media nationalism. he failed 
to explain why, leaving a pressing question unanswered: What happens to 
media imperialism if media nationalism has been on the rise? the latter 
appears to have superseded the former largely because much of the histori-
cal evidence and key issues tunstall used to buttress the thesis of media 
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nationalism took place before the 1970s. from the 1977 The Media Are 
American to the 2008 The Media Were American, tunstall made an interest-
ing conceptual turn, but missed a great opportunity to explicate its theo-
retical significance. it should be illuminating to see whether the central 
concept and thesis in international communication research that tunstall 
helped spread, but discarded some 30 years later, continues to be codi-
fied in the literature. if the life cycle in table 1 is any indication, the 1977 
book may have a shelf life for yet many years to come unless scholars and 
researchers seek outside the frame (goffman, 1974) of what is contained in 
the book for opposing versions of reality in international communication, 
as tunstall did himself.
the notion of cultural imperialism appears not only in scholarly 
works, but also in journalistic reports. it has become part of the vocabu-
laries in the mainstream media as fait accompli of some sort. in 1992, 
when euro disneyland opened its theme park in the suburb of Paris, the 
New York Times (9 april 1992, p. C1, emphasis added) reported this way: 
“the french intelligentsia have been taking potshots at the 4,800- acre 
euro disneyland . . . , dubbing it a ‘cultural Chernobyl’ and denouncing 
the ‘imperialism of Mickey.’” nearly two decades later, the Economist (31 
May 2008, p. 89, emphasis added) carried a story with very much the same 
theme: “the french film industry is more often given to introspective 
agonising about American cultural imperialism or the tyranny of the market 
than to self- congratulation.” these two stories demonstrated the extent to 
which the received knowledge of cultural imperialism has somehow taken 
root in the news.
from the 2008 report in the Economist to McPhail’s 2010 book, it is 
striking that the idea of cultural imperialism has persisted in academic and 
journalistic circles for more than 40 years after it was first proposed in the 
1960s. this intriguing phenomenon deserves to be closely interrogated, 
especially when the internet has fundamentally altered the global media 
environment. Quantitatively, expansion of daily audiences in units of mil-
lions takes place at a speed and pace previously unthinkable. Qualitatively, 
convergence of a single platform for all forms of media has become a real-
ity. economically, the decline of traditional media, particularly newspapers 
and commercial tv in terms of audience size and advertising revenues, 
has led to a reconfiguration of the markets that affects the flow of various 
media content.
how does the internet affect the global media landscape and the form 
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of international communication? first, with the global network made pos-
sible by the internet, countries around the world are densely connected. 
access points to this global network, however, still remain local. they are 
bounded by the political and social interests of territorial governments. 
Who controls the internet is therefore of significant importance to inter-
national communication “to determine what is to be delivered and how” 
(Chang, 2010, p. 13). second, although globalization implies a weakened 
nation- state, the new form of state in today’s information age is the net-
work state (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 14), in which each node— the 
nation- state— is linked to other nodes “that are equally necessary for the 
performance of the state’s functions.” given this networked structure at the 
global level where the flows move in many directions, how does cultural 
imperialism take place?
this study contends that the theory has lagged far behind the new real-
ity. in international communication research, the state of theory is either 
underdeveloped in the first place or misguided by the traditional ways of 
thinking and conceiving the world, or both. simply put, there is a lack 
of alternative perspectives. groupthink still permeates in the intellectual 
enterprise in the field of international communication. for one thing, 
theorists of cultural imperialism have failed to take note of the technologi-
cal innovations and the shift of content production and distribution from 
corporate interests to user- generated concerns (e.g., Web 2.0) that have 
largely reshaped the form and content of global media.
technologically, the new global media environment defies traditional 
conceptions, requiring theoretical rethinking of what is to be seen and 
how to see it. Why would a theory formulated at a time when countries 
were not as connected as they are today continue to be relevant to the 
network society created by the ubiquitous internet? When the object of 
observation has changed, would the focus of conceptual lens capture the 
same image as it appeared before? implied in these questions are layers 
of conceptual focus and their different theoretical formulation. this has 
implications for international communication research. as alford and 
friedland (1985) argued, “theories themselves must be analyzed at differ-
ent levels, which cannot be reduced to each other” (p. 392). epistemologi-
cally, thomas Kuhn (1970) reasoned convincingly that no existing theory 
should be tested in isolation by itself. goffman’s (1974) notion of “keying” 
in frame analysis is relevant. a theory provides a frame that is keyed to see 
the reality in some way.
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Keying of Concepts in International Communication Research
in his seminal book Frame Analysis, goffman (1974, p. 11) argued that “once 
a term is introduced . .  . it begins to have too much bearing, not merely 
applying to what comes later, but reapplying in each chapter to what it 
has already applied to.” the essence of his arguments— that there is a lin-
ear presentation in conceptual formulation and articulation embedded “in 
some sort of logical sequence” (p. 11)— is central to this study’s contention. 
introducing a term is very much like keying. Keying of concepts concerns 
how an idea might be called by different researchers over time. Concepts 
are ingredients of theories, but they are not theories per se. as alford and 
friedland (1985, p. 394) put it, “Concepts always contain a theory of the 
causes and consequences of the essential attributes of the phenomena lo-
cated and defined by the concept.” Moreover, in a historical view “concepts 
are properties of the social relations of production of knowledge” (aford & 
friedland, 1985, p. 27).
in international communication, imperialism is certainly a concept. 
as a theory, it is more complex, involving a set of interrelated statements 
that seek to describe and explain in a systemic manner how and why in-
ternational relations may function the way they do. in this study, cultural 
imperialism is used as an encompassing concept to include all types of 
communication- related forms of imperialism, which have been coined in 
the literature. technically, the choice of which adjective (media, cultural, 
communication, or informatic) to precede the word imperialism appears to 
be largely wordplay or what goffman (1974) called “keying” that frames 
what is to follow or to be expected. in the cognitive orientation of the 
world, goffman (1974, p. 443, emphasis added) argued, “Wordplay seems 
to celebrate the power of the context to disqualify all but one reading, more 
than it disconfirms the workings of this force.” in the ladder of abstraction, 
the four concepts are located at different levels. below the most abstract 
concept, culture, they slide up or down as a key with a slight different tone.
a theory can be considered as a frame that sets specific boundaries with 
its key concepts to look at the reality, a form of theoretical bracketing. 
the insistence on a specific word or the priority of one particular word 
over other words misses the most fundamental question: how does cul-
tural imperialism stack up against other competing theories such as de-
pendency, reception (Liebes & Katz, 1990), or globalization? in fact, these 
terms (media imperialism, cultural imperialism, communication imperial-
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ism, and informatic imperialism)5 consist of two kinds of concept: primary 
and secondary. the primary concept is imperialism whereas the secondary 
concepts are media, cultural, communication, and informatic. What the 
secondary concepts bracket out is largely methodological categories as to 
the type of data and the unit of analysis that might be required, not neces-
sarily the underlying process. to paraphrase alford and friedland (1985), 
an imperialistic state of international relations has to exist in some form 
before the concept of imperialism could become accepted. in international 
communication research, scholars of cultural imperialism insist on defin-
ing, and thus changing, the secondary term, when it is the primary concept 
that should be reexamined. if they already see “imperialism” in interna-
tional communication, what lies beyond the rim of an “imperialistic” frame 
tends to be unattended. absence of other concepts therefore precludes al-
ternative perspectives from being discussed because they are considered 
to be irrelevant or insignificant. addition of a secondary concept does not 
break the primary framework.
this inquiry will address four different primary concepts— imperialism, 
modernization, dependency, and globalization— and their interrelation-
ships that have emerged in international communication research before 
and after Lazarsfeld’s prognosis to determine their conceptual genealogy in 
the historical context. the source of data came from Jstor, “one of the 
world’s most trusted sources for academic content” with “over one thou-
sand leading academic journals across the humanities, social sciences, and 
sciences” (http://about.jstor.org/content-collections; retrieved 20 october 
2010). the database includes 2,832 journals in 53 disciplines, varying from 
african american studies to Zoology.6
using “international communication” as the keyword in the full text, a 
search of articles and book reviews published in all eight languages (eng-
lish, dutch, french, german, italian, Latin, Portuguese, and spanish) re-
turned, as of 8 october 2010, a total of 2,415 listings. almost all the pub-
lications (99.2%) were in english, with the remaining items in three other 
languages: spanish (9), french (8), and german (3). because of the con-
centration of english publications, there might be a “historical bias” that 
anglo- american researchers in north america and europe have “towards 
citing each other” (Economist, 13 november 2010, p. 82). if the plea can 
only be heard in english, deWesternizing media studies (Curran & Park, 
2000) would be an exercise in futility.
through the keyword search in the full text, this study treats each list-
ing in the database as an equal unit of analysis regardless of its length. as 
Revised Pages
Beyond Lazarsfeld •  55
opposed to the search in the item title, a full text search has the advantage 
of retrieving all entries involving the central concepts under investigation. 
a random check of 10 percent of articles over time found that the full text 
search captured items that were largely relevant to the theories of inter-
national communication. these keywords indeed index what was theoreti-
cally discussed in the texts.
table 3 reports the genealogy of the four central concepts identified 
in the literature from the 1920s to the 2000s: imperialism, modernization, 
dependency, and globalization. each concept is assumed to underline an 
implicit theory of knowledge. the order of sequence (from imperialism 
to globalization) is arranged roughly according to their appearance in the 
literature, not necessarily their exact genesis. overall, a given concept does 
not appear to have any significant bearing on what other concepts might 
be used in different lines of thought. Within each realm of investigation, 
however, there is some consistency in that the use of later concepts does 
not replace the prior ones or diminish their usage in research.
the concept of imperialism clearly has a long history in international 
tabLe 2. articles and book reviews of international Communication research, 
1929– 2009a
“international Communication” in full textb
year articles reviewsc totald
<1929 4.6% 2.5% 4.1%
1930– 1939 1.7 2.1 1.8
1940– 19 49 3.7 4.5 3.6
1950– 59 7.0 9.7 7.6
1960– 1969 9.2 14.1 10.2
1970– 1979 14.8 13.0 14.4
1980– 1989 21.3 20.5 21.1
1990– 1999 22.7 23.8 22.6
2000– 2009 15.1 11.6 14.3
 total 1,899 516 2,415
aas of october 27, 2010 when the database was accessed, there were a total of 2,832 journals in 53 dis-
ciplines. although Jstor has been comprehensive, the database does not necessarily include all journals 
that are published in the eight languages.
b“international communication” was used as the exact phrase in the full text in the Jstor search.
centries are book reviews and are used a proxy of the number of books published during the decade. 
it should be noted that a few reviews looked at the same book, but were published in different journals.
dbased on the Jstor search results, entries represent the number of articles and reviews published in 
eight languages: english, dutch, french, german, italian, Latin, Portuguese, and spanish. in fact, almost 
all the publications were in english (99.2%). a breakdown of the number of articles and reviews published 
in different languages is: english, 2,395; dutch, 0; french, 8; german, 3; italian, 0; Latin, 0; Portuguese, 
0; and spanish, 9.
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communication research, but did not appear frequently in the literature 
until the 1970s. over the last four decades, it has remained prevalent in 
various social science disciplines, suggesting a common intellectual con-
cern over the potential impacts of cross- national communication. as a 
concept, modernization emerged most visibly in the 1960s, while during 
the previous three decades it was fairly obscure. this pattern evidently sup-
ports the campaign of modernization as the goal of national developments 
in many parts of the world since then and through the 2000s. the depen-
dency concept offers some clue as to how a theory might rise to challenge 
the existing one that purports to explain the same phenomenon. in the 
1960s and the 1970s, modernization projects in africa and other places 
were found to be a failure and the theory was largely discredited in social 
science research; dependency as an alternative perspective surged signifi-
cantly in the literature in the following decades. Like that of imperialism, 
its current usage probably reflects contemporary concerns over the real 
intention of the spread of globalization around the world. such scholarly 
concern is best expressed by vilas (2002) in an article that was simply en-
titled “globalization as imperialism.” While the notion of globalization 
might be traced to Marx’s ideas in the nineteenth century, the concept itself 
only appeared in the Jstor database in the 1980s, signaling an increasing 
intellectual attention to this particular phenomenon.
the above discussion of keying in international communication re-
search does not directly address the relationship between the concepts that 
underscore different theories in the field, especially in the era of network 
tabLe 3. genealogy of theories in international Communication research, 1929– 2009a
year imperialism Modernization dependency globalization
<1929 0.5% — 1.3% — 
1930– 1939 1.2 0.5 — — 
1940– 1949 3.5 0.5  0.6 — 
1950– 1959 6.3 3.3 — — 
1960– 1969 6.3 11.9 2.5 — 
1970– 1979 15.3 17.6 15.9 — 
1980– 989 23.5 26.7 33.1 3.6%
1990– 1999 21.6 21.0 29.3 34.9
2000– 2009 21.6 18.6 17.2 61.4
 total 255 210 157 166
aeach of four key words— imperialism, modernization, dependency, and globalization— was used in combina-
tion with the exact phrase “international communication” in the full text in the Jstor search. because of 
the small number of book reviews published over time (imperialism, 38; modernization, 27; dependency, 
14; and globalization, 17), the two categories were combined.
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society. as documented (Chang et al., 2009; himelboim, Chang, & Mc-
Creery, 2010), although the global network is open, the flow of news is 
very much closed within the network itself. Whether the media outlets 
are state- owned or privately owned, for example, the number of outgo-
ing links in foreign news is almost nonexistent, particularly so under the 
state- dominated system. Considering the advent of sophisticated software 
that automatically creates linkages between websites, apparently it is not 
the technological considerations that lead to the absence of hyperlinks. 
explanations for the missing links have to be sought beyond the hyperlinks 
themselves. the thesis of cultural imperialism obviously cannot offer con-
vincing explanation for this structural deficiency. What are the alternative 
perspectives? the question can be best answered by paradigm testing.
Paradigm Testing in International Communication Research
the notion of paradigm is borrowed from thomas Kuhn’s classic work, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1970). the term paradigm refers to 
“the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared 
by members of a given community” and “the concrete puzzle- solutions, 
employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for 
the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal sciences” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 
175). because Kuhn restricted the use of paradigm to the normal sciences, 
the field of international communication research apparently would not 
fall within the range of his conception. as such, the application of the con-
cept to the explanation of international communication phenomenon does 
not necessarily suggest there are competing paradigms in the field. in fact, 
whether international communication research could even be considered 
pre- paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense is open to debate. to claim cultural 
imperialism as a paradigm is therefore to stretch its status as the domi-
nating theoretical perspective in the field. nevertheless, his discussion of 
comparing competing theories to determine which theory best explains the 
facts is germane to gauging the production of knowledge in international 
communication research.
although Kuhn did not call it as such, for lack of a better word the no-
tion of “paradigm testing” is used here to capture the tension between two 
competing theories within the same field of inquiry, which seek to account 
for the facts. if Kuhn’s paradigm shift or scientific revolution is any hint, 
the challenge of competing theories apparently comes from outside, not 
necessarily from inside, the dominant paradigm itself, which, if successful, 
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may eventually lead to the collapse of the existing paradigm. When enough 
members of the “in- group” abandon the old paradigm, a new one from the 
“out- group” may replace it and the world is seen anew. again, “paradigm 
testing” in international communication research implies the existence of 
competing theories, not the presence of rival paradigms, if any. it is useful 
to quote Kuhn’s idea in its entirety:
all historically significant theories have agreed with the facts, but 
only more or less. there is no more precise answer to the question 
whether or how well an individual theory fits the facts. but questions 
much like that can be asked when theories are taken collectively or 
even in pairs. it makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two ac-
tual and competing theories fits the facts better. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 147, 
emphasis in original)
in international communication, if the facts are examined against the 
thesis of cultural imperialism, the u.s. domination in the global cultural 
market would indeed be supported by the historical data of unequal flows 
in many countries around the world. according to Kuhn, however, this is 
not good enough as evidence to lend convincing support to the theory. as 
used in this study, paradigm testing requires that a theory be pitted against 
a theoretical “other” or another competing theory. several theories can be 
used to explain the form of international communication flows of cultural 
products: cultural discount, cultural proximity, cultural imperialism, cul-
tural diffusion, and globalization. the empirical data have to be carefully 
analyzed and the theory of cultural imperialism has to be pitted against 
other alternative perspectives to determine how it stacks up in comparison. 
in other words, it is not adequate to examine a theory in isolation as a valid 
explanation of a given phenomenon when other theories may become vi-
able candidates.
although the design is not ideal, the Jstor database offers some proxy 
means to compare whether opposing theories in international communi-
cation research might be juxtaposed in pairs. it is assumed that when two 
different concepts appear in the same text, they are brought together pre-
sumably because of their relevance to each other. on the other hand, if 
different concepts that describe the phenomenon of international commu-
nication do not even turn up in the same space, they would literally be out-
side the conceptual domain (goffman, 1970), hidden from view. Chances 
are therefore low for the rival theories to be considered collectively or for 
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one theory to be evaluated against the other. table 4 shows the results of 
paired concepts in the literature as recorded in Jstor.
one observation becomes immediately visible. in most cases, the four 
key concepts do not have much co- appearance in the same texts, indicating 
that a significant number of studies (almost 90%) in international commu-
nication research concentrated on a single perspective. the high degree of 
mutual exclusion suggests a lack of comparison of potential contending ac-
counts. it also highlights a form of groupthink in that alternative perspec-
tives are often excluded in the literature. of the small number of studies 
that cover concepts in pairs, the evidence nonetheless points to increasing 
awareness of challenging ideas. this is particularly evident when globaliza-
tion is paired with either modernization or imperialism, an equation that 
largely echoes recent debates as to whether globalization is an extension of 
modernization or a form of imperialism in disguise. the same can be said 
of the pairing of dependency with imperialism and modernization in the 
decades between 1970s and 1990s.
Conclusion and Discussion
because of the rapid changes in the media landscape and the loss of media 
jobs as well as the growth of personal communication devices, some schol-
ars and researchers have argued that there is a crisis in international com-
munication (e.g., sparks, 2000). although i do not share such an alarmist 
tabLe 4. “Paradigm testing” in international Communication research, 1929– 2009*
imperialism/ Modernization/ Modernization/ imperialism/
year dependency dependency globalization globalization
<1929 2.2% — — — 
1930– 1939 — — — — 
1940– 1949 2.2 — — — 
1950– 1959 — — — — 
1960– 1969 2.2 2.8% — — 
1970– 1979 13.0 13.9 — — 
1980– 1989 32.6 33.3 2.6% 2.3%
1990– 1999 34.8 41.7 41.0 25.6
2000– 2009 13.0 8.3 56.4 72.1
 total 46 36 39 43
 % of Combined  
 total
11.2 9.8 10.4 10.2 
athe pair of key words was used in combination with the exact phrase “international communication” in 
the full text in the Jstor search.
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view, i have increasingly come to believe that most international commu-
nication studies have produced little knowledge that is both solid in the 
ways it has been produced and sound in its claim of validity across national 
borders, especially comparative research in news and advertising (Chang et 
al., 2001; Chang et al., 2009).
the key question this study seeks to answer is: Why and how does 
international communication research as a field of intellectual inquiry pro-
duce a body of knowledge through empirical studies that have mostly fol-
lowed the same school of thought? two general conceptual frameworks 
guided the present study: the sociology of knowledge and the powers of 
theory. the former concerns ontological and epistemological issues in in-
ternational communication research; the latter addresses theoretical, ideo-
logical, and practical matters of theory in this field. if the findings in this 
study are any indication, the field of international communication research 
has exhibited a groupthink mentality in its conceptual approach. scholars 
and researchers have yet to think outside the box of international commu-
nication inquiry, or, more specifically, the body of literature that has been 
established in this field.
groupthink often leads to stagnation or failure. at the abstract level, 
the mind- set of groupthink excludes alternative perspectives that should 
be relevant to international communication scholars and researchers who 
are engaged in the production of knowledge, especially when the received 
knowledge is delimited within certain geographical territories and defined 
by a specific perspective. any empirical research is always bound by the 
particular context of space and time, within which ideas and ways of seeing 
and doing things are formulated. but knowledge does not necessarily rec-
ognize any national borders although there are historical conditions under 
which knowledge is generally being produced. the form of international 
communication is complex. its determinants vary from country to country. 
Many competing explanations therefore can be applied to the same facts, 
depending on how they are theoretically conceived and methodologically 
analyzed.
for any theory to be valid in its knowledge claim about the reality of 
the social world, it has to be tested comparatively. examining how a theory 
in international communication may fit the historical facts is neither ad-
equate nor convincing. the world is as diverse as the number of countries 
in it. Perspectives of the reality are bound to be different when it is viewed 
from different locales. the relationship between theory and the facts is 
therefore changeable. as galtung (1990) argued, “a good theory should 
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never leave us with the idea that the world is made once and for all” and 
“will always have some empty boxes for the reality not yet there, for poten-
tial as opposed to empirical reality” (p. 102). a good theory “should be seen 
as one perspective among others rather than as a catch- all explanation” 
(p. 100). in international communication, this is especially true because 
its attributes are more multidimensional than a national one for experi-
menting different permutations and combinations, as Lazarsfeld had long 
recognized.
Lazarsfeld’s prognosis is worth rereading in the contemporary setting, 
particularly against the backdrop of the debate over “Washington Consen-
sus” vs. “beijing Consensus.” in discussing the importance of comparative 
research, he had offered in the early 1950s a recipe for inquiry about what 
was to come in today’s world as a result of the tension between the free 
market and democracy. in the united states, he said (1952– 53, p. 487) that 
social scientists “tend to assume that economic laissez- faire and political 
liberty go together. so let us study the formation of opinion and attitudes 
in countries where the two principles have developed independently and 
where economic state control has apparently not interfered with political 
freedom.” this proposal to investigate the connection or the lack of it be-
tween marketization and democratization has yet to be fully addressed in 
social sciences research.
in international communication inquiry, comparative research has gen-
erated more heat than light. Part of the reason is that, over the past four 
decades, the field as a whole has engaged in research activities that are 
stuck in an outdated mode of replaying past experience without serious 
intellectual attempt to go beyond the conceptual boundaries of existing 
frameworks in knowledge production. the “dominant” model of cultural 
imperialism no longer fits the world of nations that are interconnected and 
interdependent in a global network society. for any theory of international 
communication to find the goodness of fit, it will have to clear the frame 
that contains scholars and researchers in a groupthink mind- set.
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Notes
 1. see “Politics, social networks, and the history of Mass Communications 
research: rereading Personal influence,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (november 2006).
 2. Kuhn (1970) used the term paradigm in two different senses. “on the one 
hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community. on the other, it denotes one sort 
of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle- solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the 
remaining puzzles of normal sciences” (p. 175, emphasis added). it should be evi-
dent that cultural imperialism as a theory has not been shared by the members of 
international communication research community; nor has it offered any concrete 
puzzle- solutions to the problems of international communication.
 3. in this study, the term cultural imperialism is used as an encompassing concept 
to include all types of communication- related forms of imperialism that have been 
coined in the literature. as will be discussed later, the addition of an adjective word 
(e.g., media, cultural, communication, or informatic) to precede imperialism appears to 
be merely a form of keying to frame the thesis in a particular way.
 4. there are, of course, other major concepts in international communication 
that can be addressed. but no other concepts appear to come closer to the impacts 
of cultural imperialism as received knowledge in both academic and journalistic 
communities.
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 5. using the exact phrase in the full text search, 65 items in the Jstor database 
include “cultural imperialism” in the text, with the earliest one published in the 
Yale Law Journal in 1946 and the majority of them (81.5%) appearing in the last 
three decades (1980– 2009). for the concept “media imperialism,” 15 items were 
published in the 1980s and 1990s. only two items referred to the concepts “com-
munication imperialism” and “informatic imperialism”: one in a footnote and the 
other in the text.
 6. the Jstor database does not include any of the journals related to commu-
nication research, except for Public Opinion Quarterly. this means that journals that 
are most likely to publish international communication studies have been excluded, 




Beyond Modernization and the  
Four Theories of the Press
Jan servaes
Lerner’s model is, at least, an approximation of the Western expe-
rience and must not be accepted as a developmental inevitability. 
Lerner’s attempt to generalize to a universal process from rather 
limited historical experience should be treated with great caution. 
the model is an ethnocentric identification of Western (especially 
american) middle- class values and images.
— Chin- Chuan Lee (1980, p. 21)
Perhaps the main feature in the philosophy of american exception-
alism is the argument that the united states is unique, but at the 
same time its values and interests are universal.
— hemant shah (2011, p. 148)
differences or diversity cannot and will not stop understanding and 
communication, but ignoring them will.
— georgette Wang (2011c, p. 271)
the above opening quotes are just three among a selection of available 
critical assessments of the Western bias in international and development 
communication (see the list of references for starters). together they could 
be summarized in a few succinct points that
•	 Question and broaden the epistemological and ontological assump-
tions on which our scientific field is based. We need to look for ways 
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to complement the still dominant Western positivistic perspectives 
with interpretive social constructivist approaches, which might con-
tribute to a more universalistic interpretation of reality.
•	 at the level of the so- called Kuhnian paradigm discussion the origi-
nal model of modernization has been complemented/replaced by 
other models, such as dependency, multiplicity, globalization. how-
ever, these alternatives tend to be driven by a Western missionary 
zeal for outward expansion. More attention needs to be paid to per-
spectives which are inward looking and less determined by “imperi-
alistic” objectives.
•	 Consequently, our methods and techniques for inquiry need to be 
reconsidered in view of the above considerations. the limitations of 
quantitative methods and findings have become obvious. however, 
qualitative inquiries also need to be critically assessed. an integra-
tion of quantitative and qualitative techniques from a participatory 
perspective may provide more adequate and relevant answers.
•	 Comparative cross- national or intercultural research too often starts 
from an implicit Western bias. Models and frameworks developed in 
a Western context are used as templates for evaluation and compari-
son. a genuine indigenous starting point may be needed.
if the above is “common knowledge,” why hasn’t the mainstream of 
international and development communication research embraced these 
obvious considerations? that could be the conclusion emerging out of the 
findings of three scholars who have been assessing the “richness” of the 
field in a historical perspective: Jo ellen fair, hemant shah, and Christine 
ogan. they each, either alone or with their graduate students, by exam-
ining journal articles, books, and book chapters wanted to highlight the 
directions that the research took in different periods, broadly defined as 
from 1958 to 1986, from 1987 to 1996, from 1997 to 2005, and from 1998 
to 2007.
in the 1958– 86 period models predicting either powerful effects or lim-
ited effects informed the research: “Communication has been a key ele-
ment in the West’s project of developing the third World. in the one- and- 
a- half decades after Lerner’s influential 1958 study of communication and 
development in the Middle east, communication researchers assumed that 
the introduction of media and certain types of educational, political, and 
economic information into a social system could transform individuals and 
societies from traditional to modern. Conceived as having fairly direct and 
68 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
powerful effects on third World audiences, the media were seen as magic 
multipliers, able to accelerate and magnify the benefits of development” 
(fair, 1989, p. 145).
in the 1987– 96 period, “Lerner’s modernization model completely dis-
appears. instead, the most frequently used theoretical framework is partici-
patory development, an optimist postmodern orientation, which is almost 
the polar opposite of Lerner who viewed mass communication as playing a 
top- down role in social change. also vanishing from research in this latter 
period is the two- step flow model, which was drawn upon by moderniza-
tion scholars” (fair & shah, 1997, p. 10).
the two more recent periods, which partly overlap, 1997– 2005 and 
1998– 2007, provide new findings that may be surprising to some. i quote 
from shah’s essay first:
first, Lerner’s model of media and development has reappeared in the 
1997– 2005 time period after totally disappearing in the 1987– 1996 period. 
second, only two other theories from the traditional us- based behavioral 
science approach, social learning theory and knowledge gap, appear in the 
1997– 2005 period. the third trend to note is that the two most promi-
nently mentioned theories in 1997– 2005— participatory communication 
and social learning— reflect two popular development communication 
project orientations that were mentioned as innovations in the 1987– 1996 
study: participatory development and edu- tainment (shah, 2007, p. 13).
shah explains the persistence of “old” ideas, especially Lerner’s model 
(1958, 1977), from a technological deterministic perspective: “each new 
technological innovation in the postcolonial world since 1958— television, 
satellites, microwave, computers, call centers, wireless technology— has 
been accompanied by determined hope that Lerner’s modernization model 
will increase growth and productivity and produce modern cosmopolitan 
citizens” (shah, 2007, p. 24; see also shah, 2011).
also ogan and her students (2009) conclude that studies have moved 
away from mass communication and toward information and Communi-
cation technologies’ (iCts’) role in development, that they infrequently 
address development in the context of globalization, and often continue 
to embrace a modernization paradigm despite its many criticisms. they 
argued, “We believe that the more recent attention to iCts has to do with 
the constant search for the magic solution to bringing information to 
people to transform their lives, allowing them to improve their economic 
condition, educate their children, increase literacy and the levels of educa-
tion and spread democracy in their countries. despite years of research 
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that tells us that information is necessary but insufficient to bring about 
this change, iCts have become the most recent iteration of the holy grail 
for development. and even if communication scholars know better because 
critical scholarship written over the last 30 years has told them so, new-
comers to this field from other information- based disciplines may not have 
such close acquaintance with that literature. furthermore, because of the 
appeal of the modernization paradigm, there is a tendency to forget that it 
cannot work” (ogan et al., 2009, pp. 667– 68).
in other words, there may be more at stake than ignorance. it may well 
be that the Western bias in international communication was and is a con-
venient way for the powers that be to maintain the status quo, assisted by a 
community of academics who, as Pierre bourdieu eloquently argued, are a 
conservative lot sui generis (servaes, 2012).
it is my intention to provide some additional ammunition in this chap-
ter by looking at the historical context in which international communica-
tion evolved, questioning some of the assumptions on which the so- called 
four theories of the Press were based, and briefly outlining a possible way 
out of the current stalemate.
The Historical Context for the “Western Bias”
the proclamation of the four freedoms by President franklin roosevelt 
on 6 January 1941 (freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom 
from Want, and freedom from fear), the launch of the Marshall Plan in 
1947 after the second World War, the establishment of the bretton Woods 
financial system and the creation of the World bank, the iMf, the united 
nations, and its regional and specialized affiliates, all led to what amy sta-
ples (2006) called the birth of development, or what eric Louw (2010) has 
characterized as the Pax americana.
Many developing countries saw the “welfare state” of the north at-
lantic nations as the ultimate goal of development. these developing na-
tions were attracted by the new technology transfer and the model of a 
centralized state with careful economic planning and centrally directed 
development bureaucracies for agriculture, education, and health as the 
most effective strategies to catch up with the industrialized countries. this 
perspective has been typified by many, including myself, as the moderniza-
tion paradigm (servaes, 1999, 2008).
Modernization accelerated the growth of a Westernized elite structure 
and of urbanization. Latham (2000) explains how social science theory 
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helped shape american foreign policy during the Kennedy administration 
and resulted in the alliance for Progress with Latin america, the Peace 
Corps, and other u.s. development aid programs worldwide. it was as-
sumed that, with the help of foreign aid, the rural backward areas would 
be developed in the area of agriculture, basic education, health, rural 
transportation, community development, and so forth. as a result, govern-
ment bureaucracies were extended to the major urban centers. in fact, the 
united states was defining development as the replica of its own political- 
economic system and opening the way for the transnational corporations. 
Christopher simpson (1994, 1998), rohan samarajiva (1987), and hemant 
shah (2011), who examined the beginnings of the development commu-
nication concept, find that the seminal work by daniel Lerner (1958) and 
Wilbur schramm (1954) was a spin- off from a large and clandestine audi-
ence research project conducted for the voice of america by the bureau of 
applied social research. some of their research reports still remain classi-
fied by the Cia. they note the strong influence exerted by the demands of 
psychological warfare, in the context of the Cold War, on the early studies 
of communication in the united states: “exploratory work on the early 
period suggests the following pattern of net influence flows: marketing 
research to communication research; marketing and communication re-
search to psychological warfare; from psychological warfare to communi-
cation and development” (samarajiva, 1987, p. 17).
similar observations have been made by other scholars (see, e.g., am-
brose, 1983; Krige & barth, 2006; McMichael, 2008; roberts, 2006; schil-
ler, 1969, 1976; smythe, 1981; smythe & van dinh, 1983; or tunstall, 
1977).
the broadcasting system was used mainly for entertainment and news. 
radio was a channel for national campaigns to persuade the people about 
specific and select health and agricultural practices. according to robert 
White (1988, p. 9): “the most significant communication dimension of the 
modernization design in the developing world has been the rapid improve-
ment of the transportation, which linked rural communities into market 
towns and regional cities. With improved transportation and sources of 
electric power, the opening of commercial consumer supply networks 
stretched out into towns and villages carrying with it the Western con-
sumer culture and pop culture of films, radio and pop music. although 
rural people in bolivia or sri Lanka may not have attained the consump-
tion styles of american middle- class populations, their life did change pro-
foundly. this was the real face of modernization.”
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Communication for Development
from the 1950s onwards, communication models became increasingly 
central to the programs of development being undertaken. the basic idea 
was that communication stimulates and diffuses values and institutions 
that are favorable to achievement, mobility, innovations, and consump-
tion, or, what it means to “become modern.” according to Lerner (1958), 
the general psychological conditions captured by the concept of empathy 
stimulated mobility and urbanization, which, in turn, increased literacy 
and consequently economic and political participation— all essential to the 
modernization process. the media would serve to stimulate, in direct and 
indirect ways, the conditions of “psychological mobility” that were consid-
ered crucial to economic development. in other words, central in Lerner’s 
1958 study was the argument that empathic persons have a higher degree 
of mobility, meaning a high capacity for change, and were more future ori-
ented and rational than so- called traditional people. the driving concepts 
behind the link between communication and development were basically 
of a quantifiable and linear nature: how much and in what ways can com-
munication contribute to the process of modernization? such questions 
relied primarily on transmission models of communication derived from 
work in information engineering, in political campaigns, and the diffu-
sion of ideas. based on Lerner’s concept of empathy, inkeles and smith 
(1974) concluded their comparative analysis of six developing countries 
that “modern” people increasingly trust the mass media more than per-
sonal media for world news. hence, in their opinion, modern people prefer 
national and international news rather than sports, religious, or local news.
building on Lerner’s work, Wilbur schramm (1964) took a closer look 
at the connections between mass communication and modernizing prac-
tices and institutions. he suggested that there are at least three indispens-
able functions performed by the mass media in a modern or modernizing 
society: they are “watchdogs,” “policy makers,” and “teachers” for change. 
schramm proposed that every country should aim at a minimum level of 
mass media facilities: 10 copies of daily newspapers, five radio receivers, two 
cinema seats, and two television receivers per 100 inhabitants. reflecting 
the influence of the two- step flow theory of communication and the stress 
on attitudes and attitudinal change, schramm saw modern communication 
media as supplementing and complementing the oral channels of a tradi-
tional society. schramm suggested that the mass media functioned as mo-
bility multipliers. the relative popularity of these models within the devel-
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opment literature and practices of the time can be traced to three attributes 
associated with this way of conceptualizing the communication process. 
first, because they identified communication basically as the transfer of 
information focused on efficiency or effects. this was true both in a social 
sense, such as in rogers’s (1962) diffusion of innovation theory (which has 
changed somewhat in the course of five editions, as observed by hoffmann 
2007), as well as in a technological deterministic sense (for which McLu-
han 1964 is the chief proponent). McLuhan (1964) sees technology as a 
value- free and politically neutral asset in bringing about the modernization 
of under- developed countries. he argued that technology gradually creates 
a totally new human environment. this “totally new human environment” 
was that of the modern society. in other words, technology is an inexorable 
force in development, irresistible and overwhelming. rogers (1962, 1986, 
2003) stressed the adoption and diffusion processes of cultural innovation. 
Mass media are important in spreading awareness of new possibilities and 
practices, but at the stage where decisions are being made, personal com-
munication is far more likely to be influential. therefore, the general con-
clusion is that mass communication is less likely than personal influence to 
have a direct effect on social behavior.
also, the communication models fit neatly into the nature and mechan-
ics of mass or mediated communication, an emergent and powerful force 
at that time. in other words, communication was primarily about the ma-
nipulation of messages and people for the purposes of directed develop-
ment. implicit in this formulation was the idea that media messages are 
like a “bullet” or “hypodermic needle,” whose effects are quickly and ef-
ficiently inserted into the consciousness of receivers. over the years— as 
documented by hornik (1988), Leeuwis and van den ban (2004) and in 
the historical meta- analysis summarized in the introduction— this may 
have changed slightly but not fundamentally.
A Critical Assessment of the Modernization Paradigm
since the 1960s, communication and modernization has come under at-
tack from distinct sides in different parts of the world. the most important 
points of this criticism of the modernization view of communication can be 
summarized as follows (further elaborated in servaes, 1999, 2008):
1. empirically, what has been studied are primarily specific, quantita-
tively measurable, short- term, and individual effects that are generalized in 
a questionable manner. When testing Lerner’s thesis, for instance, several 
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scholars, including schramm and ruggels (1967), have found little evi-
dence of any single pattern of mass media growth in relation to literacy, ur-
banization, and per capita income. rather, the evidence showed that these 
patterns vary widely by region, environment, or culture.
2. this approach starts from basic positivistic and behavioristic positions 
that presuppose a linear, rational sequence of events, planned in advance 
and with criteria of rationality determined externally. the assumption is 
that human behavior can be explained in terms of independent, isolated, 
and direct causalities, as has been the case with the behavioristic stimulus- 
response model. the process of communication through mass media is 
compared to the communication process in face- to- face situations. the 
transmission of information is viewed as an isolated and linear activity, with 
a beginning and an end. this concept, which is directly derived from the 
mechanistic information theory, is, in my opinion, difficult to transfer to 
processes of human interaction where the context, in which the transmis-
sion or communication process occurs, form an integrated and substantial 
part of the overall process.
3. Positivism assumes “reality” can be “objectively” and empirically 
grasped, and rarely questions these assumptions. indeed, the normal mode 
is to laugh off those who do, or request they empirically invalidate empiri-
cism. in many cultures, however, the immeasurable (i.e., that which can-
not be named, described or understood through any form of reason) is 
regarded as the primary reality. rather than a stimulus- response switchbox, 
people are regarded as active, creative, purposeful creatures. Writing about 
the brahmin view of “oneness and subjectivity,” Jayaweera and amunu-
guma (1987, p. 41) say such challenges “are not likely to be considered 
seriously by social scientists .  .  . who purport to live in the real world of 
empirical science. but then their ‘real world’ . . . is being shown up to be 
mostly a fiction, and that, by the most scientific among them, the high- 
energy physicists.”
4. in most sender- receiver models the social context in which com-
munication takes place is absent. therefore, according to thomas (1982, 
p. 84), “the entire notion of a sender- receiver relationship may tend to 
obscure the process of information transmission as it occurs at the social 
level of behavior.” the notion of intentionality is still considered to be 
a basic aspect of any definition of communication. this notion assumes 
implicitly— in the “uses and gratifications” theory even explicitly— that 
each human activity can be explained on the basis of a subjective defini-
tion provided by the actors themselves. in other words, human behavior 
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is not conditioned by one’s place in a social context (system or subsystem, 
social group or class), but by the individual’s self- defined place and impact 
on his or hers environment. this results in dominant and dominated man- 
man relationships that are consistent with the anti- historical dominant 
man- environment relationship that constitutes the Western world view of 
history. More specifically, the two- step- flow hypothesis neglects the fact 
that a great amount of information flows directly from the media to users 
without passing through an opinion leader. furthermore, the concept of 
opinion leader has proven to be far too simple. it can be said, for instance, 
that change can and should occur from below by those who need it on their 
own behalf.
5. Little attention is given to sociological and contextual factors except 
for commercial and ideological reasons. by motivating individuals to aspire 
to mobility and higher standards of living, the media, in editorial mate-
rial as well as advertising, are creating the kind of consumer demand that 
maintains the dependence of third World economies on the West. Partly 
because of the high proportion of imported programs, partly because of 
imitation, the dominant message of the media is conservatism, materialism, 
and conformism. even schools and educational tv programs reinforce 
this kind of ideas. at the same time, by omitting advertising from much 
research and only concentrating on the content of editorial material, these 
researchers divert attention away from the principal intended object of the 
mass media, namely to produce and market to advertisers the means to 
complete the marketing of consumer goods and services. therefore, dallas 
smythe (1981, p. 250) argues that “in this way, they [these researchers] nat-
urally protect from investigation the blind spot: the audience and its work.”
6. as a result of the underlying ethnocentrism and endogenism one 
takes for granted that results derived from u.s. campaigns can be extrap-
olated toward third World settings, or that the media hardware as well 
as software has to be imported from “outside.” this rather deterministic 
perspective has had very negative consequences, especially in the field 
of technology transfer. therefore, one could argue for an integrated and 
multidimensional approach in which communication technology has to be 
considered as a complement to the development process. however, in re-
ality, one often observes that technologies are under the control of those 
with power and will be used in ways consistent with those interests or re-
main inaccessible to the majority of the population, or both.
7. the static and ahistorical manner of studying communication pro-
cesses leads to the supposition of a stable social system where social har-
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mony and integration prevails and where class struggle or social conflicts 
and contradictions are non- existent. rao (1986, p. 202) says such research 
“equals a long series of empirical- analytical, fragmentary, piecemeal stud-
ies, guided by the dichotomy of facts and values, directed by the interested 
to steer social technology for status- quo purposes, and epistemologically 
handicapped by the Kantian tradition of confining reality to predefined 
categories which are applied to it.”
The Four Theories
traditionally, in communication sciences one used to refer to the book by 
siebert, Peterson, and schramm (1956) for a positioning of the relation-
ship between media and society, or, the so- called normative media theo-
ries. siebert, Peterson and schramm started from the assumption that “the 
press always takes on the coloration of the social and political structures 
within which it operates. especially it reflects the system of social control 
whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted” (siebert, 
Peterson, & schramm, 1956, pp. 1– 2). the four models they identified 
have become critiqued since for being too Western- centric and for mak-
ing unrealistic universalistic claims. additions such as the “development 
model” and the “democratic- participatory model” were introduced (for 
an overview, see, e.g., hachten, 1996; hachten and scotton 2007; Merrill, 
1974, 1979, 1989; McQuail, 2005; nerone, 1995; or servaes, 1989). how-
ever, siebert’s starting thesis was never questioned. the above- mentioned 
authors also think that, as summarized by John Merrill (1979), “media sys-
tems are, of course, closely related to the kinds of governments in which 
they operate; they are, in essence, reflective and supportive of the govern-
mental philosophy. When viewed in this way, it is possible to say that all 
press systems are enslaved— tied to their respective governmental philoso-
phies and forced to operate within certain national ideological parameters” 
(Merrill, 1979, p. 153).
three of the more recent contributions to the tradition of compara-
tive media theories and systems are the work by Christians et al. (2009), 
the overview presented by daniel hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004), and 
the assessment of recent social and media changes in central and eastern 
europe by Karol Jakubowicz (2007). of these three, hallin and Mancini’s 
work is the one most often quoted and used in comparative analytical ways 
(see, for instance, the recent overview of european journalism education, 
edited by terzis, 2009).
76 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
hallin and Mancini (2004) distinguish between three models: the 
north atlantic or Liberal Model (which includes britain, united states, 
Canada, and ireland), the northern european or democratic Corporatist 
Model (austria, belgium, denmark, finland, germany, netherlands, nor-
way, sweden, and switzerland), and the Mediterranean or Polarized Plu-
ralist Model (france, greece, italy, Portugal, and spain). a fourth model 
has been added by Karol Jakubowicz (2007), who, assessing the central 
and eastern european region and quoting hallin and Mancini, argues that, 
since the falling apart of the former Communist bloc, central and eastern 
european journalism has embraced the liberal or anglo- american version 
of professional journalism. While many local people (including journalists) 
initially welcomed the “spreading of the gospel of democracy” (especially 
the financial benefits that accompanied it) into their world, this new love 
affair has lost some of its glamour lately, especially since the 2008– 9 global 
financial meltdown has had a sobering ripple effect on all sectors of society, 
including the post- Communist version of journalism with its blind belief 
in unbridled individual freedom and free market principles. however, be-
cause of the strong historic role of the state, “the democratic Corporatist 
Model, we suspect, will have particularly strong relevance for the analysis 
of those parts of eastern and Central europe that share much of the same 
historical development” (hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 305).
in view of the recent economic crisis, the far too optimistic hint by hal-
lin and Mancini (2004, p. 301) that “there is . . . a clear tendency of conver-
gence toward the Liberal system” against the two other models may need to 
be re- assessed. hallin & Mancini warn against simplistic generalizations— 
there are important differences among and within the media systems they 
grouped together— and plead for more comparative historical and ethno-
graphic research on the subject. they also make an effort to assess how the 
three models “might relate to other systems” in the so- called developing 
world: “even though the Liberal Model has dominated media studies and 
has served as the principal normative model against which other media sys-
tems have traditionally been measured, it is probably the Polarized Plural-
ist Model, more than the other two, that is most widely applicable to other 
systems as an empirical model of the relation between media and political 
systems. We suspect that scholars working on many parts of the world— 
eastern europe and the former soviet union, Latin america, the Middle 
east and all of the Mediterranean region, africa, and most of asia— will 
find much that is relevant in our analysis of southern europe, including 
the role of clientelism, the strong role of the state, the role of media as an 
instrument of political struggle, the limited development of mass circula-
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tion press, and the relative weakness of common professional norms” (hal-
lin & Mancini, 2004, p. 306).
hallin and Mancini’s comparative analysis still overemphasizes po-
litical, technological and economic conditions, and implicitly disregards, 
apart from the proverbial lip service, the importance of cultural dimen-
sions in media systems and societies. by collapsing almost all non- Western 
countries and regions under one category, they do injustice to the complex-
ity, specificity, and richness of local, national, and sociocultural systems. 
for instance, in the african context, the anthropological analysis of the 
african political and media system by francis nyamnjoh (2005, 2007) or 
the philosophical observations by people like Kwame appiah (2005, 2006) 
and Molefi Kete asante (2007) are far more sophisticated and multifaceted 
than the Polarized Pluralist Model may make us believe.
A More Complex and Integrated Framework  
for Normative Media Theories
already in the eighties (see, e.g., servaes, 1982, 1989; servaes & tonn-
aer, 1992) i have argued in favor of a triple and dialectically integrated 
framework for the study of the so- called normative media theories: at a 
philosophical, a political- economic, and a culturalist- anthropological level. 
Christians et al. (2009, p. 16) use a more or less similar typology: a philo-
sophical level focusing on normative traditions; a political one assessing 
models of democracy; and the different roles the media can play. We con-
sider the role of the media part of the culture at large.
My critique was that the classic models are based on, on the one hand, 
a too restricted (Western) description of concepts like “freedom,” “democ-
racy,” “objectivity,” and so on, which allow little or no generalizations; and 
that, on the other hand, reality often doesn’t comply with the principles de-
fined in philosophical terms. traditional principles such as the freedom of 
the press and professional journalism practices, i contended, need a radical 
rethinking in order to become an integral aspect of the process of democ-
ratization in both media and society. i am glad to notice that this ‘coupling 
of journalism and democracy’ was the theme of a recent special issue of 
Journalism, edited by beate Josephi, who concluded: “all panelists (nerone, 
Zelizer, george, Waisbord, i.a. [inter alia]) agreed that the dominance of 
the journalism and democracy paradigm found to date in scholarly litera-
ture has led to a distortion in the way journalism is perceived” (Josephi, 
2013, p. 441).
the increasing multiplicity and convergence of iCts, the internet, 
78 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
and social networks, the deregulation of media markets, and the cultural 
globalization/localization of media products and services forces a re- 
assessment of international communication. Multi- tasking on different 
media platforms and the 24/7 news circles challenge journalists not only in 
technical ways but force them to reconsider classic notions of balance, ob-
jectivity and bias (thussu, 2008). this also accounts for the interpretation 
of concepts such as cultural and press freedom in, for instance, the post- 
communist world (Casmir, 1995; de smaele, 1999; Jakubowicz, 2007), asia 
(iyer, 2001), Latin america (beltran, 1993; fox, 1988) or islamic society 
(hussain, 2006); a discussion on journalism ethics and universal versus par-
ticular values (Christians & traber, 1997; Karikari, 1996; Preston, 2007; 
ukpabi, 2001), journalism in a buddhist (dissanayake, 2006; gunaratne, 
2007) or Confucian/Chinese (Chen, 2004; gunaratne, 2005) tradition; or 
deontological codes and practices in different parts of the world (Mendel, 
2008; Pigeat & huteau, 2000).
Christians et al. (2009) identify four distinct yet overlapping roles for 
the media: the monitorial role of a vigilant informer collecting and publish-
ing information of potential interest to the public; the facilitative role that 
not only reports on but also seeks to support and strengthen civil society; 
the radical role that challenges authority and voices support for reform; 
and the collaborative role that creates partnerships between journalists and 
centers of power in society, notably the state, to advance mutually accept-
able interests. each role could be associated with a specific set of compe-
tencies, which the journalist or knowledge worker of the future needs to 
acquire in order to perform adequately. in other words, competencies are 
characteristics that individuals have and use in appropriate, consistent ways 
in order to achieve a desired performance. these characteristics include 
knowledge, skills, aspects of self- image, social motives, thought patterns, 
mind- sets, and ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (dubois & rothwell, 
2004; irigoin et al., 2002; hofstede & hofstede, 2005). the journalistic 
competencies needed to operate in today’s complex world are manifold 
and are almost impossible to acquire during a regular journalism program. 
they range from core or generic competencies (e.g., communication, 
teamwork) to managerial competencies (e.g., empowering others, decision 
making) and technical or specialist competencies related to specific jobs 
within the journalism profession. in other words, a competency is mea-
sured by identifying the behaviors or tangible results (outcomes) produced 
by their use in the context of the work performed.
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For Instance: Thailand
if we return to the earlier argument made by hallin & Mancini that most 
countries in asia are leaning towards a Polarized Pluralist Model and 
apply this to the case of thailand, we are faced with a complex picture. 
thailand was once recognized as the country with the most liberal media 
system in southeast asia. thailand has also been boasting about its consti-
tution as being one of the most democratic in the region (Chongkittavorn, 
2000, p. 37).
therefore, as thailand has never been colonized in a formal sense, the 
country provides an interesting case study. advocates of the Liberal Model 
claim that if the press were regulated it would become a servant of the 
state. Privately owned media competing in a free market, they argue, can 
ensure complete independence from the government. the fourth estate 
is ensured by the market relationship between the press and its audience. 
ideally, through their buying power, consumers, not the government, act as 
the controllers of press output (Wheeler, 1997, p. 129).
unfortunately, the privately owned media in thailand do not operate 
in this ideal way. as the media rely largely on advertisement revenues, it is 
hard to keep them away from external political and economic pressures. 
since its inception in 1932 the thai democracy has always been an oli-
garchy, governed by an ever- changing coalition of elites (Lertvicha, 1987; 
nelson, 2004). hence, it is difficult to stop the nature of corruption in 
thailand as journalists chose their careers and media increase income by 
censoring themselves, and for the most part they reliably transmit the mes-
sage of the rulers to the people (Lertrattanavisut, 2004; Phongpaichit & 
Priryarangsan, 1994). furthermore, under the concept of “lèse majesté,” 
the media cannot cover news about the royal family in a disrespectful or 
critical way.
Within such a frame, the political situation in thailand has turned 
into turmoil, with the thai people roughly divided into two groups. the 
first group consists of the grass roots that were happy with former prime 
minister thaksin’s populist policy and those advocating globalization and 
a total neo- liberalism. the second group consists of the suburban middle 
class and intellectuals who advocate the king’s sufficient economy concept 
(Likhitsomboon, 2006, 25; Prasirtsuk, 2007). each group claims to pro-
mote a more sufficient economy and civic and just society (Wasi, 2003, p. 
136).
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several characteristics make the thai media system different from most 
other media systems in asia (see Cheypratub, 1995; Chongkittavorn, 2000; 
McCarco, 2000; servaes, 1999; servaes, Malikhao, & Pinprayong, 2009; 
siriyuvasak, 2004, 2005; supadhiloke, 2007, 2008; taveesin & brown, 
2006). or, as Lauren Kogen, who assessed the relevance of the hallin & 
Mancini model in the case of thailand, concludes: “Citizens unsatisfied 
with the thai version of democracy are protesting against the current 
regime, and continue to be suppressed, sometimes violently, by the state. 
during such uncertain times, civil society, the corporate world and the 
government will be facing off to try to find a way to balance power in the 
new system” (Kogen, 2010, p. 343). Whether thais opt for total liberaliza-
tion or a sufficient economy or a mixture of both, the thai democratic and 
media system will remain difficult to comprehend from a Western perspec-
tive.
Challenges Ahead
each from their specific vantage point, the following scholars provide 
unique insights and perspectives for a better understanding of what the 
future has in store: bhambra (2007), on modernity; braman and sreberny- 
Mohammadi (1996), on globalization and localization as “interpenetrated 
globalization”; Cimadevilla and Carniglia (2004), on sustainability and ru-
ral development; friedmann (1992), on empowerment; geertz (1983), on 
local knowledge and “blurred genres”; gunaratne (2005, 2011), on asian 
philosophical perspectives; hall and du gay (1996) and bera and Lamy 
(2008), on cultural identity; Lie (2003), on intercultural communication 
spaces; thornton and Cimadevilla (2010), on participation; tremblay 
(2007), on the relationship between communication and sustainable devel-
opment; and Wronka (2008), on social justice and human rights.
this also implies that the cultural perspective has to be fully embraced, as 
argued by southern scholars such as Kwame anthony appiah (2005, 2006), 
Wimal dissanayake (2006, 2011), Mohan dutta (2011), guo- Ming Chen 
(2004, 2011), hattam (2004), shelton gunaratne (2005, 2011), swamina-
than (1994), Majid tehranian (2007), and georgette Wang (2011a).
gunaratne (2005) attempts to de- Westernize communication theory. 
he interprets press theories from the perspective of eastern philosophy 
and the emerging theory of living systems. he also draws from quantum 
physics, post- Parsonsian systems thinking, and world- systems analysis to 
derive a more humanocentric theoretical framework that reflects the inte-
gration of eastern ontology with Western epistemology.
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hattam (2004) advocates for a socially engaged buddhism that involves 
a creative and dialectical attitude toward buddhist teachings as a middle 
way. it attempts to apply these principles to the highly complex and in-
creasingly globalized world. a range of socially engaged perspectives are 
outlined including those from nagarjuna, the dalai Lama, thich nhat 
hanh, sulak sivaraksa, and the think sangha.
dissanayake (2006, 2011) argues for a new concept of humanism: “hu-
manism as generally understood in Western discourse  .  .  . places at the 
center of its interest the sovereign individual— the individual who is self- 
present, the originator of action and meaning, and the privileged location 
of human values and civilizational achievements. however, the concept of 
the self and individual that is textualized in the kind of classical works that 
attract the attention of asian communication theorists present a substan-
tially different picture. the ontology and axiology of selfhood found in 
buddhism differs considerably from those associated with european hu-
manism. What these differences signpost is that there is not one but many 
humanisms” (dissanayake, 2006, 6).
Many humanisms may lead to what appiah calls the cosmopolitan chal-
lenge: “if we accept the cosmopolitan challenge, we will tell our represen-
tatives that we want them to remember those strangers. not because we 
are moved by their suffering— we may or may not be— but because we are 
responsive to what adam smith called “reason, principle, conscience, the 
inhabitant of the beast.” the people of the richest nations can do better. 
this is a demand of simple morality. but it is one that will resonate more 
widely if we make our civilization more cosmopolitan” (appiah, 2006, p. 
174).
By Way of Conclusion: “Internationalize” Media Education
these are some of the “problems” and “constraints” a genuine “interna-
tionalizing” of international communication may have to come to grips 
with. however, an equally important “internationalization” may need to 
take place in journalism and media education.
Professional education (of journalists and others) continues to be based 
on local or national parameters. it has to break out of its national carcass 
and internationalize. one of the central questions is “how do we escape na-
tional stereotypes in journalism education? how do we break the mode of 
a nationally biased understanding of media and news?” More multicultural 
and international “authentic” learning experiences, more innovative and 
critical reflection, more problem solving, social negotiation of information 
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and knowledge, and collaboration are the challenges for journalism edu-
cators of the future. this will have a tremendous impact on teaching and 
learning (servaes, 2009).
new needs for visual and online literacy will soon lead us into difficul-
ties comparable to that of illiteracy in the nineteenth century. Like the illit-
erate of those times, the new illiterate will be, as we can clearly see from the 
diffusion patterns of new technologies, of lower social status, with an as-
sociated lower income and level of education. Medium- term developments 
may lead to a dichotomized social body made of, on the one hand, wealth-
ier, better educated, and new literates having the skills and the means to 
access and use iCts and, on the other hand, poorer, less educated, and new 
illiterates kept out of the new tech scene and deprived of most technolo-
gies and hence denied access to an increasing amount of information and 
culture. hence, the need for new forms of media education.
furthermore, in order to promote participation, it is important to re-
inforce independent and pluralistic media. for media to be able to offer a 
critical view of government, political and economic systems must enable 
the media to operate in as open a public sphere as possible. Press freedom 
is never guaranteed, particularly when media industries are commercial-
ized, even in a democracy. apart from creating the appropriate political 
and economic environments for an independent media system, it is crucial 
to educate journalists to the highest ethical and professional standards pos-
sible. how to deal with a permanent overload of information will be the 
key challenge for journalists and citizens alike, and how to regulate this 
in a democratic way will be the challenge for public authorities (servaes, 
2005). for both journalists and citizens the capacity and speed to access, 
retrieve, select, and reproduce information and turn it into knowledge will 
determine power and facilitate change in the age of globalization.
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Professional Models in Journalism
Between Homogenization and Diversity
Paolo Mancini
this chapter is focused on the discussion of the possible contradiction 
between the homogenization and fragmentation of professional models 
in journalism following our Comparing Media Systems (hallin & Mancini, 
2004). one of the most frequent criticisms raised about our book concerns 
the homogenization hypothesis that we discussed in the last chapter of the 
book. We observed that in all the countries that we analyzed, a clear ten-
dency was emerging: most of the differences in professional journalism ob-
servable in the second part of last century were disappearing or had already 
disappeared. Professional journalism in the 18 countries of our study was 
becoming closer to what we had defined as the north atlantic or liberal 
model, particularly as practiced in the united states and in great britain, 
and that other authors had already defined as the liberal model (Curran, 
1991; Waisbord, 2000) or the anglo- american model (Chalaby, 1996). all 
those features (partisanship, comment orientation, elite press, and so forth) 
that could be observed in other models, being very different from those 
that were inherent to the liberal model, were progressively disappearing. 
in particular, we stressed how the level of partisanship clearly found in 
most of continental journalism in europe up to the 1980s was dramatically 
decreasing.
i still believe that, yes, the tendency toward homogenization character-
izes most of the professional models in western european countries, but, if 
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we look beyond that part of the world, i have to admit that, no, that same 
tendency is not so clearly emerging; rather, it is openly contradicted. in 
the final chapter of Comparing Media Systems, we stressed that because of 
increasing commercialization and the secularization of society, which led 
to the decline of traditional mass parties in favor of more individualized, 
media- centered forms of political mobilization, and the consequence of 
technological innovation, the differences that up to few years before had 
marked professional journalism in Western democracies were disappearing.
the development of the european union and then the attention de-
voted to the formation of a single, unified economic market have favored 
the exchange of experiences, fostering the adoption of one single pro-
fessional model. these changes can be seen as pushing european media 
systems closer to the liberal model, centered around commercial media 
and mostly information- oriented journalism in which market forces are 
dominant, as well as are more individualized forms of political commu-
nication, which are rooted in the culture of marketing and consumption. 
these forces are significant in most of the rest of the world as well but not 
to the extent that a unique, unifying model of professional journalism is 
emerging.
on the contrary, in many parts of the world beyond the Western one, 
journalism appears to be something completely different from what most 
of the scholarly community assumes it ought to be. it is not just that the 
professional procedures of the dominant Western model of professional 
journalism (neutral journalism, the separation between news and com-
ment, accuracy, and so forth) do not exist and are not applied, but journal-
ism itself, its own raison d’être, is something else from what it is expected 
to be in the Western world.
even if journalists perceive that there exists a dominant model of jour-
nalism whose practices and principles are spreading around the world, even 
if they may claim to follow and to apply this normative framework, nev-
ertheless in their everyday activity they perform in a completely different 
way. at least there exists a gap between the theory of journalism and its 
everyday practice. a very vivid picture of this contradiction has been given 
by silvio Waisbord (2000):
even if we consider the liberal model in its own terms, without ad-
dressing the adequacy of its theoretical bases and prescriptions for the 
existence of a democratic press, it is obvious that its chances of becom-
ing effective were at odds with south american politics. its visibility 
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in public discourse contrasted with the realities of press systems. its 
prospects ran against conditions that differed glaringly from original 
contexts coupled with questionable commitment of press barons. it 
was improbable that a liberal press would develop in antiliberal capi-
talist societies, considering that owners rhetorically exalted liberalism 
but ceaselessly courted states, supported military interventions and 
only (and vociferously) criticized government intrusion that affected 
their own political and economic interests.” (p. 51)
With this statement, Waisbord touches on many points that need to be 
discussed at length, focusing around one major question: the difference 
between what journalism is supposed to be in our Western view and what 
journalism is in real practice in many other parts of the world.
another reason for abandoning the idea of professional homogeniza-
tion is the increasing fragmentation of the media system. there are two 
main aspects to be considered: the increasing commercialization of the 
media system, and technological innovation. the first point is very well il-
lustrated by the experience of fox news: to compete within a very crowded 
market and essentially to compete with its most direct competitor, Cnn, 
fox news has clearly chosen its own market niche composed mostly of 
conservative people. rupert Murdoch’s television network offers a product 
that fits very well with the expectations of a conservative audience whose 
beliefs have been pushed even further rightward by reactions to President 
obama’s health care reform and by the tea Party movement. the ideal 
of neutral, objective, detached journalism is progressively disappearing on 
fox news.
of course, the commercialization process was already well developed 
when we wrote Comparing Media Systems. indeed, elihu Katz had written 
that article with the very appealing title “and deliver us from segmenta-
tion” (Katz, 1996) in which he pointed out that, because of the segmenta-
tion of the market linked to the process of commercialization, there was 
the risk of the disappearance of the wider public sphere, including all the 
different interests acting in the society, in which all these different voices 
could meet and discuss problems of general interest. in 1992 daniel hal-
lin himself had written another paper in which he discussed the possible 
weakening of that strong ideology of neutrality and objectivity that char-
acterized u.s. journalism in the ’60s and ’70s because of the increasing 
fragmentation of the mass media market.
today, the internet, and technological innovation in general, pushes 
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even further the process of fragmentation: blogs and social networks favor 
the birth and the development of “micro” niches of users who are drawn 
together by a common affiliation and by the sharing of common feelings, 
interests, habits, and beliefs. these “virtual communities,” as rheingold 
(2000) has named them, introduce specific practices and routines that very 
often are of very particular nature and that, moreover, are aimed at rein-
forcing a common affiliation and pre- existing feelings and opinions.
all these observations underscore the importance of abandoning the 
traditional Western- centrism of media studies (and, more important, the 
Western- centrism that very often directs professional education in journal-
ism), the assumption that Western journalism, what Jean Chalaby (1996) 
defines as the anglo- american model, is journalism. in many parts of the 
world journalism is something completely different and the tendency to-
ward the adoption of a unique professional model today seems to be con-
tradicted both by increasing commercialization and the internet.
Instrumentalization and the Diffusion  
of the Polarized- Pluralist Model
in a very general way it could be said that if we observe countries beyond 
the Western world, journalism is no longer an instrument to spread news 
but, first of all, it is an instrument to take an active part in the decision- 
making process, to intervene in the public arena, to influence not just the 
construction of a consensus but the actions of government, to promote 
the interests, both economic and political, of the groups that own the me-
dia outlets. in Comparing Media Systems we used the word “instrumental-
ization” to stress that, contrary to the mythical idea of liberal journalism, 
whose main goal ought to be the construction of an informed citizen, in 
many parts of the world the diffusion of news is exactly an “instrument” 
to reach particular goals that do not pertain solely to the distribution of 
knowledge within a community. in particular, our study found that instru-
mentalization was to be found in the so- called Mediterranean or polarized- 
pluralist model.
in a written comment after his first reading of Comparing Media Systems, 
stylianos Papathanassopoulos, one of our greek colleagues whom we had 
asked to comment on the initial draft of our book, reported a widely cir-
culated statement among the political community in greece: when a new 
government is established politicians aiming at important government po-
sitions are not afraid to tell the appointee prime minister: “if you don’t give 
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me a ministry, i [will] start a newspaper.”  We defined “instrumentalization 
as the control of the media by outside actors, parties, politicians, social 
groups or movements, or economic actors, seeking political influence, who 
use them to intervene in the world of politics” (hallin & Mancini, 2004, 
p. 37). in this case the candidate minister who is starting a newspaper, or 
threatening to do so, is not at all interested in spreading news and in fa-
cilitating the distribution of knowledge. he wants to start a newspaper to 
be used against the prime minister who has not given him the opportunity 
to become a minister in the government. he is not interested either in 
fostering political participation or in narrowing the links between political 
actors and citizens. he is just interested in influencing the decision- making 
process to better guarantee his own interests and, in this case, to get a posi-
tion of high responsibility.
this attitude seems very widespread outside the Western world. as to 
russia, svetlana Pasti has written, “Like ordinary people, journalists must 
manage through common sense and effort to find a niche in the new pros-
perous russia. therefore they serve the interests of those who possess po-
litical and economic capital, i.e. the state and business elite” (Pasti, 2005, 
p. 109). outside eastern europe, the situation doesn’t seem to be very dif-
ferent: discussing journalism in southeast asia, duncan McCargo writes, 
“in short, rapid economic growth and rapid social change gives media a 
heightened political salience, and empowers media to be much more po-
tent political actors in their own right than has generally been the case in 
the West” (McCargo, 2012). in most of the cases instrumentalization is 
linked to clientelism as Chin- Chuan Lee has demonstrated as to the media 
in taiwan (Lee, 2000).
What has been described in these previous statements was characteristic 
of Western journalism when it was born and it still represents an important 
reason for its existence today in many parts of the world. instrumentaliza-
tion is one of the main features of what we have defined as the “Mediter-
ranean or polarized- pluralist model”: in the view of many scholars who 
refer to our interpretive schema, the polarized- pluralist model seems to be 
a widely diffused  model outside the Western world, with its strong preva-
lence of partisan media, a tendency to instrumentalization of the media by 
political and economic elites and their use as tools of bargaining and ma-
neuvering among those elites, frequent state intervention and involvement 
in the media system, lesser development of journalistic professionalism, 
and lower newspaper circulation.
but there is no doubt that even the polarized- pluralist model may as-
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sume very particular forms beyond the Western world. in most cases, it 
mixes with a dramatic influence of mass media commercialization, very 
close to the competitive situation that is possible to observe in the liberal 
model and the already quoted influence of the ideal principles of liberal 
professionalism. these principles could direct the behavior of reporters if 
they don’t clash with their everyday activities, which are also determined 
by the instrumentalization practices that we just discussed. but in most 
cases the principles of liberal journalism constitute a sort of “false ideol-
ogy” of the profession (false as in most cases it is not really applicable) that 
is taught in schools, that is illustrated in textbooks, and that, in omes way 
or another, constitutes a continuous reference for all discussions around 
the profession, influencing both those who are already part of it, those who 
want to enter it, and those who interact with it in different ways. in this way 
a situation of hybridization may emerge. i shall return to this later.
Political Parallelism beyond the Western World
the forms that the polarized- pluralist model of journalism assumes be-
yond the Western world may be different from what was possible, and still 
is possible, to observe in some of the countries studied in Comparing Media 
Systems. one of the major differences seems to lie in the experience of mass 
parties that was so important in the european context (and in a minor 
degree in the united states too);  political parallelism was one of the most 
important features affecting the relationship between media and politics 
in our polarized- pluralist model. both the experience of mass parties and 
the idea of political parallelism are deeply tied to the particular political 
history of western europe and can hardly be observable beyond that area. 
indeed, in western europe there were patterns of development centered 
around multiparty democracy, built around the competition of mass parties 
and other organized groups, such as unions,that are rooted in broad socio-
economic interests. european mass parties historically have represented 
the most important means to participate in the life of the community and 
to address problems of general interest. they have had a strong influence 
in many processes of socialization, including the mass media, which in the 
strongest forms of party- press parallelism played the roles of diffusing po-
litical “faith” and information to members and of reinforcing and linking 
together the organization of the party. the mass party systems of west-
ern europe provided a clear structure to political conflict mostly centered 
around the Left- right spectrum, and media tended to have stable rela-
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tionships with these groups, or stable ideological identities rooted in their 
conflicts, or both. the print media in most of the West, and the broadcast 
media in many countries, were born within this framework of ideological 
links and affiliations.
but this is a very particular political history. in other countries political 
parties tend to be relatively shallow and transient: they do not have deep 
social roots or clear ideological identities; they tend to appear and disap-
pear very quickly; neither voters nor political leaders have strong, stable 
attachments to them. in many cases we face personalized parties, with po-
litical organizations, in most cases very weak organizations, built around 
the figure of a single politician or businessman who decides to enter the 
political arena for specific goals and interests. a very good prototype of this 
is represented by berlusconi’s Popolo della libertà. this is a party without 
a real organizational structure that is dependent on the symbolic, charis-
matic, and economic resources of its founder. similar structures may be 
found in many other countries as well and particularly in eastern europe 
and in asia.
in many parts of the world the specific kind of political parallelism 
that was tied to the historical experience of mass parties is today replaced 
by completely different forms of parallelisms. news media overlap with 
a range of different organizations: with ethnic or religious organizations 
that very often represent interests that are not just based on ethnicity and 
religion but that also embrace political and economic constituencies or in-
terests. very often news media overlap with different forms of business or-
ganizations and interests to the point that, mostly in relationship to central 
and eastern europe, scholars have described this as “business parallelism” 
(ornebring, 2010). this is a very complex form of instrumentalization, also 
observable in Western countries, that mixes together business, politics, and 
the news media within a system of reciprocal clientelistic links, with recip-
rocal advantages and disadvantages. as Colin sparks has observed, “there 
exist a close set of relations between politicians, businessmen and the me-
dia that leads to a routine interchange between different groups in post- 
communist countries” (sparks, 2000, p. 42). sparks himself defines “politi-
cal capital” as the “overlapping between economics, politics and the media” 
(sparks, 2000, p. 42).
not differently, duncan McCargo uses the formula “partisan polyva-
lence” to indicate the weakness of traditional political parallelism and how 
the media in east asia may be used for (and may be instrumentalized by) 
a multiplicity of different goals, such as supporting one political figure (or 
one political program) and pursuing business goals at the same time. the 
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news media can also shift from one goal to another in a very brief period of 
time without losing their traditional formula and readership.
alina Mungiu Pippidi has been studying corruption for many years and 
she argues that “in societies based on particularism rather than free com-
petition media outlets are not ordinary business ventures. rather, investors 
use their channels for blackmail or for trading influence” (Mungiu Pippidi, 
2010, p. 126). and alena v. Ledeneva confirms this: “[t]he black Pr dis-
course is symptomatic of a situation where certain defects of formal institu-
tions, weakness of political parties, lack of independent media, disrespect 
for the law create incentives for informal practices to spread” (Ledeneva, 
2004, p. 36). Peter gross adds that “the profit making incentive of some 
media owners was simply married to the political use of the media, which is 
to say, some media owners are also politicians” (gross, 2003, p. 87).
so, if we look beyond the Western world, what we see is that the news 
media play a mixture of different roles within which the provision of news 
and the goal of facilitating an informed citizen are not the major objectives. 
they undergo different forms of parallelism: the traditional political paral-
lelism, which was characteristic of many news outlets in the Western world 
in past years, is not the most important one, and very frequently it mixes 
with “business parallelism.”
the idea of “political parallelism” presupposes the existence of strong 
party organizations that are active in different sectors including the pro-
duction of news. but, and this is the main difference, the experience of mass 
parties is a Western experience, deeply rooted in Western history and in 
the economic context within which they were born and developed. they 
are the product of specific economic, social, and cultural conditions that 
do not exist or are very different beyond the Western world today. they 
are— better, they were— the product of those “cleavages” that character-
ized the european situation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
that motivated their existence.
of course, political parties exist beyond the Western world but they 
are very different organizations: as already said, very often they assume 
the form and the structure of “personal parties” built around the figure of 
one single politician and around the specific interests and symbolic con-
notations of this single figure. their ideological dimension is very weak. 
the system of common values that was at the very root of european mass 
parties does not exist either, and therefore a “culture” to be transmitted is 
almost completely absent. news media are not means to socialize people to 
the culture of their own group.
in other situations, party organizations are weak and volatile: they are 
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established for particular goals and under particular contingencies but 
when these contingencies disappear, the parties, too, suddenly either dis-
appear or change their nature and name. this is what has happened very 
frequently in eastern europe, where the shift from communism to democ-
racy has given rise to a situation of uncertainty and continuous change in 
which stable party organizations have not been able to develop. Parties are 
not broadly inclusive organizations and the number of members is lim-
ited: they act essentially at the electoral moment, thus confirming the well- 
known typology of angelo Panebianco and the existence of the so- called 
electoral- professional party (Panebianco, 1998) supported by professionals 
in the field of communication, press, advertising, and being active just in 
the moment of an election campaign. this form of party organization also 
confirms the instrumental role of the news media: they are mostly used at 
election time when they have to produce consensus around single politi-
cal figures or specific political programs and proposals, but stable political 
parallelism doesn’t exist because stable and strong political organizations 
don’t exist either. religious parties are very common beyond the Western 
world; in their experience, too, parallelism assumes forms very different 
from those that it is possible to observe in europe.
About the Nature of the State
another important difference between what it is possible to observe in 
the Western world and what is observable beyond the Western world as 
to the relationship between politics and news media lies in the very na-
ture of the state. We are used to referencing the existence and the activity 
of news media to our specific idea of the state and then to the question 
of its government. indeed, following the thesis of the polarized- pluralist 
model, in many countries in the Western world the relationship between 
state and news media is very strict: news media are an instrument for dif-
ferent organizations to compete for government within a stable and con-
solidated state organization. in the polarized- pluralist model and in the 
democratic- corporatist model too, news media are strongly connected to 
the state. they depend on it not just for rules ensuring their freedom but 
also for a framework of different interventions aimed at making possible a 
better and more comprehensive pluralism and therefore making possible, 
also through economic subsidies, the existence of papers and other media 
outlets representing the voice of different minority organizations. very of-
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ten this is an occasion through which parties in government try to shape 
and to influence news media to get more support for their actions.
but the form of state we are referring to is very rare beyond the West-
ern world: in many countries and in many parts of the world, including in 
eastern europe (where we have a large amount of evidence), the state is still 
something that has to be constructed in a stable and consolidated manner. 
first, it is not a unitary actor behaving in an organized and homogeneous 
way (grzymala- busse & Jones- Luong, 2002; McCargo, 2012), as we often 
assume in the Western world. it includes many different parts that very 
often act in a contradictory way and not rarely compete and struggle with 
each other. very often, rather than “nation building” we face a situation 
of “state building,” as the existing state is weak, is contradictory, and often 
acts in a confusing way. this is what is possible to observe in most of the 
so- called transitional democracies: “oligarchs, political parties and presi-
dent on one hand and international financial institutions or regional trade 
associations on the other, all have access to the nascent state structures and 
exert considerable pressures on the process of state formation” (grzymala- 
busse & Jones- Luong, 2002, p. 533).
the construction of the state is a question of struggle among elites. in 
this situation the state can’t play any role in facilitating a free market of 
ideas and pluralism, neither stressing freedom of the press nor its neutral-
ity, as we assume it ought to do. rather, news media are used instrumen-
tally by the different elites to compete for the formation and the control of 
the state. in this situation, as we have seen, political parallelism is just one 
of the many components that direct the behavior of the media.
in an opposite way, there are social contexts in which the state plays 
a much more important role that not rarely ends in censorship, and this 
doesn’t just apply to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes but also to many 
young democracies as well. as McCargo (2012) argues:
the dominant order of state- media relations, especially as regards 
electronic media, is that states interfere wherever they can. this 
is particularly true in middle- income developing countries, where 
newspaper readership is typically low, yet most people have ready 
access to television and radio. but the idea of state intervention is 
also complicated by questions concerning the nature of the state 
itself. in many developing countries, the state has a patrimonial 
character and is used as a vehicle for rent- seeking. in other words, 
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the state or certain elements thereof has been captured by private, 
elite interests. in great swathes of the developing world, the much- 
vaunted distinction between public and private, on which so many 
heuristic categories and so much of the basic tool kit of social sci-
ence relies, turns out to be something of an urban myth. under such 
circumstances, state intervention in media is the norm rather than 
the exception. the same applies to censorship: rather than imagin-
ing that media is free to report whatever it wishes, unless subject to 
specific external interference, in much of the world it is safe to as-
sume that such freedom is always highly contingent. (p. 213)
very often, both in the newborn democracies in the moment of “state 
building” and in those countries on the path toward democracy where a 
strong state already exists, there is mixture of formal and informal rules that 
doesn’t facilitate an independent and neutral role for the media. indeed, in 
these situations the media are part of the many negotiation practices that 
take place among elites as the space for reciprocal accommodation exists 
because of either the prevalence of informal rules or the contradiction that 
often exists between formal and informal rules (borocz, 2000; Park, Kim, 
& sohn, 2000; Ledeneva, 2004). in this case, too, the state can’t be that 
guarantor of press freedom and independence as it is assumed to be in the 
most classic liberal model.
the weakness of the state and its brutal intervention in limiting free-
dom of the press seems to be a characteristic in all those countries that are 
on the path toward democratization and in most transitional democracies 
(voltmer, 2012). the so- called developmental state (Clark, 2000) contra-
dicts our Western view of the state and its role also in regard to the news 
media. that framework of interventions, warrants, and attitudes that we 
expect in our view of the state should not be expected where this particular 
state doesn’t exist.
the discussion about the role of the state may be viewed also in a differ-
ent light. as the successful book by the english journalist John Kampfner 
(2010) has put before Western public opinion, in many countries, mostly 
in east asia, there is a completely different idea of both state and gov-
ernment and their role. in its attempt to improve the economic status of 
the country’s citizens the state can limit press freedom and influence the 
behavior of the news media to establish that harmony whose roots are to 
be found in Confucian philosophy (gunaratne, 1999). the possibility of 
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criticism by the media is therefore limited to pursuing harmony in the 
press- government relationship that may persuade citizens to be part of a 
society in which conflicts are rare and are not welcome, and in which they 
are stimulated to collaborate to reach the common good and to improve 
the life conditions of the entire community.
this is a completely different view from the Western idea of the state, 
where, on the contrary, the role of the press is rooted in the oppositional 
design that allots to journalists the duty to control and limit the power 
of the rulers. as is well known, this interpretation of the role of the press 
is not just part of professional education and everyday professional prac-
tice in the so- called liberal model, but it was clearly stressed by Jürgen 
habermas (1989), who, as niklas Luhmann (1998) has pointed out, saw 
the birth of the public sphere as an instrument of the struggle between the 
absolute power of the king and the newborn needs of the bourgeoisie. this 
view, very much rooted in Western political philosophy, could be enlarged 
to understand, still in the oppositional logic, the relationship between the 
press and the rulers in today’s society. the press found, and is still finding, 
its primary goal in the attempt to control power holders. in Western world 
common sense and in the professional culture of the journalists this op-
positional view of the relationship between the press and the government 
has produced the well- known catchword of “watch- dog” journalism. this 
may have a hard time in contexts where, on the contrary, a different view of 
this relationship prevails that is based on the Confucian harmonic design.
Which Interpretive Categories?
With this, we have reached a central point and it seems necessary to revive 
an old concept that has been used for many years: “cultural imperialism.” 
in this case, these words aren’t about the export of meaning and cultural 
product, as they were in the original work of herbert schiller and his fol-
lowers, but they concern the interpretive frameworks we apply to look at 
realities beyond the Western world. it is not easy to admit this, but there 
is a cultural imperialism that is linked to our own work as scholars and, 
specifically, as media scholars. very frequently we pretend to observe re-
alities beyond our own using our own interpretive categories, which are 
taken, as Curran and Park already observed in 2000, from “a tiny handful 
of countries” (Curran & Park, 2000, p. 3). “the tiny handful of countries” 
refers to our Western experience. therefore, for instance, we assume that 
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the idea of the mass party that was (and partially still is) so influential in 
Western history is some sort of universal category that is possible to apply 
everywhere, as mass parties represent the principal instrument for political 
participation and for the life of democracy and also affect journalistic per-
formance. equally, very often it is assumed that the state as we have expe-
rienced it in the Western world is the only possible form of state, whereas, 
instead, this idea of the state is profoundly rooted in specific historical con-
ditions. the idea of “democracy” itself, as developed in the Western world, 
may be questioned by different frameworks of cultural values and histori-
cal conditions. this point has been  discussed by political scientists and 
particularly by all those who have criticized samuel huntington’s thesis on 
democratization.
in other words, in the field of media studies, as in many other social 
scientific fields, very often it is assumed that our history is the history. on 
the basis of our particular experience and the interpretive categories that 
“this specific history” produced we can observe and interpret social reali-
ties that come from completely or partially different experiences. Most of 
the time, to be culturally correct, we don’t pretend to export our models 
of how things ought to be done; we are not normative at that point, but, 
perhaps unconsciously, we observe different realities with our own eyes. 
undoubtedly, we suffer from an almost unavoidable Western bias. With 
regard to the news media, we are not only pushed to believe that what-
ever deviation from the ideal type we have constructed on the basis of our 
own experience has to be interpreted as degeneration or bad functioning, 
but we apply our interpretive categories to realities where these categories 
don’t find room. in part, this is almost unavoidable: the categories that we 
apply cannot but be based on our own history and experience. to avoid this 
sort of “interpretive imperialism” we could abstain from analyzing coun-
tries beyond our own experience, but there is no doubt that this does not 
serve scientific inquiry.
Could we avoid stating that clientelism is clientelism wherever it oc-
curs? that corruption is corruption everywhere? again, avoiding these 
sorts of statements would badly serve scientific inquiry. nevertheless, we 
have to be aware that to interpret these phenomena correctly we have to 
place them within the set of particular conditions within which they devel-
oped in each part of the world. Journalism doesn’t grow up in a vacuum: it 
is the product of specific historical, economic, social, and cultural condi-
tions that have very local roots.
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Journalism Culture as a “Shortcut” to Avoid Our Western Bias
indeed, as a conclusion to this paper, i would like to advance the idea of 
journalism culture as a possible means to avoid our almost unavoidable 
“Western bias.” indeed, the concept of “journalism culture,” at least in the 
way in which it is conceived in this chapter, may be useful because it of-
fers two advantages. first, it allows journalism to be placed in the widest 
social and political context in which it develops. the idea of journalism 
culture may include all those technical skills and practices necessary for 
everyday work and the assumptions of a very broad nature regarding the 
political culture of each country and the role of professional journalism 
within this set of expectations. unlike other professions, such as medicine 
or engineering, journalism is not a neutral, aseptic profession that can be 
separated from the surrounding social, cultural, and political reality. Like 
many other professions, journalism is made up of skills that we could define 
as being technical and specialist, but their cultural and political dimension 
is so important and their relationships with other social subsystems are 
so frequent and profound that it is impossible to isolate the specific type 
of professionalism from the society in which it develops. for this reason, 
the concept of journalism culture not only allows us to view journalism 
as a profession, with its own routines, practices, and specific ethics (that 
can have some sort of universal nature), but also to link this profession to 
the country’s more general culture and especially to its political culture. 
indeed, journalism doesn’t grow up in a vacuum. this simple, almost com-
monplace statement is shared by many scholars and, nevertheless, most 
of the time it remains a sort of dead letter that doesn’t produce any fur-
ther interpretive improvement. since the classic Four Theories of the Press, 
many media scholars have stressed the need to place journalism within a 
broader context. at the very beginning of their book, siebert, Peterson, 
and schramm wrote in 1956: “the thesis of this volume is that the press 
always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political struc-
tures within which it operates. especially it reflects the system of social 
control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted” 
(siebert, Peterson, & schramm, 1956, p. 1). nevertheless, as some critics 
have pointed out (nerone, 1995), Four Theories of the Press seems to assume 
one model, the libertarian model and its “social responsibility” derivation, 
as a sort of ideal model independently from the surrounding social context; 
at least it is conceived as the one that constitutes the basis for the evalu-
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ation of all the others. an interpretive category, rooted in Western world 
experience, has become the category to interpret and to judge journalism 
in other parts of the world. on the same path as siebert, Peterson, and sch-
ramm is herbert gans, who concluded his seminal work Deciding What’s 
News with these words: “this study has, thus far, ignored the intriguing 
possibility that journalists and their firms are pawns of larger and more ba-
sic social processes to which they unwittingly respond. Perhaps journalists 
perform unintended or unrecognized (latent) functions for the nation and 
society as a whole which are necessary enough to force journalists to act as 
they do” (gans, 1979, p. 290).
all these statements and many others (schudson, 1995; Cook, 2006; 
hanusch, 2009) have not been followed by studies and interpretations that 
have placed journalism within the social contexts in which it develops. 
in most cases, in Western media studies, journalism has been studied as 
a closed system in itself; the stated connections with the broader society 
have been forgotten and very few works have been able to address them in 
a productive way. Journalism procedures, routines, and professionalization 
processes have been analyzed as if it were possible to abstract them from 
each single social context. Progressively, mass media have been studied in 
themselves and this attitude has grown with the development of the me-
dia studies field that has produced, on the one hand, a positive academic 
autonomy from other scientific fields, but, on the other, has separated the 
mass media from their social and political context, undermining a better 
understanding of their functioning.
the second reason to prefer the expression “journalism culture” is that 
this concept may represent a very useful tool for comparative research be-
cause, at least in the sense i’m proposing it, it is deeply rooted in the dif-
ferent national contexts that can therefore confront each other (hanitzsch, 
2007). but in spite of its importance, the concept of journalism culture is 
very hard to study empirically. different proposals have been advanced 
to catch it empirically (servaes, 1999; hanitzsch, 2007), but the difficulty 
remains. this concept is multifaceted, maybe contradictory in its different 
aspects, and is difficult to transform into quantitative indicators; it deals 
with factors of cultural and emotional nature that the people we interview 
in our studies rarely are willing to express freely and sincerely. the com-
plexity of this concept is very well synthetized by the expression that rich-
ard hoggart used several years ago to introduce Bad News. he used the 
expression “the cultural air we breathe” in the light of the specific topic of 
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that book and to indicate how news, and its interpretation, has to be placed 
within a framework of a sort of common sense that tells us that “some 
things can be said and others had best not to be said” (hoggart, 1981). Mi-
chael schudson has further developed his idea: “hoggart has written that 
the most important filter through which news is constructed is the cultural 
air we breathe, the whole ideological atmosphere of our society, which tells 
us that some things can be said and that others had best not to be said. 
that cultural air is one that in part ruling groups and institutions create 
but it is in part one in whose context their own establishment takes place” 
(schudson, 2005, p. 189). some years before this sentence schudson him-
self had already pointed out the importance of the cultural environment 
within which journalists work: “the news then is produced by people who 
operate often unwittingly within a cultural system, a reservoir of stored 
cultural meanings and patterns of discourse. . . . news as a form of culture 
incorporates assumptions about what matters, what makes sense, what time 
and place we live in, what range of considerations we should take seriously” 
(schudson, 1995, p. 14).
this cultural heritage is what permeates journalism culture and prac-
tices everywhere; it is the product of history and particular social, cultural, 
economic, and political conditions. this heritage is very hard to observe 
empirically and it is almost impossible to define in precise terms. it is “the 
cultural air we breathe”: something that is in the air, that is volatile, that 
goes with the wind, and that, nevertheless, is there in that specific place 
where we breathe it.
the concept of journalism culture may be very useful in understand-
ing why our word today is “hybridization” (norris & inglehart, 2009). on 
the one hand, globalization is something that nobody can deny. Journal-
ists practice a profession that has some kind of universal nature and this 
universal nature goes around the entire world through movies, textbooks, 
seminars, global events, education, media ownership, media concentration, 
and so forth. this universal nature is first of all rooted in the idea (and 
practice) of news as a good for the market, news as a product to be sold 
and to be consumed. today, market and news are strictly interrelated as 
they were when the idea of the “marketplace of ideas” was born in the 
Western world. this universal nature takes shape essentially in a whole of 
professional rules, and may be identified in what is called the liberal model 
of professional journalism. the influence of the liberal model of journal-
ism is something very hard to deny: it depends on the strong tendency 
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toward commercialization but also on the influence that Western thought 
(and our own scholarship and education efforts) exercises consciously and 
unconsciously.
nevertheless, the universal nature of journalism takes shape in relation 
to the different cultural contexts where it occurs. as barbie Zelizer puts it, 
“despite the prevalence of arguments of journalism’s universal nature, the 
culture of journalism presupposes that journalistic conventions, routines 
and practices are dynamic and contingent on situational and historical cir-
cumstances” (Zelizer, 2005, p. 211). this is the reason why many authors, 
in connection to the interpretive framework proposed in Comparing Media 
Systems, have talked of a situation of hybridization (voltmer, 2012; dobek- 
ostrowska, 2012; Chadwick, 2013) between what we defined as the liberal 
model of professional journalism and the polarized- pluralist model where 
we found that instrumentalization was, and still is, a very  common fea-
ture. indeed, if one looks beyond the Western world the set of conditions 
that feature the polarized- pluralist model seem to construct the common 
framework even if with specific features that vary country by country.
the liberal professional model mixes together with local conditions, 
producing a hybrid that we tend to look at and to interpret on the basis 
of our Western categories. in some ways the hybridization between the 
liberal and the polarized- pluralism model that, following our Comparing 
Media Systems, is seen by several scholars as the most appropriate model 
to explain professional journalism beyond the Western world, may suffer 
from the Western bias deriving from the application to different realities of 
categories that are deeply rooted in the Western experience within which 
they were conceived.
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Conditions of Capital:  
Global Media in Local Contexts
Michael Curtin
allow me to begin with an alternative proposition: the field of interna-
tional communication studies doesn’t need “internationalizing,” at least so 
far as film and media studies are concerned. from the beginning, film stud-
ies has been thoroughly international, both theoretically and epistemologi-
cally. it conceived of cinema as a cultural phenomenon of modern nation- 
states and set out to delineate the distinctive features of national cinemas, 
comparing each against the others. Concerned about the intrusive impact 
of hollywood exports on societies around the world, film scholars sought 
to counterbalance it with a profound and ongoing appreciation of french, 
egyptian, and indian cinemas, among others (nowell- smith, 1999). they 
celebrated the growth of international film festivals, supported national 
film policies, and developed an impressive ensemble of university courses 
and textbooks that sustained and explained the distinctive histories and 
practices of national cinemas worldwide. More recently, scholars have chal-
lenged and interrogated the national cinemas model (hjort & Mackenzie, 
2000; vitali & Willemen, 2006; durovicova & newman, 2010), but film 
scholarship nevertheless remains anchored to national points of reference.
similar observations could be made about studies of publishing and 
electronic media. harold innis (1972), a founding figure, wrote expansive 
histories of communication from the very dawn of human history to the 
modern era, describing the communicative features of empires, theocra-
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cies, and feudal regimes, but when it came to the modern era, his analysis 
focused on national media systems situated within an international con-
text. he reflected on power imbalances and transborder flows, but largely 
he compared and contrasted the distinguishing features of national media. 
others followed this lead, which is understandable given the significant 
influence of sociology on the field of communications. sociological para-
digms were built on the assumption that communication was largely a na-
tional systemic concern, and in those situations where it breached national 
borders it was explored as a disruptive or transgressive influence. this led 
to the most common and enduring conception of transnational communi-
cation as media imperialism, an insidious menace that raised the specter of 
cultural homogenization on a global scale. even today, critics point to the 
ubiquity of american media products such as Batman, CSI, and Lady gaga, 
and they portray the world’s masses as vulnerable, even gullible, subjects in 
a circuit of culture that feeds corporate conglomerates and impoverishes 
national modes of expression and public life (schiller, 1969; guback, 1969; 
Miller et al., 2008). Many scholars and government policy makers have ar-
gued that national governments and international institutions are the best 
hope for containing the imperial tide, pointing to policies that limit im-
ports, foster indigenous production, and promote responsible citizenship 
(Mcbride, 1980).
so perhaps we need not internationalize our scholarly endeavors so 
much as we should explore alternative approaches to the issues raised 
above. to what extent are national frameworks and perspectives useful, or 
to what extent do they obscure recent trends engendered by media glo-
balization? global studies researchers proceed from a different set of as-
sumptions, acknowledging the enduring significance of national systems 
and expressing concern about the unequal distribution of economic and 
cultural power, but this school of thought moves beyond a foundational 
focus on national concerns to explore the interactive dynamics that unfold 
at a variety of levels. these scholars say media globalization has no uniform 
logic and no central command center but is rather a push- pull process with 
many unexpected outcomes (tomlinson, 1999). the interactions between 
global, national, and local institutions are therefore radically contextual 
and complex. researchers point to examples of local media competing with 
dominant global counterparts in many parts of the globe, and they pay at-
tention to the ways that popular culture appropriates, reconfigures, and re-
interprets global hegemonic texts. although conscious of systemic patterns 
of power, global studies scholars are especially alert to local contingencies, 
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differences, and disjunctures (appadurai, 1996). they see the world less 
as a mosaic of interlocking and discrete national entities than as a col-
lage of diverse, layered, and transversal elements. they furthermore argue 
that national governments are not necessarily the best antidote to global-
ization, since they too are characterized by unequal structures of power 
that advance the interests of elites through the fabrication of supposedly 
indigenous values and cultural artifacts. With respect to China, these re-
searchers are quick to point out the many internal differences that belie 
the fiction of national unity as promoted by the Communist Party (e.g., 
Pan, 2010). global studies scholars therefore acknowledge that national 
political action can be a site for contesting cultural domination from afar 
but they also aim to uncover other important locations of cultural struggle 
and to explain them within the context of globalization.
although the foregoing approaches differ in significant ways, they share 
a set of central research questions with respect to modern media: What are 
the relations between global, national, and local institutions? What are the 
patterns of dominance and subordination? Where are the centers of cre-
ativity and cultural power? how do these relations of power affect creative 
workers and media users? how do they affect the socio- cultural fortunes 
of human communities? What are the essential principles that inform the 
production, circulation, and social uses of modern media? such questions 
are implicitly spatial, which helps to explain persistent concerns about 
boundaries and relationships. yet it is curious that spatial concerns are not 
more explicitly foregrounded in communications research. if film and me-
dia scholars were to do so, they might place more emphasis on the study of 
cities, and in particular the study of port cities, rather than the study of na-
tions. this might present us with different ways of thinking about cultural 
power in the contemporary global media environment.
in ancient and medieval times, imperial regimes exerted their influ-
ence across space by subduing local populations and building alliances 
with groups that controlled strategic fortresses, towns, and cities. this was 
superseded by the modern system of states that were predicated on the es-
tablishment of fixed political boundaries and the internal cultivation of na-
tional populations. under both systems, political and cultural power often 
coincided so that centers of creative activity developed around the centers 
of political rule. but capitalism subsequently endowed many cities around 
the world with resources that grew from commercial and industrial activ-
ity rather than political power and military conquest. especially important 
in this regard were seafaring cities— such as bombay, Lagos, beirut, and 
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hong Kong— that functioned as centers of trade, finance, manufacturing, 
and culture.
Port cities often operated in between the grand empires or on the mar-
gins of powerful states. they were places where the exchange of goods, 
ideas, and cultural artifacts was the basis of metropolitan prosperity. as 
modern publications, movies, and sound recordings expanded the geo-
graphical range of popular media, these cities were especially well situated 
to facilitate the transversal circulation of cultural goods and influences. 
they became centers of regional media economies that transcended na-
tional borders and they furthermore served as launching pads for the circu-
lation of cultural products even further afield— bombay movies to the gulf 
states, african high life music to the americas, and Chinese wuxia (martial 
arts) novels to southeast asia. such cultural flows accelerated in the latter 
part of the twentieth century with the emergence of satellite television, 
digital recordings, and internet communication. at first, these new tech-
nologies seemed to serve the interests of Western media conglomerates 
based in hollywood, new york, and London, but over time they facilitated 
counter- flows within and between regions, and from the margins to the 
centers. these circulations also enabled new ways of thinking about one’s 
affinities with others and about one’s place in the world. some dreamed of 
life in hollywood but many others looked to cities like bombay and beirut 
with respect to fashion, culture, and lifestyle (Mitra, 2010). for those that 
were politically disempowered within their material locale, such cultural 
centers provided imaginary alternatives to the constraints and indignities 
they suffered in everyday life.
national governments were uneasy with cultural competition from afar, 
whether it came from hollywood or Mumbai, cities that i refer to as media 
capitals. and they grew even more unsettled as it became easier to circulate 
popular music and screen media in the digital era. at the same time that 
cultural products were moving more fluidly across national borders, so too 
were capital, technology, and commercial goods, eventually tying countries 
into an interdependent global economic system (harvey, 1990; Castells, 
1996). as states saw their cultural and economic sovereignty eroding, their 
decision- making and administrative power were similarly constrained by 
forces from afar. they felt pressure from dominant Western powers to al-
low transnational media to flow freely and they felt exasperated by a rising 
enthusiasm among their citizens for cultural options from afar. if govern-
ments tried to set import quotas on movies, consumers would turn to black 
market video discs. if states banned satellite dishes, audiences would turn 
to the internet. such developments helped to heighten tensions between 
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global hegemons, national governments, and port cities from which many 
transnational media products emanated.
as suggested above, these dynamics are not simply (inter)national, they 
are truly global: multidimensional, intersecting, conflictual, and systemic. 
they demand attention to national institutions and international relations 
but they also require the investigation of agents, forces, and locations be-
neath and between the nation- state. My recent research attempts to address 
these global cultural dynamics through the analysis of “media capital,” a 
concept that at once directs attention to the leading status of particular 
cities and to the principles and processes that promote the concentration 
of resources in specific locales (Curtin, 2004, forthcoming, in progress). in 
this essay, i focus on the struggles between the Chinese state and hong 
Kong film industry since the 1997 transfer of sovereignty, considering 
the spatial and power dynamics of their relationship in the past, present, 
and future. i inquire as to why the Chinese film industry has shifted its 
geographical center of gravity over time: from shanghai to singapore to 
hong Kong, and most recently to beijing. rather than a nationally rooted 
commercial cinema, the Chinese film industry has been mobile, dynamic, 
and transnational for much of its history. this example raises intriguing 
questions about the contested relations between global, national, and local 
media. but before turning to this particular case study, i explain the princi-
ples of media capital and then describe the institutional characteristics and 
enabling conditions that encourage media resources to accumulate in par-
ticular cities. i offer bombay as a fairly clear example of a successful media 
capital that operates relatively autonomously from the West. and finally, i 
turn to Chinese media, noting the rise and demise of hong Kong as a me-
dia capital and exploring the Chinese state’s role in disciplining its cultural 
competitor, as it endeavors to exert its “soft power” aspirations abroad. 
Compared to Mumbai, the Chinese case offers a contrasting example of a 
strong state battling for cultural supremacy at home and abroad. although 
the state has been arguably successful in many respects, the chapter con-
cludes by explaining that the principles of media capital suggest why, under 
current conditions, beijing is unlikely to become a media capital and un-
likely to extend its cultural influence globally or even regionally.
What Is Media Capital?
although the range of forces and factors at play are various and complex, 
one can nevertheless discern three key principles as playing a structuring 
role in screen industries around the world since the early twentieth cen-
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tury: (1) the logic of accumulation, (2) trajectories of creative migration, 
and (3) contours of socio- cultural variation.
the logic of accumulation is not unique to media industries, since all 
capitalist enterprises exhibit innately dynamic and expansionist tendencies. 
as david harvey (2001, pp. 237– 66) points out, most firms seek efficien-
cies through the concentration of productive resources and through the 
expansion of markets so as to fully utilize their productive capacity and 
realize the greatest possible return. these tendencies are most explicitly 
revealed during periodic downturns in the business cycle when enterprises 
are compelled to intensify production or extensify distribution in order to 
survive, or both. such moments of crisis call for a “spatial fix,” says harvey, 
as capital must on the one hand concentrate and integrate sites of produc-
tion so as to reduce the amount of time and resources expended in manu-
facture and on the other hand it must increase the speed of distribution in 
order to reduce the time it takes to bring distant locales into the orbit of 
its operations. these centripetal tendencies in the sphere of production and 
centrifugal tendencies in distribution were observed by Karl Marx more 
than a century earlier when he incisively explained that capital must “anni-
hilate space with time” if it is to overcome barriers to accumulation (Marx, 
1973, p. 539). as applied to contemporary media, this insight suggests that 
even though a film or tv company may be founded with the aim of serving 
particular national cultures or local markets, it must over time re- deploy 
its creative resources and reshape its terrain of operations if it is to survive 
competition and enhance profitability.1 implicit in this logic of accumula-
tion is the contributing influence of the “managerial revolution” that ac-
companied the rise of industrial capitalism (Chandler, 1977). indeed, it was 
the intersection of capitalist accumulation with the reflexive knowledge 
systems of the enlightenment that engendered the transition from mer-
cantile to industrial capitalism. Capitalism became more than a mode of 
accumulation, it also became a disposition toward surveillance and adapta-
tion, as it continually refined and integrated manufacturing and marketing 
processes, achieving efficiencies through the concentration of productive 
resources and the extension of delivery systems (giddens, 1990).
the second principle of media capital emphasizes trajectories of cre-
ative migration. audiovisual industries are especially reliant on creative 
labor as a core resource due to the recurring demand for new prototypes 
(i.e., feature films or television programs). yet the marriage of art and com-
merce is always an uneasy one, especially in large institutional settings, and 
therefore the media business involves placing substantial wagers on forms 
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of labor that are difficult to manage. as asu aksoy and Kevin robins (1992, 
p. 12) observe, “Whether the output will be a hit or a miss cannot be pre-
judged. however, the golden rule in the film business is that if you do not 
have creative talent to start with, then there is no business to talk about at 
all, no hits or misses.” in fact, attracting and managing talent is one of the 
most difficult challenges that screen producers confront. at the level of the 
firm this involves offering attractive compensation and favorable working 
conditions, but at a broader level it also requires maintaining access to 
reservoirs of specialized labor that replenish themselves on a regular basis, 
which is why media companies tend to cluster in particular cities.2
geographer allen J. scott contends that manufacturers of cultural 
goods tend to locate where subcontractors and skilled laborers form dense 
transactional networks. besides apparent cost efficiencies, scott points 
to the mutual learning effects that stem from a clustering of interrelated 
producers. Whether through informal learning (such as sharing ideas and 
techniques while collaborating on a particular project) or via more formal 
transfers of knowledge (craft schools, trade associations, and awards cer-
emonies) clustering enhances product quality and fuels innovation. “Place- 
based communities such as these are not just foci of cultural labor in the 
narrow sense,” observes scott (2000, p. 33), “but also are active hubs of 
social reproduction in which crucial cultural competencies are maintained 
and circulated.”
this centripetal migration of labor encourages path dependent evolu-
tion, such that chance events or innovations may spark the appearance of a 
creative cluster, but industrial development depends on a spiral of growth 
fueled by the ongoing migration of talent in pursuit of professional oppor-
tunities. Locales that fail to make an early start in such industries are subject 
to “lock- out,” since it is difficult to disrupt the dynamics of agglomeration, 
even with massive infusions of capital or government subsidies. the only 
way a new cluster might arise is if a dominant media capital were to falter or 
if a new cluster were to offer an appreciably distinctive product line.
despite the productive power and structural advantages of media capi-
tals, the symbolic content of media products attenuates their geographical 
reach. that is, the cultural distance between, say, Chinese filmmakers and 
turkish or indian audiences introduces the prospect that the meaning-
fulness and therefore the value of certain products may be undermined 
at the moment of consumption or use. although the centripetal logics of 
accumulation and of creative migration help us identify concentrations of 
media capital, the centrifugal patterns of distribution are much more com-
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plicated, especially when products rub up against counterparts in distant 
cultural domains that are often served, even if minimally, by competing 
media capitals.
Cities such as Cairo, Mumbai, hollywood, and hong Kong lie across 
significant cultural divides from each other, which helps to explain why 
producers in these cities have been able to sustain distinctive product lines 
and survive the onslaught of distant competitors. these media capitals are 
furthermore supported by intervening factors that modify and complicate 
the spatial tendencies outlined above. Consequently, the third principle of 
media capital focuses on contours of socio- cultural variation, demonstrat-
ing that national and local institutions have been and remain significant 
actors in the global cultural economy.
during cinema’s early years of industrial formation, market forces and 
talent migrations fostered the growth of powerful producers such as hol-
lywood, but governments around the world reacted to hollywood’s grow-
ing influence by developing policies as early as the 1920s to limit imports 
and to foster local media production. attempts to develop local filmmaking 
institutions often proved difficult, but many countries were nevertheless 
successful at promoting radio and later television (most of them public 
service broadcasters) that produced popular shows and attracted substan-
tial audiences. broadcasting seemed an especially appropriate medium for 
intervention, since many of its cultural and technological characteristics 
helped to insulate national systems from foreign competition. the ensuing 
parade of broadcast news and entertainment punctuated daily household 
routines, interlacing public and private spheres, thereby situating national 
culture in the everyday world of its audiences (scannell, 1991; silverstone, 
1994; Morley, 2000).
it should also be pointed out that state institutions were not the only 
actors to organize and exploit the contours of socio- cultural variation. 
Media enterprises have for decades taken advantage of social and cultural 
differences in their production and distribution practices, especially by em-
ploying narratives and creative talent that resonate with the cultural dis-
positions of audiences within their spheres of influence. they furthermore 
made use of social networks and insider information to secure market ad-
vantages, and they invoked ethnic and national pride in their promotional 
campaigns. Contours of socio- cultural variation have provided and con-
tinue to provide opportunities to carve out market niches that are beyond 
the reach of powerful but culturally distant competitors.
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overall, media capital is a concept that at once acknowledges the spa-
tial logics of capital, creativity, culture, and polity without privileging one 
among the four. Just as the logic of capital provides a fundamental structur-
ing influence, so too do forces of socio- cultural variation shape the diverse 
contexts in which media are made and consumed. the concept of media 
capital encourages us to provide dynamic and historicized accounts that 
delineate the operations of capital and the migrations of talent, while at 
the same time directing our attention to socio- cultural forces and contin-
gencies that can engender alternative discourses, practices, and spatiali-
ties. such an approach furthermore aims to address the supposed tension 
between political economy and cultural studies scholarship— and between 
the media imperialism and global studies approaches— by showing how 
insights from each of these schools can productively be brought to bear on 
the study of film and television.
What Are Media Capitals?
Media capitals are powerful geographic centers that tap human, creative, 
and financial resources within their spheres of circulation in order to fash-
ion products that serve the distinctive needs of their audiences. their suc-
cess is dependent on their ability to monitor audience preferences, tap the 
popular imagination, and operationalize resources within their cultural 
domain. a media capital’s preeminence is therefore relational: its bounty 
flows outward while in turn it gathers and exploits the very best human 
and cultural resources within its sphere of circulation. its preeminence is 
dynamic and contingent, for it is subject to competition from other cities 
that aspire to capital status. dubai, for example, is self- consciously attempt-
ing to challenge the leadership of beirut within the sphere of arab satel-
lite television and Miami has recently arisen as a transnational competitor 
to Mexico City. thus, the concept of media capital encourages a spatial 
examination of the shifting contours of accumulation and dissemination, 
which both shape and are shaped by the imaginary worlds of audiences. 
such research seeks to understand why some locales become centers of 
media activity and to discern their relations to other locales. Media capitals 
emerge out of a complex play of historical forces and are therefore contin-
gently produced within a crucible of transnational competition. Cities as 
diverse as hollywood, Mumbai, and Lagos operate as media capitals within 
their respective spheres of circulation. although qualitatively different in 
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many respects, cities that become media capitals exhibit a shared set of 
characteristics with respect to institutional structure, creative capacity, and 
political autonomy.
institutionally, media capitals tend to flourish where companies show 
a resolute fixation on the tastes and desires of audiences. in order to cater 
to such tastes, they adopt and adapt cultural influences from near and far, 
resulting in hybrid aesthetics. such eclecticism and volatility is moderated 
by star and genre systems of production and promotion that help to make 
texts intelligible and marketable to diverse audiences. the bottom line for 
successful firms is always popularity and profitability. although often criti-
cized for pandering to the lowest common denominator, commercial film 
and tv studios are relentlessly innovative, as they avidly pursue the shifting 
nuances of fashion and pleasure. in the early stages of development, a me-
dia capital may be characterized by small businesses with an opportunistic 
outlook, many of them chasing the latest trend with abandon, churning out 
products on shoestring budgets and releasing them into the market with 
little promotion or strategic calculation. as media capitals mature, how-
ever, firms begin to formalize their institutional practices and in most cases 
they begin to integrate production, distribution, and exhibition within large 
corporations. Profitability is derived from structured creativity that feeds 
expansive (and expanding) distribution systems. Marketing considerations 
become woven into the conceptual stages of project development and fi-
nancing. Media capitals therefore emerge where regimes of capital accu-
mulation are purposefully articulated to the protean logics of popular taste. 
the mercantilist opportunism of an emerging filmmaking community gives 
way to industrialized modes of production and distribution.
Just as importantly, media capital tends to thrive in cities that foster 
creative endeavor, making them attractive destinations for aspiring talent. 
the research literature on industrial clustering shows that creative labor-
ers tend to migrate to places where they can land jobs that allow them 
to learn from peers and mentors, as well as from training programs that 
are sponsored by resident craft organizations (Porter, 1998). Job mobility 
and intra- industry exchanges further facilitate the dissemination of skills, 
knowledge, and innovations. thus a culture of mutual learning becomes 
institutionalized, helping to foster the reproduction and enhancement of 
creative labor (scott, 2000). Workers are also inclined to gravitate to places 
that are renowned for cultural openness and diversity (florida, 2005). it’s 
remarkable, for example, that the most successful media capitals are usually 
port cities with long histories of transcultural engagement.
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it’s furthermore noteworthy that national political capitals rarely 
emerge as media capitals, largely because modern governments seem inca-
pable of resisting the temptation to tamper with media institutions.3 Con-
sequently, media capitals tend to flourish at arm’s length from the centers 
of state power, favoring cities that are in many cases are disdained by po-
litical and cultural elites (e.g., Los angeles, hong Kong, and Mumbai). 
successful media enterprises tend to resist censorship and clientelism, and 
are suspicious of the state’s tendency to promote an official and usually os-
sified version of culture. instead, commercial media enterprises absorb and 
refashion indigenous and traditional cultural resources while also incorpo-
rating foreign innovations that may offer advantages in the market. they 
do this even though such appropriations tend to invite criticism from state 
officials and high- culture critics. the resulting mélange is emblematic of 
the contradictory pressures engendered by global modernity, at once dy-
namic and seemingly capricious yet also shrewdly strategic. the choice of 
location is no less calculated: media capital tends to accumulate in cities 
that are relatively stable, quite simply because entrepreneurs will only in-
vest in studio construction and distribution infrastructure where they can 
operate without interference over extended periods of time.
Mumbai as a Media Capital
Mumbai is a useful example of a prosperous port city that has grown to 
become an influential media capital. it is a city that has been a commercial 
nexus for centuries, enjoying transcontinental trading relations with Per-
sia, egypt, and greece during ancient times and later becoming the central 
node of the british imperial shipping and railroad networks in south asia. 
the expansion of the railroads in the late 1800s and explosive growth of 
the city’s cotton industry made bombay a prosperous mecca for merchants 
and job seekers. as a result, almost every indian language and many foreign 
languages are spoken in Mumbai. Marathi, the state language, is dominant, 
followed by gujarati, hindi, bengali, and urdu. english is commonly used 
in commerce and government. such diversity has brought periods of eth-
nic and religious strife, but bombay/Mumbai nevertheless has long been 
considered one of the most cosmopolitan and tolerant cities in india.
today Mumbai remains india’s principal seaport, the railhead for two 
major trunk lines, and country’s principal airport, handling almost two- 
thirds of india’s international flight traffic. the stock exchange, estab-
lished in 1875, and commodity markets make Mumbai the most important 
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financial center in south asia. the local economy— initially renowned 
for banking, shipping, and textile manufacturing— has diversified since 
independence to include plastics, printing, and pharmaceuticals. given 
the constant flow of people and goods, it’s not surprising that Mumbai 
is also an important center for illicit trade in currencies, gemstones, pre-
cious metals, and human flesh. Closely connected to mafia networks in 
Karachi and dubai, the underworld societies of Mumbai have exerted a 
powerful influence on trade, real estate, and the movie industry. Mum-
bai is also an aspirational locale, where the wealthy live lavishly and the 
more modestly endowed can sample the ambiguous gift of cosmopolitan 
modernity. both onscreen and off, the city has come to symbolize the at-
tractions and trepidations of big city life, with many popular melodramas 
representing it as the quintessential urban locale of south asia (Prakash, 
2006; Mitra, 2010).
Mumbai’s status as a port city is intimately intertwined with its history as 
a cultural center. during the british raj, Parsi migrants from Persia rose to 
become wealthy and influential players in the shipping, shipbuilding, and fi-
nancial industries. they also launched the city’s popular commercial theater 
troupes that shrewdly intermingled a range of performance traditions, in-
cluding shakespearean drama, Persian lyric poetry, and hindu folk dances. 
Lavishly staged, Parsi theater was renowned for spectacle and melodrama, 
often with historical or mythological themes. during the nineteenth cen-
tury, these theater companies traveled throughout india and southeast asia, 
playing to appreciative crowds (gupt, 2005; ganti, 2004). their appropria-
tion of diverse cultural influences no doubt derived from Parsi awareness 
that, as a minority population, the commercial success of their theatrical 
endeavors would depend on their ability to negotiate differences.
some of these theatrical troupes made the transition to cinema, which 
first arrived in bombay in 1896, and as filmmakers they earned renown 
for borrowing from a broad range of sources in order to satisfy the grow-
ing demands of moviegoers. by the 1920s, the city was widely recognized 
as a leading center of indian movie production and its accomplishments 
were all the more impressive given the fierce competition from Western 
imports. the arrival of sound technology in 1931 posed new challenges 
for bombay filmmakers, since there existed no “natural” candidate for spo-
ken dialog. bombay itself was polyglot, and was surrounded by territo-
ries where Marathi and gujarati prevailed. no doubt aware that language 
would affect the patterns of movie distribution, filmmakers gravitated to 
hindustani, a mixture of hindi and urdu that was used by the trading 
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classes in north and central india. as the lingua franca of the bazaars, hin-
dustani was furthermore a fitting choice because bombay was tied to these 
locales via historical trade routes and the indian railway. Moreover, hindi 
was the most widely spoken language in india and urdu was a foundational 
idiom for populations in northern india and what is today Pakistan. the 
two share a common grammatical structure and much vocabulary. hin-
dustani was therefore accessible to hindi and urdu speakers, as well as 
somewhat accessible to speakers of other indo- aryan languages.
“this led to a peculiarity,” observes tejaswini ganti (2004, p. 12). “bom-
bay became the only city where the language of the film industry was not 
congruent with the language of the region. . . . the fact that cinema in the 
hindi language developed in multi- lingual bombay, rather than the hindi- 
speaking north, disassociated hindi films from any regional identification, 
imbuing them with a more ‘national’ character. as a result of circulating 
in a national market, hindi cinema also developed its own idiom and style 
[that] does not necessarily correspond to any particular regional variant of 
hindi.” Cinematic hindustani was therefore a language that many could 
access, but none could claim, making bombay films appear as transcultural 
as the theatrical tradition from which the city’s film industry emerged. the 
hindustani language furthermore insulated against Western imports and 
spurred the development of a lucrative popular music industry (Punath-
ambekar & Kavoori, 2008). these cultural characteristics helped bombay 
movies to establish broad if haphazard circulation patterns across many 
parts of colonial india, including what is today Pakistan, sri Lanka, and 
bangladesh. their success allowed producers to invest in ever more lavish 
on- screen spectacles, which in turn enhanced their competitive edge over 
regional competitors from Calcutta, hyderabad, or Madras. With their 
resolute focus on popular taste, film (and later television) companies in-
corporated diverse cultural influences while nevertheless disciplining their 
hybrid aesthetics to star and genre systems that rendered texts popular and 
marketable in various contexts. distribution concerns were thoroughly in-
tegrated into the conception, financing, and production of products, ensur-
ing a healthy circulation of popular fare.
Mumbai furthermore benefited from its reputation as a center of cre-
ative endeavor. talent was attracted to the city not simply because jobs 
were available but also because it was renowned for a creative community 
that had institutionalized a system of mutual learning. the city was gener-
ally welcoming to diverse populations and, as a seaport, had a long history 
of cultural and economic exchange with outsiders. it was a stable and pros-
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perous locale that became renowned as a trendsetter among the middle 
class and aspiring middle class of south asia.
after india became in 1947, tensions between commercial filmmakers 
and the national government became an enduring feature of the indus-
try (Jeffrey, 2006). for a variety of complex reasons, however, the indian 
government eventually capitulated to the pervasive influence of Mumbai 
media, anointing it with official industry status in 1998, which opened 
the door to new financing opportunities from the private sector as well 
as government programs aimed at bolstering media enterprises. the state 
furthermore passed legislation that legitimized commercial satellite televi-
sion, providing lucrative distribution channels for television programming, 
feature films, and popular music. synergies among the three have fueled 
the fortunes of these industries, which most likely would have languished 
on their own. although the term “bollywood” raises the hackles of many 
industry insiders, ashish rajadhyaksha (2003) has quite correctly pointed 
out that the term at least provides a means of coming to grips with the 
complex interconnections among commercialized and globalized media 
institutions headquartered in the indian city of dreams. Mumbai is the 
undisputed center of financing, production, and distribution, serving as a 
magnet for creative talent, a bazaar for media merchants, and a palimpsest 
for cultural influences from near and far.
as this very brief historical sketch indicates, Mumbai’s status as a media 
capital traces its roots to commercial circulations, human migrations, ethnic 
diversity, cultural hybridity, linguistic opportunism, and underworld machi-
nations. admired by the masses and disdained by the nation’s elite, the city 
matured at the center of india’s economy but on the margins of political 
power. Mumbai’s fortune as a media capital rests not only on its centrality 
but also on its marginality. it is in many respects the emblematic melting pot 
of the indian nation and yet it is in many respects remarkably Western. it 
exists at the center of flows, yet it’s also on the periphery of both india and 
the West. bollywood therefore must mark its distance from new delhi and 
from hollywood if it is to survive as a media capital. for the attraction of its 
screen media resides in their perceived distance from the disciplinary logic 
of the indian state and the cultural logic of hollywood.
Contested Capital in Chinese Screen Media
the commercial Chinese movie industry was, during its prime, a funda-
mentally transnational medium. expansive and mobile, it emerged in the 
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1920s in shanghai and hong Kong, and soon expanded into export mar-
kets in southeast asia. during the 1930s, the mainland movie market was 
beleaguered by war and revolution, so the center of Chinese commercial 
cinema shifted south to singapore, only to be buffeted yet again by waves 
of nationalist fervor on the Malay Peninsula during the 1950s. the indus-
try then relocated to hong Kong, where it matured and flourished, serving 
local audiences but also fashioning products with an eye to overseas mar-
kets (fu, 2003, 2008; uhde & uhde, 2000; Zhang, 2004). Chinese movie 
executives pursued opportunities wherever they arose and the industry was 
therefore proto- global in orientation, even if its products were not ubiq-
uitous worldwide. it was anchored moreover by a resident creative com-
munity that tapped talent and resources from near and far, making hong 
Kong the central node in the intricate circuits of Chinese popular culture.
although transnational in orientation, it was also quite local in many 
respects. in the latter decades of the twentieth century hong Kong film-
makers shot most of their productions on the streets of the city and con-
sciously fashioned their movies for local fans. hong Kong’s film culture 
was then renowned for midnight premieres, where cast and crew would 
mingle among the moviegoers, taking the pulse of the audience and some-
times adapting the final cut of the film accordingly (teo, 1997; bordwell, 
2010). Movies were made for locals and their response was considered as a 
rough predictor of potential success in overseas markets such as Malaysia, 
singapore, and taiwan. the creative community made its home in a co-
lonial city, among a population that had largely migrated from elsewhere 
and was then in the process of developing a distinctly indigenous but also 
cosmopolitan identity. Moviemaking was a local business with a translocal 
sensibility (Zhang, 2010). aspiring Chinese talent moved to hong Kong 
from many parts of asia— and even as far afield as europe and north 
america— seeing the city as the most promising place to build a career. 
Movie executives similarly saw it as the best place to raise financing, recruit 
labor, and launch projects.
the movie business operated outside the reach of national politics, 
sheltered by the benign neglect of the british colonial regime. Producers 
cobbled together feature films in a freewheeling fashion and at a ferocious 
pace, turning out popular products, occasional gems, and a good deal of 
rubbish. nevertheless the tempo, scale, and diversity of production helped 
to foster a flexible ensemble of film companies that provided job opportu-
nities to thousands of professionals as well as training for those that aspired 
to join the industry. hong Kong became a magnet for talent from near and 
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far, and became an incubator for creative experimentation (Curtin, 2007). 
it was home to tsui hark, Maggie Cheung, and Leonard ho. home to 
ann hui, Peter Chan, and Michelle yeoh. home to Peter Pau, Wong Kar- 
wai, and Christopher doyle. it was also home to a vibrant ensemble of 
newspapers, music labels, and broadcasting stations.
in 1997, the People’s republic of China reclaimed hong Kong after 
more than a century of british rule. the terms of transfer provided a fifty- 
year transition in which the city would operate as a relatively autonomous 
special administrative region, but it was clear from the beginning that 
beijing intended to exert its authority and many believed that government 
scrutiny of the media industries would increase. this posed a problem for 
hong Kong film companies that were accustomed to producing satirical 
and ribald comedies, as well as fantasy, horror, and crime stories. the city’s 
creative class grew nervous as the deadline for transition approached, for 
the very genres that had proven most prosperous were likely to become 
targets of censors and propaganda officials. Consequently, many producers, 
directors, and actors began to explore job options abroad and even those 
that remained in place quietly began moving resources and families over-
seas in case of an official crackdown (Chan, 2009). the industry also entered 
into a cycle of hyperproduction, spewing out as many movies as possible, 
hoping to maximize profits before the fateful moment of transition. this 
flooded the market with low- grade products that alienated loyal audiences 
both at home and abroad. hong Kong’s reputation suffered tremendously 
as a result, most tragically with its audiences, who by the late nineties had 
grown accustomed to cultural alternatives from tokyo, seoul, europe, and 
hollywood that were readily available at movie multiplexes, on video, and 
over the internet. no longer willing to risk the expense of a theater ticket 
for a hong Kong feature film, consumers bought (or downloaded) pirated 
Chinese movie videos that sold for only a fraction of the retail price (Wang, 
2003). as audiences turned a cold shoulder to the industry, so too did media 
professionals in other parts of asia. distributors stopped buying, producers 
stopped collaborating, and directors declined to use hong Kong talent on 
their projects. in the decade following the handover, the industry’s trans-
national network of audiences, distributors, and creative talent slowly dis-
solved (Curtin, 2007; Chan, fung, & ng, 2010; bordwell, 2010).
in retrospect, anxieties about the handover to Chinese sovereignty were 
somewhat exaggerated and the industry was therefore ill- served by the op-
portunistic mentality that prevailed throughout much of the 1990s and 
into the new century. in fact, it suffered less from censorship than it did 
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from a fear of censorship that fueled self- destructive cycle of overproduc-
tion. the beijing leadership therefore didn’t need to dip its hands directly 
into the messy mechanics of content regulation. instead, it kept its distance 
and withheld assistance during a time when the hong Kong industry was 
under tremendous stress. interestingly, the Chinese leadership hatched nu-
merous joint ventures with hollywood partners while snubbing the hong 
Kong industry, whose films were treated as foreign imports for seven long 
and turbulent years after the city’s return to Chinese sovereignty. the PrC 
government essentially starved the industry at a moment of crisis and only 
opened the door to the mainland market slowly after it was sure it had the 
upper hand in its relationship with “hollywood east.”
in the years following the handover, movie companies started shutter-
ing their operations, support services evaporated, and talent dispersed. to 
make matters worse, PrC policies regarding censorship remained cloudy, 
so that many producers urged caution with respect to content issues, fos-
tering a culture of self- censorship that further alienated audiences, espe-
cially those in important overseas markets such as taiwan, singapore, and 
Malaysia. as the irreverent and innovative qualities of hong Kong media 
products diminished, export revenues declined and producers were con-
fronted with two options: focus on the tiny domestic market of the sar 
itself or enter into projects (usually coproductions) with mainland media 
partners.4 the former would entail significant downsizing while the latter 
would require feature films that were fashioned as much for PrC cen-
sors as audiences. the beijing government furthermore sent signals that 
it would brook no challenges to the supremacy of state institutions such as 
China film and China Central television (CCtv). if hong Kong firms 
were to participate in the rapidly growing mainland media economy, they 
would do so within parameters established by the Communist Party (yeh 
& davis, 2008; yeh, 2010; davis, 2010).
today, hong Kong is but one node in a geographically dispersed cir-
cuit of deal- making and creative endeavor that is increasingly driven by 
the exigencies of the mainland market. filmmakers must be attentive to 
government officials that explicitly make use of import policies, subsidies, 
and regulations to shape movie messages and to nurture the development 
of large national enterprises that they hope will someday compete with 
their hollywood counterparts. they favor big movies with big stars. the 
themes and dialogue are cautious, even at times stilted, but the production 
values are growing more competitive with global standards and much of 
this has to do with the skills and insights that hong Kong talent bring to 
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these coproductions. indeed, the leading box office performers during the 
first decade of the 2000s were hong Kong– PrC blockbusters. Most were 
historical dramas (e.g., Hero, 2002; Red Cliff, 2008; The Warlords, 2008), 
which were safe with censors because they displaced controversial issues 
onto a distant past and were furthermore acceptable to officials because 
they promoted the image of China as a grand and ultimately united civi-
lization with a long and distinguished history (Wang, 2009; Zhao, 2010).
audiences in east asia outside the PrC seem to sense the caution and 
calculation behind these efforts, and many moviegoers consequently opted 
for hollywood products, which are arguably no less cautious or calculated. 
the difference is that hollywood filmmaking is periodically rejuvenated 
by sleeper films and independent features. it also has a film rating system 
that makes it possible for filmmakers to target particular segments of the 
audience and to explore mature themes and offbeat topics. these structural 
mechanisms have allowed innovative projects— such as Juno (2007), Slum-
dog Millionaire (2008), and The Hurt Locker (2009)— to break through the 
institutional inertia and the insider dealings of the industry. as currently 
constituted, the mainland movie industry has no such mechanisms. instead, 
there is a yawning gap between state- sanctioned feature film extravaganzas 
(all of them g- rated) and sadly undernourished mid- range and indepen-
dent movies (Zhang, 2010; Chan, fung, & ng, 2010; song, 2010). Chinese 
independent films are micro- budgeted projects that are either destined for 
the international festival circuit or they are opportunistic features that are 
produced largely for the satellite television market. the former are seen 
as unprofitable art cinema that rarely make it into theaters while the latter 
tend to be “main melody” films that are subsidized by the state and con-
form to ideological guidelines that favor uplifting characters and pro- social 
themes (song, 2010).
television likewise suffers from various institutional constraints, so that 
mainland China— which has by far the world’s largest national television 
audience— remains a net importer of programming (Keane, 2010). Low- 
cost genres (talk, reality, and variety) flourish, but few are innovative and 
those that are find themselves quickly besieged by imitative competitors 
(Keane, fung, & Moran, 2007). drama and comedy— signature genres of 
the world’s most successful television enterprises— remain underdevel-
oped, largely because of the same caution and calculation that prevails in 
the movie business. besides the constraints on content, mainland television 
enterprises also suffer from structural limitations. shanghai and guang-
zhou media have exploded in size and hunan provincial television has 
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proven itself to be a shrewd innovator, but most tv companies are run 
by provincial or municipal units of government that are eager to maintain 
their authority and ownership status. this makes it difficult for companies 
to merge and makes it difficult to shake out the weakest performers (diao, 
2008). Provincial and municipal tv enterprises are hampered as well by 
regulations that favor the state- sanctioned national champion, China Cen-
tral television, which in a stunning conflict of interest is also the organi-
zation that overseas national television ratings. Provincial and municipal 
telecasters are furthermore discouraged from building overseas distribu-
tion channels, a privilege that largely belongs to beijing- based institutions 
that nest snugly under the wing of the state, where they are closely moni-
tored for content and tone.
if today there is a geographic center to Chinese media, it is within the 
Communist Party offices in beijing, not because the party micromanages 
the day- to- day operations of television and film enterprises but rather be-
cause it systematically doles out favors and franchises to those that acknowl-
edge its supremacy. the party leadership is quite successful at keeping a 
leash on domestic players and at exploiting joint venture partners from 
overseas.5 the PrC government has cagily manipulated both Western and 
hong Kong movie companies to serve its own ambitions, which are to 
build a movie infrastructure that will ultimately be popular with national 
audiences and competitive with hollywood, both at home and abroad. to 
the extent that it has succeeded, it is largely because China’s moviegoing 
public is expanding at a breathtaking pace, with box office receipts of $2.7 
billion in 2012, making it the second largest theatrical market in the world 
(“China box office round- up,” 2013). television is undergoing a similar 
growth trajectory, with CCtv announcing that its 2010 annual advertising 
auction drew $1.9 billion in revenue, rising more than 15 percent over the 
preceding year (Coonan, 2010b); by 2013, that figure had doubled.
yet despite these impressive figures, mainland media have little influ-
ence abroad, casting barely a ripple through media markets in Korea, tai-
wan, or Japan, let alone europe or the united states. this is due largely 
to the fact that PrC cinema has, since its inception, been an instrument 
of the state, a bridge between the Communist Party and the people. since 
the 1980s, the government has reorganized and marketized the national 
economy so that media institutions now operate in a more decentralized 
fashion. they pursue audiences as they might pursue media consumers, 
but their overriding mission is to serve the party and media ownership 
remains squarely in the hands of the state (Zhu, 2003; diao, 2008). this 
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system of control is fairly obvious to viewers on the mainland who com-
monly seek alternatives via the internet and the dvd black market. young 
people especially rely on internet viewing, employing a host of strategies 
to circumvent the “great firewall” in order to acquire products that could 
never find their way into cinemas or onto the airwaves (barboza, 2010; 
Chua & iwabuchi, 2008). as for overseas markets, audiences seem occa-
sionally interested in historical dramas that emanate from the mainland, 
but their tastes are quite diverse and they have access to a great range of 
media products and services. Mainland movies have therefore performed 
modestly overseas and television exports have proven to be of little interest 
to audiences in hong Kong, taipei, and singapore. as for projecting soft 
power even further afield in asia, state media products have enjoyed little 
success in tokyo, seoul, or bangkok.
Conclusion
by breaking outside a national perspective and applying a global lens to the 
development of media institutions in east asia, one begins to appreciate 
the pervasive tensions between national and cosmopolitan media, between 
state imperatives and the dynamic principles of media capital. beijing’s ap-
parent success at controlling its domestic film industry runs counter to 
what many critics and researchers see as the unrelenting global expansion 
of Western media conglomerates. it raises the prospect of a new center of 
cultural power based in the national capital under the watchful eye of the 
state, suggesting that, under certain conditions, state regimes may indeed 
be able to assert their cultural influence domestically, and may further-
more be able to tame the power of nearby competitors in cities such as 
hong Kong. yet the regime’s apparent triumph also constrains its explicit 
soft- power ambitions. for beijing is unlikely to become a global media 
capital so long as it is remains the seat of national government. this is 
because media capital flourishes at cultural crossroads, not at the centers 
of political power. beijing may build and manage a vast domestic media 
infrastructure, but it is likely to struggle in its efforts to influence popular 
culture beyond its borders. this is because media capitals tend to prosper 
at a distance from state power— Mumbai vs. new delhi, Lagos vs. abuja, 
Miami vs. Mexico City. although London has been successful as a media 
capital, that’s largely because its creative industries tend to be resolutely 
capitalistic and are insulated from state pressures by a common law tradi-
tion that sets limits on state power. even the national public broadcaster, 
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the bbC, has a long tradition of creative independence and insulation from 
the political imperatives of the ruling regime. if Chinese media can some-
day achieve this level of relative autonomy, beijing might indeed emerge as 
a transnational media capital, but until that time its creative cluster is per-
haps more appropriately seen as a national center or media hub. London is 
an exceptional case— perhaps a rare historical accident— and one doubts, 
for example, that Washington or riyadh or Moscow could ever be media 
capitals.
as for hong Kong, the (soft) nationalization of its film industry helps 
to explain why its status as a media capital is declining. once known for its 
rambunctious, reflexive, and visceral cinema, the city’s creative community 
has shriveled and the talent that remains has capitulated to a system that 
is built around the cautious, calculated blockbuster feature film that will 
appease state censors, party officials, and major financial backers. audi-
ences matter, but not the way that they used to matter when the hong 
Kong industry was in its prime, and not the way they continue to mat-
ter to filmmakers in Los angeles or Mumbai. hollywood and bollywood 
both have been successful because of their ongoing fixation on audience 
preferences. their popularity in large and diverse domestic markets has in 
turn translated into overseas profitability, so that both industries now place 
a premium on global audiences and routinely consider them during the 
conception and financing of new products (schuker, 2010). Chinese com-
mercial cinema has by comparison turned inward and one therefore won-
ders where (and if) a new center of gravity will emerge in the Chinese film 
industry. Will it remain a national industry nestled in beijing under the 
watchful eye of the state or might a transnational media capital reemerge in 
one of the seaport cities along China’s coast? for if China is truly to assert 
its soft power, it seems less likely to do so as a state- driven media regime 
than as a popular culture industry situated at a cosmopolitan crossroads.
References
aksoy, a., and robins, K. (1992). hollywood for the 21st century: global competi-
tion for critical mass in image markets. Cambridge Journal of Economics 16:1– 22.
appadurai, a. (1996). Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization. Min-
neapolis: university of Minnesota Press.
barboza, d. (2010). for Chinese, Web is the way to entertainment. New York Times, 
18 april, p. b1.
bordwell, d. (2010) Planet Hong Kong: Popular cinema and the art of entertainment. 
2nd ed. http://www.davidbordwell.net/books/planethongkong.php.
130 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. Malden, Ma: blackwell.
Chan, P. (2009). a discussion with producer/director Peter ho- san Chan on global 
trends in Chinese- language movie production. interview, taiwan Cinema web-
site, government information office, republic of China (taiwan), 2 april. 
http://www.taiwancinema.com/ct.asp?xitem=58252&ctnode=124&mp=2.
Chan, J. M., fung, y. h., and ng, C. h. (2010). Policies for the sustainable development 
of the Hong Kong film industry. hong Kong: Chinese university of hong Kong 
Press.
Chandler, a. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American business. 
Cambridge: belknap Press of harvard university Press.
China box office round- up 2012: China becomes world’s second biggest market. 
(2013). Screen Daily, 21 January. http://www.screendaily.com/china-box-office-
round-up-2012-china-becomes-worlds-second-biggest-market/5050843.ar-
ticle.
Chua, b., and iwabuchi, K. (2008), East Asian pop culture: Analysing the Korean wave. 
hong Kong: hong Kong university Press.
Coonan, C. (2010a). Chinese b.o. totals $1.14 bil. Variety, 19 october. http://www.
variety.com/article/vr1118025904.html?categoryid=1278&cs=1&query=chin
a+box+office.
Coonan, C. (2010b). ads auction up 15.5% for CCtv. Variety, 8 november. http://
www.variety.com/article/vr1118027181.
Curtin, M. (2004). Media capitals: Cultural geographies of global tv. in J. olsson 
& L. spigel, eds., Television after TV: Essays on a medium in transition (pp. 270– 
302). durham, nC: duke university Press.
Curtin, M. (2007). Playing to the world’s biggest audience: The globalization of Chinese 
film and TV. berkeley: university of California Press.
Curtin, M. (forthcoming). global media capital and local media policy. in J. Wasko, 
g. Murdock, & h. sousa, eds., Handbook of political economy of communication. 
Malden, Ma: blackwell.
Curtin, M. (in progress). Media capital: The cultural geography of globalization. Manu-
script.
davis, d. W. (2010). Market and marketization in the China film business. Cinema 
Journal 49 (3): 121– 25.
diao, M. M. (2008). research into Chinese television development: television in-
dustrialisation in China. Phd diss., Macquarie university, sydney.
durovicova, n., & newman, K., eds. (2010). World cinemas, transnational perspectives. 
new york: routledge.
florida, r. (2005). Cities and the creative class. new york: routledge.
frater, P. (2008). hollywood weighs China yin- yang. Variety, 1 august. http://www.
variety.com/article/vr1117989939?refCatid=2520&query=yin+yang.
fu, P. (2003). Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The politics of Chinese cinemas. stan-
ford, Ca: stanford university Press.
fu, P. ed. (2008). China forever: The Shaw brothers and diasporic cinema. urbana: uni-
versity of illinois Press.
ganti, t. (2004). Bollywood: A guidebook to popular Hindi cinema. new york: rout-
ledge.
Revised Pages
Conditions of Capital •  131
giddens, a. (1990). The consequences of modernity. stanford, Ca: stanford university 
Press.
guback, t. h. (1969). The international film industry: Western Europe and America 
since 1945. bloomington: indiana university Press.
gupt, s. (2005). Parsi Theatre: Its Origins and Development, Calcutta: seagull books.
harvey, d. (1990). The condition of postmodernity. Malden, Ma: blackwell.
harvey, d. (2001). Spaces of capital: Towards a critical geography. new york: routledge.
hjort, M., & Mackenzie, s., eds. (2000). Cinema and nation. new york: routledge.
innis, h. (1972). Empire and communications. toronto: university of toronto 
Press.
Jacobs, J. (1984). Cities and the wealth of nations. new york: random house.
Jeffrey, r. (2006). the mahatma didn’t like the movies and why it matters. Global 
Media and Communication 2 (2): 204– 24.
Keane, M. (2007). Created in China: The great new leap forward. London: routledge.
Keane, M. (2010). Keeping up with the neighbors: China’s soft power ambitions. 
Cinema Journal 49 (3): 130– 35.
Keane, M., fung, a. y. h., & Moran, a. (2007). New television, globalisation, and the 
East Asian cultural imagination. hong Kong: hong Kong university Press.
Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy. new york: 
vintage.
Mcbride, s. (1980). Many voices, one world: Communication and society, today and to-
morrow; Towards a new more just and more efficient world information and communi-
cation order. new york: unipub.
Miller, t., govil, n., McMurria, J., Wang, t., & Maxwell, r. (2008). Global Hol-
lywood: No. 2. London: british film institute.
Mitra, s. (2010). Localizing the global: bombay’s sojourn from the cosmopolitan 
urbane to aamchi Mumbai. in M. Curtin & h. shah, eds., Reorienting global 
communication: Indian and Chinese media beyond borders. urbana: university of 
illinois Press.
Morley, d. (2000). Home territories: Media, mobility, and identity. new york: routledge.
nowell- smith, g. (1999). The Oxford history of world cinema. new york: oxford 
university Press.
Pan, Z. (2010). enacting the family- nation on a global stage: an analysis of CCtv’s 
spring gala. in M. Curtin & h. shah, eds., Reorienting global communication: In-
dian and Chinese media beyond borders. urbana: university of illinois Press.
Pang, L. (2010). hong Kong cinema as a dialect cinema? Cinema Journal 40 (3).
Porter, M. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Busi-
ness Review (november): 77– 90.
Prakash, g. (2006). the idea of bombay. American Scholar 75 (2): 88– 99.
Punathambekar, a., & Kavoori, a., eds. (2008). Global Bollywood. new york: new 
york university Press.
rajadhyaksha, a. (2003). the “bollywoodization” of the indian cinema: Cultural 
nationalism in a global arena. Inter- Asia Cultural Studies 4 (1): 25– 39.
scannell, P. (1991). A social history of British broadcasting. Cambridge: blackwell.
schiller, h. i. ([1969] 1992). Mass communication and American empire. 2nd ed. boul-
der, Co: Westview.
132 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
schuker, L. a. e. (2010). in depth: Plot change: global forces transform holly-
wood films. Wall Street Journal Asia, 2 august, p. 14.
scott, a. J. (2000). The cultural economy of cities. thousand oaks, Ca: sage.
silverstone, r. (1994). Television and everyday life. new york: routledge.
song, t. (2010). independent cinema in the Chinese film industry. Phd diss., 
Queensland university of technology, Queensland.
teo, s. (1997). Hong Kong cinema: The extra dimensions. London: british film insti-
tute.
tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and culture. Chicago: university of Chicago 
Press.
uhde, Jan, and uhde, yvonne ng. (2000). Latent images: Film in Singapore. singa-
pore: oxford university Press.
vitali, v., &Willemen, P., eds. (2006). Theorising national cinema. London: british 
film institute.
Wang, s. (2003). Framing piracy: Globalization and film distribution in greater China. 
Lanham, Md: rowman & Littlefield.
Wang, t. (2009). understanding local reception of globalized cultural products in 
the context of the international cultural economy: a case study on the reception 
of Hero and Daggers in China. International Journal of Cultural Studies 12:299– 
318.
Wong, a.- L., ed. (2002). The Cathay story. hong Kong: hong Kong film archive.
yeh, e. y. (2010). the deferral of pan- asian: Critical appraisal of film marketization 
in China. in M. Curtin & h. shah, eds., Reorienting global communication: Indian 
and Chinese media beyond borders. urbana: university of illinois Press
yeh, e. y., & davis, d. W. (2008). re- nationalizing China’s film industry: Case 
study on the China film group and film marketization. Journal of Chinese Cin-
emas 2 (2): 37– 51.
young, d. (2010). news Corp sells controlling stake in China tv channels. Reuters, 
9 august, http://www.reuters.com/article/idustre67810L20100809.
Zhang, y. (2004). Chinese national cinema. new york: routledge
Zhang, y. (2010). transnationalism and translocality in Chinese cinema. Cinema 
Journal 49 (3): 135– 39.
Zhao, y. (2010). Whose Hero? the “spirit” and “structure” of the made- in- China 
blockbuster. in M. Curtin & h. shah, eds., Reorienting global communication: 
Indian and Chinese media beyond borders (pp. 161– 82). urbana: university of il-
linois Press.
Zhu, y. (2003). Chinese cinema during the era of reform: The ingenuity of the system. 
Westport, Ct: Praeger.
Notes
 1. Monopoly rents are an exception, but as shown in this chapter, monopoly 
rents have proven less tenable in an era of changing technologies and increasing 
transborder flows.
 2. although it does not address media industries specifically, an extensive litera-
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ture discusses the impact of human capital on the clustering of business firms in 
particular locations (Jacobs, 1984; Porter, 1998; florida, 2005).
 3. London, the national capital of the united Kingdom, is an exception, largely 
because of the residual advantages of empire that made it such an important mari-
time and financial center. its importance as a center of media activity has been 
perpetuated largely because it has exploited its access to the wealthy global an-
glophone market and because the state has exercised restraint in its oversight of 
creative institutions.
 4. recently, a third option has begun to present itself. the terms of the Closer 
economic Partnership agreement between the PrC and hong Kong has made it 
possible for filmmakers to target the provincial guangdong market (Pang, 2010). it 
is still too soon to know whether this possibility will provide greater autonomy to 
the hong Kong industry.
 5. news Corporation and Warner bros. have both thrown in the towel after 
more than a decade of failed joint ventures, and the general consensus among 
Western executives is that india is a better bet for investment these days (frater, 
2008). Most prominently in this regard is news Corporation’s decision to sell its 





The Enduring Strength of Hollywood
The “Imperial Adventure” Genre and Avatar
Jaap van ginneken
during the last decade of the twentieth century, we have witnessed the 
disintegration of the soviet union, the Warsaw Pact, and the eastern euro-
pean bloc of Communist countries, as well as the emergence of the inter-
net as an instrument of globalization. the ensuing “free market” euphoria 
led to a series of economic bubbles and their bursting around non- Western 
currencies, dot- com shares, and housing mortgages— culminating in the 
worldwide credit crisis of 2008.1
today, we are witnessing the rapid emergence of new powers such as 
brazil, india, and China, not so much because of “development aid,” but 
rather because these countries turn out to be large and diversified enough to 
kick off cycles of capital accumulation and productivity gains on their own.
one major question remains: to what extent will these profound 
changes affect the global landscape of international/intercultural/inter-
ethnic communication and media? the debate on a new World infor-
mation and Communication order (nWiCo), within the framework of 
the united nations organization for education, science and Culture 
(unesCo), was sidelined long ago, due to fierce opposition from the 
dominant media powers: the major anglo- saxon countries and their clos-
est allies, representing the largest and most of all the richest media home 
markets in the world.
recent years have finally seen the emergence of some significant non- 
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Western media and media groups. yet the media materials circulating be-
tween continents do still mostly originate from the Western world. this 
holds for news agency dispatches and syndicated journalism, books and 
translations, comic strips and video games, toy characters and gadgets. it 
holds for news pictures and films, television series and formats, as well as 
movies. true, hong Kong, bombay, and other cities have become major 
film hubs, but few of their movies make an impact beyond the immediate 
neighboring countries and overseas diasporas of Chinese and indians, for 
instance.
to fathom the implications of this state of affairs, we need to focus 
not on alternative cinema but on worldwide blockbusters instead (stringer, 
2003), which help shape the global conscience, its view of history, geog-
raphy, and society. the website iMdb provides an elaborate database on 
movies. among other things, it carries up- to- date numbers on the “World-
wide box office” revenue generated by individual movies during their the-
atrical releases. this is also the basis for an all- time blockbuster list. re-
cently, it had 390 movies that had made more than two hundred million 
dollars in cinemas up to that point.2 Let us consider a further breakdown.
Who Makes Global Blockbusters? The Pyramid and the Prism
of these almost four hundred movies, 70.3 percent mentioned a single 
producing country: namely, in 67.9 percent (or more than two- thirds) of 
cases, the united states alone; in a meager 2.3 percent, a country other 
than the united states. these latter few percent involved four times an-
other anglo- saxon country, thrice a european country, and twice Japan. by 
contrast, 29.7 percent, or almost a third, of the films were listed as interna-
tional co- productions. of these, 27.4 percent (or more than a quarter) of all 
the blockbusters also mentioned the united states as a participant; a min-
iscule 2.3 percent did not. by far the largest part of the co- productions, or 
19.2 percent of the blockbusters overall, mentioned another anglo- saxon 
country (Canada, the united Kingdom and ireland, australia and new 
Zealand), 15.9 percent a continental european country (mostly germany, 
because of a special tax law there), and only three films involved Japan.
so the united states remains the mammoth in this field, with even its 
closest allies playing only a marginal role. other countries are rather insig-
nificant. hong Kong was mentioned three times as a territory participating 
in a production, the People’s republic of China and taiwan once (for the 
same brilliant wuxia movie, Crouching Tiger). but india was not mentioned 
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at all (Slumdog Millionaire was not listed as an indian production, though 
partly in hindi).3 nor was any other country from other continents listed: 
none from asia and the Pacific, Central and south america, africa, or the 
Middle east.
Most blockbusters listed one of the “seven sisters” among the holly-
wood studios as the prime participating company: universal (43), Warner 
(42), disney (including buena vista, 35), twentieth Century fox (including 
fox 2000, 32), Paramount (29), Columbia (22), and the relative newcomer 
dreamworks (20). even lesser american studios registered many more hits 
than (originally) european companies, such as Polygram (3) and gaumont 
(1). sony was mentioned once. a key question is of course why the united 
states is so far ahead of all others. is it just its political and economic, cul-
tural, and linguistic clout worldwide? or are there other structural factors 
as well?
one major factor is of course that in hollywood, filmmaking is un-
equivocally a commercial affair. Participants make an investment and a 
calculation about how they plan to recoup their money. they gamble, but 
cover their risks— usually by not departing too far from the ideological 
mainstream. films are also “tested” on u.s. audiences before release. if 
needed, new scenes are shot, other scenes are re- edited. sometimes, a com-
pletely new ending is added (usually more upbeat), until the whole proves 
to “work” with audiences.
in europe and elsewhere, filmmaking is often approached in a more 
“arty” way, by contrast, with government subsidies playing a key role. Pro-
ducers often cave in to “auteur” directors. but the most important factor 
is this: the united states is already a mosaic society of immigrant groups, 
including many recent ones who are not always fluent in english yet. euro-
pean countries have long lived with more or less monolithic linguistic and 
cultural reference frames. Most popular french and german films, italian 
and spanish ones, therefore, do not cross cultural borders very well.
hollywood learned from the start to make movies that crossed lines 
between communities relatively easily by playing on very primary reac-
tions to impressive “production values”: elaborate sets and props, grandi-
ose spectacle and special effects— always employing the latest in technol-
ogy, however expensive— a cast of recognizable stars, and an attendant star 
system, with festivals and awards, paparazzi and gossip.
among the almost four hundred blockbusters on the list, furthermore, 
there were at least forty different series of sequels of two or more films. ap-
parently, such recognizable formulas can be marketed globally with ease— 
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across the atlantic and Pacific oceans— supported by fast food chains and 
soft drink companies with considerable clout. they also tie in with games 
and television series, toys and figurines, posters and clothing, books and 
comics— alliances making each separate release a multi- billion enterprise. 
the numbers also seem to be suggesting an accelerating trend on this 
score.
one key question remains as to what extent this american and g7 pre-
dominance affects non- Western audiences. Who can have his or her voice 
heard on the world stage, and who remains largely silent? the nature of 
the problem may be illustrated by a crude comparison. the makers of most 
blockbusters form a kind of pyramid or prism. they are mostly white males 
with english as their mother tongue, multi- millionaires or aspiring to be-
come one as soon as possible. they look at the rest of the world from the 
perspective of the major Western urban centers— although most do appar-
ently see themselves as cosmopolitan and liberal.
on a more fundamental level, however, they have usually internalized 
a mid- atlantic view of global history and geography, its central myths and 
legends. even if they feel they have just freely “thought up creative fanta-
sies,” they often unwittingly reproduce clichés from a pre- existing body 
of folklore and popular culture (pulp novels, comic strips)— often harking 
back to colonial and segregationist days. so many blockbusters remain eth-
nocentric, even today: they tend to make non- Westerners look at the world 
through Western eyes.
but their effect is not always simple, as there is always a “negotiation of 
meaning” throughout the entire process— from production to reception. 
the latter has been well demonstrated by early studies on the differing 
interpretation of central themes in the supposedly “texan” blockbuster 
television series Dallas by american, dutch, israeli, and immigrant viewers 
there, and ultimately also Japanese (ang, 1985; Liebes & Katz, 1990).
“Cultural Encounter” Genres and Stereotypes
one of the central notions in film studies is that of “genre,” which is de-
rived from a french term for kind or category. the notion was long taken 
for granted, although a closer look reveals that there are many different, 
often overlapping and contradictory, ways to distinguish genres. the dom-
inant theme may play a role, or the way in which it is treated, for instance. 
genres often bring their own idiom or grammar. newer films often refer 
back to famous scenes and characters in earlier “classical” films in the same 
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category, either explicitly or implicitly. Part of the joy of looking at such 
films is being able to recognize and decode such “inter- textual” references 
to predecessors (altman, 1999; neale, 2002).
Within the aforementioned list of almost four hundred bestselling 
blockbusters of all time, “intercultural encounters” often play a major role. 
one may select some 80 movies or 20 percent in which this is clearly the 
case, and group them into a dozen categories for closer inspection. Within 
these categories, one may try to identify “meta- narratives” and “sub- texts” 
through discourse analysis and similar approaches, and illustrate these with 
case studies of some prominent and overly familiar examples. but other ob-
servations may deal with recurring choices in casting and props, images and 
sounds. various academic disciplines, sub- and inter- disciplines, have wres-
tled with the question of the possible influence of such tropes and clichés.
Like many social sciences, international/intercultural/interethnic 
communication and media studies are primarily an anglo- american af-
fair today. yet, dominant anglo- american media images have always been 
critically dissected, often by scholars with some kind of privileged tie to 
other cultures. the mere reproduction of stereotypes by such media does 
of course not necessarily lead to their internalization, as the Dallas studies 
point out. yet it may be illuminating to try and analyze their hidden logic. 
Popular culture and film studies have increasingly done so over the last 
generation. some early examples were nederveen Pieterse’s study (1992) 
on “blackness,” dyer’s study (1997) on “whiteness,” shohat and stam’s 
study (1994) on “eurocentrism,” and bernstein and studlar’s study (1997) 
on “orientalism” in film.
i myself long taught a video- illustrated course on dominant Western 
media images of other cultures for students coming from all continents. i 
developed two english books for it: an earlier one on Understanding Global 
News (1998), and a later one on Screening Difference (2007) in the mov-
ies. Whereas some of the aforementioned film studies also included rather 
technical analyses of unfamiliar art house movies, i chose to focus mostly 
on a discussion of commercial successes in plain, everyday language. the 
chapters were built around the detailed dissection of some ten different in-
tercultural encounter genres, series, and prime examples— one at the time.
animated cartoons made for children provided a good appetizer about 
a wide range of overly familiar stereotypes, for instance, the four major 
1990s disney productions on exotic boys from the Middle east and africa, 
respectively (Aladdin and Lion King), and about exotic girls from the ameri-
cas and asia (Pocahontas and Mulan). after that introduction, i switched to a 
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largely chronological grid. in religious movies, old testament movies have 
a clear tendency to include anti- arab elements (e.g., successive versions of 
The Ten Commandments as well as The Prince of Egypt); many pre- war new 
testament movies had a tendency to include anti- Jewish elements (partly 
revived in The Passion of the Christ). antiquity movies, in turn, treat greece 
rather differently from Persia (e.g., Troy, Alexander, 300).
of course the cinematic history of european overseas expansion is 
shot through with familiar tropes. Wilderness adventure has various sub- 
genres: monster movies (e.g., the successive versions of King Kong), jungle 
man movies (e.g., the successive versions of Tarzan), and castaway/survi-
vor movies (e.g., the successive versions of Robinson Crusoe and its present- 
day “reality television” spin- offs). the clichés of the western genre are 
of course also overly familiar: even a worthwhile revisionist western like 
Dances with Wolves is unable to break clear of all of them. british colonial 
adventures in turn are of course u.K. centric: whether supposedly histori-
cal (Lawrence of Arabia or the successive versions of Anna and the King) or 
fictional (the successive versions of Alan Quatermain— the key model for 
the later Indiana Jones).
several special themes stand out. romantic and erotic encounters be-
tween white Western men and “colored” non- Western women show a 
particular hidden logic, for instance, whether situated in the Pacific (the 
successive versions of The Mutiny on the Bounty as well as almost all other 
south seas movies) or in east asia (the successive geisha- type movies and 
movies about China). at the same time “us” versus “them” is of course at 
the heart of all armed confrontation abroad: in the spy sub- genre (James 
Bond), the lone commando sub- genre (Rambo), and the limited military ex-
pedition overseas genre (Black Hawk Down). science fiction further proj-
ects these intercultural themes into space and into an imaginary future 
(e.g., the Star Trek and Star Wars series).
all these genres and films turn out to be ethnocentric in a wide variety 
of ways: from supposed “research” to overt wish- fulfillment fantasies about 
characters and story lines. that’s the case not only because they obviously 
prefer Western authors and Western accounts, often dating back to the 
days of colonialism and segregation, and still bearing many traces of them, 
or because they mostly consult Western experts or submit to Western pres-
sure groups (e.g., for religious or patriotic movies). it’s also because these 
ideological orientations do determine a wide range of cinematic details 
that we will usually tend to overlook.
time and again, it can be demonstrated that even technical choices 
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concerning light, color, and camera movements, for instance, are used in 
a highly ideological manner. the choice of (the ethnicity of) actors, their 
makeup, and their costumes is often ideological. the props, sets, and design 
are often oriented in similar ways, as are the sound and music, language and 
speech. in sum, they often reflect the legacy of a large variety of imperial 
adventure movies. even where they ostensibly try to “revise” the original 
drift, they mostly remain mired in the same old idiom and grammar.
of course similar things also hold for Chinese or indian or other films 
aimed at a large home audience. on the one hand, they remain “open” texts 
that can be “read” in a variety of ways. on the other hand, they are often 
built around “saming” and “othering.” they flatter their own people and 
denounce the enemy. but their influence abroad is very limited, in contrast 
to hollywood blockbusters.
James Cameron and the Avatar Project
soon after the publication of the Screening Difference book, the 3d super- 
mega- giga blockbuster Avatar was released. on the one hand, it seemed to 
be a unique and standalone project. on the other hand, it seemed to be an 
adept re- combination of all the aforementioned genres, a kind of Emerald 
Forest meets Dances with Wolves, or Indiana Jones meets Star Wars. to what 
extent was it able to break free of the accumulated body of clichés, or did it 
inevitably remain mired in it?
We should begin to emphasize that director James Cameron is an ex-
tremely versatile filmmaker. born to a Canadian family that later moved 
to California, he had done the first treatment of Spiderman there, wrote 
the first version of Rambo, wrote and directed the successful science fiction 
movies Terminator, Alien, and the Abyss, and the romantic disaster movie 
Titanic— the highest grossing film up to that day (robb, 2002). he always 
showed great affinity with natural science, advanced technology, and spe-
cial effects, and was one of the first blockbuster directors to get involved in 
the development of a new generation of 3d systems after the turn of the 
millennium. he had also made underwater documentaries, as well as cov-
ered mythical and biblical themes (Exodus Decoded, The Lost Tomb of Jesus).
Cameron claimed the earliest inspiration for Avatar came from a dream 
his mother had reported when he was young. Just after the mid- seventies 
he said he had developed a first screenplay along those lines, and just be-
fore the mid- nineties a more elaborate script. but he had to wait ten more 
years for imaging technology to catch up. filming started in april 2007, 
and the film was finally released in time for the Christmas season in late 
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2009. the term avatar originally referred to a hindu god incarnating in a 
human body, but it had meanwhile become video game speak for a figure 
onscreen representing the player. in this case, the characters are suppos-
edly deep asleep in the human world when they are wide awake in the alien 
world, and vice versa.
the story is set in 2154 on the moon Pandora of a planet in a distant 
galaxy. a terrestrial corporation has financed a huge space program to send 
a large- scale armed expedition there in order to mine the rare substance 
“unobtainium,” which is worth “twenty million a kilogram.” but the cor-
poration runs into opposition from aboriginals, the na’vi. a small group 
of explorers is trained to inhibit native bodies as “avatars,” to win the locals 
over or infiltrate them, or do both. at the very last moment, one of those 
scientists dies and has to be replaced by his “genetically identical” twin 
brother. this Marine veteran, Jake, who is in a wheelchair, is the central 
protagonist of the movie.
the film paints an extremely enchanting fantasy world. it uses the very 
latest in “synthetic” imaging techniques, blending real actors with elabo-
rate computer animation. it is the first major 3d blockbuster of a new 
generation, where special glasses suggest an in- depth view. the story and 
characters seem highly original at first. but upon closer inspection, they 
turn out to borrow heavily from the entire “intercultural encounter” film 
library i discussed in my book Screening Difference. We will see that it also 
harks back to specific scenes and story lines in a wide range of similar previ-
ous “imperial adventure” movies.
a key question is whether Avatar became the greatest blockbuster so 
far in spite of the fact that it recycled all clichés of the genre, or exactly 
because it did. even at a running time of more than two- and- a- half hours, 
a fantasy movie can be much more efficient if it works with all the stereo-
types already pre- installed in the audience’s minds. in hollywood movies, 
this is often called “research”: making a prior inventory of all narratives 
and visuals on a particular topic, and taking it from there. for major disney 
animation features, it is even standard procedure. so let us look at how five 
major themes of Avatar resonate with its forerunners.
1. The Theme of the Underpopulated “Virgin” Land
films and sequences start with an “establishing shot” of a location that sets 
the scene and the tone for what follows. good examples are the 1492 “dis-
covery of america” sequences in archetypical Columbus movies (at least 
three of which were almost simultaneously released upon the 500th an-
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niversary of the landing). they show an aerial shot of immaculate vegeta-
tion, suggesting uninhabited “virgin lands” belonging to nobody, and thus 
seemingly offering themselves up for exploration and exploitation. Avatar 
starts with very similar shots. somewhat later, there often is an imperative 
counter- shot. in Columbus movies, we observe the encroachers from and 
through the foliage as an obviously native hand pushes the branches aside, 
alerting us to a possible impending confrontation.
further to the interior of the discovered land, majestic waterfalls are of-
ten a key feature of the landscape. they may cover grotto entrances or pas-
sages to secret valleys behind them. they denote the deepest heart of the 
newly penetrated land, between upstream rivers and lakes. the first major 
Western explorers of africa went looking for the origins of the nile, found 
a lake and falls, which they then named after the british queen victoria. it 
has become the arch template for such settings.4
the features of that precise landscape and Mount Kilimanjaro also 
played a key role in the visuals of disney’s african Lion King, for example 
(largely plagiarized from the preceding Japanese Kimba, by the way). the 
first major Western explorers of present- day Zaire explored the higher 
reaches of the Congo river. think of Joseph Conrad’s terrifying Heart of 
Darkness— also a major source of inspiration for francis ford Coppola’s 
vietnam War movie, Apocalypse Now.5
the “heart of darkness” itself is located in a forest, of course: not just 
any forest, but a dense rain forest. the largest remaining one still stretches 
all the way from the amazon basin to the orinoco river in the north. near 
the mouth of the latter river lies a small island that had become a key motif 
in imperial adventure fantasies, the imaginary location of the aforemen-
tioned Robinson Crusoe by daniel defoe (recycled in present- day popular 
“reality television” formats).
such natural settings are of course inhabited by wild and exotic animals, 
which are used to scare readers and viewers alike in imperial adventure 
narratives. Indiana Jones, The Mummy, and their like also capitalize on such 
animals in a desert environment. disney’s Tarzan and Lion King even re-
duce africa to a tourist safari park and entirely blot out the natives, as a 
potential source of embarrassment. Avatar in turn scares its audiences with 
sci- fi versions of the same familiar tropical zoo, ranging from “scorpions, 
lizards and bats” to “hyenas, panthers and rhinos” (according to explana-
tions in the script).
the superlatives of scary animals in such movies are prehistoric mon-
sters, surviving in those very same deep unexplored interiors, derived from 
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the dinosaurs in The Lost World by Conan doyle, spilling over into the 
original King Kong story co- authored by edgar Wallace, and also revived 
in Godzilla and Jurassic Park. in Avatar, they find their parallel in the ap-
pearance of smaller and larger dragon- like animals, which are then domes-
ticated.6
Matinee audiences for intercultural encounter and imperial adventure 
movies are also habitually scared with masses of creepy smaller animals 
(bats, rats, spiders, and so forth) as well as with repulsive animal food. 
think of the recurring fried beetles, baby snakes, sheep eyeballs, live mon-
key brain dishes, etcetera, that are standard fare in the Indiana Jones se-
ries. in Avatar, the natives eat beetle larvae as a delicacy, and live worms 
as a sacred medicine. they send shivers through the theater— exactly as 
intended— and further help to “otherize” the aliens.
2. The Theme of the Primitive Native Tribe
We have seen that the imperial adventure story primarily feeds on two 
major predecessors: the american “cowboys and indians” story (with “cow-
boys” including early settlers and later cavalry) and the european “colonial 
adventure” story (with the travails of british, french, and other pioneers in 
africa, asia, and elsewhere).7
in the original versions, ethnic difference between the explorers and the 
natives is highlighted in a wide range of different ways. in traditional West-
ern thinking, “skin color” was the prime signifier of “race,” as can be seen in 
all popular visual arts. first, the explorers are and remain lily white, to such 
an extent that they often hardly show a suntan— even after decades in the 
tropics (as in the case of Tarzan). Many often have exaggerated light blond 
hair and exaggerated light blue eyes (as in the case of Lawrence of Arabia).
the natives, with skins ranging from beige to brown, are seen and em-
phatically depicted as “colored” by contrast, with east asians as “yellow,” 
native americans as “red,” and africans as “black” (in comic strip versions 
by disney and others, they are often literally given such primary colors). 
in Avatar, the natives are assigned the primary color cyan blue, in order to 
stay away from this real- life race heritage, but still remain within the same 
repertoire.8 Most also have the long black hair of native americans, but 
some also show the fashionable braids of african americans.
second, the whites in imperial adventure movies are implicitly seen and 
depicted as of “normal” height— even though the male heroes themselves 
may sometimes be slightly above average. asians are mostly seen and de-
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picted as slightly smaller on average, and therefore sneaky. africans are of-
ten seen and depicted as slightly larger on average and therefore implicitly 
threatening. they are also larger in a sexual sense, in the “rape and lynch-
ing” lore of the segregationist southern united states.
in Avatar, the natives are made considerably larger than the explor-
ers. their ethnicity is a mix of native american and african. they are 
also somewhat “animalized” and explicitly ascribed “feline” characteris-
tics. Jake’s love interest, neytiri, hisses like a cat whenever threatened, for 
instance. the na’vi natives move rapidly through the trees, swinging on 
lianas— as in Tarzan. the colonel therefore derogatively calls them “blue 
monkeys.” but the clan leader retorts that the colonel “smells” in turn (an-
other key signifier of racial difference).
the other senses are also enlisted. in Avatar and many such movies, 
views of the jungle are overlaid with the sound of an isolated pan flute to 
denote quiet nature, contrasted with massive drums (and sometimes col-
lective chants), denoting the disquieting presence of a threatening tribe 
nearby— for instance, in King Kong. a warrior also shouts “an ululating 
warning”— familiar from north african arabs and north american na-
tives. Cameron even took great care to have ethno- linguists develop a local 
language— as gene roddenberry had already done with great success for 
the original Star Trek tv series, which he created and produced.9
3. The Theme of the Indigenous Natural Worldview
Avatar illustrates that the “creative avant- garde” in the Western metropoli-
tan centers that holds itself to be “most advanced” is trying to rehabilitate 
the seemingly most backward natural religions of indigenous peoples and 
rain forest tribes— by slightly adapting them to their own tastes as they are 
purged of their multitude of personal gods and turned into a new kind of 
abstract pantheism.10
that is the idea that the entire universe and planet earth, as well as 
its plants and animals, form a godlike perfect whole— the equilibrium of 
which should be respected rather than disturbed. such greenpeace eth-
ics emerged in a range of previous blockbusters, particularly “revisionist” 
depictions of “indians” with a superior morality— as in the aforementioned 
Emerald Forest and Dances with Wolves. they embody the “noble savages” 
of the enlightenment philosophers. at one point, the hero of Avatar notes 
(Cameron, 2007, p. 84 in the script): “they don’t even have a word for 
‘lie’— they had to learn it from us.”
the privileged way to experience this connectedness is through Zen- 
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like meditation, Avatar’s heroine suggests (p. 64): “When you hear nothing, 
you will hear everything. When you see nothing, you will see everything.” 
Within the media, chroniclers of religion were first and foremost to point 
to this noteworthy aspect of the new age fairy tale. a commentator in the 
New York Times noted “Cameron’s long apologia for pantheism .  .  . hol-
lywood’s religion of choice for a generation now.” a reviewer for a major 
Christian film website added that the film was “a virtual apotheosis of hol-
lywood mythopoeia,” as it “is not so much something that has never been 
done as something that everything else has been trying to be or preparing 
for,” citing among other things “hippie politics” with “eco- spiritual and 
pacifist themes” (greydanus, 2009).
this environmental consciousness seems to have taken hold at “five 
minutes to midnight,” when the world’s climate is already changing, raw 
materials seem to be running out, the rain forests are dwindling, and biodi-
versity is shrinking at an alarming rate, with unique plant and animal spe-
cies dying out every single day. it is a secular religion worshipping Mother 
nature and Mother earth.
the earth goddess gaia has maintained subtle balances so far— just like 
Pandora’s equivalent goddess eywa. this theme is underlined by the ex-
alted design and visuals of Avatar, some of them harking back to the first 
lyrical documentaries about the strange alternative underwater universe 
by the famous french diver Jacques Cousteau and to the idyllic photo and 
film reports commissioned by the american national geographic society, 
its magazine and television arms.
the living totem of the tribe is an ancient sacred willow tree, the “well 
of souls” that helps the natives connect to their forefathers. “signal trans-
duction” connects all living organisms to an “electrochemical network” of 
energy, a force field that exists between plant tendrils, animal antennae, and 
human neurons. each of the billions of trees  has ten thousand connections 
to other trees— “more than a human brain.”
the na’vi are also capable of thought transmission. “it’s a global net-
work” with “uploading and downloading,” the movie explains, in an obvi-
ous reference to the global internet. the aggressive invaders threaten to 
cut such vital connections, sometimes literally. but near- dead people can be 
revitalized by restoring “the bond.” the network is symbolized by a kind of 
blue- green spiritual luminescence reminiscent of ghost movies.
in Avatar, the key figures of this religion are the clan leader and his 
wife, the high priestess. they are also the parents of the local heroine, and 
the future in- laws of the hero from earth: Jake. in the course of the film 
he turns into the archetypical prophet/liberator hero overly familiar from 
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western and colonial folklore. he is a kind of Moses from exodus in the 
old testament, or Jesus from the gospels in the new testament, but also 
Lawrence of Arabia, Indiana Jones, and many others, whose inborn superior-
ity and charisma as “natural leaders” is demonstrated in their interaction 
with local crowds.
they are the eternal non- natives who soon turn into better natives than 
the natives themselves— who feel forced to show their deference and re-
spect. in Avatar, Jake becomes the military leader of the uprising, gets to 
marry “the princess” as his prize, and impregnate her. he will thus become 
“the new king” or at least the father of the new king, a colonial era fantasy 
par excellence (already in the twisted popcult version of Pocahontas, Alan 
Quatermain, and other films).
tribal life is also signified by the usual props in Avatar: the teeth of 
wild animals as a warrior necklace, rings lengthening the neck, feathers as 
headgear, like typical “indians,” the skulls of wild animals on gates and to-
tems. the tribe gathers and chants around a bonfire, as in the famous bali 
monkey dance paraphrased in an early version of King Kong. they use an 
intoxicating drink and fragrant herbs for purification and initiation rituals.
When assembling, the tribe even looks like a hippie “Woodstock in 
the jungle”— so says the script. When praying, they do so “in concentric 
rings of people, all plugged- in and softly chanting.” When mobilizing, they 
radiate “a dark primeval energy.” We are not far from the stirring human 
sacrifice and cannibal scenes in Alan Quatermain, and similar ones in the 
Indiana Jones series (e.g., The Temple of Doom).
4. The Theme of Imperial Armed Intervention
the basic premise of Avatar is simple. it is basically “cowboys and indians” 
catapulted into distant space and into the far future, as in Star Trek and Star 
Wars— and by extension, colonialism and neocolonialism catapulted into 
future space. the home country/planet of the invaders is running out of 
the necessary resources; they intervene militarily elsewhere to obtain them.
the mineral “unobtainium” on Pandora is like the gold mines in africa 
for the british imperial hero alan Quatermain, or like the references to 
Middle east oil wells that disney inserted throughout the Aladdin movie. 
the Avatar script contains explicit references to meddling in oil- rich coun-
tries like nigeria and venezuela, and implicit ones to the confrontations 
around iran and iraq. the script also contains references to “development 
aid” as a lubricant for unequal exchange. the carrots supplementing the 
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stick: roads, clinics, schools, and the inevitable learning of . . . english.
such action and war movies have traditionally been primarily aimed 
at adolescent boys at home, as “armchair conquistadores.” they seem to 
promote their enlistment for military service overseas only a few years 
later— as a more virile adventure.11 they tend to glamorize Western tech-
nological superiority, from the eternal gadgets of the british spy James 
bond to the electronic savvy and overwhelming firepower demonstrated 
in most american war movies— an implicit warning to overseas audiences. 
the relation of Avatar to such displays is ambivalent. on the one hand, 
it impresses us with its oversized weapons; on the other hand, it seems to 
frown upon their actual use— as natives denigrate the invading soldiers as 
cowardly, “hiding inside machines.”
the movie “shocks and awes” us with these huge contraptions, but we 
can “read” these scenes as industry promotion, pacifist propaganda, both 
or neither. it begins with “Mitsubishi MK- 6 ampsuits— human- operated 
walking machines 4 meters tall.” they resonate with the giants in ancient 
folklore and the golem, with harnessed knights on horses in the medieval 
armory, but also with hollywood inventions such as The Hulk and Robocop. 
then there are “samson tilt rotors: big as a blackhawk”— familiar from the 
movie with the same name about a failed military expedition in somalia.12
to confront this “overwhelming force,” the native tribes use only some 
of their traditional means. they put on war paint and utter war cries to try 
and scare their adversaries away. they use martial arts techniques familiar 
from man- to- man combat in asian movies; they are also “Zen” in their 
concentration and focus. they use the bows and poison- tipped arrows of 
native peoples everywhere, as well as their white imitators such as Tar-
zan and Rambo. yet when they try to scale the fence around the invaders’ 
compound, they are easily mowed down by gunfire. they are still like the 
indians trying to scale the palisades around the cavalry fort.
toward the end of the film, this confrontation is gradually drawn into 
the usual orgy of stylized violence, as an air fleet of invading troopships 
and gunships squares off against a swarm of dragons— some jockeyed by 
the natives, and the mythical largest one by the new non- native leader Jake. 
it is esthetically choreographed: with many victims, but little of their suf-
fering in sight. this is also a catharsis— as the good guys win, of course. 
the final battle takes fifty pages, half as much as the rest of the script taken 
together. it is made elegant, but also comic book cartoonesque (“Kapow, 
Kaboom”).
Most interesting of all are the two liminal characters ultimately leading 
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these opposing forces. on the one hand, there is the unsympathetic gung-
 ho colonel of the mining company’s security detail, with a crew cut and 
multiple scars to denote him as an experienced veteran fighter. and on the 
other hand is the sympathetic paraplegic reincarnated in his local avatar 
who comes to the defense of a seemingly desperate cause. as an avatar, he 
is also a kind of mulatto— and a turncoat who becomes a hero. not navy 
but na’vi. the colonel to Jake: “how does it feel to betray your own race?”
this is indeed a surprising twist for an american action movie. but 
maybe even more surprising is that it leaves the further structure of the 
archetypical imperial adventure story largely untouched. this is also il-
lustrated by a final theme.
5. The Theme of the Beautiful Native Girl
dating within one’s own group has always and everywhere been considered 
normal; crossing group boundaries is “not done” but sometimes strangely 
attractive, from the classic Romeo and Juliet play to the modern West Side 
Story musical.
in the original imperial adventure genre, and according to the early 
hollywood production codes, interracial romance and miscegenation were 
completely out of the question. in later novels and movies, the taboo was 
slowly circumvented— as it was in real life, timidly at first, and under vari-
ous clandestine pretexts. White men abroad often felt drawn to exotic girls 
(Suzie Wong); white women being attracted to exotic men abroad was even 
more problematic (The Sheik). it was the sinful lure of transgressing cul-
tural taboos, of tasting the “forbidden fruit.” but after a passionate fling, 
the native partner was often made to die in such scripts, so that the white 
hero (or heroine) could return to a regular life and marriage at home.
of course the semi- nudity and suggestive dancing by the locals had 
often added to their immediate sexual appeal— for instance, in cinematic 
Polynesia. in Avatar, according to one review, “the girls are sexy enough 
to be easy on the eyes, but not too sexy for the comfort level of typical 
parents.” the first review in the New York Times added that “the humanoid 
na’vi come with supermodel dimensions (slender hips, a miniature- apple 
rear, long articulated digits” and “slanted eyes”) (dargis, 2009).13
neytiri’s attire is a difficult hollywood compromise between prudish 
covering and provocative uncovering of shoulders or legs (compare Poca-
hontas). the script itself describes the love interest of the hero in Avatar: 
“lithe as a cat, with . . . nubile breasts . . . devastatingly beautiful.” fortu-
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nately, at age 18 she has just ceased to be under age. Jake’s white superior 
reproaches him: “you got a little local pussy.” after he has made love to 
neytiri, his native rival erupts: “you mated with this woman?” on the last 
page of the script, we learn that she is “obviously pregnant” (Cameron, 
2007, pp. 90– 105). the girl is played by Zoe saldana, who also played the 
“ethnic other” of uhura in Star Trek.14
interestingly enough, “surplus libido” was often ascribed to such cul-
tural others of the opposite sex. they were supposed to be more animal-
istic, primitive, childish, or at least very much lower class. Lower on the 
ladder of civilization, therefore more uninhibited, authentic, and attractive. 
this theme also derived from illicit relations between male masters and 
female slaves in the u.s. south, between settlers and servants in the eu-
ropean colonies, later between millions of military men and prostitutes in 
south, southeast, and east asia. the theme also runs from the successful 
classical opera Madama Butterfly to its present- day knockoff musical Miss 
Saigon.
of course most multiracial societies were characterized by grave in-
equalities. for a “colored” girl to become the potential fiancée or even a 
marriage prospect for an ordinary white man, she had often to be elevated 
to the status of a local “princess” in a story— thus almost equaling him in 
status— to the extent that even a mere chieftain’s daughter was depicted 
as royalty (Pocahontas). this is also a theme in one of the original fictional 
stories about the colonial hero alan Quatermain— the indiana Jones of his 
day. it is the central theme of the romance in Avatar as well.
in Pocahontas and Avatar, there is a further twist. the superior attrac-
tiveness of white men in general is further underlined by the fact that the 
local princess had already been promised to a local partner/fiancé, but she 
immediately drops him after receiving “a sign” and upon first encounter-
ing “ the real one.” this is a theme in the mythical (but twisted) Pocahontas 
story: in the disney version she literally falls for the very first young white 
man she sees setting foot on american soil— and begins kissing him within 
minutes . . . in the very same sequence. this theme is also maintained in 
Avatar, even though it takes them slightly longer. in the end the native rival 
cedes, and recognizes the white man’s superiority (if not physically then at 
least characterwise).
this is related to another recurrent racist theme, which we have al-
ready pointed out. the white hero soon proves to be a better native than 
the natives themselves: in fighting and riding local animals, in using local 
weapons and strategies. this is the central theme of Tarzan, but also of all 
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other imperial heroes such as Alan Quatermain, Lawrence of Arabia, Tintin, 
Indiana Jones, Rambo— and Jake in Avatar. the interesting thing is that a 
movie like Avatar may be explicitly anti- imperial, but its narrative structure 
implicitly retains many pro- imperial traits that derive from the large body 
of predecessors by which it is inspired. the “free fantasy” of the writer 
and director feeds on pre- existing stereotypes in their heads, often without 
them being aware of it.
Avatar’s Revival of Hollywood’s Strength
the unprecedented success of Avatar came along at a crucial moment. hol-
lywood had seemed to be severely affected by the 2008 economic crisis, the 
decline of dvd sales, and the rise of illegal copying. twelve hundred pro-
fessionals participated in a three- day conference on the state of the indus-
try in Los angeles, convened by the Producers guild of america. the New 
York Times reported that “the big studios are cutting back” on the number 
of productions, largely limiting themselves to “bloated sequels, bloated re-
makes,” whereas “half of the independent distributors in the united states 
have folded over the past couple of years” (barnes, 2010).
Whereas it is said that a cat has nine lives, hollywood may turn out 
to have ten. technological advances have always helped restore its pre- 
eminence, outdistancing both producers overseas and illegal copiers. in 
this case, there had already been some renewed experiments with 3d, even 
by Cameron himself. but Avatar became the first mega- blockbuster to 
demonstrate the attractiveness of this revolution. Movie theaters around 
the world were adapted in a hurry, and manufacturers of television screens 
also launched themselves into the breach— even contemplating new ways 
to get rid of the cumbersome stereoscopic glasses.
nine and a half months after its release, on 1 october 2010, movie 
databases already listed Avatar as the highest grossing film ever, calling it a 
“must see” event. it was also a hit in emergent markets such as China, the 
natural beauty and cultural legacy of which had inspired some of its unique 
“floating mountains” scenery.15 the outlay for Avatar had been estimated 
at an unprecedented $300 million for production, with $150 million more 
for marketing. but the worldwide theatrical box office receipts (ticket sales) 
were calculated to be $2.8 billion that far— not including video rentals, 
television rights, merchandizing, and other revenues of further multiple 
billions. that was already 50 percent more than the runner- up Titanic, 
also made by James Cameron, a dozen years earlier. the director quickly 
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opened talks with twentieth Century fox over two possible sequels.
other directors quickly followed suit. steven spielberg (of the Indiana 
Jones series and many others) was involved in developing an alternative 3d 
system for which one would no more need special glasses. george Lucas 
had already rushed into converting his half dozen Star Wars films into 3d. 
disney was adapting the next installment of Pirates of the Caribbean. as 
a matter of fact, all major studios and blockbuster directors were in the 
process of hastily shifting major projects to 3d, including a wide array of 
remakes and sequels already in the pipeline. so Avatar proved not only 
“more of the same” but also the ultimate catalyst for another revolution in 
hollywood.
Avatar’s Cultural Reception
Meanwhile, Avatar had also been rather well received by reviewers. Web-
sites Metacritics and rotten tomatoes each aggregated 35 early reviews 
into scores of 84 percent and 94 percent positive, although the film got 
“only” three oscars (as opposed to six for The Hurt Locker). spin- offs in-
cluded books, music, videos (including a documentary on Cameron’s en-
tire life and work), action figures— and of course a first- person “shooter” 
video game available for all existing game machines, where the player has 
to choose sides between the invaders and the invaded. there is no Pan-
dora/na’vi theme park ride at this point, but it will no doubt come about.
but let us return to the question with which we began this essay. What 
did Avatar mean, or what was it made to mean, by viewers around the world 
belonging to various groups? early television researchers had alerted us to 
the possibility of alternative “readings” by other cultures. We have seen 
that the blockbuster was shot through with contradictory messages, both 
subliminal and supraliminal. the Chicago Tribune even called it “the sea-
son’s ideological rorschach blot,” after the ambiguous ink stain used to 
uncover unconscious feelings in psychotherapy.
it seemed apt that it was the first blockbuster movie for which one ex-
plicitly had to put on special glasses, in order just to be able to see it as 
intended. some people deemed the movie nihilistic, others rather utopian. 
an article in the New York Times noted that over the very first month it 
had “found itself in the crosshairs of a growing number of interest groups, 
schools of thought and entire nations”: feminists and anti- smoking activ-
ists, liberals and conservatives, the Kremlin and the vatican and whatnot.16
Like most people of his social category, Cameron had always felt sym-
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pathy for environmentalism and indigenous people. but after Avatar he 
now felt obliged to take an even clearer stand, as native american groups 
pressed him to take up the defense of the remaining “real Pandoras” in the 
world. for instance, in the amazon basin, where thirteen native tribes felt 
threatened by a dam project.17 the indians invited him to join a three- day 
protest. he flew in, put on war paint, and showed them his movie on dvd: 
for many, it was the first encounter with such modern technology. the 
meeting predictably became a media event, was filmed in high definition, 
and shown by television channels around the world (itzkoff, 2010a).
but there seemed to be a paradox. the first review in the New York 
Times had noted that it was ironic that Avatar “feeds you an anti- corporate 
line in a corporately financed entertainment.” it was distributed by twen-
tieth Century fox, the hollywood movie arm of the most global of all 
media empires— rupert Murdoch’s news Corp.18 the blockbuster was 
also promoted worldwide by the usual broad alliance of powerful u.s. cor-
porations. Coca Cola supported the worldwide marketing campaign with 
specially marked Avatar cans and bottles. Mcdonalds distributed toys of 
half a dozen major characters with its happy Meals in half a dozen major 
countries. Mattel announced that it would produce a line of Avatar action 
figures.
even more surprising: Avatar was embraced as a powerful symbol by 
people and groups fighting for freedom and resistance against foreign 
domination. soon, news channels around the world showed Palestinian 
demonstrators against israel, in nablus on the West bank, painted blue and 
dressed like Pandora’s na’vi.19 evo Morales, the first indigenous president 
of dirt- poor and landlocked bolivia, praised Avatar for its “profound show 
of resistance to capitalism and the struggle for the defense of nature.” he 
maintained tense relations with the united states, which was actively op-
posing a number of his social reforms. the aforementioned Christian film 
website had already noted about Avatar: “it’s noble primitives and war-
mongering Westerners, imperialist and expansionist guilt and no blood for 
oil, Cortez and Custer and george W. bush in one fell swoop.” another 
website called it “the essence of the white guilt fantasy, laid bare.”
so even if such a movie may be chockfull of age- old “imperial adven-
ture” themes, it may still be experienced as an anti- imperial statement over-
all. such a complex product has multiple threads running through it that 
can be “read” in contradictory ways. audiences “negotiate” its meaning to 
themselves and their situation. the message of movies does therefore al-
ways remain polysemic: audiences with different experiences in varying 
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contexts can extract their own messages from them. that remains a central 
finding of international/intercultural/interethnic studies of communica-
tion and media.
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Notes
 1. analyzed in my 2010 dutch book Gek met geld— Over financiële psychologie 
[Mad with money— about financial psychology].
 2. 21 february 2010. of course such a list has a tendency of overweighing the 
number of visitors in developed countries, as they pay higher ticket prices.
 3. Crouching Tiger was the first “pan- Chinese” blockbuster, although it was said 
that the four main actors could hardly understand each other, as they spoke with 
entirely different accents: from beijing and Canton, from taiwan and Malaysia. 
(Columbia and sony participated as well.) Slumdog Millionaire was officially an 
english film, although with an indian co- producer and with a screenplay based 
on an indian novel. Critics have claimed that Chinese and indian movies can only 
become worldwide blockbusters if they somehow cater to Western tastes and ste-
reotypes.
 4. think of henry Morton stanley’s highly dramatized accounts of his travels in 
these regions looking for david Livingstone and beyond, which became the major 
source for the Tarzan novels by burroughs. (neither the movie productions nor the 
novelist ever set foot in the real africa, though,)
 5. Cameron’s college years near niagara falls may have further resonated with 
such primeval features.
 6. in recent years, this same theme had already been developed by several series 
of bestselling novels for both children and adults. improvements in Cgi animation 
techniques had already enabled their inclusion in blockbuster movies.
 7. the belgian comic strip Tintin (the film rights of which have been bought by 
steven spielberg) is a good example— which i have analyzed elsewhere in greater 
detail in the dutch book Striphelden op de divan [Comic strip heroes on the couch, 
2002].
 8. green may have been less of an option, as they would then blend too much 
into the background.
 9. this Klingon became highly popular among “trekkies” or fans of the series, 
and a popular “pseudo- foreign” minority language.
 10. it is of course no coincidence that environmentalism arose whenever and 
wherever the natural environment had almost disappeared.
 11. it is well documented that such movies have often been facilitated and subsi-
dized by departments of defense, particularly in the united states.
 12. the images of trigger- happy and gung- ho gis with huge guns hanging out of 
the open doors of helicopter gunships, and scrutinizing the jungle underneath for 
anything that moves, comes straight out of older vietnam footage, of course: both 
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newsreel and hollywood fiction.
 13. steven d. greydanus on the Christian website http://www.decentfilms.com. 
and Manohla dargis in the International Herald Tribune, 19– 20 december 2009.
 14. there is a whole category of stars in hollywood devoted entirely to play-
ing certain ethnic roles. People such as anthony Quinn or raquel Welch easily 
switched from Latino to indian to everything in between. also think of yul brunner 
who built an entire career on “ancient and exotic tyrant” roles.
 15. Within a month, Avatar reportedly broke all previous box office records in 
China, for instance, with receipts exceeding 100 million dollars. Like elsewhere, 
moviegoers proved to prefer the more expensive 3d theaters over the less expen-
sive 2d ones. according to discussions on some Chinese websites, evictions and 
similar themes from the film resonated with current domestic controversies. avatar 
“beat” the newly released major local movie Confucius, favored by the authorities, 
according to simon elegant, in “Letter from China/a little bit of flexibility,” Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 5 february 2010.
 16. dave itzkoff, “sci- fi epic becomes a culture- war battleground,” International 
Herald Tribune, 20 January 2010.
 17. they were to be displaced by the $11 billion belo Monte dam project, cre-
ating a 500 square kilometer lake in the basin of the Xingu river (a tributary to 
the amazon). it was to provide electricity to são Paulo, brazil’s bustling industrial 
metropolis.
 18. International Herald Tribune, 19– 20 december 2009.




Resurrecting the Imperial Dimension in 
International Communication
Colin sparks
the concept of cultural imperialism dominated thinking about interna-
tional communication in the 1970s and early 1980s. subsequently, it has 
been thoroughly discredited and more or less fallen out of mainstream 
usage. today, relatively few writers are ready to engage with theoretical is-
sues involved in the concept of imperialism (Louw, 2011). While there are 
some more or less casual uses of the concept in studies of the media, and 
it retains a surprisingly vigorous life in other fields, such as linguistics, in 
most specialist studies it is firmly relegated to a discussion of the history 
of media and communication theories (ndlela, 2009). When imperialism 
is mentioned in discussions of contemporary realities, it is usually in the 
context of a discussion of its limitations. Kraidy, for example, set his task 
as “dissecting the deficiencies of the cultural imperialism thesis” (Kraidy, 
2005, p. vi). even those writers who credit it with some lingering impor-
tance in that it did identify real disparities in the provision of cultural re-
sources internationally spend much of their time discussing its shortcom-
ings (Morley, 2006).
in part perhaps this is the consequence of more general intellectual 
and political shifts during the period, but it also reflects a theoretical re- 
alignment of the field. Much of the work on international communication 
in the last two decades has been dominated by theories that stress regional 
markets, complex flows, and the relative unimportance of the state in inter-
national communication. the dominant current of thinking, globalization, 
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has tended to discount the role of the state in favor of the relations between 
the global and the local. to the extent that the state has been recognized 
as a significant factor in cultural exchanges, it is through the lens of “soft 
power” rather than “imperialism.”
this chapter questions whether it is possible to recover anything valu-
able from the ruins of the cultural imperialism edifice. in order to do that, 
it first revisits the classical formulations of the theory and considers some 
aspects of its defining characteristics. it then reviews some of the main 
criticisms that were leveled against the theory and which were responsible 
for its loss of influence. in order to re- establish a workable theory, the un-
derlying concept of imperialism is reconsidered and an alternative account 
to that prominent during the 1970s and 1980s is offered. building on this, 
the scope of a redefined theory is advanced. finally, reasons are given as to 
why current international developments mean that the concept is likely to 
become more pertinent in the coming years.
Cultural Imperialism
Cultural imperialism, as has often been pointed out, is an imprecise cate-
gory: one of its most severe critics argued that rather than see it as a coher-
ent body of thought, “a better way of thinking about cultural imperialism is 
to think of it as a variety of different articulations which may have certain 
features in common, but while may also be in tension with each other, or 
even mutually contradictory” (tomlinson, 1991, p. 9). this judgment is 
certainly correct: many writers with quite different intellectual positions 
employed the term to a variety of ends. there were, however, “features in 
common” uniting writers with approaches as diverse as tunstall, Mattelart, 
and smith, notably in their stress upon the importance of the united states 
of america in world media markets (Mattelart, 1979; smith, 1980; tunstall, 
1977). despite this methodological, and indeed political, variety, however, 
from a theoretical point of view there can be little doubt that the main cur-
rent was of Marxist inspiration and that it was the work of herbert schiller 
that formed the central reference point for the development and diffusion 
of the concept (Maxwell, 2003, pp. 38– 41). he developed the concept most 
famously in his Communication and Cultural Domination and it is worth-
while repeating the definition of cultural imperialism he gives there:1
[t]he concept of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum 
of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern 
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world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pres-
sured, forced and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions 
to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the 
dominating center of the system. (schiller, 1976, p. 9)
this brief statement contains both the core of the concept and the key to 
some of its weaknesses. We can identify four distinct elements that have 
been central to discussions of cultural imperialism:
1. this is a very broad conception of the issues at stake (Lee, 1980, 
pp. 41– 42). taken literally, it would include all sorts of pressures, for ex-
ample structural adjustment programs developed by the iMf, which do 
not naturally fall within the ambit of culture but which certainly involve 
pressure to shape social institutions to fit the dominating center of the sys-
tem. this broad concept of cultural imperialism is sometimes contrasted 
with the much narrower claim of media imperialism, which oliver boyd- 
barrett defined as “the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribu-
tion or content of the media in any one country are singly or together are 
subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any 
other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influ-
ence by the country so affected” (boyd- barrett, 1977, p. 117). in practice, 
this distinction has proved hard to sustain. boyd- barrett included both of 
the schiller texts cited here in his catalogue of scholars working within the 
scope of media imperialism and schiller’s own work tended to be highly 
focused on the international trade in information products, notably televi-
sion programs (schiller, 1970).
2. schiller operates with a core- periphery model of imperialism (schiller, 
1976, p. 14). the system has a center, and it is clear both from the remainder 
of this text and from schiller’s other work that this center is the united states. 
he recognizes that in the past the united states was obliged to struggle with 
and defeat the earlier imperialist centers of britain and france, notably in 
the field of international news but also more generally: “under the banner 
of the “free flow of information” u.s. media products came to dominate 
the world” (schiller 1976, pp. 24– 38). similarly, schiller is clearly speaking 
of a “peripheral” country when he discusses the ways in which a society is 
“brought into the modern world system.” this conception of imperialism 
as fundamentally a relationship between the rich, developed world and the 
poorer, underdeveloped, world was, and is, one of the theoretical and practi-
cal foundations of most, if not all, existing theories of cultural imperialism.2
3. schiller’s account makes two distinct claims: first, the media and cul-
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tural apparatuses of the united states, aided by the government, dominate 
the international trade in media, notably in television programming, which 
newly established broadcasters in developing countries need in order to 
fill their schedules while remaining within their budgets; second, that the 
result of the continual consumption of this u.s.- made material is effective 
propaganda for the ideas and values of the united states, turning the local 
elite away from the needs of their own populations and facilitating absorp-
tion, or at least collaboration, with u.s. enterprises. these two propositions 
relate to two different inquiries. the first is concerned with the political 
economy of the international trade in television programs and the ways in 
which that dovetailed with the policies of the u.s. state. the second makes 
a claim about the effect of the consumption of this programming upon its 
audience in a peripheral country, which can only be answered by an inves-
tigation into the realities of watching such material.3
4. a fourth point, not present in the text quoted above but elaborated 
later in the same book, was the argument for the development of national 
communication policies. While he operated with a more complex notion of 
the problems of cultural domination, recognizing that these existed within 
countries as well as between them, schiller’s stress on national communica-
tion policies in practice came to mean the efforts of elites in the developing 
world to re- negotiate their relationship with the developed world.4 if the 
current arrangements, centered on the free flow of information around the 
world, were leading to the worldwide domination of u.s. culture at the ex-
pense of the national cultures of developing nations, then one way to coun-
ter this was to develop national communication policies designed to limit 
the inflow of alien messages with their damaging effects on the “cultural 
integrity of weak societies” (schiller, 1970, p. 109). Just as it was a central 
part of the industrialization process of countries like the united states to 
protect infant manufacturing industries until such time as they were suf-
ficiently developed to be internationally competitive, it was necessary to 
find ways to protect the cultural life of developing nations. this, schiller 
thought, could best be achieved through “responsible international regu-
lation of television programming,” most likely through policy changes in 
unesCo (schiller, 1970, p. 125).
this overall position inspired an avalanche of books, articles, and re-
ports, both general and scholarly. in addition, it provided a theoretical ba-
sis for a protracted campaign, focused on unesCo, that purported to 
change the balance of world communication and to foster national com-
munication policies.
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Criticisms and Alternatives
the various critiques of cultural imperialism are extremely well known, 
and there is little need to recount them exhaustively here. it is, neverthe-
less, worth sketching four of the more important objections since they pro-
vide an insight into the some of the issues that any new theory will have to 
account for:
1. the tendencies toward regional production noted by boyd- barrett 
and tunstall were identified as important growth points in the world mar-
ket for media artifacts. in particular, the developing national television in-
dustries of brazil and Mexico, and later of Japan and Korea, were seen as 
drivers of regional markets based upon cultural proximity (sinclair, 1999; 
straubhaar, 2007). While the world market for some media artifacts— 
high- budget films, for example— remains dominated by u.s. products, 
there are many other areas of cultural exchange that have a much more 
complex structure.
2. the assumption that there was, or could be, a single national culture 
that could be defended against u.s. values proved untenable. every exist-
ing society, even in the most successful and developed modern states, ex-
hibits a plurality of cultures, very often themselves a combination of earlier 
influences from “outside.” the “national culture” of every society is the 
culture of the dominant group and it is one of the mechanisms by which 
their hegemonic role is consolidated. the united Kingdom provides an 
obvious example of these tendencies: the national language itself is an ac-
cretion of different influences; the diverse population enjoys a variety of 
different cultures; the norms of “national” culture are unquestionably the 
norms of the dominant, white, male, metropolitan middle classes. to de-
fend a “national culture” is to defend the position of an elite group, not of 
a whole people. in some cases, it may be that imported texts articulate sup-
pressed elements of a national culture and allow audiences to celebrate an 
aspect of their own cultural experience that the broadcasters dominated by 
the official culture are unable to address (Miller, 1995).
3. the turn toward a conception of the active audience, most markedly 
in the traditions of cultural studies but also in more empirically oriented 
research, demonstrated that texts do not have one single reading that will 
be absorbed by an entire audience either within or across national bound-
aries (ang, 1995; Liebes & Katz, 1990). readings of texts are variable de-
pending upon the cultural resources of their consumers: people watching 
a u.s. series may absorb u.s. values or they may interpret the same text 
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in a radically different way. the conditions for the success of an imported 
program or series depends in part a least on domestic factors, ranging from 
the established local conventions of broadcasting to scheduling decisions 
that influence the size of the available audience.
4. the attempt to organize a political struggle around opposition to 
cultural imperialism took the concrete form of a struggle for a new World 
information and Communication order (nWiCo). a great deal of effort 
went into attempting to influence unesCo, and into building alliances 
with the representatives of many unsavory despots who were only too 
happy to curb the media and impose cultural uniformity on their unfor-
tunate subjects. nWiCo became embroiled in the Cold War and it went 
down to defeat along with the stalinist allies it had accumulated in its at-
tempt to win acceptance (hamelink, 1997).
one could both amplify and expand this list of objections: taken to-
gether, the evidence against the concept of cultural imperialism advanced 
by schiller is simply overwhelming. the new orthodoxy in the study of 
international communication began from the complexity both of media 
production and of audience behavior. there are many studies document-
ing the production and circulation of television programs, cinema films, 
and other artifacts originating far outside the range of hollywood. simi-
larly, there are detailed studies of the ways in which audiences, or at least 
sections of audiences, within the developed world utilize these non- u.s. 
media artifacts to construct their own cultural frameworks and identities. 
underlying this plethora of studies has been one or other variant of theo-
ries of globalization, which replace the concept of imperialism as the orga-
nizing element in this framework of thought. this is a notoriously protean 
group of concepts but we can note one central element which is common 
to many of the variants: it systematically marginalizes the role of the state.
this marginalization is clearly present in the pervasive slogans of “the 
global and the local,” “glocalization,” “think global, act local,” and so on. 
the missing term in all of these formulations is precisely the state. un-
less the term “local” really means “national,” as indeed it does when one 
interrogates many of these celebrations of the “local,” then the claim is that 
the poles of contemporary cultural (or indeed almost any other) life are to 
be located regionally, and thus “below” the level of the state, and globally 
“above” the level of the state. unlike the national, neither the local nor the 
global are equipped with the full apparatus of state power that coerces and 
regulates social life, culturally and economically. on the contrary, they are 
much more the field of the free play of economic competition.
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Complexity and freedom become the central organizing categories of 
studies of international communication. there is no doubt that the work 
that has taken this as its starting point has illuminated some important 
dimensions of contemporary media and cultural experience. there clearly 
are many other centers of production of cultural artifacts than simply the 
united states, and the international trade in these commodities is un-
doubtedly much more complex than was previously supposed: both bol-
lywood (india) and nollywood (nigeria) produce more movies each year 
than does hollywood, and tv globo (brazil) is a major source of televi-
sion fiction. there clearly are sub- national cultures and media organiza-
tions, such as basque and Catalan broadcasting in the spanish state and 
Cantonese- language broadcasting in southern China. it is clearly also the 
case that different social groups, indeed different individuals, increasingly 
use the resources of new media to construct diets of media consumption 
that are independent of the programming policies of any broadcaster— 
local, national, or global. all of these are good reasons for correcting the 
emphasis on the role of the state.
although it is important to correct the overemphasis on the state that 
marked the concept of cultural imperialism, it does not follow that the state 
is no longer a significant actor, a position exemplified by bauman’s claim 
that in the epoch of globalization “the military, economic and cultural self- 
sufficiency, indeed self- sustainability, of the state— any state— ceases to be 
a viable prospect” (bauman, 1998, p. 64). this view may have exerted a 
superficial attraction in the period after the fall of communism, when ri-
valry between states seemed no longer to be a serious prospect in the age 
of Pax americana, although even then the claim that the conclusion ap-
plies to “any state” seems much too strong. the fragments of the former 
yugoslavia, rwanda, somalia, later afghanistan and a dozen other “failed 
states” might have been incapable of “self- sustainability,” but surely that 
term could never have been be applied to the united states, or China and 
india for that matter? today, should anyone make such a claim it would be 
immediately rejected as quite incredible.
it is more convincing to argue that there is amongst states what we may 
call a hierarchy of competences. some states, pre- eminently the united 
states, are indeed capable of sustaining themselves in all three of the do-
mains identified by bauman. some states, for example the failed states, are 
clearly not capable of the same sort of self- determination. others fall be-
tween these two poles. Japan, for instance, is economically very powerful 
and culturally increasingly influential, but politically much weaker. We do 
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not yet live in a post- Westphalian age, and all but the failed states have, to 
varying degrees, unique characteristics that mark them off from both the 
local and the global. specifically, they have the power to coerce (what Max 
Weber classically described as a monopoly of the legitimate use of vio-
lence), which they can employ both to control their own population and to 
settle conflicts with other states.
if the critique of the classical formulation of cultural imperialism must 
lead one to reject it, attempts to construct alternatives that do not begin 
from the centrality of the state system to an understanding of the con-
temporary world, and see available resources— economic, political, and 
cultural— as distributed in a fundamentally and systematically unequal way 
between these states, have proven equally unsatisfactory.
Imperialism Reconsidered
settling conflicts with other states has, of course, been one of the main geo-
political features of the last twenty years or so. under a variety of guises, 
large, powerful states have used their power, political, economic, and mili-
tary, to coerce other, weaker, states: serbia, afghanistan, iraq, georgia, and 
others have all experienced direct military interventions. these uses of the 
armed might of the state to achieve its ends has given rise to the vigorous 
contemporary debates about imperialism, and any attempt to reconsider 
global patterns of cultural life must begin from a reconsideration of what is 
meant by imperialism in the present period.
discussions of imperialism have never been exclusively Marxist in inspi-
ration: writers like John hobson and Joseph schumpeter historically, and 
in the present period niall ferguson and Michael Mann, have addressed 
the issues involved from a variety of intellectual standpoints and political 
positions (ferguson, 2003, 2004; hobson, 1902; Mann, 2003; schumpeter, 
1951). schiller, and others who developed the concept of cultural imperi-
alism, did however work within a broadly Marxist tradition and that has 
been, since the early years of the last century, the intellectual current most 
centrally concerned with developing a theory of imperialism (Callinicos, 
2009; Kemp, 1967).
as we saw above, one of the key characteristics of the way in which 
imperialism was conceived by schiller and others was in terms of the rela-
tions of the “center and periphery,” with the center in question being the 
united states. this approach still dominates contemporary discussions, 
most influentially in the work of Panitch and gindin. they argue that only 
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the u.s. state is today genuinely imperialist, in that it dominates over the 
rest of the world state systems, and lesser states are essentially clients of 
Washington, lacking the capacity for independent action (Panitch & gin-
din, 2004).
there is clearly a great deal of evidence to support this view. the united 
states is by far the largest economy in the world, and it has a military ap-
paratus that is vastly more powerful, and expensive, than any other in the 
world. as one u.s. commentator put it, “We have a quarter of global gdP 
(gross domestic product) and 46 per cent of defense spending” (Mcgregor 
& dombey, 2011). although it seeks allies and supporters for its use of 
these forces, it is capable, where necessary, of acting independently. by con-
trast, other large and heavily armed states, like the united Kingdom, have 
found it impossible to use their armed forces against the will of the united 
states, at least since the suez crisis in 1956, and in practice have tended to 
be a loyal and subservient ally to the united states. in this account, as with 
earlier versions, the essence of “imperialism” is the domination exerted by 
large, developed states (the center) over poorer and weaker states (the pe-
riphery). this domination, exercised by persuasion, bribery, and coercion, 
circumscribes the political freedom of developing nations, subordinates 
their economies to the needs of the center, and helps to ensure that the 
majority of their people are deprived of the benefits of development. there 
is, of course, ample evidence that this kind of behavior takes place.
despite the strength of the evidence, however, there are both theoreti-
cal and practical grounds for doubting the validity of this view. in its origi-
nal formulations, the classical Marxist theory, and indeed contemporane-
ous formulations by non- Marxists like schumpeter, focused on conflicts 
within the developed world. While they were acutely conscious of the ways 
in which the developed countries dominated and plundered their colonies, 
they faced the urgent task of explaining why europe was experiencing the 
horrors of the first World War. the theory of imperialism was developed 
to explain how conflicts between imperialist states arose; in other words, 
they agreed with the liberal hobson that “the leading characteristic of . . . 
modern imperialism [is] the competition of rival empires” (hobson 1902, 
p. 19). this political and military competition, which in that epoch took 
the form of the annexation of territories and the construction of colonial 
empires, arose from the increasing scale of capitalist production and of the 
capitalist firm. as firms came to have a dominant role in their national mar-
kets, they more and more faced international competition from capitalists 
originating in other states, and they increasingly tended to enlist “their” 
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states in these competitive struggles. as nikolai bukharin put it: “When 
competition has finally reached its highest stage, when it has become com-
petition between state capitalist trusts, then the use of state power, and the 
possibilities connected with it begin to play a very large part” (bukharin, 
1972, pp. 123– 24).5 in contemporary versions of this theory, advanced by, 
among others, alex Callinicos and david harvey, it is the existence of a 
number of competing large, developed, states that is the condition for im-
perialism (Callinicos, 2009; harvey, 2005).
empirically, this seems a better way to account for the history of the last 
century or so than does the “unipolar” theory of imperialism. the first half 
of the twentieth century was dominated by a struggle between the british 
empire as the incumbent dominant force and the emerging german em-
pire. out of the mutual exhaustion of the contenders arose a competition 
between the united states and the soviet union which lasted up until 
1991. it is true that, throughout this period, the united states was over-
whelmingly the more powerful of the competing states, and this was the 
motor of its ultimate victory, but it nevertheless faced real opposition and 
military competition from the soviet bloc. the period after the collapse 
of the soviet union has indeed been one in which the united states has 
been the unchallenged dominant player but this has been a relatively brief, 
and atypical, interlude. the relative decline of the united states and the 
growth of new economic powers are evidence of the ending of this period. 
Particularly since the 2008 economic crisis, there is certainly evidence that 
other states are able to follow policies contrary to the wishes of Wash-
ington: arguments between the united states and China over currency, 
between the united states and germany over the political economy of 
economic recovery, between the united states and russia over the war in 
georgia, are all cases where other states have demonstrated independence 
from the desires of the u.s. government. the shift in the balance of world 
economic power means that these demonstrations of independence, and 
the international conflicts that they provoke, are likely to become a more 
marked feature of the coming years: we are returning to a period in which 
a powerful incumbent is challenged in its international dominance by new 
and emerging powers. as secretary of state hilary Clinton told the u.s. 
senate foreign relations Committee: “We are in a competition for influ-
ence with China; let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do- good side of 
what we believe in, and let’s just talk straight realpolitik” and illustrated 
her point with reference to a contest over rights to natural gas deposits in 
Papua– new guinea (dombey, 2011). More generally, the influential u.s. 
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magazine Foreign Affairs devoted a large section of its March/april 2011 is-
sue to a series of essays grouped under the theme “Will China’s rise Lead 
to War?” Charles glaser opens his contribution with the question “Will 
China’s ascent increase the probability of a great- power war?” (glaser, 
2011). fortunately for most of us, he gives an optimistic answer that such 
an event can be avoided, provided that the united states makes conces-
sions such as surrendering taiwan to the People’s republic of China. it 
is, however, plain that the economic and military development of China, 
although still immeasurably weaker than the united states, is beginning to 
pose an increasing challenge to Washington’s domination of world affairs. 
inter- imperialist conflict is once again a possibility.
We should, however, be clear as to what inter- imperialist conflict means 
and what it does not mean. it is certainly true that conflicts between devel-
oped states can take the form of military conflict, but there are many other 
less catastrophic ways in which the power of the state is used in inter- state 
competition. trade and currency policy, intellectual property protection, 
safety and design standards, international economic aid, and so on are all 
ways in which the state is imbricated in protecting and advancing the eco-
nomic interests of businesses located within its own border. on the other 
hand, there are many forms of international economic competition that do 
not involve significant state intervention, other than the necessary interna-
tional agreements that must be present to allow lawful trading in the first 
place. if the term “imperialism” is to have any precise and useful meaning, 
then it must be used to describe actions of states, rather than what are es-
sentially private economic activities.
the theory of imperialism that emerges from these considerations, and 
which fits better with the empirical record, thus differs markedly from that 
which informed writers like schiller. the driving force in producing impe-
rialism is the conflicts between large- scale capitalist enterprises, allied with 
“their own” states, seeking to improve their competitive position. instead 
of there being one center, there is an array of competing and conflicting 
states of different sizes and power, in some at least of which there is a 
co- ordination of political and economic power. the consequences of this 
competition involve a struggle for control of weaker and less developed 
countries, partly for reasons that are ultimately economic but also for geo- 
strategic ones as well.6 at the start of the twentieth century, this normally 
involved formal annexation and the construction of rival colonial empires, 
but during the last century this has shifted almost entirely to what harry 
Magdoff called “imperialism without colonies” (Magdoff, 1972). the sub-
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ordination of less developed countries often involves brutal exploitation 
and military violence, but this is not the defining characteristic of imperial-
ism. it is the struggle between developed countries that is the driving force. 
Within that framework, certain factors will be properly labeled “imperial-
ist” (in a world war, almost all social activities) but others will represent 
forms of economic competition conducted more or less independently of 
the state.
Reframing Cultural Imperialism
this revised theory of imperialism has three immediate consequences for 
any revision of the concept of cultural imperialism. first, it does not rest 
upon the notion that there is one center: on the contrary, the condition 
for the modern form of imperialism is that there is competition between 
different states. second, it is this competition between the states of the 
developed world that is the central axis of imperialism, not the domina-
tion of the developed over the developing world. third, it is important to 
scrutinize very carefully the evidence of international cultural exchanges 
to determine whether they are simply economic transactions or if they de-
pend upon the exercise of one form or another of state power: only the 
latter would properly fall under the heading of imperialism.
following from the fact that it is international competition that is the 
motor of imperialism, we would expect to find that international trade is 
characterized by a multiplicity of sources rather than just one: in other 
words, the theory of imperialism predicts not a single center but a range of 
different producers competing in the world market. Cultural production 
does not map directly onto economic strength, but given that economies 
of scale are to be expected in the production of cultural goods as much as 
in any other industry, we would expect to find that the serious competitors 
are among the larger economies as measured by gdP. the united states 
is by far the largest economy, ranked first in both nominal gdP and gdP 
at Purchasing Power Parities (1/1).7 those countries that are often cited 
as sources of alternative flows of cultural material are also quite substan-
tial: Japan (3/3); india (4/11); brazil (7/8); Mexico (11/14); south Korea 
(12/15). since the u.s. economy is, on either measure, around three times 
the size of the Japanese, and between three and ten times the size of india’s, 
the dominance of the united states across a broad spectrum of cultural 
production is hardly a surprise. Measured over time, however, the position 
of the united states, for nearly a century to incumbent power both in eco-
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nomics and culture, is being eroded and its dominance is being challenged 
(tunstall, 2008, pp. 360– 412).
the international trade in cultural products is dominated by large pro-
ducers who have distinct “national” home markets. their trade is primar-
ily within the developed world, as predicted by the theory of imperialism. 
according to the most recent figures available at the time of writing, news 
Corporation, probably the most “global” of the global media corporations, 
remains very heavily focused on the developed world. in 2009, 94 percent 
of its revenues came from north america, australia, and europe (news 
Corporation, 2009, p. 95). the same applies to other major media corpora-
tions: 90 percent of viacom’s 2009 earnings came from the united states 
and europe (viacom, 2010, p. 106); 93 percent of the Walt disney Com-
pany’s 2009 revenues came from the united states, Canada, and europe 
(Walt disney Company, 2010, p. 71); for bertelsmann, 95 percent of 2009 
revenues came from europe and the united states (bertelsmann, 2009, p. 
57); 87 percent of Pearson’s sales were in the united states, Canada, and 
europe in 2009 (Pearson plc., 2009, p. 97).
none of these facts mean that the penetration of the media products of 
the developed world into the developing world does not exist, nor that it 
does not have important consequences, but it does place them in propor-
tion. the companies cited here, and their peers in europe and the united 
states, have dominant positions in their home market and compete vigor-
ously in other markets, primarily in the developed world. these are the 
conditions that give rise to the modern form of imperialism.
the third issue, the degree to which international cultural exchanges 
actually constitute cultural imperialism, is much more difficult. there are 
some forms of cultural exchange that clearly fit almost any definition of 
cultural imperialism: the voice of america, the bbC World service, the 
british Council, and so on, are evidently organizations funded by imperial-
ist states with the specific aim of promoting the ideas, beliefs, and values of 
their home country. on the other hand, there are many cultural exchanges 
that do not properly fit into any notion of imperialism: the international 
sale of a format by a production company is a more or less straightforward 
example of a trading relationship that does not presuppose state interven-
tion any more than would the sale of the television set upon which the 
final version of the program will be viewed. in between such extremes lies 
a variety of cases that require concrete analysis in order to classify them 
accurately. in making such a classification, seven important points need to 
be borne in mind:
1. neither the concept of imperialism nor the concept of cultural impe-
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rialism supposes any consciously aggressive policy on the part of any state 
or any conspiratorial alliance between top- hatted capitalists and bowler- 
hatted civil servants. the conflicts that can and do arise originate in the 
“normal” economic competition between rival capitalist companies and 
they become imperialist conflicts to the extent that states are drawn into 
resolving them. states can claim, perhaps sometimes with justification, that 
their policies are aimed at a “peaceful rise” or at spreading “freedom and 
democracy,” but they can still find that pursuing these ends brings them 
into conflict with other states.
2. Cultural imperialism can be both offensive and defensive. discussion 
has usually turned on the offensive aspects of the phenomenon, for ex-
ample the drive to negotiate treaties opening audio- visual markets to free 
trade. there are, however, equally clear examples of the use of state power 
to prevent foreign entrance into cultural production: the united states, 
for example, prevents the control of u.s. television stations by foreign na-
tionals by barring them from owning more than 25 percent of the shares. 
similarly, the european union insists on quotas of european production 
for broadcasters of general channels in the eu.
3. if, as is argued here, imperialism refers to the recruitment of the 
state to intervene in international relations primarily in order to facilitate 
economic development, then there must be the demonstrable presence of 
state action in any international cultural exchange for it to qualify as cul-
tural imperialism.
4. it follows from this that the “imperialist” dimension of cultural im-
perialism is determined by the presence of state action, not by the nature 
of the cultural artifact in question. it is not the intrinsic characteristics 
of a television program, or a language, that make it “imperialist” but the 
use to state power to ensure that it gains currency. the media are not in 
themselves “imperialist” even when the conditions specified by boyd- 
barrett actually apply, as for example they have done, historically, in ire-
land (Corcoran, 2004, pp. 15– 16). there is a long history of british cultural 
imperialism in ireland, but the spillover of u.K. signals into the republic 
is not part of it.
5. it is essential to distinguish between what may properly be termed 
“cultural imperialism,” which may be briefly defined as the use of state 
power in the international cultural sphere and the fact that some cultural 
exchanges are closely connected with imperialism. the international status 
of the english language is a good example of this. english is not, in itself, 
an “imperialist” language. its spread in a number of areas, ireland most 
obviously, was indeed closely associated with imperialist policies, but its 
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contemporary global reach is a product of the fact that for the last two 
centuries the world’s dominant imperialist power has been predominantly 
english speaking: first the united Kingdom, then the united states. the 
presence of english in india is not due to the characteristics of the lan-
guage but to the fact of the long british imperial rule in india: it is not 
itself cultural imperialism, but rather one of the cultural consequences of 
imperialism.
6. it is not a necessary condition for cultural imperialism, or for the 
cultural consequences of imperialism, that they have a particular kind of 
impact upon their audiences. in some cases, cultural forms that evidently 
originate in imperial centers are enthusiastically adopted by the popula-
tion of subject territories: the sport of cricket in india, where it commands 
a far more central place in the dominant culture than it does in its english 
place of origin, is an obvious example, and the control of the sport, once 
located in London, today lies in india. in other cases, cultural phenomena 
might have quite different meanings in different places, being popular in 
one and not another, or being reworked into hybrid forms, and so on. the 
extent and nature of the impact of any cultural phenomenon is a matter for 
empirical investigation and is independent of the question as to whether 
that phenomenon occurs as the result of state action or through simple 
economic exchange. the consequences that earlier theories of cultural im-
perialism assumed as being intrinsic to the nature of the trade in cultural 
products are in practice only one possible set of outcomes among many.
7. not only is the assertion as to the existence of homogeneous “na-
tional cultures” extremely difficult to sustain empirically but the theory 
of cultural imperialism has no place for such a concept, given that most 
Marxist- inspired theories of the modern state system see it as the result 
of historical struggle between different class interests rather than as the 
natural expression of a people. there is no reason to suppose that either 
the agents (large capitalist corporations and powerful modern states) or 
the objects of cultural imperialism (states and societies endowed with less 
economic, political, and military power) are ethnically or culturally homo-
geneous. there are dominant and subordinate cultures within both the 
imperialist states and those states that experience their attentions.
Consequences
the first result of applying the above criteria is that it is possible to advance 
a viable and coherent concept of cultural imperialism that is not subject to 
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the kinds of criticisms that were applied to schiller’s version. it once again 
becomes a viable project to investigate the ways in which state power and 
cultural power are intertwined in the production and circulation of cultural 
artifacts. the second consequence is that the term “cultural imperialism” 
will be used in a narrower set of circumstances than was the case in the past, 
although the category of the cultural consequences of imperialism is likely 
to be quite large.
We can illuminate what this means by considering some of the issues 
that were at the center of contention during the ascendency of the concept 
in the 1970s and 1980s. as we noted above, whatever the motives of many 
of the participants, the struggle over the new World Communication and 
information order was caught up in the inter- imperialist rivalries between 
the united states and the soviet union. some of the items of contention, 
for example the close and open alliance between the u.s. state depart-
ment and the Motion Picture association of america in ensuring that trade 
treaties guaranteed free access to national audio- visual markets, clearly fall 
within our revised category of cultural imperialism. others, for example 
the character of the reporting of africa, fit better into the category of the 
cultural consequences of imperialism, both in terms of the social terrain 
that was being reported and many of the assumptions upon which report-
ing was (and too often still is) based.
in the future, these concepts will come to have ever greater relevance. 
direct economic rivalry between the u.s. incumbent and a new challenger 
is an obvious feature of the contemporary world, and we saw above how 
the u.s. secretary of state has begun to formulate that rivalry in terms of 
strategic conflicts. as China, and other new economic powers such as india, 
grow stronger so we will see increasing competition and conflict between 
them and with the Western powers that have dominated the world for two 
centuries. the analogous situation is with the established and apparently 
“natural” domination of the british empire experiencing challenges from 
germany at the end of the nineteenth century, and later from the united 
states and the soviet union. our concern is with the media, not with the 
general geopolitics of the contemporary world, so we do not have to specu-
late as to whether this rivalry will have the same consequences as the earlier 
conflicts: we can simply express the fervent hope that the outcomes this 
time will be different and much less horrifying.
in media terms, however, we can anticipate at least six possible ways 
in which these more general economic and political changes will lead to 
debates and conflicts:
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1. direct rivalry between states in terms of their propaganda efforts. 
one of the major developments of the last decade or so has been the pro-
liferation of state- backed international broadcasters, who now pose a chal-
lenge to the incumbent international broadcasters, both state and private. 
to quote hillary Clinton again, on the Middle east: “We [the united 
states] are in an information war, and we are losing that war. . . . al- Jazeera 
is winning” (dombey, 2011). in the future, that challenge is likely to widen: 
China, for example, has recently substantially increased the resources of 
the former CCtv9 and renamed it CCtv news, while at the same time 
funding Xinhua to establish a new international news channel. We should 
recall that such channels do not need to command a mass audience to have 
a powerful influence on public perceptions. al Jazeera is an exception in 
that it commands a fairly wide audience across the arab world but Cnn 
and the bbC have tiny audiences most of the time in most places. the at-
tention of a small elite audience can be as much a bone of contention as a 
mass audience.
2. Conflicts over the nature of news and journalism. these state broad-
casters are already engaged in a struggle over what constitutes “news” that 
rests on deeply embedded assumptions in the news cultures of the different 
countries. Many u.s. journalists, news organizations, and media scholars 
have a developed and self- conscious sense of the norms of professional 
conduct. these views are strongly held and frequently expressed, despite 
the fact that reality sometimes does not correspond to ideology. these 
views are not in practice shared by journalists formed in other traditions 
and one only needs to recall the disputes over the coverage of tibet in 2008 
to see that these differences can be expressed by news workers, scholars, 
and even large numbers of ordinary people.
3. Conflicts over the regulation of international media flows. the pro-
tection of cultural industries has been a theme of international trade nego-
tiations since at least the 1947 treaty establishing the general agreement 
on tariffs and trade (gatt), whose article iv (d) permitted the retention 
of screen quotas for cinematic films. the original treaty stated that “screen 
quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation, liberalization 
or elimination,” but cultural protectionism derived from this article con-
tinue to this day (general agreement on tariffs and trade, 1947). the 
continuing efforts by states to protect the creative industries operating 
within their territory lead regularly to public altercations. historically, the 
pressure to open markets and allow free trade, in general as much as in 
the creative industries, has come from the most powerful players. as the 
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locus of economic power shifts, so the offensive and defensive postures 
will be exchanged. yesterday’s fervent protectionist becomes tomorrow’s 
free trader, and vice versa. We can already see some slight evidence of such 
reversals in the problems al Jazeera experienced in getting carriage on u.s. 
cable channels. the issue of who can own channels and stations is likely to 
intensify as the balance of economic power shifts.
4. Conflicts over the control of the internet. the distribution of power 
in the governance of the internet reflects the old international order. for 
example, at the time of writing, the internet Corporation for assigned 
names and numbers (iCann) board of directors contains 21 people, 
one of whom is Chinese (and he is from taiwan) and two indians (one 
of whom has long lived in the united states) (iCann, 2011). the sub- 
committee that oversees the root servers reported to the u.s. national 
telecommunications and information administration’s office of spectrum 
Management. as the number of users, and the commercial forces involved, 
shift towards asia, so there will be disputes over where decisions are taken, 
and the composition of the bodies that take them. the World summit on 
the information society process already illustrated the ways in which such 
disputes link economic and political forces.
5. Conflicts over the protection of intellectual property. issues over the 
widespread copying of computer programs, film and video programs and 
formats, and music are already well known. Paradoxically, perhaps, this is 
one area where we might expect to find a decrease in the level of conflict 
as the economic balance shifts. the ambition of large broadcasters in asia 
to become exporters of content, for example, is already changing their at-
titude toward formats. instead of the murky processes that led from Pop Idol 
through American Idol to Super Girl, there have more recently been formal 
purchases of rights and the signing of co- production agreements.
6. Conflicts over the nature of popular culture. international conflicts 
find expression in popular cultural artifacts. one need only think of hol-
lywood representations of Japanese, russians, and Communists to see how 
international struggles can map quite closely onto ideologies and this is 
likely to continue in the future. at the same time, shifting economic power 
results in the popularization of cultural forms with a different national ori-
gin: the shift from cricket to basketball in the Caribbean is one well- known 
example. a similar shift can be traced in the visual styles of animation fol-
lowing the economic development of Japan, which seems likely to continue 
in the burgeoning Chinese industry. so, too, the sites and content of popu-
lar culture change: there is a considerable distance between an evening 
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spent in a western bar or pub and an evening of Chinese Ktv (karaoke 
television).
some of these issues are already evident in the contemporary media 
while others are certain to become important in the next decade. Cata-
loguing such changes empirically can be performed within any theoretical 
framework or none at all. if we wish to analyze and explain them, however, 
then an appropriate theoretical account is essential. the issues all have a 
simple economic dimension, but they are also, to a greater or lesser extent, 
also involved in the actions of states, and an adequate theory must be able 
to account for both of these. it is for this reason that imperialism, cultural 
imperialism, and the cultural consequences of imperialism are once again 
an essential part of the theoretical framework for the study of international 
communication.
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Notes
 1. schiller was, of course, a consistent critic of imperialism, both in general and 
in its specific cultural form, but it is possible to find positive accounts of cultural im-
perialism to place alongside celebratory theories of imperialism such as niall fer-
guson’s: “it is in the general interest of the united states to encourage the develop-
ment of a world in which the fault lines separating nations are bridged by shared 
interests. and it is in the economic and political interests of the united states to 
ensure that if the world is moving toward a common language, it be english; that if 
the world is moving toward common telecommunications, safety, and quality stan-
dards, they be american; that if the world is becoming linked by television, radio, 
and music, the programming be american; and that if common values are being 
developed, they be values with which americans are comfortable” (rothkopf, 1997, 
p. 45).
 2. this conception, sometimes using the terms “metropolis” and “satellite,” has 
been extremely influential in a wide range of fields (frank, 1967). galtung, in a 
famous article, wrote: “imperialism is a relation between a Center and a Periphery 
nation so that: (1) there is harmony of interest between the center in the Center 
nation and the center in the Periphery nation, (2) there is more disharmony of 
interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations, (3) there is dis-
harmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery 
in the Periphery nation” (galtung, 1971, p. 83).
 3. it is worth noting that schiller operated with a model of effects very similar to 
that of Wilbur schramm and other development scholars (schiller, 1970, pp. 109– 
15).
 4. it is worth noting, however, that the charge of assuming a uniform interna-
tional media market often laid against proponents of cultural imperialism cannot be 
sustained. boyd- barrett, for example, recognized the existence of regional markets 
for news and media as a potential challenge to the dominance of the core (boyd- 
barrett, 1977, p. 134).
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 5. this state- centered approach differs radically from that of Michael hardt and 
antonio negri, who argue that contemporary capitalism has outgrown the state 
system and therefore there is no longer any basis for the geopolitical conflicts that 
so marked the twentieth century. the conflicts of imperialism have been replaced 
by the conflict between “empire” and “Multitude.” as they put it: “the distinct 
national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the 
imperial global rainbow” (hardt & negri, 2000, p. xiii). in essence, this is a theory 
of globalization rather than imperialism.
 6. so the british empire seized gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, aden, and singapore 
not to exploit the denizens, loot raw materials, or export capital, but for the obvious 
military advantages they presented.
 7. gross domestic Product can be measured in several ways. the most common 
measure is nominal gdP in u.s. dollars, but an alternative is gdP at Purchasing 
Power Parities (PPPs). there is no obvious reason for preferring either measure, 
although in terms of the amount of human effort that is expended in cultural pro-
duction the PPP measures seem more likely to give a better picture of national 
capacity. both measures are provided by the international Monetary fund, and the 
rankings here are based on their figures for 2010. the first number is the country’s 
place in the ranking of gdP at PPPs, the second that in the ranking of nominal 




De- Westernization and  
Cosmopolitan Media Studies
silvio Waisbord
James Curran and Myung- Jin Park’s (2000) De- Westernizing Media Stud-
ies offered an eloquent, much- needed call to expand the geographical 
and intellectual frontiers of communication and media studies. it aimed 
“to contribute to a broadening of media theory and understanding in a 
way that takes account of the experience of countries outside the anglo- 
american orbit” (Curran & Park, 2000, p. 11). featuring a dozen chapters 
from around the world, the book makes a normative argument for why the 
field needs to be more inclusive and worldly. it stands as a prime example of 
the latest push toward the “internationalization” of media studies (thussu, 
2009). there is no shortage of studies published in english that examine 
recent changes in media systems (fox & Waisbord, 2002; McCargo, 2008; 
romano & bromley, 2005; sakr, 2007; voltmer, 2006), journalistic practices 
(de burgh, 2005), mediated politics (Lilleker & Lees- Marshment, 2005; 
strömbäck & Kaid, 2008), and journalistic ethics (Ward & Wasserman, 
2010) around the world. amid “the globalization of everything,” including 
academia during the 1990s, Curran and Park’s volume makes a strong case 
for breaking away from academic parochialism. de- Westernization implies 
opening up analytical horizons by considering cases from around the world 
that are not known either due to language obstacles or disinterest. given 
that the importance of the non- West is not news for non- Westerner schol-
ars, Curran and Park’s goal is primarily to encourage curiosity about other 
regions among anglo- american researchers.
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since its inception, the field of media studies has had a distinctive West-
ern, and particularly anglo- american, accent. the field emerged out the 
convergence of theories and questions rooted in the tradition of the social 
sciences in the West during the inter- war period (Katz et al., 2003). ex-
pectedly, the analytical focus and theories have been Western, and spe-
cifically u.s. theories. the Western- centric character of media studies is 
not surprising. research questions that have dominated the field, such as 
media effects, journalistic practices, and media and public opinion, mainly 
reflected the priorities of scholars in the united states and western europe 
who laid the foundations of the field. Likewise, theoretical frameworks 
were grounded in the epistemological premises and analytical traditions 
of political, psychological, and sociological theories developed in the West. 
Whereas the field has maintained its position as the meeting ground for 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, it has been largely con-
centrated on issues relevant in the united states and fundamentally drew 
from Western social thought. nor is the field of media studies unique in its 
Western centrism. similar arguments have been made about the social sci-
ences and humanities, particularly in recent years. informed by multicul-
turalism, deconstructionism, and subaltern studies, scholars have criticized 
the Western focus and intellectual categories in social analysis (rudolph, 
2005).
amid similar debates across academic disciplines, Curran and Park’s 
book raises questions about the purpose, the strategies, and the academic 
politics of the “de- Westernization” of media studies. is the goal to enrich 
the pool of studies published in english? Question the provincialism of the 
field? Promote theory- building that draws on a larger set of cases? What 
methodologies and analytical strategies are adequate to de- Westernize? 
should it be through the institutionalization of non- Western research in 
Western academia? should be it through the study of global questions and 
analysis? Who needs de- Westernization? Western and non- Western schol-
ars alike? is it a debate primarily relevant to Western academia? or should 
it also apply to academic debates in the global south? these questions lack 
obvious answers.
in this chapter, my goal is to discuss the purpose and strategies of the 
“de- Westernization” of media studies. given my particular interests in 
media studies, the analysis focuses on the study of the press and politics. 
the argument presented here is as follows. “de- Westernization” should 
nurture cosmopolitan scholarship characterized by sensitivity to compara-
tive and global questions and approaches and engagement in globalized 
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debates. it not should lead to the balkanization of the field in “area studies” 
that cover various regions of the world. instead, it should lead to the “de- 
centralization” of theories and research agendas in ways that foreground 
globalized perspectives and questions. de- Westernization is not simply 
about accommodating international research and perspectives in the field. 
instead, it is about globalizing research in ways that foreground questions 
and arguments that draw from various media and political systems. Cos-
mopolitan media studies should be guided by theoretical and empirical 
questions that are relevant across geographical and academic borders.
Why Area Studies Are a Problematic Way  
to “De- Westernize” Media Studies
one could argue that “de- Westernization” of media studies should be ac-
cepted without hesitation. de- Westernization is unquestionably good 
and desirable. after all, who would argue that ignoring the world is fitting 
for academic life? an analytical mind open to the world defines intellec-
tual work and academic imagination (bourdieu, 1988; Mills, 1959). it is 
why cosmopolitanism, particularly in recent decades, has been celebrated 
(appiah, 2007; held, 1995). a worldly, inquisitive, curious mind embod-
ies immanuel Kant’s understanding of cosmopolitanism as hospitality to 
foreigners. it is why provincialism is a pejorative adjective that conjures 
what academic minds should not be. it is why theorists believe that inter-
national education is critical for nurturing a cosmopolitan mind (hansen, 
2008; nussbaum, 1996). ignoring the majority of media systems in the 
world is unbecoming to intellectual openness. yet to argue that the study of 
non- Western media is necessarily good is insufficient. the history of me-
dia research in the West amply demonstrates that the purpose of studying 
non- Western societies is ambiguous. the study of non- Western media has 
been driven by various and even opposite goals: to legitimize and promote 
Western ideals about press/media systems, to critically interrogate West-
ern premises, and to explore other societies and media systems.
because de- Westernization has ambiguous goals, it is important to clar-
ify its purposes. de- Westernization should be more than an effort to make 
media studies in the West less parochial and more welcoming to research 
from around the world. the production of knowledge about non- Western 
media can coexist with an academic mind- set that remains unaware and 
untouched by global ideas and findings. in fact, both may develop in paral-
lel without entering into a productive dialogue or challenging each other 
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to rethink premises and analytical foci. neither the availability of non- 
Western cases in the West nor growing receptiveness to research about 
non- Western societies inevitably leads to abandoning provincialism or to 
revisiting prevalent paradigms.
this is why area studies as a strategy to integrate research from around 
the world in specific regional categories in a given discipline or field does 
not solve the main challenges of de- Westernization in media studies. dur-
ing the Cold War years, the social sciences and humanities in the West en-
gaged with the non- Western world under the rubric of area studies. areas 
studies have been organized around geographical labels (“south asian,” 
“Middle eastern”) that assume commonalities among neighboring coun-
tries. so, “Latin american studies” tacitly assumes that countries south of 
the united states can be analyzed as a group under the assumption that 
they share common characteristics, such as political history, economics, 
and culture.1
the organization of knowledge about the “non- West” in area studies 
is fraught with problems. the main problem is not the division between 
“soft” empirical research (“area studies”) and “hard” theory (“american” 
studies) (bates, 1997; franco, 1988; graham & Kantor, 2007). although 
such conclusions point out an extended, and unfortunate, perception, such 
generalizations unfairly portray the richness and diversity of such studies, 
and leave out several shortcomings. the crystallization of “international 
research” in “area studies” presents several problems. it replicates forms of 
conceptualizing academic knowledge through Western, geopolitical cat-
egories (Kratoska, raben, & schulte nordholt, 2005; nugent, 2010; simp-
son, 1998; szanton, 2004; yudice, 2003). area divisions perpetuate Western 
constructions of world regions (“Latin america,” “southeast asia”) that are 
linked for geopolitical, strategic reasons unrelated to analytical justifica-
tions. by building compartmentalized analytical categories, “area studies” 
also discourage dialogue and collaboration across regions. they tacitly rel-
egate regional studies to the production of knowledge that informs and 
builds on models developed in the West. finally, “area studies” reinforce 
the construction of the “non- West” as “the other” (harbeson, 1997; ra-
fael, 1994).
these criticisms point out to the problem of academic insularity and 
splintering— the construction of separate geographically bounded limits. 
area studies produce findings that, even if they are of interest to regional 
specialists, may not be necessarily relevant to the field. boxing up scholar-
ship in clear- cut geographical categories is supported neither on theoretical 
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nor methodological distinctions. typically, studies ask questions to under-
stand the causes, characteristics, and consequences of specific national and 
regional media systems, journalistic practices, news coverage, and other 
subjects. as important as these issues are, they may not be directly rel-
evant to the field at large if questions aren’t linked to broad debates. “thick 
descriptions” (geertz, 1973) of individual case studies are of interest pri-
marily to area specialists. they reinforce analytical compartmentalization 
grounded on geographical, and political, social, and cultural boundaries. 
such an approach has limited impact on the field at large.
these limitations are found in works about non- Western cases that, 
although they discuss interesting questions, fail short of making theoretical 
arguments that are relevant to the field at large. because they are framed 
as area studies, primarily concerned with local phenomena, they are dis-
engaged from broad theoretical discussions. the result is a rich body of 
international literature with little impact on theoretical and conceptual de-
bates that remain focused on “Western” issues. area specialists primarily 
talk to fellow area specialists. they live in separate academic worlds even 
when, paradoxically, they may be interested in similar theoretical questions 
(e.g., the power of news frames, various types of agenda- setting effects, 
the impact of commercial media on political knowledge). Consequently, 
geographical divisions are not conducive to metatheoretical debates and 
intellectual cross- pollination.
this problem is manifested, for example, in edited volumes that show-
case a diversity of world cases, but are not sufficiently engaged with com-
mon themes and questions. they contribute to internationalizing the field 
by making a wealth of cases available in english, yet they do not necessarily 
probe theoretical arguments or advance conclusions that build on Western 
scholarship. for Pippa norris (2009), this is the problem of studies and 
books that offer a “grand tour” of the world, but fail to make theoretical 
contributions if they are not organized around broad and common ques-
tions. the problem is not the study of country cases per se; rather, it is a 
matter of how questions and findings are linked to large theoretical and 
empirical debates. the division of area studies leads to focusing on ques-
tions and arguments that, albeit relevant to specific regions, may not add to 
the body of knowledge in the field at large.
“area studies” presents other challenges, too. it clusters research on 
presumed similarities among countries whereas those similarities actually 
need to be critically examined. it assumes essentialist visions that ascribe 
immanent similarities to geographical regions. such regions are political 
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and academic constructions that ignore profound differences and simi-
larities inside and across regions. in fact, this is what numerous country/
regional studies show: the existence of important differences within geo-
graphical areas that make regional clusters questionable. should south 
africa be included with the rest of africa? how about Mozambique, Ke-
nya, and senegal given different media legacies largely shaped by different 
colonial powers? should China, vietnam, and Cambodia be grouped to-
gether given their common communist history? or should China be com-
pared to the other briC economic powers of brazil, russia, and india? 
should contemporary russia be compared to other countries that feature 
“hybrid” political regimes between authoritarianism and democracy (e.g., 
venezuela)? should Lebanon, a country with the most open media system 
in the Middle east, be compared to monarchical media regimes in Mo-
rocco and saudi arabia? should indonesia be grouped with other countries 
with Muslim majorities? should brazil, a country with a strong tradition of 
market- driven media and journalistic practices inspired by the u.s. model 
of professionalism, be grouped with Latin american countries where those 
conditions are absent?
asking questions about the logic of geographical groupings are also 
relevant to interrogate the binary division between “Western” and “non- 
Western” studies. do we run the risk of essentializing countries, regions, 
and scholarship by continuing to establish differences between the West 
and the non- West (godrej, 2009)? What is the non- West anyway? argu-
ably, the rationale for clustering dozens of countries together as the “non- 
West” is their geographical position as well as their presumably common 
relation to the West. yet the justification for maintaining such a division is 
not obvious. Certainly, this dichotomy is found among defenders of “West-
ern” traditions and geopolitics as well as among critics of “Western civiliza-
tion.” at a time when analytical and ideological categories (e.g., first/third 
worlds, core/periphery) that have dominated the social sciences during the 
past half a century are thrown into question, shouldn’t we cautiously ap-
proach, or simply refrain from using, the “Western/non- Western” dyad?
how we answer these questions depends on what theoretical challenges 
are considered to be a priority in media studies. even if regional groupings 
may be justified on the basis of common media history, language, colo-
nial past, and political regimes, the problem is maintaining strong geo- 
analytical boundaries. neat geographical divisions lose sight of the fact 
that theoretical questions should drive research agendas. Local and re-
gional developments, inevitably, generate empirical questions. to name a 
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few, the relation between media and regime transition, the role of media in 
the rise of right- wing populism, and the impact of new media on political 
identities are questions that stem from concrete developments in particular 
countries and, unsurprisingly, are more relevant to some media/political 
systems. the problem lies in approaching questions solely in terms of em-
pirical relevance without considering their significance for the field of me-
dia studies. area divisions constrain scholars to maintaining conversations 
with other area specialists instead of making research relevant to scholars 
beyond geographical borders.
another problem of area studies is the preservation of “methodological 
nationalism” (beck, 2007; beck & sznaider, 2010), that is, the focus on “na-
tional” questions within the boundaries of modern states. such questions, 
beck argues, are not the most urgent or important at a time of planetary 
challenges and global consciousness and actions. “Methodological nation-
alism” ignores the fact that problems need to be reconceptualized amid 
globalization. the shift from local/national to global requires researchers 
to ask questions beyond political- geographical boundaries.
beck unnecessarily downplays the persistent significance of nations and 
states as analytical units. the rise of planetary problems doesn’t invalidate 
the significance of a host of issues that remain relevant at the local/do-
mestic level. for example, despite increased globalization, media politics 
as well as models of media and politics (hallin & Mancini, 2004) remain 
largely anchored in local and national dynamics. it’s not a question of “ei-
ther/or,” but rather the need to remain attentive to questions at multiple 
levels. yet beck’s call to think “globally” rightly raises questions about the 
need to expand analytical perspectives in media studies. implicitly, it offers 
a much- needed corrective to the geographical narrowness of area studies. 
a perspective grounded in area studies does not tend to formulate ques-
tions in terms of global developments and trends. rather, it tilts the analy-
sis in favor of questions that are primarily relevant to local and national 
media politics.
in summary, area studies as a path to “de- Westernize” media studies runs 
the risk of reinforcing scholarly insularity and fragmentation. it assumes 
commonalities instead of examining the basis for geographical- analytical 
divisions. it maintains and encourages parallel debates. Case studies are 
necessary to foreground how theoretical questions and arguments play out 
in various contexts. yet the fragmentation and solidification of “case ex-
pertise” in geographical differences is a deterrent to cross- regional, global 
debates.
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finally, “de- Westernizing” media studies in the direction of area studies 
is particularly wrongheaded at the present juncture of the field. it fails to 
address a basic challenge in both media studies and political communica-
tion: the lack of robust empirical generalizations and theoretical arguments 
based on a range of cases. foundational and contemporary theories and 
arguments in the literature overwhelmingly draw from case studies on the 
united states and britain. broadening the analytical base is necessary to 
determine the strengths of propositions across media and political systems. 
in summary, besides the problems of essentialist and geopolitical premises, 
area studies reinforce academic insularity and parallel debates.
Cosmopolitan Media Studies
to avoid the limitations of area studies, i propose to embrace a cosmopoli-
tan outlook to further “de- Westernize” media studies. here cosmopolitan-
ism is understood as an analytical attitude open to multiple perspectives 
and developments beyond geography.
the idea of academic cosmopolitanism builds on the recent “cosmo-
politan” turn in the social sciences and humanities (Caney, 2005; dallmayr, 
2003; held, 1995; nussbaum, 1996). Cosmopolitanism is generally associ-
ated with contemporary normative theories that, drawing from classic and 
modern philosophy, outline the need for a moral commitment to justice, 
law, human rights, and politics that transcends conventional state borders. 
it champions cosmopolitan governance premised on the notion of world 
citizens and equal members of the global community. at a time of unprece-
dented mobility of people, ideas, and goods as well as the porosity of politi-
cal, economic, and cultural borders, world citizenship offers responses to 
critical issues and urgent needs. along these lines, media scholars (Chou-
liaraki, 2006; silverstone, 2006) have made persuasive arguments for why 
the media play critical roles in nurturing cosmopolitan consciousness and 
citizenship.
Cosmopolitan media studies demands studying the world to enrich and 
challenge intellectual premises, categories, and conclusions. it starts from 
the present condition of a globalized, interconnected world as the basis for 
stimulating a cosmopolitan outlook (fine, 2007). it is not synonymous with 
the aggregation of “case studies” from around the world. it is contrary to 
clear- cut geographical separations that reify “otherness” in the categories 
of “international” or “global.” Cosmopolitan scholarship is not reduced 
to being hospitable to “international” research. instead, it is a globalized 
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perspective that critically considers world differences to probe theoretical 
arguments and define empirical questions (also see Miller, 2009).
a cosmopolitan approach raises awareness about global differences and 
similarities (ong, 2009). in a world characterized by interconnectedness 
and multiple flows (appadurai, 2001; giddens, 1990), it invites scholars 
to expand analytical horizons beyond the “comfort zone” of country bor-
ders. it promotes a global sensitivity guided by analytical questions and 
informed by research from around the world. it pushes for the globaliza-
tion of knowledge and dialogue. it encourages country specialists to make 
broad theoretical and conceptual contributions.
Cosmopolitan media studies doesn’t assume that borders, grounded 
in political, social, economic, and cultural differences, are irrelevant. in-
deed, it assumes that they need to be taken into account to expand research 
agendas and produce arguments that examine differences and similarities. 
Contrasts across media and political systems, as well as their interactions, 
provide evidence to test conclusions. in doing so, cosmopolitan scholar-
ship overcomes the limitations of theory- building based largely on anglo- 
american scholarship. because these countries have quite unique traditions 
of media and politics, casting a wider geographical net is indispensable to 
refine theories and arguments.
Cosmopolitan scholarship also contributes to a shift in the direction 
of knowledge flows. Like other social sciences (Mcfarlane, 2006), media 
studies has long been dominated by a one- way flow of “knowledge trans-
fer” from the West (particularly u.s. and british scholarship) to the rest. 
such patterns are not only problematic for maintaining the primacy of 
theories and concepts produced in a few countries. they are also incongru-
ous with the reality of multiple centers for academic production. there-
fore, cosmopolitan scholarship seeks to rectify a lopsided flow of ideas by 
promoting more egalitarian global exchanges and debates.
i’m not proposing “cosmopolitan media studies” as a desirable academic 
identity, the equivalent of cosmopolitan citizenship in a world of increased 
mobility and fluidity. nor i am suggesting that national borders are irrel-
evant to the study of media and politics on the assumption that they have 
been superseded by globalization and remain remnants of the old order. 
My argument is neither about normative citizenship (“a way of being in 
the academic world”) nor the absolute preeminence of global questions. 
rather, i propose cosmopolitan scholarship as an analytical perspective 
that prioritizes theoretical and critical thinking informed by international 
research and globalized dialogue. this approach is not simply consistent 
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with a globalized academic world and the current challenges of global-
ization. it is also necessary to overcome geographical divisions and bring 
together strands of research around common questions and arguments.
How to De- Westernize and Promote Cosmopolitanism
Just like philosophical and political arguments for cosmopolitanism, cos-
mopolitan scholarship raises questions about strategies. how is cosmopoli-
tanism possible? What strategies may stimulate a globalized perspective in 
the field?
fundamentally, cosmopolitan media studies is about placing local re-
search in the context of global debates and developments, and engaging 
with conversations that transcend local interests and phenomena. it is not 
only about prioritizing research questions that transcend borders. More 
importantly, it is about shifting the way questions are asked and answers 
are formulated.
here i propose three research strategies to pursue the “de- 
Westernization” of media studies along the lines of cosmopolitanism: 
address questions that are absent in the literature in the West, conduct 
comparative studies featuring non- Western cases, and analyze global phe-
nomena that transcend geographical and regional boundaries.
Analyze Neglected Issues
the first option is to approach the global south as a rich trove of cases 
that have been generally ignored in the West. given the West- centric na-
ture of research agendas, important questions in the global south have not 
been at the forefront or even discussed in the West. the research agenda 
has remained largely, and expectedly, local or national. Consequently, the 
literature has empirical and theoretical blindspots that reflect the powerful 
influence of Western concerns and categories.
here, i’ll mention just a few examples. Press performance amid condi-
tions of statelessness is not uncommon in large swaths of the world given 
the chronic problems of state instability and the power of para- state actors 
(Waisbord, 2007). the links between media and various forms of media 
populism (Mazzoleni, stewart, & horsfield, 2003) also takes on particu-
lar characteristics around the world. in countries dominated by authori-
tarian regimes or where governments exert powerful influence on media 
economics and access to information, journalists’ strategies to navigate 
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government restrictions are different from the West (Lee & Chan, 2008). 
Worldwide, the role of religious values in the professional identity of jour-
nalists is different from the situation in secular europe and the conven-
tional norms of professional journalism in the united states. the impact 
of commercialism on state- controlled media systems is not identical to 
the much- discussed effects in Western countries (Porto, 2008; sakr, 2007; 
Zhao, 1998). Media pluralism in societies with a long history of ethnic and 
religious conflicts may not be conducive to more democratic expression, 
but, instead, it deepens divisions and violence (ismail & deane, 2008). dif-
ferent historical and philosophical traditions of civil society suggest that 
opportunities for citizens’ participation in media policies and performance 
are different from the West (rodríguez, 2001; Waisbord, 2010).
because these issues aren’t common either in the united states or brit-
ain, or for that matter in the West, they are notoriously understudied in 
the english- language literature. the significance of such questions is not 
simply that they address key issues and dynamics in the global south. also, 
they reveal questions that are theoretically important to understand the 
intersection between media and politics. they raise important questions 
about arguments at the core of the field such as freedom of expression 
and democratic communication; the interaction between media, states, and 
markets; the professional identity of journalists; and media models.
the purpose of studying these issues is not simply to demonstrate that 
“things are different” outside the West. rather, the goal is to put the spot-
light on issues that, because they are not common in the West, help us 
rethink arguments and broaden analytical horizons. to return to the pre-
viously mentioned examples: how to think about press freedom in situa-
tions where the state does not function? does media tabloidization nurture 
populist attitudes and movements across political regimes and countries? 
does commercialization have positive effects on media systems tightly 
controlled by governments? does media pluralism necessarily contribute 
to more democratic expression or feed sectarianism and polarization? is 
there a single model of professional journalism? are the prospects for civic 
actors to promote media reforms widely different around the world? if so, 
why?
Conduct Comparative Research
Comparative research is another strategy to de- Westernize media stud-
ies in the spirit of cosmopolitan scholarship. in recent decades, interest in 
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comparative research in media and politics has grown considerably since 
blumler and gurevitch’s (1975) seminal article. in an updated version of 
their original call for comparative research, gurevitch and blumler (2004, 
p. 327) argue that the importance of systematic comparison lies on the 
need “to understand how varying contexts (such as those generated by 
different types of state regimes and political institutions, cultural regions, 
levels of development, or media systems) shape processes of political com-
munications.” recent studies (esser & Pfetsch, 2004; hallin & Mancini, 
2004; voltmer, 2008) have renewed interest in comparative research, and 
contributed to breaking away from past approaches that categorized me-
dia/press models in ideological terms (siebert, Peterson & schramm, 1956; 
for a critique, see nerone, 1995). these studies shared the premise that 
conceptual and theoretical rigor requires conclusions informed by com-
parative analysis (also see norris, 2009). also, comparative research has 
been motivated by the need to break away from the “u.s.- centrism” of the 
literature. because central arguments and theories in the literature reflect 
the singular characteristics of u.s. media and politics, it is necessary to 
probe the generalizability of those arguments and theories.
the main contribution of cross- national, comparative research is not 
just to make the field less parochial. as has been discussed in other disci-
plines, the comparative method yields stronger propositions and general 
theories that are relevant beyond particular contexts (skocpol & somers, 
1980). its main virtue is not to open up attention to different settings or to 
stimulate curiosity, but rather to provide more solid and nuanced theoreti-
cal conclusions.
two types of comparative studies can be distinguished in the recent 
literature on media and politics. one type is implicitly comparative: stud-
ies examine the applicability of conclusions from one country (or media/
political systems) to another without conducting country- to- country com-
parison. the other type is explicitly comparative: studies compare certain 
phenomena (e.g., news content, election campaigning, media impact on 
political knowledge) in two or more countries. implicit comparisons mainly 
test the applicability of u.s.- based conclusions in other settings. examples 
of such an approach are studies of the impact of news frames on political 
attitudes and participation (aarts & semetko, 2003; de vreese & semetko, 
2002); the influence of political elites on news content (archetti, 2008; 
sheafer & Wolfsfeld, 2009); the impact of the nature of media systems 
on citizen information (Curran et al., 2010); the consequence of political 
communication systems on voter turnout (baek, 2009), and the dynamics 
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of agenda setting and policy making (baumgartner, green- Pedersen, & 
Jones, 2006; Walgrave & van aelst, 2006). in contrast, explicit comparisons 
examine media and politics across two or more countries and explain dif-
ferences and similarities. recent examples are studies about news coverage 
of war and peace (dimitrova & stromback, 2005; Peng, 2008), immigra-
tion (benson, 2010), media models (hallin & Mancini, 2004), and presi-
dential communication (hallin & Mancini, 1984). the purpose of compar-
ing news coverage, media systems, and the interaction between media and 
political systems and dynamics is to develop evidence- based, theoretical 
arguments that draw from more than one case.
these two types of comparative research have produced novel insights 
and refined previous arguments. for example, they have questioned the 
applicability of conclusions about a necessary link among news, cynicism, 
and participation that was originally developed in the united states. in 
the context of different media and elections, cynical frames do not neces-
sarily suppress participation or fuel political cynicism (de vreese & se-
metko, 2002). also, they have produced eloquent evidence showing that 
the public or commercial nature of media systems affects the quality of 
news and information levels among citizens (Curran et al., 2010). simi-
larly, cross- national analysis of news coverage of immigration, war, antiwar 
movements, and scandals (Canel & sanders, 2006) suggests that the unique 
characteristics of media and political systems as well as the interaction be-
tween them do affect content (dimitrova & stromback, 2005; Peng, 2008). 
since variation at the system level is most clearly seen via cross- national 
comparative studies, international research is best positioned to build more 
generalizable theory about the production of journalistically mediated po-
litical discourse.
the recent crop of comparative studies in political communication is 
overwhelmingly focused on the West. they typically test the applicability 
of arguments originally made in the u.s. context in european countries, 
or, alternately, compare developments and trends across europe. this pat-
tern is not surprising given the preeminent position of u.s.- based research 
in communication/media studies and political communication in particu-
lar. also, geographical proximity coupled with regional academic networks 
and funding agencies has facilitated cross- national research in europe. 
the fact that many european academics write fluently in english coupled 
with incentives in european universities (Lillis & Curry, 2010) to publish 
english- language journal articles and books has also stimulated compara-
tive research.
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yet it would be mistaken to attribute this pattern only to the presence 
of pan- european academic networks and the global position of u.s. ac-
ademia. one could reasonably suggest that the Western focus of recent 
comparative studies also reflects the fact that u.s./western european cases 
lend themselves better to comparative research. they seemingly meet key 
conditions for comparative cross- national studies, namely, to apply John 
stuart Mill’s) method of agreement and difference presented in A System of 
Logic (1843). the existence of “party- press” parallelism, public broadcast-
ing systems, the tabloid press, and parliamentary systems make european 
countries fertile settings for cross- national comparisons. also, the presence 
of common elements (e.g., stable democracies, common philosophical tra-
ditions) and important differences (media systems, political systems) on 
both sides of the north atlantic facilitate comparisons between u.s. and 
european countries.
Comparing Western and non- Western cases presents more challenges. 
not only do more variations have to be accounted for but significant sim-
ilarities are harder to find. Comparative studies should select cases that 
are sufficiently similar yet different rather than focus on cases that are 
vastly different (Przeworski & teune, 1970). Countries that are too differ-
ent make it difficult to produce parsimonious arguments that control for 
possible variations and causal relations. this challenge is more difficult to 
address for explicit than for implicit comparisons. Comparisons between 
countries with substantially different media as well as political histories and 
dynamics have trouble accounting for multiple factors that explain differ-
ences or similarities. instead, research designs that conduct implicit com-
parisons (“do conclusions based on country X apply to country y?”) can 
resolve that challenge more effectively.
applied to non- Western contexts, implicit comparisons may provide 
fresh insights into questions and arguments that have dominated the study 
of media and politics in the West. does the news media promote a “virtu-
ous circle” (norris, 2000) by stimulating political interest and participation 
across democracies? do political elites consistently exercise similar power 
in indexing news (bennett, 2005) across issues and countries? does elite- 
dominated news consistently reduce the range of public issues and citizens’ 
voices? does soft news stimulate political interest among young citizens? 
do new media (from cable television to “social media”) exacerbate political 
polarization? What factors influence news coverage of terrorism? how do 
new social movements use new information technologies to voice demands 
and advance political goals? do different media promote or suppress po-
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litical participation? do “post- broadcast” media (Prior, 2007) reinforce in-
equalities in access to political information? Why is the apparent crisis of 
newspapers and journalism in the united states less pronounced in many 
countries in the south? how do civic associations make news? how does 
civil society shape processes of media reform?
in summary, recent case studies that test the applicability of propositions 
produced in other political- media settings as well as comparative research 
conducted in europe show two fruitful strategies for de- Westernization. 
both research designs share an interest in exploring whether and why 
“context matters” to explain similarities and differences in the interaction 
between media and politics. they show the usefulness of case studies and 
small- n comparisons to refine theoretical conclusions.
Analyze Trans- Border, Global Questions
a third approach to de- Westernizing is to analyze empirical questions 
that transcend national and regional boundaries. these are trans- border, 
global issues that are seldom foregrounded in local/national case studies. 
by studying a phenomenon or process at a global scale, research highlights 
commonalities and differences, and explores causes, characteristics, and 
consequences.
one possible line of research is to study “global media events” that ei-
ther deliberately or unexpectedly transcend local borders. “Planned” global 
media events (dayan & Katz, 1992)— for example, the olympics, the 
World Cup, u.s. presidential inaugurations, coronations, state funerals— 
which are designed to be experienced by astonishingly large audiences, 
raise interesting questions about the dynamics of media globalization, au-
dience interpretations, the nexus between the local and the global, and the 
politics of news coverage. in contrast, “unplanned” media events are news 
that transcend the political/media boundaries of one country and become 
the subject of coverage and discussion worldwide. the “Mohammed car-
toon crisis” (eide, Kunelius, & Phillips, 2008) is one recent example. What 
initially was a local news event quickly became global. global press cover-
age, reaction, and the political aftermath brought up important questions 
about global journalistic ethics, international news, and public diplomacy. 
given that any media content may “go viral” and global on the internet, 
such news events are likely to become regular features of globalized media 
politics.
another set of “global questions” refer to planetary developments, that 
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is, trends and phenomena that are not limited to one country or region. re-
cent examples include the globalization of news practices and ideals (Cohen 
et al., 1996); the “modernization/americanization” of politics (scammell, 
1998; swanson & Mancini, 1996); the “mediatization of politics” (Canel 
& sanders, 2006; strömbäck, 2008); the personalization of politics (Mcal-
lister, 2007); the professionalization of politics (esser, reinemann, & fan, 
2001; holtz- bacha et al., 2007); media populism (Mazzoleni & schulz, 
1999); the adoption of similar communication strategies by insurrectionary 
groups across the world (bob, 2005); and the use of mobile telephony and 
other new informational platforms for civic participation (aday & Livings-
ton, 2008). because these developments transcend the national boundaries 
of political and media systems, they need to be examined across borders. 
if they are not unique to one national media- political system, then it is 
reasonable to presume that globalizing dynamics underlie those processes.
this line of research shows that both the forces of homogenization 
and heterogenization are at work. similar developments across media and 
political systems may have comparable causes but they do not necessarily 
have identical consequences. instead, they reflect how global events and 
trends, disseminated by transnational institutions and technologies, play 
into local and national dynamics. similar trends (e.g., media commercial-
ization, the crisis of political parties, dumbed- down news) facilitate the rise 
of similar processes worldwide. yet they are integrated within specific pro-
cesses anchored in the logic of local media and political institutions.
in summary, the three lines of research presented in this section are 
possible strategies to “de- Westernize” media studies and promote cosmo-
politan scholarship.
Globalization and Cosmopolitan Media Studies
academic politics, however, may not strongly favor cosmopolitan schol-
arship. despite academic enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism and the glo-
balization of scholarship, cosmopolitan perspectives do not easily fit the 
conventions of academic research. the turn to cosmopolitanism may not 
necessarily lead to significant epistemological shifts or serious question-
ing of the premises of media studies. undoubtedly, globalization has fa-
cilitated communication and academic links from around the world. the 
global networks of academic knowledge, such as information technologies, 
professional institutions, and international meetings, ease up connectivity. 
such processes, however, does not necessarily motivate the major analytical 
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and research shifts envisioned by beck. such processes bring new impetus 
and add novel questions to academic agendas, yet this is far from causing 
scholars to reconsider research and theoretical approaches. Cosmopolitan 
media studies bump up against the realities of academic work, namely, the 
persistent pull of local/national studies.
Locality continues to provide strong incentives for selecting topics, 
adopting perspectives, and framing academic research. geographical prox-
imity, research opportunities, language, and existing professional networks 
tilt research toward local and national issues. the “case study” approach to 
analyzing questions within the confines of the “nation- state,” the dominant 
analytical unit of modern social thought (gerring, 2007), remains enor-
mously attractive. it is questionable whether cosmopolitan scholarship su-
persedes “national” approaches or, instead, produces important yet limited 
changes in the conceptualization of research questions. a globalized aca-
demia, as an interconnected community of world scholars, is compatible 
with the preeminence of local and national questions.
the other challenge is that inequalities in the global production of aca-
demic knowledge continue to stack the deck in favor of scholarship about 
u.s., and to a lesser extent, european media politics. the primacy of eng-
lish as the lingua franca of global academia, the staggering amount of re-
search produced in the united states, and well- established north- to- south 
flows of knowledge foreground research about the u.s. media and politics. 
specialists in media and politics in the West may not find it necessary to 
globalize research interests or interrogate analytical approaches as long 
as the examination of developments and evidence in the West is deemed 
sufficient to produce relevant knowledge. notwithstanding academic glo-
balization, research agendas may still have a strong anglo- american flavor 
and limit the impact of cosmopolitan scholarship. given the weight of lo-
cal factors in determining research agendas and the continuous presence 
of preceding flows of academic knowledge, the call to “de- Westernization” 
may powerfully resonate with media scholars in the West and the rest of 
the world, yet it may lead to major renovation of research priorities.
these challenges make it necessary to stimulate cosmopolitan per-
spectives through platforms that shape academic production and research 
agendas. Professional associations, funding agencies, academic curricula, 
journals, and book series need to stimulate globalized debates and research 
in ways that contribute to strengthening media theory. to be clear, i am not 
suggesting that only global questions push analytical horizons and produce 
better theory. geographical scope neither determines the quality nor the 
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theoretical relevance of the contributions. “Case expertise” remains critical 
to probe and flesh out theoretical propositions, and determine whether and 
how “context matters” in mediated politics. at the present juncture, how-
ever, a cosmopolitan outlook is necessary to “de- Westernize” media stud-
ies. studying cases engaged with broad theoretical discussions, conducting 
comparative, cross- national research, and analyzing global developments 
and trends may, hopefully, make the field more inclusive and produce more 
nuanced propositions.
Conclusions
unquestionably, the field of media studies has become less u.s.- centric 
in the last two decades. renewed interest among european researchers 
has largely helped to probe conclusions originally developed in the united 
states. ongoing collaboration among professional and individual networks 
and support from european union agencies and foundations continue 
to drive this trend in promising directions (e.g., Koopmans and statham, 
2010). simultaneously, the steady publication of “international studies” in 
books and journals has expanded the availability of “non- Western” cases 
in english.
further cross- regional dialogue and collaboration is necessary. in a 
globalized world, “area studies” is not conducive to multiple- way con-
versations, but rather it solidifies inward- looking debates. Cosmopolitan 
scholarship, instead, offers an alternative that will further decentralize the 
field and facilitate collaboration around common theoretical and empiri-
cal questions. yet cosmopolitan media studies requires institutional condi-
tions that are not strongly developed yet. Moreover, funding sources, lan-
guage barriers, and geographical distance limit the potential of globalized 
research. it is imperative to discuss ways to make media studies not only 
more receptive but also more engaged with arguments and perspectives 
from around the world.
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Note
 1. arguably, area studies never achieved the same level of institutionalization in 
media studies as in other disciplines such as political science, history, and literature 
in the united states during the past half century. the analysis of this issue falls 
outside the scope of this paper, and needs further attention. three reasons should 
be explored: the “late” development of communication/media studies compared 
to other disciplines and fields in the social sciences and humanities, the different 
power of various disciplines in leading universities, and the amount of public and 
private funding received from foundations and government agencies channeled to 




Local Experiences, Cosmopolitan Theories
On Cultural Relevance in International 
Communication Research
Chin- Chuan Lee
today’s world is in fact a world of mixtures, of migrations, of cross-
ings over.
— edward W. said (2000, p. 287)
from the particular, you may ascend to the general; but from the 
general theory there is no way back to the intuitive understanding 
of the particular.
— Leopold von ranke (1795– 1886), as quoted in ringer (1997, 
p. 11)
When a british colleague asked me for a take on my experience as a teacher 
of international communication at a midwestern u.s. university, i quipped 
half- jokingly, “american students tend to define their country as an op-
posite rather than as a part of the international system.” hence “interna-
tional” students are “foreign” students whereas “international” communi-
cation is defined, reductively and by default, as “non- u.s.” communication. 
Just as baseball’s pinnacle event in north america is called the “World 
series,” the international Communication association (iCa) has been “in-
ternational” primarily in the sense of holding an annual conference at a 
hilton or sheraton hotel in an overseas metropolis once every four years.1 
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Citing his survey of curriculum and introductory texts in major u.s. uni-
versities, downing (2009, p. 274) observes that the trend in international 
media studies is “strongly in the direction of insularity rather than inter-
nationalism.” if the Western- cum- global model symbolizes “the imperial-
ism of the universal” (bourdieu, 2001), then this “globalized” model in fact 
originated from “the parochialism of the particular” (the term coined after 
Pierre bourdieu) writ universal.
the need to internationalize media studies has increasingly been rec-
ognized, with the impetus coming from scholars who do not conform 
strictly to the u.s. mainstream orbit and especially from those who have 
cross- cultural or multicultural experiences. downing (1996) questioned 
the representativeness of media studies based on a few affluent, stable de-
mocracies with Protestant histories and imperial entanglements with the 
rest of the world. Curran and Park (2000, p. 3) took the first initiative 
to “de- Westernize media studies,” editing a volume as “part of a growing 
reaction against the self- absorption and parochialism of much western me-
dia theory.” Curran (2005, p. xiii) further criticized two forms of myopia: 
“the inward orientation of american journalism research” and “the spu-
rious universality of european media and cultural theory.” More recent 
albeit uneven attempts at de- Westernizing media studies have been made 
by thussu (2009) and Wang (2011). it is fair to say that these sober voices 
have been murmured from a position of relative marginality; only those on 
the margin are more inclined to cross over and intersect various modes of 
knowledge.
the foreground of today’s calls for “internationalizing” international 
communication research is set against the larger post– Cold War back-
ground that gave the united states an added sense of political triumpha-
lism and cultural complacency. the united states proclaimed itself “bound 
to lead” (nye, 1990) in the “new world order,” oriented toward the neo-
liberal regime of the “Washington consensus.” instead of broadening in-
ternational or cross- cultural dialogue, the rhetoric of globalization is often 
honed to promote strategic policy vantage points of the united states— to 
the point that we can legitimately ask if globalization is a thinly veiled dis-
guise of the “manifest destiny” ideology. fukuyama’s “end of history” the-
sis (fukuyama, 1992) posits, in a self- congratulatory way, liberalism’s vic-
tory over fascism and communism as a final answer to history. huntington 
(1993), a former advocate of the by- now bankrupt modernization theory, 
advances a bewilderingly reductive, fundamentalist, and exaggerated sce-
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nario of conflicts between Western, Confucian, and islamic civilizations. 
his focal concern was not so much with the resolution of civilization- based 
clashes as it was with the potential threats of such clashes to dominant u.s. 
interests and Western values. international communication studies have 
not made much progress despite the marching trumpet of globalization.
in this chapter, i shall first argue that the extreme form of positivistic 
methodology, with its bent for subsuming cultural specificity to abstract 
generality, has reinforced the Western- cum- universal epistemology and 
practices. by way of making my point, i shall take the liberty of draw-
ing on my own intellectual biography to reflect on what i consider to be 
the pitfalls of the once dominant paradigm of international communica-
tion in the united states. seeing this methodological flaw as deriving in 
part from cultural vacuousness, i shall plead that we give the Weberian- 
phenomenological methodology its due attention, and take cultural mean-
ing more seriously instead of treating it as an antecedent, a consequence, or 
a residual category of sociological or psychological variables.
several preliminary remarks are in order. first, we must reject both 
the dominant view and the nativistic view. as said (1978, p. 247) argues 
eloquently, cultures and civilizations are hybrid, heterogeneous, and “so 
interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply de-
lineated description of their individuality.” such hegemonic views as fu-
kuyama (1992) and huntington (1993) foreclose alternative thought and 
equal dialogue. on the opposite side, the nativistic reactions of Lee Kuan 
yew’s “asian values” or beijing- defined “Confucian ethos” represent self- 
righteous, arrogant, and anti- liberal backlashes against democracy (Lee, 
2001). second, social sciences are an art of managing the creative tension 
between generality and specificity. universality that obliterates specificity 
is both hegemonic and colonial, while specificity without general implica-
tions is self- defeating. Cultural interpretation gives life to rich specificity 
that is dialectically interactive with generality; it also enlivens the meanings 
of generality by giving specificity a pride of place. third, social sciences 
have a relatively brief history in the West and were not introduced into 
China until the late nineteenth century. Media studies are not yet fully 
institutionalized in today’s China, where a nation of eager teachers and stu-
dents have been groping for directions in the way of language, paradigms, 
epistemology, and methodology. Mutual borrowing is both necessary and 
healthy only if it is done as a critical choice and without losing one’s firm 
cultural grips.
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Pitfalls of the (Once) Dominant Paradigm
i was attracted to the emerging field of international communication in the 
early 1970s by way of exposure to several seminal works in “development 
communication.” daniel Lerner, Wilbur schramm, and everett M. rogers 
were the leading proponents of this paradigm. they sought to explain the 
role and functions of the media in the process of national development, 
which was part of modernization theory, as conceived by american social 
scientists with the active encouragement of the u.s. government, on the as-
sumption that economic growth held a key to democracy (diamond, 1992). 
the newly emerging nations pursued national development projects with a 
vengeance from the 1950s to 1970s, at a time when the united states was 
at the peak of its global expansion and meanwhile pushing forward its Cold 
War agendas to prevent Communist encroachment.2
Lerner: The Passing of Traditional Society
of the trio, both schramm and rogers acknowledged their intellectual 
debt to Lerner. since schramm (1964) was not based on primary research, 
i shall focus on the other two but start with Lerner’s (1958) pioneering The 
Passing of Traditional Society. Lerner (1958) was a work of central impor-
tance to international communication research but curiously peripheral to 
the sociology of modernization. My point of concern in this chapter will 
focus on how Lerner went about mustering “evidence” both epistemologi-
cally and methodologically to make his theoretical case.
based on a reanalysis of survey data originally conducted to test the ef-
fectiveness of u.s. propaganda vis- à- vis soviet propaganda in the Middle 
east, Lerner proposed this model of modernization:
increasing industrialization has raised urbanization; rising urbaniza-
tion has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to raise 
media exposure; increasing exposure has tended to increase political 
participation in economic and political life. (p. 46)
Lerner argues that the key to the passing of traditional society is to rid 
people of their fatalism. individuals must collectively develop what he calls 
“empathy” or “psychic mobility,” a modernizing personality that enabled 
people to discard fatalism and, further, to imagine beyond the narrow con-
fines of their immediate roles and contexts. Mass media were conceived 
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of as the “magic multiplier” of empathy and a crucial catalyst for social 
change. as more and more people acquire empathic capacity, the whole 
nation (as if it were a linear aggregate of individuals) would break off from 
the yoke of tradition and enter the threshold of modernization.
various criticisms made of Lerner should be by now familiar, such as 
(see Lee, 1980, pp. 17– 24): (a) rigidly segregating tradition from modernity 
instead of fostering a creative synthesis; (b) using a psychological variable 
(empathy) to explain the macro- societal transformation to the exclusion 
of acute structural constraints, global domination, imperialism, and post- 
colonial conditions; (c) imposing the Western pathway to modernization 
as a universal process, and thus contradicting the historical evidence show-
ing a multiplicity of modernization routes in the West itself; and, also, (4) 
ignoring the differences in structural conditions between late development 
(the third World) and early development (the european nations).
Lerner declared (1958, p. 79) that “what america is— to condense a 
rule more powerful than its numerous exceptions— the modernizing Mid-
dle east seeks to become.” in his view, the Middle east would have to 
walk through the same linear path that the united states had trodden. 
the american experience was not only relevant to the geographical re-
gion called “the West” but was projected as a “globally” valid model. he 
rejected the calls made by the emerging nations for alternative models as 
“ethnocentric predicament” and “a formidable obstacle to modernization” 
(p. ix). Lerner’s logically circular claim on a linear model of moderniza-
tion, however, flies in the face of historical evidence presented by Moore 
(1967) and tilly (1975). Moore showed that there were multiple pathways 
to modernization among the Western nations. tilly argued that the West-
ern model was an unintended consequence of an extractive, repressive, and 
coercive process; it was indeed considered a “lucky shot” that could not be 
reproduced.
Committed to a teleological vision, Lerner argued that the whole theo-
retical landscape required “some principle of unity in diversity” (p. 77). 
What does this mean? “by making explicit the regularities we document 
the process; by noting the deviations we locate each country in its proper 
phase” (p. 89). generality subsumes exceptions. he thus postulated turkey 
and Lebanon at the top of modernism (read: Westernization), egypt and 
syria in the middle, with Jordan and iran at the bottom. Methodologically, 
Lerner set out to craft a series of six single- country narratives, which har-
old d. Lasswell praised as “brilliantly arresting” (cited on the book cover). 
each country narrative was a mix of historical facts, anecdotes, and second-
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ary data geared toward constructing “a theory of modernization that ar-
ticulates the common compulsion to which all Middle eastern peoples are 
subject.” three comments should be made. first, these country narratives, 
however vivid or arresting, are only “illustrative” of his committed posi-
tion at best; they do not offer a strong “proof” or fair test of his theoreti-
cal model. second, it is critical to pay close attention to the “considerable 
latitude” he had admittedly taken to treat “specific topics that varied from 
one country to another,” in order to discuss the “salient connections be-
tween communication, economic, and political behavior” (pp. 103– 4). each 
country story, by itself, is telling enough. but selective use of facts, topical 
emphases, and interpretations might have rendered these narratives not 
consistently comparable with reference to posited “salient connections” 
across six countries. as a whole, the theoretical edifice may thus sit on a 
shaky empirical ground. third, given his penchant for pursuing “unity in 
diversity,” Lerner tended to cast aside “deviant” cases that did not fit into 
his explanatory system as countries “not yet modernized” instead of treat-
ing such counter- evidence as an invitation for rethinking his model. it did 
not occur to Lerner that his model might be limited, one- sided, or wrong 
(as many of his critics later pointed out).
Rogers: Diffusion of Innovations
the diffusion of innovation was regarded as one of the “invisible colleges” 
(Crane, 1972) for scholarly investigation. Diffusion of Innovations, a popu-
lar text that everett M. rogers spent his entire career updating, was reis-
sued in five editions over a span of four decades. rogers tried to establish 
a propositional inventory as a middle- range meeting ground to bridge 
theoretical concepts and empirical findings. the first edition of this text 
(rogers, 1962) sifted through 405 studies, mostly conducted in the united 
states and europe. the second edition listed 103 propositions that were 
digested from 1,500 studies; the sharp takeoff in the number of studies con-
ducted in the developing world in the 1960s gave rogers much confidence 
to subtitle this edition “a cross- cultural approach” (rogers & shoemaker, 
1971). Claiming to be even “less culture- bound,” rogers (1983) distilled 91 
propositions out of 3,085 studies, 30 percent of which originated from the 
developing nations. rogers (1995) estimated the total number of diffusion 
publications at 4,000, which was rising to 5,200 articles shortly before his 
death (rogers, 2003).
the structure of propositional inventory was retained in all five edi-
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tions, but only the second edition (rogers & shoemaker, 1971) offered a 
“scoreboard” to track the “popularity” of each proposition, for example:
5– 29  earlier adopters (of innovation) have a higher degree of opinion 
leadership than late adopters (42 studies, or 76 percent, support; 
13 studies do not support).
5– 30  earlier adopters are more likely to belong to systems with modern 
rather than traditional norms than are later adopters (32 studies, 
or 70 percent, support; 14 studies do not support). (pp. 375– 76)
in retrospect, it must have been this kind of prima facie scientific co-
gency that enticed this beginning graduate student to stake his career on 
the emerging field of communication. it was much later before i became 
well aware of the harsh criticisms made of rogers. downs and Mohr 
(1976) faulted rogers’s propositions as empirically too inconsistent to be 
interpreted. rogers (1983, p. 132) was probably legitimate in his defense 
that the diffusion research compared favorably with other branches of so-
cial sciences in terms of consistency, but i suspect as a synthesizer he might 
have (inevitably) smoothed out the rough edges of empirical findings from 
the disparate literature to make them seem less conflicting. More serious 
was Mcanany’s (1984) criticism that rogers’s propositions were too crude 
for theory- building. for me, it is even more pertinent to ask another ques-
tion in this context: how should anomalous findings be treated? should 
they be dismissed purely as “nuisances” and “exceptions” to the “general 
rule,” or should they prompt a critical reflection on the validity of the pos-
tulated model?
even though many diffusion studies had originated from the develop-
ing countries, these studies were neither comparative nor “cross- cultural,” 
but seemed to directly replicate or reproduce the deeply embedded 
middle- class american assumptions, frameworks, and worldviews in over-
seas outposts.3 over the life span of his text, rogers did a few rounds of 
revision. he first took the “dominant paradigm” to task for displaying pro- 
innovation and pro- individualism biases (rogers, 1983), then proposed a 
convergence model in place of the liner diffusion model (rogers, 1995, p. 
xvi), and finally added new topics (the internet, the aids epidemic, and 
world terrorism) to the diffusion process (rogers, 2003). but none of these 
attempts have come close to addressing the fundamental criticisms of mod-
ernization theory that informed the diffusion research.
Methodologically, the diffusionists have skirted around, if not bypassed, 
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three major issues in comparative research (smelser, 1976, p. 166): (a) are 
the social units comparable with one another? (b) are the abstract vari-
ables applicable to the dissimilar units that have been selected for study? 
(c) are the indicators of the independent and dependent variables compa-
rable from one sociocultural context to another? it goes without saying 
that comparative analysts must grapple with the issues of conceptual and 
empirical equivalences across different systems. What’s more, according to 
smelser, sociocultural contexts might exert pressure on the articulation of 
the theory- data connections. rogers seems to assume the diffusion process 
as unitary, universal, and invariant with respect to sociocultural contexts. 
rogers (2003) collected many story tidbits from various cultures, as in-
triguing as Lerner’s individual country narratives, but these stories only 
served to exemplify a stated position rather than to reflect on theoretical or 
methodological premises.
the diffusion of knowledge has in general been flowing from center 
to periphery, from developed to developing countries, and from the West 
to the east. academic hegemony is exercised not through coercion but via 
the conditioning of certain beliefs and assumptions which, if internalized 
or codified, may lead to an entrenched system of intellectual dependency 
without conscious reflection, resistance, or challenge. despite its waning 
popularity in international communication, the diffusion research is still 
going strong in such applied fields as marketing, health, or agricultural ex-
tension. as we witness a weakening influence of this paradigm in the global 
center, it has continued to exert considerable authority in the world periph-
ery. this lack of self- consciousness and self- confidence in the third World 
shows the obstinacy of the underlying structure of academic hegemony. if 
we can take something positive from the postmodern turn, it would be the 
possibility of decentering and multipolar centers, such that the periphery 
can someday become a center. that makes maintaining scholarly vigilance 
and cultural self- consciousness particularly crucial. What is the value of 
“cross- cultural” studies if they simply serve to endorse the propositions of 
middle- class american worldviews?
The Weberian- Phenomenological Approach
Lerner tailored different Middle east countries to his theoretical model, 
and rogers ended up with rather ad hoc and “on the one hand, on the other 
hand” sort of findings. both of them were in conformity with the dominant 
u.s. ideology. What seems seriously absent from the established frame-
Revised Pages
Local Experiences, Cosmopolitan Theories •  209
works is the much- needed sensitivity to the Weberian- phenomenological 
interpretations of cross- cultural meanings by and of social actors, thick de-
scription of deep motives and complex consequences, and ample allowance 
for multiple realities to be constructed by different cross- cultural interpre-
tive communities (berger & Kellner, 1981; ringer, 1997).4
“Web of Significance”: Causality and Meaning
Patterned after the natural sciences, positivistic social sciences aim to re-
duce the complex web of social phenomena to a parsimonious structure 
consisting of a handful of dominant variables and thus to establish causa-
tion between them— best of all, to express such causal relationships for-
mally in mathematical terms (Luckmann, 1978). interpretative social sci-
ences, informed by humanistic studies, seek to elucidate and give order to 
layers of complex meanings in the “structure of feelings” (Williams, 1977) 
by means of “thick description” (geertz, 1973). Whitehead used to say this 
about positivism: “seek simplicity, and distrust it.” Carey (1992) twisted it 
to describe the culturalist approach: “seek complexity, but order it.” the 
Weberian- phenomenological approach is the most important interpretive 
epistemology and methodology that tries to strike a middle ground be-
tween science and the humanities. What can we learn from it to enrich 
international communication research?
Weber’s methodology obviously cannot be divorced from his substan-
tive work,5 but i shall focus on his methodological implications in this 
chapter. as shils (1949) notes, social sciences have developed a whole series 
of accurate, concrete techniques of observation and analysis that even op-
timists could not have expected in Weber’s time. but he laments, “random 
curiosity has caused a vast sprawl of interest over a multitude of subjects 
that could not be coordinated into a unified body of knowledge.” shils 
calls for social scientists to heighten their consciousness of Weber’s discus-
sion of “value- relevance” that would guide the criteria of problem selection 
and bring order into the agenda and program of social sciences. What this 
means is that we should do well by starting our analysis with an account of 
significant “local knowledge” (geertz, 1983), “relevance structure” (berger 
& Kellner, 1981), and “lived and living experiences” (Williams, 1977) of 
social and cultural inhabitants. on this basis, scholars try to help social 
actors reinterpret (objectify or typify) their subjective interpretations of 
the lifeworld in larger contexts. in phenomenological terms, what we do 
in our scholarly investigation is attempt to transform first- order mean-
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ings “within” the lifeworld of social actors to second- order meanings “out-
side” it. doing so requires establishing a greater distance from existential 
concerns by relating local experiences to a systematic body of theoretical 
knowledge (berger & Kellner, 1981).
the Weberian approach strives to balance “causal adequacy” with 
“meaning adequacy.” it provides empathetic understanding of social ac-
tion with an explanation of its causes and consequences, while at the same 
time elucidating the layers of rich and complex meaning of this social ac-
tion. Weberians make claims on causality in more fluid, more contingent, 
and less sweeping terms than do positivists; Weber did not wish to pursue 
abstract “general laws” but attempted to attribute concrete effects to con-
crete causes with general significance or historical interest (ringer, 1997; 
Weber, 1978b). two general implications can be highlighted. first, beware 
of “the imperialism of the universal” (bourdieu, 2001). Let’s not accept any 
externally imposed universal models— be they modernization theory, the 
development of underdevelopment, technological determinism, or eco-
nomic determinism— as preordained assumptions or conclusions. in this 
regard, for example, i (Lee, 2011b) have taken exception to the tendency of 
the heidelberg sinologists (Wagner, 2007) to view the early shanghai press 
in China through contemporary and post- hoc lenses of Jürgen habermas 
instead of contextualizing the press at its historical moments, thus resulting 
in overinterpreting the scope of the “public sphere” thought to have ex-
isted. second, our selection of problem is best guided by “relevance struc-
ture” emanating from within our culturally and historically specific yet vital 
experiences. i echo Mills’s plea (1959, p. 8) that our “sociological imagina-
tion” should start with reflecting on “the personal troubles of milieu,” then 
relating such troubles to the “public issues of social structure,” and ulti-
mately integrating local problems into comparative and historical contexts.
by no means am i proposing an insular or parochial approach. the “lo-
cal” is not synonymous with the “parochial,” for the “local” must maintain 
a dynamic interaction with the “global.” at a certain point we are bound to 
tie the specific to the general when we meet, consult, and confront a larger 
body of the literature, take advantage of cosmopolitan concepts, and recon-
struct more cosmopolitan arguments. but as a matter of priority, we had 
better begin with the specific and move to the general through critical as-
sessment, modification, and absorption of the relevant literature to reflect 
on our experiences. specificity and generality exist as a dialectical pair: the 
more we understand ourselves, the more likely we are to understand oth-
ers; on this basis, a meaningful cultural dialogue may occur, and it always 
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occurs within a context. Leopold von ranke (1795– 1886), the dean of the 
nineteenth- century german historians, maintains: “from the particular 
you may ascend to the general; but from general theory there is no way 
back to the intuitive understanding of the particular” (quoted in ringer, 
1997, p. 11). international communication is a creative fusion of local per-
spectives and global visions, but using theories to explain our experiences 
should take primacy over appropriating our experiences to fit the theories. 
Cultural experiences are the horse and general theories the cart; we do not 
put the cart in front of the horse.6 Why should we abandon our cultural 
bearings, only to provide foreign if not exotic “validation” of the Western 
“truth,” often dressed up in the name of “scientific laws”?
Contrasting Two Dependency Perspectives
in the 1970s two major versions of dependency perspectives grew out of 
Latin america to rebel against modernization theory. the radical theory 
of the “development of underdevelopment” (frank, 1972) was a positivis-
tic mirror image and yet ideological antithesis of modernization theory. 
frank claimed that the development of first World countries was achieved 
historically at the price of third World underdevelopment through colo-
nial exploitation, external conditioning of economies, and military con-
quest. Contrasting frank’s formal theory of underdevelopment was a far 
more sophisticated perspective of “dependent development” by Cardoso 
and faletto (1979) that treated dependency as a methodology for analyzing 
concrete situations of underdevelopment. While frank (1972) takes the 
sweeping, general- to- specific framework, Cardoso and faletto (1979) takes 
the more contingent, specific- to- general route. Cardoso (1977) criticized 
u.s. sociologists for interpreting dependency perspectives through frank’s 
positivistic lenses.
by “dependent development,” Cardoso and faletto (1979) maintained 
that some economies in Latin america were capable of experiencing indus-
trial development amid continuing dependence. Methodologically, they 
take a structural- historical approach to elaborate the key concepts that 
related “opposing forces that drag history ahead” and “situations of depen-
dency” in a global way. “history becomes understandable when interpreta-
tions propose categories strong enough to render clear the fundamental 
relations (of domination) that sustain those that oppose a given structural 
situation in its globality” (p. xiii). instead of focusing exclusively on the 
dimension of external exploitation, they try to account painstakingly for 
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the intricate interplay between the strong state, the internal class structure, 
and their interaction with the international capitalist system. this line of 
structural- historical analysis has inspired a series of sophisticated studies 
on brazil (evans, 1979), south Korea, and taiwan; a rare study of media 
“dependent development” was attempted by salinas and Palden (1979). 
dependency perspectives seem to have gone out of vogue in the past two 
decades, but not because they have exhausted their intellectual mileage or 
relevance. as the neoliberal regime and ideology prevailed in the post– 
Cold War era, it seems that academic hounds have moved on to hunt for 
newer and tastier targets in postmodernism and globalization.
Cross- Cultural Research
the trajectory of international communication research has not been fully 
internationalized or cross- culturalized. international research does not im-
ply one- sided imposition of dominant Western perspectives on peripheral 
corners of the global frontier. in criticizing the literature on development 
communication and the diffusion of innovations, i do not mean to show 
disrespect for our intellectual forebears posthumously, but the hard and 
valuable lesson i learned as a young student has constantly forced me to 
reassess my own academic path. equally important is that we must reject 
any reverse tendency toward nativistic claims on cultural exclusivity. Zhang 
(2004, 2010), a cultural scholar, warns against close- minded cultural na-
tionalism as well as the east- West bipolarity, while urging sinologists to 
move out of their isolated cocoon and engage in a healthy dialogue with 
members of the larger intellectual community. Likewise, we should come 
out of the closed circle of “area studies” in favor of the empirically rich and 
theoretically sensitive “area- based studies” (to borrow a term from Prewitt, 
2002, p. 8) to integrate the rich area knowledge into a theoretical frame-
work.
Merton (1972), in a seminal essay, calls for mutual learning of the in-
sider’s and outsider’s views. borrowing from Williams James, he delineates 
two kinds of knowledge: “acquaintance with” and “knowledge about.”7 
the insider may have the advantage of obtaining the “acquaintance with” 
type of knowledge, referring to direct familiarity and personal, firsthand 
experiences with the world. however, familiarity breeds inattention, and 
the insider cannot claim monopolistic or privileged access to other kinds 
of knowledge just because of his or her ascribed status (e.g., race, nation, 
culture). the “knowledge about”— that is, more abstract formulations of 
Revised Pages
Local Experiences, Cosmopolitan Theories •  213
knowledge acquired through systematic investigation— requires certain 
academic detachment and trained capacity to know how to ask what kind of 
questions, and how to assemble and assess the relevant evidence. “Knowl-
edge about” is not exclusively owned by the insider or the outsider, but 
accessible to those who have engaged in long- term patient cultivation and 
systematic inquiry. the insider’s and outsider’s views are cross- fertilizing. 
Moreover, there are two implications for the distinction made between two 
types of knowledge. first, as social scientists we are professionally trained 
to be “multiple persons” who traverse between the two zones of experi-
ence, holding the insider’s intuitive insights on some topics and the out-
sider’s detached analysis and systematic knowledge on other topics. there 
is always a vibrant flow of exchange between these two overlapping modes 
of knowledge, such that we trust our intuition on the one hand and distrust 
it on the other. also we habitually attempt to turn “acquaintance with” into 
“knowledge about” as part of our professional activities. second, in relating 
to the Weberian- phenomenological approach, the scholar’s role is to help 
transform social actors’ “acquaintance with” into a more systematic body 
of “knowledge about.”
Newton’s Apple: In Defense of Case Study and Comparative Study
smelser (1976) starts his sophisticated text on comparative methodology 
with tocqueville’s single case- study treatise on american democracy, and 
proceeds to compare Weber’s phenomenological method with durkheim’s 
positivistic method. he finally privileged durkheim over tocqueville and 
Weber, for he was in favor of the positivistic method capable of rigorous 
statistical control to tease out spurious variables. Multivariate statistical 
analysis requires a large number of cases— a condition that international 
and cross- cultural investigators often find difficult to meet, especially if 
the comparison is to be contextually rich and culturally meaningful. interna-
tional communication studies, devoid of cultural meanings, tend to gener-
ate rather bland, reductive, and generally dubious conclusions.
What’s more, smelser’s evaluative criteria could be severely challenged 
if our primary cognitive interest is to acquire intellectual insight through 
what geertz (1973) calls “thick description” of patterns, structures, pro-
cesses, motives, and interaction. even today, any serious discourse on de-
mocracy has little recourse but to return to alexis de tocqueville’s classic 
Democracy in America (first published in two volumes in 1835 and 1840, re-
issued in 1945) as a baseline. Closer to media studies is Lippmann’s (1922) 
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cogent analysis of public opinion in the united states, which can be dis-
puted but not bypassed. i am arguing that social scientists may look up to 
the “scientific” tradition but do not have to model their work solely, much 
less blindly, on the “hard” scientific laws. We may indeed look for ways to 
profit from the enduring concerns, rich insights, and the interpretive meth-
odology of various humanistic disciplines. Weber’s methodology (Weber, 
1978b) is a fruitful and practical middle- way position between objectivism 
(causal adequacy) and subjectivism (meaning adequacy). his substantive 
work (Weber, 1978a) is a guiding light that shows us the way.
as a leading proponent of the culturalist approach to media studies, 
Carey’s profound work (Carey, 1992; Munson & Warren, 1997) was quint-
essentially american. even though he did not excurse into the interna-
tional terrain, many of his domestic analyses should stimulate comparative 
work. silvio Waisbord argues in his otherwise eloquent chapter that “thick 
description” (geertz, 1973) of individual case studies primarily holds the 
narrow interest of “area specialists,” but not of cosmopolitan scholars. 
ironically, Carey’s “thick description” of the historical, cultural, and tech-
nological formation of the u.s. media possesses far greater appeal to theo-
retically informed, interdisciplinary humanists and social scientists than to 
specific circles of area specialists. the same remark can be made of the 
seminal work by Cardoso and faletto (1979), who follow a Weberian tack. 
the real strength of a case study (better yet, a comparative case study) lies 
not in empirical generality, but in its ability to generate conceptual general-
ity. Metaphorically, a seminal case study can be likened to newton’s apple 
with the ultimate aim to reveal the law of gravity. articulation of robust 
concepts in relation to larger comparative, historical, or global terrains has 
unusual power to illuminate and open up ways of seeing the structure of 
the world anew— not only enabling us to understand the tree but also un-
locking a side yet critical window on the wood.
to illustrate, Clifford geertz (1963) developed the concept of “invo-
lution” to account for the social- ecological history of agricultural trans-
formation on the indonesian islands of Java and bali. the superimposed 
demands of the dutch rulers and rising population pressures forced the 
agricultural system in Java to take a self- defeating route of intensifica-
tion rather than change. in other words, Java tried to absorb increased 
numbers of cultivators on a unit of cultivated land. this practice did not 
result in improving the per- capita output but, on the contrary, produced 
disastrous social and ecological consequences. the concept of “involution” 
was further extended to mean the introversive tendency toward internal 
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elaboration of details and the dazzling display of technical virtuosity at 
the expense of conceptual innovation, bold experiment, and open change. 
Clement so (1988) aptly invoked this concept to interpret the increasing 
trend of core communication journals toward self- referencing instead of 
cross- referencing the larger social science literature. instead of equating 
the supposed “self- sufficiency” in journal citation with disciplinary matu-
rity, i too regard it as a classic case of academic involution characterized by 
self- absorption and conceptual inbreeding, particularly detrimental to the 
development of an emerging field like ours (see more discussion in chap-
ter 1 of this volume). technical hair- splitting on trifling problems serves 
to fortify the false security of various fragmented, inward- looking interest 
groups and erect academic walls against fresh and bold ideas; consequently, 
the field is insulated from active engagement with and open contestation 
over big issues. What i am trying to argue is that the concept of “involu-
tion,” derived from a case study by a renowned u.s. anthropologist in the 
faraway islands of indonesia, has exerted far- reaching influences that cut 
across, and reach beyond, disciplinary and cultural borders. therefore, it 
is not case study itself that is at fault, but the real challenge is how to offer 
conceptual power in a case analysis. given this, shouldn’t we be inspired to 
revisit some of the more important interpretive media concepts derived 
from various case studies— such as “stereotype” (Lippmann, 1922); “stra-
tegic ritual of objectivity” or “news net” (tuchman, 1978); “sphere of le-
gitimate controversy” (hallin, 1986); “incorporation” (Williams, 1977)— in 
order to draw out their international ramifications?
Generalizing Cross- Cultural Implications
if historians quarrel over whether to generalize their analysis, most media 
sociologists are unquestionably inclined to generalize their findings. in-
ternational communication is at once comparative and generalizing, and 
the comparative horizons can arise within and between cultural communi-
ties. through arduously administered focus- group discussion, Liebes and 
Katz (1993) linked the multifaceted and thick- meaning interpretations of 
an imported u.s. cultural text (a tv series, Dallas) to israeli social contexts 
(i.e., multiple subcultural immigrant groups, each with different interests 
and perspectives that made up a cultural mosaic). by tapping into how sub-
cultural assumptions may influence different groups in their decoding of 
a foreign cultural product, they contribute to the continuing debate on 
“cultural imperialism.” they take exception to some political economists 
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who tend to equate capitalist ownership and control of media institutions 
with the presumed ideological effect of capitalism, but between these two 
points there is little effort to investigate how the audience interprets me-
dia genre and content (tomlinson, 1991). by no means is this big debate 
settled, but Liebes and Katz have reopened it in a fruitful way by showing 
the “polysemy” in cultural readings of media genre.
their cross- cultural study can be extended from intranational to inter-
national contexts, but it would be a more difficult undertaking especially if 
language expertise and substantive cultural knowledge are to be expected. 
that is why, despite the rhetoric, comparative media studies of interna-
tional scope have been so rare.8 an exemplary project came from hallin 
and Mancini (2004) who first compared the “most similar design” of media 
systems across 18 countries in western europe and north america, and 
then fostered an interesting comparison with the “most dissimilar design” 
of some non- Western countries (hallin & Mancini, 2012).
i hope to be pardoned for drawing on our work (Lee, he, & huang, 
2006, 2007) to make a further point, not because of its outstanding merits 
but because of my own familiarity with it. in this project, our problem 
selection was geared toward deciphering the mysterious myopia of China’s 
media system that is being cross- pressured by a mix of Communist con-
trol and quasi- capitalistic market operation. instead of beginning with any 
“universal” model, we set out to listen to the voices (i.e., meaning system) 
of media executives, editors, and journalists we interviewed, and then in-
terpreted their insights in relation to our own long- term grasp of the situ-
ation and also to the larger literature. We reconstructed the concept of 
“corporatism” from Latin americanists, but added to it critical elements 
of party- market collusion and collision that were unique to what i char-
acterized as “Communist- capitalist media” in China (Lee, 2005). finally, 
we propose three prototypes of “party- market corporatism” to account for 
the interlocking of the state, capital, and media in China. the first, as in 
shanghai, is the pattern of clientelism in which media submission is exer-
cised through the exchange of political silence for economic reward. the 
second prototype, as in guangzhou, is “marketization of political manage-
ment” where media corporatism is driven by fierce market competition 
within the party- state ideological limits. the third, as in beijing, is a pat-
tern of “political absorption of marketization,” where “managed diversity” 
is maintained through a precarious balance of the emerging interest politics 
among counterbalancing power bases. it is hoped that we may contribute 
to comparative work on media- state- capital transition within and between 
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former european Communist states and the right- wing dictatorships of 
Latin america and asia.
for me, the most inspiring example has been edward W. said’s work on 
orientalism (1978). he read the same body of canonical Western literary 
texts and yet produced, in Williams’s (1977) terms, a set of “alternative” and 
even “oppositional” interpretations vis- à- vis the “dominant” ideology. said 
adopted the methodology of “contrapuntal reading” (in musical terminol-
ogy) of the literary texts and linked them to the political, economic, and 
cultural contexts of european and american imperialism. subsequently 
said (1993) extended this analysis to show how third World peoples 
sought to resist, subvert, and contest the cultural hegemony of the imperial 
center. by offering a formidable challenge to the dominant Western read-
ing, he has sharply changed the interpretative contours and enriched the 
whole gamut of comparative discourse in culture, politics, and ideology. 
the post- colonial perspective, which said’s work has inspired, should con-
stitute a starting point of analysis for many international communication 
studies. his method of “contrapuntal reading” should be systematically ap-
plied, so we can revise, develop, extend, or debunk the existing pool of 
concepts in international and cross- cultural media research.
Exemplary Cross- Cultural Encounter
two masters in modern Chinese humanistic and social science studies— 
Wang guowei and Chen yinque— offer examples of most profound sig-
nificance in terms of how they handled the interpenetration of Chinese 
and Western knowledge systems (based on yu, 1998, pp. 331– 51; yu, 2007, 
pp. 279– 90).9 in his youth Wang guowei (1877– 1927) was intensively im-
mersed in german philosophy (from immanuel Kant, arthur schopen-
hauer, to friedrich nietzsche); as a figure so erudite in various branches of 
social sciences (ranging from psychology and sociology to law and logic) 
he also represented the highest level of understanding of Western knowl-
edge in China. these early experiences formed part of his core intellectual 
nutrients that would continually provide a tacit reservoir of creative ideas 
for him throughout his career. When he turned to the study of medieval 
Chinese history and geography, he profited from a wealth of newly discov-
ered archeological finds and also from the work of european and Japanese 
sinologists. but most important, he saw himself as an heir to the Qing tra-
dition of Chinese textual research, surpassed it, and eventually established 
a new paradigm that exerted profound influences on the creative minds 
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of his and the next generations. although he hardly made any reference 
to Kant and others in his mature work, as if he was ignorant of them, yu 
(2007) argues that Wang would not have been able to develop a paradig-
matic program of scholarship tackling a series of original questions with 
such rigorous analysis had he not internalized his early Western training.
Chen yinque (1890– 1969), widely acknowledged as an encyclopedic 
historian who wrote a tablet inscription in honor of Wang at his death, was 
another exemplary figure. Chen was versed in a dozen languages critical to 
his study of cultural encounter and the economic interactions of the tang 
dynasty, which marked the peak of China’s glory, with the neighboring 
countries in Central asia. in his youth Chen had studied at tokyo, ber-
lin, Paris, and at harvard, harboring the ambition to master world history 
with scientific methods. When Chen later returned to China and devoted 
himself to the study of Chinese historiography, he followed the example 
of Wang and went back to the classical Chinese textual tradition, raising 
culturally indigenous questions that were nonetheless of general implica-
tion. owing to his broad range of Western learning in his early years, he 
was able to develop many key concepts that opened up new avenues to give 
old history renewed understanding. as yu (1998) vividly illustrates, Chen 
forged a vital synthesis of Chinese and Western scholarly traditions; he 
preserved the best practices of Chinese historiography, modernized them, 
and took them to the new heights. both Wang and Chen were the central 
figures whose creative transformation and integration of intellectual re-
sources enhanced the scholarly dialogue across cultures to a level that few 
could match.
Coda
if international communication scholars are truly serious about achieving 
the goals of mutual understanding through cultural dialogue, it is impera-
tive that we listen humbly to symphonic music whose harmonious unity 
has themes and variations and is made up of a cacophony of instrumental 
sounds. Mindful of the cultural trend toward crossings over, said (2000, 
p. 583) urged conflict managers like samuel huntington and henry Kiss-
inger, of whom he was critical, to pay more attention to and “understand 
the meaning of the mingling of different musics, for example, in the work 
of oliver Messiaen or toru takemitsu.”
it is fitting to quote a deliciously moving poem, “Married Love,” writ-
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ten some seven centuries ago by guan daosheng (1262– 1319) in dedica-
tion to her husband:10
you and i
have so much love,
that it
burns like a fire,
in which we bake a lump of clay
Molded into a figure of you
and a figure of me.
then we take both of them,
and break them into pieces,
and mix the pieces with water,
and mold again a figure of you,
and a figure of me.
i am in your clay.
you are in my clay.
in life we share a single quilt.
in death we will share one coffin.
to give this poem’s rich images and metaphors a slight twist: if inter-
national communication is remolded as a lump of clay, we stand in need 
of building a figure of “me” and a figure of “you,” so ultimately i can be in 
your clay and you in mine. this means interpenetration, mutual learning, 
and cross- fertilization. a figure of “you” without “me” as a partner is a futile 
attempt at communication. however, the current state of affairs in the field 
of international communication research is that the figure of “me” has been 
overshadowed by a figure of “you.” We must strengthen a figure of “me” 
by producing an abundance of quality case- study, comparative, or cross- 
cultural accounts of cultural institutions, media representation, and every-
day ways of life, on which a meaningful dialogue with others is predicated. 
there is a very long way to go toward building such an edifice. as a modest 
step, we should encourage the laying down of more bricks that comprise 
theoretically informed, culturally enriching case studies and comparative 
analyses. to understand “me” in relation to “you” so we can have a conver-
sation is, to me, the essence of international communication studies that can 
be aided by the Weberian- phenomenological methodology.
to close this chapter, i would like to turn specifically to Chinese media 
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studies. We abhor the Western- cum- universal hegemony, but we are not 
interested in creating any essentialized theories of asian or Chinese media. 
We have nothing to do with any concept of “Chinese exceptionalism.” We 
study Chinese media partly but not only because we are culturally Chinese. 
nor because we are culturally Chinese can we only study Chinese media. 
the study of Chinese media is by no means intellectually self- sufficient or 
isolated; it should interpenetrate with the theoretical and methodological 
advances in the field of international communication and, more impor-
tant, in the larger currents of the humanities and social sciences. What we 
aspire to establish is, in sum, certain general theoretical perspectives with 
Chinese characteristics that arise from and highlight cultural specificity in 
our problematic consciousness and interpretations, but ultimately emerge 
from this cultural reflection to develop a broader view of how the world 
works. if we succeed in establishing such general perspectives that allow 
for internal differences, speak with a distinctive cultural accent, and yet 
transcend theoretical parochialism, we will be in a strengthened position 
to maintain an open- minded and mutually enriching dialogue on an equal 
footing with the Western literature.11 this is the cosmopolitan spirit that 
i believe should be the guiding light of international communication re-
search.
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Notes
 1. Most iCa members had been u.s. residents until recently. now that its non-
u.s. members have risen to 42 percent, it would be more interesting to observe the 
extent to which iCa’s range of epistemological and methodological interests will 
change with its membership composition.
 2. While modernization theory has been discredited, we witness that China has 
reversed its ideological course to pursue single- mindedly a program of economi-
cally driven modernization agendas in the context of globalization (Lee, 2010). 
Whether it is desirable to pursue modernization goals (of what kind?) is one thing, 
but whether different versions of modernization theory are robust enough is an-
other. China is a dubious test case for modernization theory.
 3. rogers with svenning (1969), for example, reported the results of a usaid- 
sponsored project to study the impact of communication on peasants in brazil, 
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nigeria, india, and Colombia, but the findings were based on translated versions 
of the same questionnaire. rogers presented statistical correlations between such 
variables as empathy, literacy, innovativeness, achievement motivation, cosmopoli-
tanness, opinion leadership, and media exposure, all pooled at the individual level 
regardless of national contexts.
 4. i am referring to the Weber- schultz line of methodology; see Luckmann 
(1978) for a sophisticated exposition. for Weber’s relationship with positivism and 
phenomenology, see huff (1984, pp. 1– 26).
 5. Weber’s work on the rise of capitalism and the Protestant ethic (Weber, 1930) 
is a landmark achievement of lasting influence, but his extension to comparative 
religions of China and india has been controversial. Weber (1951) relied on trans-
lated texts to argue that Chinese religion, especially Confucianism, did not cultivate 
the ethos of “innerworldly asceticism” as did Calvinism, and was hence antithetical 
to the rise of capitalism. yu (1987) refuted this theme; based on evidence from tex-
tual research he maintained that “innerworldly asceticism” was part of the Chinese 
religious ethos. Capitalism did not rise in China for a different reason: that its 
political and legal systems had not undergone the process of rationalization. this 
shows how difficult it is to do comparative research by making use of Weber’s “ideal 
type” design.
 6. Professor Zhang Longxi told a moving story about his “lived experience” of 
being sent to the countryside for hard labor during China’s Cultural revolution 
that had a real impact on his life, only to see some literary theorists abstractly ro-
mancing the beauty and nostalgia of that country life.
 7. Chicago sociologist robert Park (1940) also used this pair of concepts to ana-
lyze news as a form of “acquaintance with” knowledge.
 8. over the years i have been asked, or asked to recommend someone, to de-
velop a comparative text on east asian media systems (generally considered as the 
Confucian cultural area), but i really know of no one equipped with the requisite 
linguistic and substantive competence to do it. When east asian scholars get to-
gether, english is the lingua franca, but english writings on these media systems 
are in short supply.
 9. the account of Wang and Chen is based on yu yingshi, a distinguished his-
torian at Princeton university, many of whose important works (for example, yu, 
1987) ask the Weberian questions.
 10. translated by rexroth and Chung (1982, p. 53). Zhao Mengfu, a very promi-
nent yuan official, scholar, and calligrapher, was so moved by his wife’s poem as to 
abandon the thought of picking up a concubine.
 11. this paragraph is taken from Lee (2011a). interestingly, Kuang- kuo hwang 
expressed a similar vision for the movement of indigenous psychologies when he 
urged the development of a universal theoretical model to account for “one mind, 
many manifestations” (evenden & sandstrom, 2011). instead of striving for balkan-
ized indigenous theories, he argued, the goal should be to integrate various cultural 




Theorizing Media Production  
as a Quasi- Autonomous Field
A Reassessment of China News Studies
Judy Polumbaum
a quarter century ago, Charles berger and steven Chaffee sought to delin-
eate the contours of their preferred academic domain with the publication 
of the Handbook of Communication Science (berger & Chaffee, 1987c). in an 
introductory chapter, they identified the coalescence of studies concerning 
communication into dedicated academic departments, scholarly journals, 
and schools of research as evidence that a formerly diffuse field was “ac-
quiring the trappings of a discipline” (berger & Chaffee, 1987a, p. 15). 
they contrasted this situation with Wilbur schramm’s observation, an-
other quarter century earlier, that communication fell considerably short 
of disciplinary status, being rather “an academic crossroad where many 
have passed, but few have tarried” (schramm, 1963, p. 2). yet this increas-
ingly self- conscious and institutionalized realm of knowledge remained 
immature, according to berger and Chaffee. it was time, they proposed, to 
attempt to impose some theoretical coherence on the terrain.
Pairing the term “communication” with the term “science” was their 
admittedly limiting way of drawing boundaries that excluded some forms 
of research while valorizing others. What distinguishes science from non- 
science, they explained, with obvious allusion to the natural science model, 
is the development of “testable theories” in pursuit of generalizable ex-
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planations. their definition explicitly rejected research conducted in the 
cause of media criticism or activism, as well as the study of “individual 
communication events” for their own sake rather than in furtherance of 
larger theoretical principles (berger & Chaffee, 1987a, p. 17). the funda-
mental goals of science, they wrote, included “explanation, . . . prediction 
and control”— meaning control not of social outcomes, but in a narrow 
methodological sense of having a handle on the conditions under study; 
any “positive” or “negative” implications, while of legitimate concern for 
anyone as citizens, were beyond the ken of the scientist (berger & Chaffee, 
1987b, p. 100).
the Handbook should not be undervalued; its synthesizing essays of-
fer both historical markers and enduring insights, and some of the entries 
are indisputably masterful. the custodians of the volume are unquestion-
ably giants in the field— steve Chaffee was already a legend when he died 
prematurely. the collection is particularly lucid about levels of analysis, 
and examines a wide range of communication modes and contexts whose 
exploration continues to give vigor to the field. nevertheless, from the 
vantage point of the twenty- first century, the editors’ circumscription of 
the field looks oddly stingy and self- defeating.
“Positivism” has become the popular epithet to describe adoption of the 
natural science model for use in the social sciences, but this oversimplifies 
the issue— not to mention needlessly promoting academic antagonisms. 
theoretical assumptions, guiding questions, and methodological choices 
will always constrain research results; however, assuming transparent col-
lection, data should be useful to anyone caring to examine it, and subject 
to reconsideration even in analyses that may have nothing to do with the 
original research intent. doubts about the idealized scientific method ex-
ist even among the natural sciences, but that does not preclude advocates 
of different approaches from making mutual use of each other’s empirical 
findings.
in the field of communication, however, it could be argued that the 
natural science model constrains the scope of research in ways that are 
ever more outmoded. from the rigidly scientific perspective, for instance, 
what we have long called “international” or “comparative” communication 
research becomes merely a source of sites of replication. the Handbook’s 
reduction of international communication to a single essay, relegated to 
the end, on “Cross- cultural Comparisons” (gudykunst, 1987) is perhaps 
symptomatic of this rejection of particularistic study. the meager atten-
tion also highlights an inhibiting lack of curiosity about the world. by now, 
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even among scholars of disparate persuasions, it is widely recognized that 
diversity and commonality are equally important constituents of human 
existence. this does not obviate the quest for transportable explanations, 
which emerge in part from identifying differences that make a difference. 
but variation may matter in other ways entirely.
at bottom, this chapter is a plea for generosity in the construction of 
what “counts” as progress in the study of communication, and for a corre-
spondingly more expansive view of international communication. in such a 
spirit, i outline an approach that seems promising for advancing the inter-
national study of media production with reference to the body of research 
i know best, concerning the production of news in contemporary China. 
drawing on a considerable accumulation of studies of Chinese journalism 
and news media in the post- Mao reform period, i try to integrate some of 
the most recent empirical findings into a coherent analysis in a manner 
that respects both ambitions of generalizability and the integrity of the 
particular.
as with other contributions to this volume, my discussion takes in-
spiration from the movement to “de- Westernize” media studies (Curran 
& Park, 2000), including the criticism of research conventions that deem 
Western/u.s. contexts the norm or template against which findings from 
other settings are measured. of course, the critique does not dictate spurn-
ing everything that originates with Western thinkers. along with fellow 
contributors, i find in Western social theory much useful guidance for 
international communication research, and in Western research practice 
many helpful exemplars. i am especially grateful to rodney benson for 
his explication, here and elsewhere (e.g., 1999, 2006), of Pierre bourdieu’s 
concept of “fields of cultural production,” and to C.C. Lee for his argument 
for grounded, culturally nuanced studies that dignify rather than elide di-
versity; indeed, this chapter is intended as complement (as well as compli-
ment) to theirs.
Fields as Arenas for Action
if my discussion begins as a rejoinder to conventional definitions and goals 
of social science as represented by berger and Chafee, these reservations 
are by no means original. the fine tradition in this vein reached a kind of 
fervor in the early 1970s with the turn toward interpretive sociology, re-
flexive anthropology, and other alternatives to the mainstream canon, and 
continues in what arguably has become a more pluralistic, if less combat-
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ive, academic climate today. the communication literature likewise is full 
of caveats arising from the “ferment in the field” of the 1970s, the trans- 
continental influence of cultural studies and, more recently, the interest in 
alternatives to anglo- american constructions of media and journalism. yet 
the fact that, even today, these trends typically are framed as critiques is 
indicative of how entrenched the natural sciences model remains.
in his best- known treatise, giddens (1984) provides one of the stron-
gest rejections of the natural science template, arguing for dispensing with 
a search for stable laws and even generalizations in the human realm. for 
him, social theory should refer to a mode of analysis that revolves around 
“conceptions of human being and human doing, social reproduction and 
social transformation” (p. xx). his substitute for the aim of establishing and 
validating generalizations is what he calls structuration, or analysis that 
hinges on the interactions of human agency and social structure. this is 
theory in the sense of conceptual assumptions about how the world works, 
rather than propositions to be tested. it is theory as starting point rather 
than outcome. it begs the question of why or whether we should call it the-
ory at all, as opposed to, say, approach or framework or guiding premise. by 
whatever name, giddens’s interest in how social actors assert autonomy of 
action within the mechanics of power, as well as his emphasis on empirical 
study in particular spheres of meaning and action, are of direct relevance 
to those of us who study media production.
bourdieu (1993) developed the idea of fields of production with refer-
ence to social spaces within which cultural producers operate. a field is 
a “space of possibles” (p. 176) where specialized agents and institutions 
interact to preserve or transform the established order. and while external 
configurations exert influence upon fields, these spaces in themselves allow 
for degrees of autonomy. externally, economic or political forces, histori-
cal events or technological developments may contribute to expanding or 
circumscribing the elastic range of possibilities; while within a field, actors 
operating from various positions with variably distributed interests and re-
sources interact in ways that may fortify established possibilities, promote 
emerging innovations, or yield new creations.
it seems to me that giddens and bourdieu have, if different languages, 
similar understandings of social actors at the individual level. giddens sees 
“lay” people, meaning non- scholars who are the subjects as opposed to 
the conductors of research, as skilled and knowledgeable about their own 
behavior; bourdieu sees the specialized producers he studies as strategic 
and purposive. their formulations rest on sophisticated interpretations of 
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agency that consider conscious action as well as the unconscious, intent as 
well as unintended consequences.
fields are oriented around particular stakes and a structured set of posi-
tions; occupants holding those positions have varying resources and incli-
nations, and engage in strategic struggles to define and redefine the stakes. 
fields have varying degrees of autonomy, a field’s boundaries are fluid, and 
any field is interdependent with other fields (Warde, 2004). bourdieu’s 
concept of “habitus” resonates with giddens’s focus on “routine” as inte-
gral to day- to- day practices that go into the reproduction of social systems. 
they share the conviction that social systems structure possibilities for ac-
tion, while action in turn creates and conditions social structures.
as hesmondhalgh observes (2006, p. 216), bourdieu provides an al-
ternative to “naïve notions of creative freedom and innovation,” and the 
same may be said for giddens. structuration is based on the conviction 
that the dynamics of human affairs entails give and take across levels of 
activity, from the workings of the individual mind to the most macroscopic 
of societal forces; and analysis of fields of production calls attention to 
articulation among the different levels as well as among different fields. 
as ryfe notes (2006, p. 207, citing benson), journalism is unique in play-
ing a mediating role with respect to other social fields; for this reason, he 
argues, the field of news production is especially subject to influences from 
contiguous fields.
these ideas provide a fruitful framework for studying media produc-
tion that is rooted in the particular, an approach consistent with the an-
thropological imperative of attending to context. to geertz (1973), culture 
is context; his admonition to focus the microscope ever more closely on 
the phenomena under scrutiny underscores the importance of precision 
in deciphering meaning within an enveloping culture. the objective is not 
causal attribution, but rather grounded explanation. this mode of inquiry 
lends itself to pursuit of questions of “how” and “why” with respect to par-
ticular constellations of actors within particular institutional configurations 
at particular confluences of space and time— suggesting the interdisciplin-
ary importance of geography, history, and biography. it also invites study 
of patterns of change within bounded yet permeable social systems— the 
attempt to track how and why things that used to work that way came to 
work this way, and what changed within and among the moving parts to 
reconfigure outcomes and consequences.
such a framework has helpful implications for research questions and 
study design (e.g., Kunelius & ruusunoksa, 2008) and is no less useful as a 
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guide for re- analysis of completed studies. the recognition of degrees of 
autonomy within fields, with attention to enabling mechanisms working at 
multiple levels and in multiple directions, calls for examination of how so-
cial spaces for doing media work may expand or contract; and much of the 
empirical research on Chinese media production from recent years casts 
light on this very issue.
Surveying the Field of Chinese News
the once exceedingly small window on mass media in the People’s repub-
lic of China has expanded steadily with increased scholarly access from the 
1980s on, and the literature continues to grow in volume, ambition, and 
sophistication (see Polumbaum, 2010). this essay revisits empirical studies 
of newswork in China published in english during the first, quite produc-
tive, decade of this century.
regardless of stated theoretical approaches or objectives, most authors 
of this scholarship share an interest in social change and generally agree 
on its potential sources: state, market, media occupations, and audience in-
fluences. Methodologies vary, with field studies yielding the most produc-
tive findings about journalists and their practices, while content analysis 
continues to be used (not always wisely, sometimes well) as a basis for in-
ference about practice. fieldwork consistently identifies negotiation, im-
provisation, and even guile as important dynamics of the news production 
process. scholars differ, however, on which actors exercise agency in ways 
that make a difference, and which benefit from the results, in both short and 
long terms. traversing this literature with these discrepancies in mind helps 
identify the range of the possible and provides markers for further research.
among the work that explicitly considers interactions of structure and 
agency, Pan (2000) views journalists as “entrepreneurial actors” who avail 
themselves of tensions between political controls and market freedoms 
to improvise and innovate in a manner that is reconfiguring institutional 
space differentially in different regions. akhavan- Majid (2004) suggests 
that official and unofficial agents have collaborative interests in state policy 
initiatives that have enabled non- state agents to engage in “creative rene-
gotiation and expansion,” contributing to mass media reform. she identi-
fies the replacement of ideology by pragmatism, the shift in authorities’ 
operational emphasis from “ideological supervision” to “entrepreneurial 
collaboration,” and common interests in media profitability in an increas-
ingly commercial system as beneficial to these diverse categories of actors.
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hu (2003) discerns an intertwining of political and economic forces in 
the restructuring of media, with the establishment of media conglomerates 
fortifying the alliance between sources of capital and sources of political 
power. Lee, he, and huang (2006, 2007) have gone the furthest in docu-
menting the complicity of state and media agents and institutions, finding 
accommodation at many levels that ultimately serves both political and 
economic power.
tilt and Xiao (2010), in a content analysis of coverage of the 2005 son-
ghua river chemical spill, supply further evidence that Chinese media are 
not homogeneous. “We were quite surprised to find CCtv, a huge news 
organization that is technically still owned and operated by the central 
government, airing news segments that exposed and condemned a major 
government cover- up,” they write. they attribute CCtv’s evident abil-
ity to control coverage of this story to greater financial independence— 
and suggest that increasingly even state- run news organizations inhabit a 
growing social sphere of collective interest between the state and informal 
society. sullivan and Xie (2009) find preliminary evidence that commu-
nication about environmental activism on the internet draws in diverse 
actors, including both unofficial and state, interrelating both informally 
and formally around various objectives in complex online social networks.
such findings dovetail with some of the political science literature on 
China, such as the work of Mertha (2009), who argues that a system he 
characterizes as “fragmented authoritarianism” is becoming surprisingly 
pluralized, with what he calls “policy entrepreneurs”— including from the 
media— gaining access to policy processes. in the field of hydropower de-
velopment, he gives examples of how interests among various agents can 
converge in a serendipitous manner, with media outlets and individual me-
dia producers playing an important role in the forging and recognition of 
shared interests.
While absolutist constructions of totalistic state control over media 
have been largely abandoned, some studies suggest that China’s media suc-
cumb to direct political pressure on certain subjects and at certain times 
(Chen, 2005; e. Zhang & fleming, 2005). Pugsley (2006) adds the twist of 
narrative analysis, finding that in times of controversy or crisis the Chinese 
news media give voice to officially constructed stories in culturally familiar 
ways. Zhang (2006) likewise concludes that political power governs the 
construction of current affairs programs to a greater extent during crisis. 
however, tong (2007) suggests somewhat the opposite: that controversial 
events can provide openings for assertive journalistic practice. tong (2009) 
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also argues that journalists’ strategic editing of reports on politically sen-
sitive topics helps further the prospects for publication of controversial 
news.
More commonly, scholars see a chronic tug- of- war between media and 
the state that spawns various configurations of benefits for opposing par-
ties. huang (2003, 2007) emphasizes the idea of adaptation within fairly 
strong structural determinants, and discerns that the pragmatic requisites 
of absorbing private, including foreign, capital as well as managerial needs 
have spurred transition to a “capitalist corporation” model of media that 
is still politically and financially state- controlled. yet he maintains that 
greater structural diversity and openness in the media market also will pro-
mote journalistic professionalism and deter corruption. Wang (2010) finds 
that local journalists, while respecting explicit boundaries, actively employ 
a variety of “strategies for mild resistance” vis- à- vis government pressures.
Lin Jie (2004), offering a Chinese media producer’s perspective while 
a neiman fellow on leave from her producer job at CCtv, characterizes 
state and profession as pitted against each other in trying to leverage advan-
tages through the market. “as a special force functioning in an overlapping 
area of political and economic realms, China’s media now seem to stand 
at a critical point,” she writes; “the more the government allows or even 
encourages the media to perform as a commercial unit, the more certain 
will it raise unavoidable and crucial challenges to the current political struc-
ture.” Meanwhile, she suggests, a kind of accommodation has emerged in 
which the Chinese government’s “optimistic” belief that media content can 
be separated from media management is working out quite well.
Chan (2002, 2007) suggests the state is the more agile agent in these 
times; he sees media organizations as compliant in the service of exercis-
ing ideological hegemony by using ever more subtle and flexible meth-
ods. stockmann (2010), studying beijing residents’ views on anti- Japanese 
protests in the spring of 2005, identifies a kind of “outsourcing” of media 
control to the market— as long as the commercialized press is reflecting 
government views. her view is that commercialization actually promotes 
the state’s ability to influence public opinion through the mass media.
in her empirically rich thesis on China’s television industry, Xu (2010) 
finds that new central government policies and practices have shifted pro-
duction risks to independent tv producers, who engage in a variety of 
cautious negotiating strategies that result in ideologically safe content. 
she concludes that commercialization, channel specialization, and other 
reforms promoted by the state since China’s admission to the World trade 
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organization have not attenuated state control, and in some respects have 
strengthened it.
hassid (2008) cautions against regarding Chinese journalists as either 
an arm of the party- state institutional structure or as advocates for citi-
zens’ interests, calling them “contentious actors in their own right.” he, 
too, however, identifies the push for journalistic independence from the 
state as a primary dynamic, working against political and economic exter-
nalities. his study is problematic in that it relies for evidence mainly on 
high- profile episodes of journalistic resistance, not on original fieldwork; 
his examples do, however, lead him to conclude that “purely structural ap-
proaches” to understanding politics are insufficient.
the difficulty of disentangling state forces from market forces emerges 
in Xin’s (2006) examination of the Xinhua news agency. this study finds 
that competition from other outlets has forced what was once an exclusive 
state- sponsored content provider into a strategy of diversification, and thus 
the ostensibly official news service has transformed itself from an appa-
ratus of the propaganda system into a client- oriented operation in which 
newspapers and other entities using its services have gained leverage. in 
such a struggle within the field of news production, political and economic 
interests simultaneously are in cahoots and at odds not only among organi-
zational actors but also within these very organizations.
Zhao (2000) envisions a multifaceted strategic alliance represented by 
“watchdog journalism” that ultimately, and most importantly, strengthens 
the power of the state. in her analysis, investigative reporting has emerged 
primarily from party and state imperatives to “reassert control over a dys-
functional bureaucracy” and reinforce the central leadership’s legitimacy, 
while also serving journalists’ professional interests and media organiza-
tion’s commercial interests.
huang dan (2011) similarly sees the policy of “supervision by pub-
lic opinion” (yulun jiandu) as an instrument extended by the party- state 
to facilitate administrative effectiveness and promote legitimacy. huang’s 
analysis of the ostensibly hard- hitting tv news program, China Central 
television’s Focus, finds its content aligned with party and government in-
terests. the watchdog mission does provide some space for criticism as 
well as for promoting technical aspects of journalistic professionalism; but 
at bottom, what seems to favor journalistic autonomy and independence 
is merely “strategic rhetoric,” huang writes. in sum, “the media’s ability 
to serve as a check on power is a mechanism for self- adjustment and self- 
improvement within the established power structure” (p. 110).
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in contrast, tong and sparks (2009) see institutionalized practices of 
journalistic investigation as primarily market- driven, and secondarily un-
dergirded by a developing professional ideology among journalists. tong 
(2010), further qualifying premises of centralized media control and con-
fluence of interest between political and economic power, casts central au-
thorities in a curiously progressive role versus elites at the local level who 
collude to counteract central policies.
sun’s (2006) case study of contention over supervision of a town tv 
station offers more nuanced distinctions for understanding state actors, 
finding a loss of central authority as local governments at different levels 
prove capable of manipulating the media market in their own interests. 
dispersal of control and juggling of interests emerge again in sun’s (2010) 
examination of “public opinion supervision,” in which government, com-
mercial media, and journalists form strategic relationships premised on as-
sessments of risks and gains.
Pugsley (2010), reviewing the succession of high- profile news stories 
emerging from China during 2008— the olympics (a “celebratory media 
event”), the tibet disturbances and torch relay demonstrations (“con-
flicted” media events), the sichuan earthquake (disaster), and tainted milk 
(scandal)— asserts that international news flows have attenuated CCtv’s 
role as “central gatekeeper” for news coverage, making it harder for the 
Chinese state to control the broadcast of media events. however, he main-
tains that the state still defines and regulates “cultural forms and practices” 
shaping national culture as reflected in domestic media.
these statements may seem self- evident, but they find considerable 
qualification in Chin’s (2011) study of central government efforts to facili-
tate the entry of overseas tv programming into China from 2000 to 2008. 
the empirical evidence reveals complex and subtle interactions between 
provincial- level authorities, national policymakers, and other actors, with 
different parties exploiting their own points of leverage. Policy is initiated 
from the top, Chin observes, whereupon the central authorities face a deli-
cate balancing act, relying on lower levels for management and sanctions 
while also trying to prevent abuse of this ceded administrative flexibility. 
Provincial officials and broadcasters, meanwhile, intervene during policy 
implementation and revision in ways that may stymie central government 
objectives. in guangdong, Chin finds, provincial interests countered cen-
tral policy by promoting stricter barriers to access, more extensive regula-
tion, and other measures, including blocking signals, with the aim of fend-
ing off domination of the local media market by overseas tv.
Mass communication research typically distinguishes reception from 
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production for purposes of both theorizing and empirical study. Concep-
tualizing media production as a field, however, requires integral consider-
ation of the audience dimension. ryfe (2006, p. 206) makes the case well: 
“because it sits between social actors, the news is especially sensitive to the 
shared, constitutive commitments of its community of readers. More sim-
ply, the news takes it shape in large part from the public it serves.”
among China scholars who underscore the role of audiences in shaping 
news production and product, Zhang (2000) proposes that changes in the 
official ideological positioning of media audiences, coupled with commer-
cialization, have created new institutional space for the flexing of journalis-
tic muscles as well as new managerial methods. sun, Chang, and yu (2001) 
suggest the importance of audience in the marketplace helps explain why 
market- oriented media are on the rise as official party organs flounder. 
although these examples incorporate audience into the analysis, empiri-
cal studies probing the audience- producer interrelationship in the Chinese 
context have yet to be devised.
as a side note, the desirability of research designs that gauge actual 
practices (as opposed to self- reports) is reinforced by a number of caution-
ary studies revealing disjunctures between attitudes and action. de burgh 
(2003) found that hangzhou tv reporters’ beliefs about journalists’ social 
responsibilities were not manifested in actual news reports. on the basis of 
a survey of guangzhou journalists, Lin fen (2010) identifies both changing 
demographics and new “complexity” in journalists’ attitudes and behavior 
arising from the combination of party values and professional values. in 
general, she says, journalists tend to be “inactively liberal”— in particular, 
despite liberal beliefs, professional agency seldom emerges in actual cover-
age of political, cultural, or moral issues.
Cumulatively, such empirical studies can further the larger project of 
explaining how the journalistic field interacts with other fields, includ-
ing political, economic, legal, and technological fields; and elucidate how 
changes in adjoining fields might impinge upon, interpenetrate, alter, com-
pete with, or otherwise disturb the field of journalistic production in ways 
that modify news practices and products and realign public constructions 
of meaning (benson, 1999; Peterson & anand, 2004). unsurprisingly, as 
internet penetration advances and electronic modes of communication 
grow in volume, variety, and salience, researchers have turned increasing 
attention to media technologies. to date, however, few studies from the 
Chinese context shed light on how technology might figure in the news 
production mix.
he and Zhu (2002), employing “ecology” and “virtual community” as 
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organizing concepts in an early study of online editions of Chinese news-
papers, provide a start with their attempt to forecast the prospects for on-
line papers in light of social factors interacting with telecommunications 
infrastructure and formal characteristics of new communication technolo-
gies. at the time, they judge online editions not yet viable in light of weak 
and primitive infrastructure, uneven distribution, and excessive cost to 
consumers in conjunction with political and social constraints; and attri-
bute the content homogeneity of print and online editions to similar fac-
tors. the study sets a good example in its endeavor to integrate technology 
into a larger picture, even if the pace of internet development in China has 
superseded the findings.
Xin’s (2010) study of interactions between conventional news media and 
“citizen journalism” from blogs and other informal channels yields fairly 
predictable findings— that netizen accounts are an increasingly important 
news source for mainstream outlets in China as well as constituting an 
alternative conduit for information, while party controls still shape public 
use of the Web. More noteworthy is attention to the element of interactiv-
ity, which is certainly vital to understanding how technology alters the in-
teractions of audiences and producers in the new media environment, and 
thus germane to studying restructuring of the field of news production.
an additional caveat against ascribing too much potency to grassroots 
media activity comes from Pugsley (2010), whose study of Chinese cover-
age of major domestic news events during 2008 suggests the state main-
tains overall hegemony over media culture even as global influences erode 
aspects of state control. in this context, he cautions that the role of citizen 
journalists should not be over- estimated given their limited “ability to cre-
ate ongoing networks of dependable news- gathering.”
examining joint ventures in China’s internet industry, Weber and Jia 
(2007) do not address news media per se, but their findings nevertheless are 
suggestive for understanding changes in fields of media production, espe-
cially the element of self- restraint. their focus is the fast- growing online 
entertainment sector, in the service of which state media employ what they 
call “strategic commercialization,” an approach intended to elicit maximum 
returns through appeals to consumer audiences. the strategy includes co- 
production arrangements and importation of cultural content, encourag-
ing domestic internet portals to make cooperative deals with global media 
firms for developing online services and products. Case studies of several 
such joint ventures suggest that the most successful hinge on “targeted” 
entertainment provision, with technology coordinated with content needs.
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the authors highlight that local partners almost invariably have signed 
an official “pledge” that includes the promise to conform to government 
content restrictions. such self- regulation, they say, insulates foreign opera-
tors from content control issues and puts the onus on domestic service pro-
viders. in other words, self- regulatory provisions limit foreign investors’ 
perceived risks and make partnerships more attractive, while enlisting the 
complicity of domestic firms in facilitating state influence and control, thus 
promoting state interests in both economic and political realms.
Weber and Jia, in identifying points of articulation between domestic 
and global agents along with related interactions among domestic enti-
ties, link the local with the global in a way that illuminates process as well 
as product. studies such as this help point the way for scholars trying to 
make connections between the local and the global in an accessible and 
measurable manner. it is tempting to seek explanations for local- global 
interactions at high levels of abstraction. yet, along with C.C. Lee in this 
volume, i would argue that closely focused local studies remain essential 
for understanding the workings of the global system.
a primary concern of globalization studies has been the question of 
cultural integrity— that is, the ability of national cultures to resist the on-
slaught of american or Western culture. Knight (2006), in an insightful 
essay on globalization’s implications for China, calls for much greater pre-
cision regarding sources of cultural authority, and his reasoning further 
accents the importance of localized study: “so- called ‘national’ cultures are 
very likely to be constructed and maintained by national governments in 
the attempt to instil in their often culturally diverse populations a unified 
national consciousness that will deliver political unity and loyalty to the 
state. Consequently, these fragile politically constructed national cultures 
may well be more subject to the erosive effects of globalisation than cul-
tures attached to particular locations and communities, where the linkage 
of place and culture remains strong. the impact of globalisation is likely to 
be different at these different levels” (p. 4).
Zhu (2001) distinguishes “theorizing” and “indigenizing” approaches 
to research on Chinese mass communication, defined respectively by their 
pursuit of the universal versus the unique, and favors research strategies 
that integrate both. Lee (2004) has called for developing theoretical vi-
sions from China’s cultural specifics. both are eloquent calls for knitting 
local study with attempts to fathom the workings of human society more 
broadly. and the inescapable recognition that China is ever more entwined 
with transnational movements of goods, people, ideas, information, money, 
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and all the other elements propelling globalization means that China can 
never be considered in isolation; this applies to rural interior China as 
much as to the metropolises. Making empirical linkages between fields of 
media production with this larger set of externalities is surely one of the 
greatest challenges facing international communication scholars.
On Staying Grounded, Flexible, and Good- Humored
i have attempted to show how an approach inspired by giddens’s concept 
of structuration and bourdieu’s notion of fields of media production can 
help us sort out the wide range of empirical findings emerging from the 
Chinese newswork context as well as contributing to formulation of future 
studies. i have also expressed common cause with scholars who emphasize 
closely focused grounded study. in furtherance of this project, and by way 
of conclusion, i would offer two additional guiding concepts for interna-
tional communication research: circumstances and serendipity. finally i pro-
pose a third, optional but highly recommended, principle: whimsy.
the literature spurring this tripartite formulation comes not from the 
field of communication, nor from social theory, but rather from manage-
ment and organization studies. it is nearly four decades since organizational 
theorists Cohen, March, and olsen (1972) introduced what has become a 
classic, if still- debated, rejoinder to scholarship premised on assumptions 
of regularity and rationality in human systems with their article “a gar-
bage Can Model of organizational Choice.” their purpose was to explain 
decision making in organizations characterized by fluid participation, shift-
ing technologies, and changing objectives, which are “characteristic of any 
organization in part— part of the time” but “particularly conspicuous in 
public, educational, and illegitimate organizations,” they explained (p. 1).
Within organizations, they proposed, decisions arise from interplay 
among numerous factors that combine in unpredictable ways. these fac-
tors, furthermore, consist of “streams” of ingredients— specifically, flows 
of choices, problems, solutions, and participants with varying degrees of 
involvement. “from this point of view,” they wrote, “an organization is a 
collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for 
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for is-
sues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for 
work” (p. 2).
the garbage can analogy was not meant to be pejorative; rather, it sup-
plied an easily grasped metaphor for a messy conjuncture of phenomena. 
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the authors concluded that, while their garbage can process was not par-
ticularly successful in resolving problems, it did enable choices to be made 
and problems to be addressed in ambiguous and variable environments. 
the model, as olsen later summarized (2001, p. 193), “views organizational 
life as highly contextual, driven primarily by timing and coincidence.”
these scholars have since extended their work (e.g., March & olsen, 
1989, 1995) into larger institutional realms of governance, democracy, the 
military, and the nature of national, regional, and international political or-
ders, promoting an approach known as the “new institutionalism.” a hand-
ful of media scholars have applied the new institutionalism to news pro-
duction to explain phenomena such as content homogeneity across news 
organizations (Cook, 2006) and the sometimes surprising counterpoint, 
content variability (ryfe, 2006).
Concerns at the institutional level may eclipse quixotic explanations of 
decision making within single organizations, but the fundamental posture 
expressed in the garbage can model endures: human affairs are best under-
stood not as outcomes of rational calculations and orderly processes but 
rather as historically contingent and socially emergent. from this perspec-
tive, distinctive socio- cultural understandings govern action, while socially 
constructed rules and practices themselves are continually molded through 
interactions and experience, and institutional structures are created, main-
tained, and transformed in interplay with multiple interests, changing re-
sources, and twists of history.
With circumstances and serendipity as operative concepts, the garbage 
can model and its institutional augmentations are suggestive for the study 
of media, including comparative and transnational media research. the 
scheme originates from a certain kind of setting (fluid) with the presence of 
certain factors (choices, problems, solutions, participants), presenting iden-
tifiable, describable circumstances. and interactions among the key factors, 
producing not particularly efficient or sensible outcomes, are animated by 
serendipity— not pure chance or luck, but rather a mix that creates op-
portunity for those opportunely positioned (see golin, 1957; also Zilber, 
tuval- Mashiach, & Lieblich, 2008).
Circumstances are “facts on the ground,” practices and routines, behav-
iors and actions, comportment and relationships, by and among agencies 
of human society, from individual actors to encompassing structures. they 
are the stuff of description, but also the basic ingredients of any social con-
figuration. serendipity, a term often found in accounts of scientific discov-
ery, refers to how circumstances combine and interact in ways that agents 
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who don’t control this confluence may nonetheless avail themselves of op-
portunities thus created. it is the stuff of explanation and analysis. these 
terms in themselves do not suggest theories or models; rather, they offer 
organizing principles for how to approach the challenges of social research. 
they also should help call attention to culturally revealing anomalies, ex-
ceptions, and outliers, which conventional social science is apt to discard. 
for the most vivid exaggerations or egregious departures from “normality” 
may be significant cultural markers in their own way, no less important 
than the common patterns and prevailing standards that fill the bell of the 
normal curve.
for scholars whose pride does not prevent playfulness, the garbage can 
model also suggests a third principle— that of whimsy. in their original 
1972 article, evidently in anticipation of those who might question the seri-
ousness of their intent, Cohen, March, and olsen translated the model into 
quantitative form for computer simulation (employing the programming 
language current at the time, fortran), a touch that seemed to offer assur-
ances of rigor and sobriety. but in the main narrative, the authors clearly 
were happy to sound a bit silly by using an everyday object as theoretical 
terminology— betraying, i would hope, a general commitment to levity as 
a stimulus for discussion and discovery.
responding to a dissection of the garbage can model long after the 
original article’s publication (bendor, 2001), we find reaffirmation of this 
propensity from olsen (2001, p. 192), who likens what he viewed as the 
critics’ lack of imagination to “the grumbling of humorless people who 
accidentally wander into the lively part of town.” ultimately, whimsy is a 
property of the scholar’s disposition, and might be seen as a call for mod-
esty in the purported understandings we assert for our work.
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Translation, Communication,  
and East- West Understanding
Zhang Longxi
as human beings, we are all born in medias res, that is, in a particular social, 
historical, and political environment with a particular language and a cul-
ture already in place before and after us. that pre- given environment and 
our upbringing determine the native language we speak, our social customs 
and cultural values, our basic points of view, our horizon of understand-
ing, and our sense of belonging or identity. such predetermined elements 
obtain in individual lives as well as in social fabrics, in the positions taken 
and choices made by individuals, groups, communities, and nations. that 
is to say, all human beings start out to be terribly parochial. the wonder-
ful thing about being human, however, lies precisely in the capability to 
transcend our self- enclosures on the individual level and to go beyond the 
social enclaves on the level of communities and nations. Parochialism and 
cosmopolitanism, nationalist tendencies and cross- cultural openness are 
forces that contend constantly, and human life is always a process of nego-
tiation that tries to keep a delicate balance.
it is almost “natural” to tip the balance toward the parochial, while the 
cultivation of a cosmopolitan spirit and openness of the mind requires a lot 
of effort. border- crossing in languages and cultures is indeed a distinctly 
human act, an indication of a person’s level of education and ability, and 
therefore of his or her social standing. this is true not only of a person 
in our time, but has been true almost since time immemorial. those who 
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can translate different languages and thereby help others get out of their 
linguistic and cultural cocoons are endowed with a special talent, and were 
even thought of in earlier times as in possession of some sort of a magic 
power. translation has always served to make communication possible. if 
we consider the greek assimilation of elements of egyptian culture, the 
greek and roman interrelations, the contribution of arabic scholarship to 
the Latin Middle ages and the renaissance, and the introduction of bud-
dhist texts from india to China and east asia, we realize that translation 
was happening very early in human history, and that it has always played a 
significant role in the expansion of knowledge, the conceptualization of the 
world, and the development of human civilization.
the notion of the world has developed gradually as human knowledge 
increases. in ancient times, the idea of the world was limited geographi-
cally, linguistically, and culturally. in the part of the world we now call east 
asia, the concept of tian xia or “all under heaven” was a sinocentric world 
with the Chinese language and culture as major sources of reference, which 
hardly had any knowledge of or contact with europe. the early european 
concept of the world, on the other hand, was largely influenced by the bib-
lical understanding of how noah and his descendants populated the differ-
ent parts of the postdiluvian earth. the medieval european mappa mundi or 
the t- o map had only a very rough idea of the world with europe on the 
left side, africa on the right, and asia on top of the t. What was thought 
of as asia was a vague idea of india. it was Marco Polo (1254?– 1325?) in 
the late thirteenth century with his famous travelogue that expanded eu-
ropean knowledge of the world and provided information for many of the 
place names and their locations in the east. for example, the well- known 
Catalan map (1375) evidently used Marco Polo’s book as a major source 
of information. as John Larner (1999, p. 105) remarks, Marco Polo gave 
europe “an amazing gift, a geographical treatise of a vast extent and com-
plexity, an unparalleled opening of horizons.” Marco Polo left venice as 
a young man, following his father and uncle to China as merchants. the 
China he came to know was under the rule of Kublai Khan as emperor of 
the yuan dynasty, namely a Mongolian empire that provided him with very 
little opportunity to get in contact with the majority han Chinese and 
their culture. that may explain why there are so many things that modern 
readers identify as typically Chinese— for example, Confucianism, writing 
brush and calligraphy, tea drinking, chopsticks, women’s bound feet, the 
great Wall of China— are hardly observed and commented on by Marco 
Polo, or not mentioned at all in his book. some have thus questioned the 
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veracity of his account (Wood, 1995; yang, 1999). for europe, then, as 
Larner argues, Marco Polo’s significant contribution lies in the discovery 
of the world, the increase of geographical knowledge to include east asia.
for cultural encounters between the east and the West, it took another 
three hundred years to start in earnest when Matteo ricci (1552– 1610), 
another italian, went to China as a Christian missionary in the late six-
teenth century. When ricci and the other Jesuit missionaries arrived in 
China of the late Ming dynasty, they found a country with a long history, a 
thriving economy, a sophisticated culture, and a rich intellectual tradition. 
the Jesuits realized that they could not simply declare that the Chinese 
had no culture, offer to teach them the spiritual truth of the revealed re-
ligion, and convert tens of millions of them into Christians overnight. so 
they adopted the so- called accommodation approach in their missionary 
work: they learned the Chinese language and tried to find concepts and 
terms in ancient Chinese writings that might be used to translate Christian 
ideas, and presented themselves as learned scholars from the West, trying 
to impress the Chinese emperor and the literati- officials with the latest 
european science and technology. ricci wrote his Christian doctrine in 
Chinese, Tianzhu shiyi or the True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, and trans-
lated the first six books of euclid’s Elements into Chinese in collaboration 
with Xu guangqi (1562– 1633), a high- ranking official at the Ming court 
and one of the most important Christian converts. the Jesuit “accommo-
dation approach” and the translation activities they engaged in certainly 
had a religious agenda and ultimately aimed to convert the Chinese to 
Christianity; at the same time, however, these were also significant efforts 
at cross- cultural understanding at a time when the east and the West first 
came into contact and tried to find some common ground for understand-
ing and communication.
the Jesuit fathers also introduced Chinese culture, particularly Con-
fucianism, to europe. in numerous letters, treatises, and pamphlets, China 
became quite well known among european intellectuals through the me-
diation of Jesuit missionaries, whose interpretation of Confucian moral 
and political philosophy made a strong impact in europe, drawing atten-
tion from such leading philosophers as gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and 
voltaire. if Marco Polo initiated an “unparalleled opening of horizons” in 
medieval europe, Matteo ricci and his followers certainly further opened 
those horizons and deepened european understanding of China and the 
east. in material culture, imported Chinese goods such as porcelain, silk, 
wallpaper, furniture, and the art of gardening already created a craze for 
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things Chinese in europe during the seventeenth and the eighteenth cen-
turies, an infatuation with what was thought to be Chinese in european 
imagination, or what is known as chinoiserie, which, as hugh honour 
(1961, pp. 7– 8) argues, “may be defined as the expression of the european 
vision of Cathay.”
the significant presence of China in europe, however, was not lim-
ited just in material culture and popular imagination, but also, and perhaps 
more important, in the area of cultural influence and social implications. 
the Jesuits’ positive representation of China as a well- governed country, 
based on natural theology, helped many european thinkers of the enlight-
enment to reflect on secular culture, meritocracy, and civil service based 
on a system of civil examination. the secular orientation of Confucianism 
suggested to enlightenment philosophers the separation of church and the 
state, an important concept for the modern nation- state. the examination 
system through which learned scholars were recruited and assigned gov-
ernment offices was extremely attractive to intellectuals in europe, where 
social mobility was severely limited under the hereditary system of aris-
tocratic lineage. as adolf reichwein (1925, p. 26) argued many years ago, 
the eighteenth century was the time of the first “metaphysical contact” 
between China and the West, and philosophers such as Leibniz and vol-
taire found in China and Confucian philosophy “a vision of happy living 
such as their own optimism had already dreamed of.” indeed, reichwein 
(1925, p. 77) declares, “Confucius became the patron saint of eighteenth- 
century enlightenment. only through him could it find a connection link 
with China.” the enthusiasm about China and Confucianism can be seen 
in Leibniz’s (1994, p. 51) spirited proposal that the europeans “need mis-
sionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of 
natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology.” 
for Leibniz (1994, p. 45), it was almost a divine plan that China and eu-
rope should have developed such different but equally great civilizations 
at the opposite ends of the world “so that as the most civilized and distant 
peoples stretch out their arms to each other, those in between may gradu-
ally be brought to a better way of life.” thus, with very different agendas 
and ideological orientations, the Jesuit missionaries and the enlighten-
ment philosophers all believed in, and promoted, mutual understanding 
between the east and the West.
that cosmopolitan spirit, the idea that different peoples at great dis-
tance from one another with very different cultures and histories can un-
derstand each other and be brought together to form a common human-
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ity, had a major influence in eighteenth- century european thinking. for 
the enlightenment philosophers, the positive image of China as a country 
built on reason rather than religious faith had important implications for 
the secularization of european life. the Catholic Church, however, saw 
the secularizing tendency as a threat and did not appreciate the Jesuit pre-
sentation of a pagan country and a pagan culture in such a positive light. 
shortly after ricci’s death, a heated debate known as the “Chinese rites 
controversy” flared up within the Catholic Church in the seventeenth and 
the early eighteenth centuries, in which the doctrinaire purists condemned 
the Jesuit “accommodation approach” for giving too many concessions to 
the language and culture of a pagan people. Whether Chinese converts to 
Christianity should be allowed to continue performing the rites of “ances-
tor worship,” or paying homage to Confucius in the Confucian temples, 
became hotly contended issues. there was also the terminology debate, 
namely, whether the Chinese language could have terms to translate the 
Christian concepts of god, angels, and the other spiritual truths. in his 
study of that rites controversy, the french sinologist Jacques gernet pres-
ents the purist argument that the Christian spiritual concepts and terms 
are indeed untranslatable into a pagan language like Chinese and, more 
fundamentally, they are not even conceivable in the Chinese mind. the 
Chinese converts had no real understanding of the truth of Christianity, 
and “where they appear to speak of our god and his angels,” as gernet 
(1985, p. 33) quotes the franciscan father antonio de Caballero saying, 
“they are merely aping the truth.” niccolò Longobardi, another purist 
opposed to ricci’s views, claimed that “the Chinese have never known any 
spiritual substance distinct from matter” (gernet, 1985, p. 203). eventu-
ally, the Jesuit “accommodation approach” was considered unacceptable, 
and the use of Chinese terms for translating god and other such concepts 
was forbidden; “the terms heaven (tian) and sovereign on high had to be 
condemned,” as gernet (1985, pp. 31– 32) observes, “by Pope Clement Xi 
in 1704 and 1715.” What comes out of the Chinese rites controversy is thus 
a dichotomous view of China and europe that sees the east and the West 
in a set of opposite concepts, terms, categories, and values.
such a dichotomous view created in “the missionary beginnings of euro-
pean sinology,” as haun saussy (1993, p. 36) argues, still influences modern 
Western views of China. for example, seeing the Chinese rites controversy 
as a cultural conflict, Jacques gernet (1985, p. 3) basically agrees with the 
Catholic purists and traces all the difficulties the missionaries encountered 
in China to a fundamental difference— “not only of different intellectual 
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traditions but also of different mental categories and modes of thought.” in 
his idea of the distinct “modes of thought,” gernet was probably influenced 
by Marcel granet’s (1884– 1940) Pensée chinoise (1934), which described the 
“Chinese way of thinking” as fundamentally different from that of the eu-
ropeans and was in turn influenced by Lucien Lévy- bruhl’s (1857– 1939) 
concept of the collective mentalité, which, according to Lévy- bruhl, each 
people of the world had as a distinct “way of thinking.” gernet not only 
agrees with the purist view of the east- West dichotomy, but he gives that 
dichotomy a metaphysical foundation on the level of thinking and lan-
guage, for he emphasizes the fundamental difference between China and 
the West as a sharp contrast between the Chinese and the indo- european 
languages. “now, a model of a language more different from that of greek, 
Latin or sanskrit cannot be imagined,” says gernet. he describes Chi-
nese as a language without proper grammatical distinctions and therefore 
without the capability to express abstract notions, for “there was no word 
to denote existence in Chinese, nothing to convey the concept of being 
or essence, which in greek is so conveniently expressed by the noun ousia 
or the neuter to on. Consequently, the notion of being, in the sense of an 
eternal and constant reality, above and beyond that which is phenomenal, 
was perhaps more difficult to conceive, for a Chinese” (gernet, 1985, p. 
241). for gernet (1985, p. 244), language and the mode of thinking are in-
terconnected, and the sharp contrast with Chinese “confirms benveniste’s 
analysis: the structure of indo- european languages seems to have helped 
the greek world— and thereafter the Christian one— to conceive the idea 
of realities that are transcendental and immutable as opposed to realities 
which are perceived by the senses and which are transitory.”
here we find a number of themes that are later picked up by other West-
ern scholars, notably françois Jullien, who in his many works reiterated in 
different ways the same dichotomy between greece and China. he argues 
that “China presents a case study through which to contemplate Western 
thought from the outside” (Jullien, 2000, p. 9). this is his invariably re-
peated argument, which comes out rather clearly in the title of his book 
Penser d’un Dehors (la Chine), in which he declares that the only way for an 
european to “go beyond the greek framework” is to take a voyage that is 
“China- bound,” because Chinese is the “only civilization that is recorded 
in substantial texts and whose linguistic and historical genealogy is radi-
cally non- european” (Jullien & Marchaisse, 2000, p. 39). Jonathan spence 
(1998, p. 145) once remarked that to set up “mutually reinforcing images 
and perceptions” of an exotic China “seems to have been a particularly 
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french genius.” that kind of exoticism, however, is certainly not limited 
to the french. developing further the ideas of mentalities and modes of 
thinking, the american scholar richard nisbett (2003, pp. xvi– xvii) sets up 
a sharp contrast between all Westerners with all asians: “human cognition 
is not everywhere the same. first, that members of different cultures differ 
in their ‘metaphysics,’ or fundamental beliefs about the nature of the world. 
second, that the characteristic thought processes of different groups differ 
greatly. third, that the thought processes are of a piece with beliefs about 
the nature of the world: People use the cognitive tools that seem to make 
sense— given the sense they make of the world.” in such a dichotomous 
view, all “Westerners” and all “asians” think differently between them, but 
within the West or asia, people think uniformly in one particular way. that 
is indeed another feature of the east- West dichotomy, namely, differences 
between cultures are overemphasized, while differences within the same 
culture are minimized. the absurdity of this particular view lies in the in-
credibly large concept of homogenous “Westerners” and “asians,” who are 
neatly set up as opposites without internal differences. even more influen-
tial theoretically is the general tendency in contemporary Western scholar-
ship toward an overemphasis on cultural differences and distinct identities. 
We may think of Jacques derrida’s (1976, p. 90) idea of différance and his 
claim that logocentrism is exclusively Western, or Michel foucault’s (1973, 
p. xv) image of China as an incomprehensible heterotopia.1 all these consti-
tute an intellectual environment that makes east- West comparative studies 
difficult, if not impossible, and if there is any effort at comparison at all, the 
emphasis is likely to fall on their differences much more than on any kind 
of similarities, shared values, or affinities.
Like the doctrinaire purists in the “Chinese rites controversy,” some 
modern scholars view the Chinese as materialist without spiritual under-
standing, their mode of thinking concrete rather than abstract, and their 
outlook immanent rather than transcendental. of course, not every sinolo-
gist subscribes to such a dichotomous view, but some do and they have 
exerted a noticeable influence on the way China and the Chinese are un-
derstood in the modern West. again, like the doctrinaire purists in the 
“Chinese rites controversy,” those who see the east and the West as oppo-
sites emphasize the untranslatability of concepts and terms, and the incom-
mensurability of cultural values and ideas. “oh, east is east, and West is 
West, and never the twain shall meet.” these lines by rudyard Kipling, the 
poet of the british empire, are sometimes cited out of context to articulate 
the idea of cultural incommensurability between the east and the West. to 
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quote gernet (1985, p. 239) again, in the Chinese language it is “so difficult 
to express how the abstract and the general differ fundamentally, and not 
just occasionally, from the concrete and the particular” that it became, he 
declares, “an embarrassment for all those who had, in the course of history, 
attempted to translate into Chinese concepts formed in inflected languages 
such as greek, Latin or sanskrit. thus, linguistic structures inevitably pose 
the question of modes of thought.” gernet made this claim despite the fact 
that buddhist sutras in sanskrit were translated into Chinese many centu-
ries ago, but probably he would regard all Chinese translations of sanskrit 
as nothing but distortions and corruptions, in which the pure essence of 
buddhism was forever lost. this is a clear example of how those who see 
east and West as opposites would deny the possibility of translation in 
spite of historical and textual evidence, and how the dichotomous view 
powerfully influences their self- imposed “mode of thinking.” typically, the 
concept of untranslatability is a denial of communication that flies in the 
face of historical facts and textual evidence, for the purist insistence on an 
unadulterated essence is not concerned with the actual translation of texts, 
not even the actual cases of untranslatable words or terms, but the impos-
sibility of understanding and communication on the level of conceptualiza-
tion, the incommensurability of mentalities or mental categories.
among modern critical theories, thomas Kuhn is probably the most 
famous in proposing the incommensurability of different paradigms, which 
made a great impact on the study of philosophy, social sciences, and the 
humanities in general far beyond his original purpose of discussing the 
historical changes in science, or what he calls scientific revolutions. Kuhn 
argues that scientific revolution is a rupture, a complete breakthrough, the 
rise of a new paradigm that displaces the old, and that different paradigms 
are totally incommensurate. scientists operating under different paradigms 
do not speak the same language; indeed, the paradigmatic change is so 
great that “after a revolution,” says Kuhn (1970, p. 135), “scientists work in 
a different world.” for quite some time in the 1970s and after, Kuhn’s con-
cept of radical incommensurability was borrowed to discuss cultures and 
traditions and became highly influential. such borrowing had certain con-
sequences that were not all that positive, because it fed the dichotomous 
view and, as Lindsay Waters (2001, p. 144) puts it, offered the “justification 
for a resurgent tribalism.” in the humanities and social sciences, Kuhn’s 
widely circulated idea became “a perversion of incommensurability,” “the 
key idea that legitimates an identity politics that insists on the impossibil-
ity of thinking across groups.” in its most militant form, “incommensura-
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bility legitimates a blinkered, absolutist, nonpluralist relativism” (Waters, 
2001, p. 145). such social consequences are certainly unintended, but even 
for the history of science, the concept of incommensurability is surely an 
exaggeration, because scientists working under different paradigms, for 
example, the Ptolemaic geocentric view and the Copernican heliocentric 
view, could quarrel over and debate important issues precisely because they 
understood what the other side was proposing as the center of the universe. 
debate is also communication, and it certainly presupposes a language in 
which different views and their very difference can be expressed.
in his later years, Kuhn retreated from his concept of radical incom-
mensurability famously proposed in his book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution, but he still insisted on the concept of untranslatability. he ad-
mits that when scientists working under different paradigms meet, they 
may indeed share most terms and much of the same language, but they 
understand certain terms they use very differently. on the one hand, Kuhn 
(2000, p. 36) allows a common language, and the problem of understanding 
is thus reduced and limited. “only for a small subgroup of (usually inter-
defined) terms and for sentences containing them do problems of translat-
ability arise.” thus, incommensurability is localized as a linguistic prob-
lem, “a claim about language, about meaning change.” on the other hand, 
however, the semantic change of terms can be so drastic that Kuhn (2000, 
p. 93) considers old and new terms to be untranslatable. “incommensura-
bility thus becomes a sort of untranslatability,” he says, “localized to one 
or another area in which two lexical taxonomies differ.” but the difficulty 
of translation, as hilary Putnam (1990, p. 127) argues, “does not mean that 
there is no ‘common language’ in which one can say what the theoretical 
terms of both theories refer to.” as a concept, untranslatability is a pure 
construct, for in reality translation, however difficult, partial, or imperfect 
it may be, has always worked to make human communication possible.
translation does not have to engage two languages, because even un-
derstanding in the same language, as george steiner (1975, p. 47) argues, 
is already translation, while inter- lingual translation is just a “special case of 
the arc of communication which every successful speech- act closes within 
a given language.” steiner uses the term “translation” in a broad sense to 
mean any cognitive or communicative act. “any model of communication 
is at the same time a model of trans- lation, of a vertical or horizontal trans-
fer of significance” (steiner, 1975, p. 45). translation across languages can 
provide a model because it most clearly poses questions of communica-
tion. “on the inter- lingual level, translation will pose concentrated, visibly 
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intractable problems; but these same problems abound, at a more covert 
or conventionally neglected level, intra- lingually . . . inside or between lan-
guages, human communication equals translation” (steiner, 1975, p. 47). thus 
the purist concept of untranslatability is a denial of communication, a 
concept that pulls back toward parochialism, that is, toward the “natural” 
tendencies of inertia and ethnocentrism. “the very aim of translation— to 
open up in writing a certain relation with the other, to fertilize what is 
one’s own through the mediation of what is foreign,” as antoine berman 
(1992, p. 4) argues, “is diametrically opposed to the ethnocentric structure 
of every culture, that species of narcissism by which every society wants to 
be a pure and unadulterated Whole.” indeed, the concept of untranslatabil-
ity is based on nothing but that narcissistic desire of cultural and linguistic 
purity, the ethnocentric illusion that one’s own language and culture are 
unique, superior to, and incomparable with any other.
in a narrow and restricted sense, we all know that certain words and ex-
pressions may indeed be untranslatable because what exists in one language 
may not exist or may not have a close equivalent in another. Many idioms, 
puns, set phrases, jokes, and technical terms are in this sense untranslat-
able, but that technical problem often finds solution in transliterations and 
loan words. this is in fact not the unique problem with translation, for 
the growth of language itself has always been a case of catachresis, that 
is, a process of borrowing from the existing vocabulary to signify what is 
new and unnamed, what steiner calls “transfer of significance.” this is true 
especially of abstract notions and concepts. as giambattista vico (1999, p. 
76) observes, the “property of the human mind is that, when people can 
form no idea of distant and unfamiliar things, they judge them by what is 
present and familiar.” he further points out “the fact that in all languages 
most expressions for inanimate objects employ metaphors derived from 
the human body and its parts, or from human senses and emotions” (vico, 
1999, p. 159). this seems to be the common principle of etymology and 
semantic growth in all languages, that is, to use a familiar term to signify 
something unfamiliar, based on some kind of a relation between the two, 
the known and the unknown, the familiar and the unfamiliar. in an an-
cient Chinese text, the appended words to the Book of Changes, we find a 
remarkably similar formulation of the same principle, where it is said that 
the ancient king Pao Xi invented hexagrams by observing the configura-
tions of heaven and earth and by imitating the pattern of traces left by 
birds and animals on the ground. “by taking hints near at hand from his 
body and farther away from external things, he created hexagrams to make 
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the virtue of gods comprehensible and the nature of all things known in 
signs” (“Zhouyi zhengyi” [the correct meaning of the book of Changes], 
1980, p. 86). this is later understood as the way in which Chinese scripts 
are created as well. that is to say, language and its vocabulary are largely 
metaphorical; they grow by borrowing from their own stock, as it were, 
by transferring the meaning of one word to another. Words are taken out 
on loan not only between languages, as in translation, but within the same 
language as well. that is the reason why george steiner, as we have seen 
above, emphatically asserts that “inside or between languages, human commu-
nication equals translation” (emphasis in original). understanding, transla-
tion, communication— all these acts of cognition are efforts to make sense 
of an original at a remove, to interpret something from the past in our 
present moment, and therefore acts of using one expression to signify an-
other, but not the purist fantasy of reproduction of the original.
in a famous essay on translation, Walter benjamin (1973, p. 70) em-
phatically states that “the translatability of linguistic creations ought to be 
considered even if men should prove unable to translate them.” benjamin 
is speaking on a metaphysical level rather than the level of technical con-
siderations of translation as practice. deeply rooted in Jewish mysticism as 
well as german philosophical idealism, benjamin conceives of translation 
not as a mere rendering of an original foreign work, but as the attempt 
to articulate what no work in the original can articulate, what he calls the 
intention of all languages or the “pure language.” as berman (1992, p. 7) 
comments, benjamin’s idea of the task of the translator “would consist of 
a search, beyond the buzz of empirical languages, for the ‘pure language’ 
which each language carries within itself as its messianic echo. such an aim, 
which has nothing to do with the ethical aim, is rigorously metaphysical in 
the sense that it platonically searches a ‘truth’ beyond natural languages.” 
in benjamin’s own words, it is this “pure language” that links all languages 
together. “Languages are not strangers to one another,” he remarks, “but 
are, a priori and apart from all historical relationships, interrelated in what 
they want to express” (benjamin, 1973, p. 72). What all languages want 
to express is a deep intention, “the intention underlying each language as 
a whole— an intention, however, which no single language can attain by 
itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supple-
menting each other: pure language. While all individual elements of for-
eign languages— words, sentences, structure— are mutually exclusive, these 
languages supplement one another in their intentions” (benjamin, 1973, p. 
74). to put it in a clear way, benjamin insists on the translatability of lan-
guages because human communication is rooted in the very nature of all 
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languages and their shared intentionality. to affirm translatability is thus 
to affirm that things, values, and ideas in different individuals, social groups 
and cultural traditions are essentially commensurable, that it is possible to 
have understanding and communication across barriers of languages and 
cultures. in making comparisons and finding equivalents between what is 
alien and what is familiar, and in bringing what is foreign to our own range 
of knowledge, translation expands our minds and bridges linguistic and 
cultural differences.
but when the differences are between the east and the West, is transla-
tion still possible? My argument so far has of course tried to give a def-
initely positive answer, but as long as the dichotomous view of cultural 
incommensurability and the overemphasis on cultural difference exert a 
considerable influence on scholarly discourses, east- West studies still face 
great challenges. as we move into an increasingly globalized world in the 
twenty- first century, however, things are changing rapidly, the physical as 
well as the psychological distance between the east and the West is dimin-
ishing, and east- West studies are emerging as a burgeoning new field of 
study in social sciences and the humanities. the critique of eurocentrism 
and any other kind of ethnocentrism has prepared the way for a truly open 
horizon and the possibility, as Kwame anthony appiah (2006, p. xvi) argues, 
of a new kind of cosmopolitanism, a strongly committed moral sense “that 
each human being has responsibilities to every other.” the social and intel-
lectual climate now seems to have changed favorably for east- West studies. 
translation, as i said earlier, has always worked in various degrees to make 
human communication possible, and in our world today with east asian 
economy and culture on the rise, east- West studies are drawing more at-
tention in scholarship internationally, and may finally have a chance to gain 
better cross- cultural understanding and communication. the challenge of 
acquiring adequate linguistic skills and in- depth knowledge of both east-
ern and Western traditions is quite daunting, and it constitutes another 
challenge for engaging in east- West studies. given such challenges, it is 
certainly no easy task for any scholar to acquire sufficient linguistic skills 
and cultural knowledge to engage in serious work in east- West studies, but 
that is definitely a task worthy of our effort, a new area of study to which 
we shall feel proud to make significant contributions.
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Public Spheres, Fields, Networks
Western Concepts for a De- Westernizing World?
rodney benson
Media research is finally internationalizing in its geopolitical ambitions, 
but what does or should this mean for how scholars theorize, analyze, 
and evaluate data? at least three distinct claims are being made about the 
challenges of truly international media research. the first is that moving 
beyond anglo- american and continental european contexts introduces a 
new level of empirical variation and complexity, requiring new theoretical 
models (appadurai, 1990; thussu, 2009). the second is that as research 
begins to flow in multiple directions— the West studying the non- West, 
the non- West studying the West, the non- West studying the non- West 
(with “West” and “non- West” of course always encompassing multiple 
standpoints)— questions of epistemology, of the limits and biases of forms 
of knowledge, come to the fore (smith, 1999). and the third is that baseline 
Western attitudes of what constitutes the good and just and “democratic” 
society— indeed whether democracy is the only worthy goal— can no lon-
ger be presumed (Latour, 2005a; silverstone, 2006).
one could argue that the challenge is so far- reaching and fundamental 
that entirely new non- Western theories and models are needed, or more 
radically, that the “north,” however we define it, is simply not epistemo-
logically or morally equipped to study or critique what is happening in 
the “south,” and thus we need new researchers and new institutions of 
research too. Without accepting such critiques in their entirety, we can 
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certainly agree that new theories and new research communities are more 
than welcome. but the reality is that global research is being conducted for 
the most part by the usual suspects using the usual theories. My question, 
then, is how well are some of these Western- originated theories meeting 
the ontological, epistemological, and normative challenges that emerge in 
diverse non- Western settings?
i focus my attention on three master concepts— public spheres, fields, 
and networks— that increasingly are being used to map the world’s complex 
and inter- connected media environments. in this chapter, i analyze each of 
the terms based on how they are actually defined by their primary theoreti-
cal proponents (Jürgen habermas and bernhard Peters for public sphere, 
Pierre bourdieu for field, and Manuel Castells and bruno Latour for net-
work) and deployed by international media scholars. broadly speaking, i 
argue that as one moves from habermas/Peters and bourdieu, on the one 
hand, to Castells and especially Latour, on the other hand, the ontological 
accounts become more fluid, the epistemological accounts (to the extent 
they are elaborated) become more relativist, and the politics become more 
open- ended. i will conclude with a discussion of what is at stake in these 
different approaches and to what extent the various theories are mutually 
complementary, antagonistic, or simply represent distinct alternatives.
Public Sphere
the term “public sphere” is most closely associated with the work of Jür-
gen habermas, and in general refers to the social space or spaces through 
which citizens debate and attempt to influence their government. there 
has long been criticism of the initial public sphere concept (habermas, 
1989) for being institutionally underspecified (benson, 2004; Calhoun, 
1992; Peters, 2008). drawing extensively on the work of his late student 
and colleague bernhard Peters (translated into english and collected in 
Wessler, 2008), habermas now acknowledges the multi- layered complex-
ity of the contemporary public sphere, in an effort to develop a model with 
“empirical relevance” (habermas, 1996, p. 373; 2006).
in the essay that laid the foundation for this approach, Peters (2008) 
argues that democratic societies are organized according to principles of 
“center” and “periphery.” the “institutional core of the system of govern-
ment” has four departments: “the parliamentary complex, the judiciary, 
government [‘the political leadership’] and administration [‘non- political’ 
or civil service]” (Peters, 2008, p. 23). the outer periphery consists of the 
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informal associations of the lifeworld’s various “private” social spheres (p. 
20). Mass media, along with other public sphere organizations, play a cru-
cial role as an intermediary “sluice” to bring progressive and emancipatory 
ideas from this outer periphery into the center. the public sphere is at the 
inner periphery of the political system, consisting of “mass media, opin-
ion research, numerous and diverse communicative networks and ‘publics’ 
crystallized around current topics or around publications, professional 
contacts and contexts for discussion specific to particular milieus.” While 
the center or core is where “debates or processes linked to the resolution 
of problems are condensed and formed into decisions,” the “legitimacy of 
(these) decisions depends on the formation of opinions and political will in 
the periphery” (Peters, 2008, p. 25).
how well does this new model work in practice to describe communi-
cation practices at least partially outside of europe and north america and 
transcending a single nation- state? sonia serra (2000) uses a case study 
of activism, media coverage, and policy making around the issue of “the 
killing of street children” in brazil to try to demonstrate this (new) haber-
masian “international public sphere” in action. for many years, brazilian 
religious, left- wing, and human rights activists from the “periphery” chal-
lenged national government policies that encouraged or at least permitted 
the police killings of poor youths, many of whom were engaged in petty or 
even violent crime (see, e.g., the film City of God). they made no progress 
until their activities were able to attract the attention of such international 
ngos as amnesty international and the Catholic Church, and through 
them well- respected media outlets such as Le Monde, the Guardian, the 
New York Times, and Cnn, which acted as “sluices” to move the issue from 
the brazilian periphery simultaneously to the brazilian governmental cen-
ter and to Western/international centers of power such as the united na-
tions (and linked organizations uniCef and defense for Children in-
ternational) and the organization of american states. as a result of this 
international (u.s./european) attention, the brazilian government created 
a national commission to deal with the problem and ultimately enacted a 
new law restricting police killings, over the objections of “powerful groups 
in the judiciary, the army, the police and business associations” (serra, 
2000, p. 162).
on one level, this is a story about peripheral associations “outside the 
structure of power” in a developing country allying themselves with (West-
ern) international civil society groups and mainstream media organizations 
in order to “influence national policy- making” (serra, 2000, p. 169). it 
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complicates habermas’s center- periphery model: in effect, the periphery 
challenges one national center of power (brazil) by mobilizing support 
from international bodies (un- related) whose power in turn ultimately 
rests on linkages to the globally dominant national centers of power (such 
as the united states, united Kingdom, france). but it is precisely in this 
linkage to u.s. and european power that we see the democratic and criti-
cal limits of this international public sphere, at least in this particular case. 
it’s not so surprising that Western media were willing to cover a dramatic, 
heartrending story that also reaffirmed “cultural images of third World 
countries as places of barbarism” (serra, 2000, p. 166). the killing must 
stop, the ngos and Western media pronounced. but what of the social 
conditions that helped produce the petty crime and the police brutality, 
what of the role of Western governments and corporations and interna-
tional monetary bodies in encouraging and facilitating economic policies 
that contributed to brazil’s extremes of wealth and poverty? the “progres-
sive” ngos and media had almost nothing to say about these problems: 
in effect, the real “center” in this account— the Western and international 
centers of power— were challenged not in the slightest and even allowed to 
revel in their sense of moral superiority and beneficence.
serra acknowledges these complexities and ironies. in the end, her ac-
count demonstrates the utility and flexibility of habermas’s new public 
sphere theory for transnational and non- Western research, even as it ex-
poses the sharp limitations of habermasian deliberative democratic poli-
tics to move Western powers toward substantial self- critique and progres-
sive economic reform.
as for its epistemological and normative aspects, habermas’s model was 
initially based on his historical research on the emergence of the western 
european bourgeois public sphere as a counterpoint to state power, and 
habermas has been a vocal defender of the Western enlightenment project. 
however, his concept of “communicative action”— in which knowledge is 
supposed to be produced through a process of mutual understanding— by 
definition seems quite epistemologically open. research guided by com-
municative action, whose forms would by necessity change in any given 
cultural setting, would seem to be the absolutely necessary precondition 
for any attempt to engage with the “other,” even if it remains vague (by ne-
cessity) how this engagement, let alone comprehension, is to be achieved.
More problematic perhaps is habermas’s normative stance in favor of 
a particular kind of democracy— deliberative democracy— which may not 
be appropriate for all societies. in his recent work (1996; see also his essay 
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in Calhoun, 1992), habermas acknowledges the need to make room for a 
wider variety of communication styles to ensure that a narrowly defined 
“rational” public deliberation does not end up reinforcing privileges rooted 
in education, wealth, and patriarchy. nevertheless, the continued focus on 
open- ended deliberation may be neither politically realistic nor resonate 
with long- standing cultural practices in some non- Western societies.
Whether the public sphere ideal is used narrowly (to emphasize the 
need for reasoned, critical debate) or broadly (to emphasize inclusion, 
and make room for diverse communicative styles) does not necessar-
ily correlate with the national origin or location of the scholar. united 
arab emirates media scholar Muhammad ayish (2006) is sharply critical 
of al Jazeera’s The Opposite Direction for its extreme sensationalism— what 
he terms “brinkmanship”— and he offers a careful quantitative parsing of 
the show’s techniques aimed at bringing guests to the verge of fisticuffs. 
While acknowledging the show’s importance as a forum for “robust de-
bate,” ayish concludes in high habermasian fashion that “talk shows need 
to promote real dialogue rather than sensational shouting matches among 
participants” (p. 125). on the other hand, american media scholar Marc 
Lynch, while acknowledging similar problems of sensationalism, tends to 
emphasize the positive aspects of arab media. according to Lynch (2006, 
pp. 247– 48), “the new arab public sphere is a genuine public sphere, char-
acterized by self- conscious, open, and contentious political argument . . . 
reform has been a consistent obsession of this new public, a constant topic 
of intense public argument in the op- ed pages and on the talk shows.”
Field
the concept of field is most often associated with the french sociologist 
Pierre bourdieu, though in fact it is also widely used by “new institution-
alist” theorists and researchers (e.g., Powell & dimaggio, 1991; fligstein 
2001; in media studies, see Cook, 1998) and the term itself owes its origins 
to the social psychologist Kurt Lewin (see Martin, 2003). the “fields” in 
field theory refer to the contemporary differentiation of society into mul-
tiple, competing, hierarchically organized, partially autonomous, and in-
creasingly specialized spaces of professional and creative endeavor. Within 
and among these fields, relations of power fundamentally structure human 
action. bourdieu brings ferdinand de saussure to Max Weber, Karl Marx 
and Émile durkheim, insisting that the “real is relational” at both the so-
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cial and discursive levels: the fundamental opposition is between economic 
and various forms of cultural power, which at the same time are inter- 
convertible and can thus be allied.
empirically, field theory offers a flexible model that nonetheless aspires 
to universal validity. as a comparativist, bourdieu rejects in principle any 
claim that there are “transhistorical laws of the relations between fields,” 
insisting that “we must investigate each historical case separately” (bour-
dieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 109). yet, in a speech delivered at the university 
of todai, Japan, in 1989, bourdieu (1998c) insists that the deep structural, 
relational analysis of culture and power that he developed from his re-
search in algeria and france is not limited to those settings, but has wider, 
even universal applicability:
i think that if i were Japanese i would dislike most of the things that 
non- Japanese people write about Japan. . . . does this mean that i 
shall confine myself to the particularity of a single society and shall 
not talk in any way about Japan? i do not think so. i think, on the 
contrary, that by presenting the model of social space and symbolic 
space that i constructed for the particular case of france, i shall still 
be speaking to you about Japan (just as, in other contexts, i would be 
speaking about germany or the united states). (p. 1)
bourdieu (1998c) continues, and it is worth quoting at length, particu-
larly since this viewpoint will be so roundly condemned by another theorist 
we are about to consider:
i am convinced that, although it has all the appearance of ethno-
centrism, an approach consisting of applying a model constructed 
according to this [relational] logic to another social world is without 
doubt more respectful of historic realities (and of people) and above 
all more fruitful in scientific terms than the interest in superficial 
features of the lover of exoticism who gives priority to picturesque 
differences  .  .  . the researcher  .  .  . seeks to apprehend the struc-
tures and mechanisms that are overlooked— although for different 
reasons— by the native and the foreigner alike, such as the principles 
of construction of social space or the mechanisms of reproduction 
of that space, and that the researcher seeks to represent in a model 
aspiring to universal validity. (pp. 2– 3, italics in original)
264 •  internationalizing “international communication”
Revised Pages
What is potentially universal then is a basic structural, relational model 
of social relations.1 the concrete forms that it takes in any given social 
context are expected to vary. as a working hypothesis, across the indus-
trialized world at this particular moment, one would certainly predict the 
economic field to be dominant. but contra Marx, this is not the result of 
any historical necessity; it is just, in Weberian fashion, the contingent result 
of a path- dependent historical process. how dominant the economic field 
will be, how autonomous the opposing fields of cultural production will be, 
and how the realms of the economic and cultural are understood would 
certainly be expected to vary cross- nationally. in the industrialized West, 
especially in western europe, the artistic and scientific “cultural” fields 
will constitute the primary opposition to the economic field; however, in 
many countries the religious field may be the major opposing field or even 
the dominant field. in some countries, the military or command- economy 
political fields may be dominant. thus, in bourdieu’s field theory, a basic 
structural framework posited to have universal validity is balanced, at least 
partially, by an open- ended investigation of the particular empirical forms 
that these structures will take in any given social realm.
indeed, field theory is already being put to use in fruitful ways for a va-
riety of studies beyond the anglo- american or french orbits (e.g., Kjær & 
slaatta, 2007; hovden, 2008; hallin & Mancini, 2004), as well as compara-
tive studies that demonstrate the persistence of national field logics against 
the supposed homogenizing force of americanization (e.g., benson & hal-
lin, 2007; benson, blach- Ørsten, Powers, Willig, & vera Zambrano, 2012; 
benson, 2013). in recent years, field theory also has been adopted usefully 
for scholarship of the global south.2
orayb najjar (2007) draws on field theory for a study of the rise of 
transnational news media outlets like al Jazeera (arabic and international) 
in Qatar and telesur in venezuela. najjar goes beyond a straight politi-
cal economy account to emphasize, in bourdieuian fashion, distinctions 
between funding (economic capital) and legitimacy (symbolic capital), and 
the relational basis of all symbolic claims to legitimacy. najjar takes seri-
ously field theory’s insistence that field relations extend beyond national 
boundaries, as when bourdieu (1998b, p. 41) remarks that for a journalis-
tic field analysis to be complete “the position of the national media field 
within the global media field would have to be taken into account.”
in najjar’s study of al Jazeera and telesur, field structure and dynam-
ics are shown to be a product of history, which in the case of global media 
must take into account the global south’s long- simmering dissatisfaction 
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with the ethnocentrism of the dominant Western news agencies counter- 
balanced by admiration of u.s. journalistic professional ideals, which em-
phasize “independence” from the state. this pre- existing state of the field 
helps explain why al Jazeera and telesur, in their effort to expand their 
audience, revenues, and professional legitimacy, have been constrained to 
simultaneously emphasize their links to unesCo’s challenge to u.s. me-
dia hegemony during the 1970s and their autonomy from their sponsoring 
states (Qatar in the case of the former; primarily venezuela, but also ar-
gentina, uruguay, Cuba, and brazil in the case of the latter) (najjar, 2007, 
pp. 7– 8).
najjar thus nicely captures how the drive for symbolic capital shapes 
action in the global journalistic field:
telesur, even while introducing a revolutionary project, could not 
move away from the tenets of global journalism and from the nega-
tive perception of media owned by government. because the idea 
for telesur was initially proposed by Cuba’s President Castro and 
because the station’s critics were already calling it “telechavez” even 
before it went on air, the station had to work to “unbrand” itself 
by moving away from a political field funded by the president of 
venezuela, to [a relatively more autonomous position] similar to 
al- Jazeera, i.e., funded by the ruler but whose board of directors is 
independent. (p. 10)
in a world in which u.s. political, economic, and cultural hegemony are 
arguably diminishing, al Jazeera’s efforts to professionalize and diversify 
journalistic staff (as al Jazeera international is well known for doing), to 
provide a wide diversity of perspectives, and to cover in a sustained and 
non- sensationalistic manner areas of the world ignored by the Western 
media are likely to reap real dividends in the accumulation of symbolic 
capital; indeed, they already have, if a glowing appraisal of al Jazeera eng-
lish in the Columbia Journalism Review is any indicator (editors, 2011). 
ironically, the u.s. government has failed to recognize how influence is 
contingent on symbolic capital in its openly government- funded and con-
trolled “public diplomacy” efforts to counter al Jazeera; as najjar (2007, p. 
17) notes, these efforts are “viewed as illegitimate because they fall in the 
political, rather than in the journalistic field.”
in contrast to habermas, epistemological questions are front and cen-
ter in field theory, at least in bourdieu’s version of it. attitudes, tastes, 
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physical bearing— what bourdieu terms “habitus”— are all indelibly shaped 
by one’s position in this complex system of stratification and the partially 
contingent circumstances through which one arrived at this position: “to 
speak of habitus is to assert that the individual, and even the personal, the 
subjective, is social, collective. habitus is socialized subjectivity” (bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992, p. 126). of course, this goes for the social researcher 
as much as for anyone else. how then does field theory escape an empiri-
cally paralyzing relativity, the kind that marks niklas Luhmann’s systems 
theory? in a word: reflexivity.
for bourdieu, what makes scientific research “scientific” is less the sys-
tematic testing of hypotheses and gathering of facts than it is the adequacy 
of one’s epistemological break with naturalized, common sense categories 
of knowledge. heavily influenced by the french epistemologist gaston 
bachelard, bourdieu succinctly describes his research process: “facts are 
conquered [through rupture with common sense], constructed, confirmed” 
(bourdieu et al., 1991, p. 24). before one can adequately “objectivize” a 
given social world, one must also engage in self- objectivation, meaning 
not only taking into account class trajectory and position, ethnicity, and 
gender, but also the privileged position of the “scholarly gaze” that pro-
duces knowledge “from afar and from above”: “What must be objectivized 
is not (only) the individual who does the research in her biographical id-
iosyncrasy but the position she occupies in academic space and the biases 
implicated in the view she takes by virtue of being ‘off- sides’ or ‘out of the 
game’” (bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 70– 72).
if bourdieuian reflexivity conceptually solves the epistemological prob-
lem of producing objective knowledge transcending the biases of the ob-
server, in both his or her individual specificity and institutional location, it 
is a little more mysterious about how this process works in practice. from 
my observations and readings of many bourdieu- inspired studies, as well 
as my own research, reflexivity means never accepting without skepticism 
the categories offered up by official agencies or previous scholarly research, 
treating one’s own categories as provisional subject to ongoing critical re-
flection (e.g., what presumptions are built into terms, whose interests do 
they implicitly support, who or what is excluded by use of such terms), and 
spending just as much time listening to the individuals acting in a field and 
learning about their practice- based “subjective” categories of action as in 
gathering data about the “objective” social factors that supposedly con-
strain their action. bourdieu’s injunction to interrogate naturalized catego-
ries is not so far from blumler, McLeod, and rosengren’s (1992, pp. 3– 18) 
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defense of comparative research that “cosmopolitanizes, opening our eyes 
to communication patterns and problems unnoticeable in our own spatial 
and temporal milieux.”
What are field theory’s implicit normative stances, its politics? for 
bourdieu, economic injustice furthered through the “symbolic violence” 
of the state and the mass media is a significant problem and one that he 
denounced as an “activist” in his later years (see, e.g., bourdieu, 1998c). 
seemingly separate from this project is bourdieu’s spirited defense of artis-
tic and especially scientific autonomy (bourdieu, 1996), though bourdieu 
has argued that a science understood as a critique of received categories of 
knowledge and as the uncovering of relations of power is inherently allied 
to projects of social justice. While bourdieu has written eloquently and 
critically about patriarchy (2002) and his long- time collaborator abdel-
malek sayad was a leading french scholar of immigration, “social justice” 
is conceptualized almost entirely in terms of economic justice and worker 
rights. he has been critical of u.s.- style identity and ethnic politics, not 
only their culturally imperialistic pretensions to be applicable to the rest 
of the world, but also, implicitly, the uses to which they have been put to 
suppress attention to what he would see as more pressing problems of eco-
nomic justice (bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999).
these political stances, however, are not inherent to field theory, that 
is, a relational- structural model of social relations acknowledging the ex-
istence of multiple, if limited, forms of power (capital) that extend beyond 
just economic power. in “new institutionalist” field theory, the stance is 
often relatively conservative, or at least conventionally “liberal pluralist”: 
in these approaches, there is no presumption of the overwhelming power 
of the economic field, and there is little or no attention paid to deep cul-
turally patterned class stratification (see, e.g., some chapters in Powell & 
diMaggio, 1991).
Network
analysis of social networks has diverse intellectual sources and long pre-
cedes the current fascination with the worldwide digital network com-
monly called the internet.3 i focus on two strains of network theory that 
seem to me to have particular relevance for global media studies: the “net-
work society” model of Manuel Castells (1996, 1997, 2000, 2007), and the 
actor- network theory most often associated with bruno Latour (2005a; but 
see also Callon, 1986, and Law, 2007).
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although Castells is now widely associated with network analysis, in 
his 19 february 2010 introductory speech at a usC- annenberg confer-
ence (see endnote 3), he conceded that his initial preferred title of his book 
The Network Society was actually “flows” and it was only the publisher who 
suggested “network society” as a more exciting title and an apt descrip-
tion of Castells’s account of the rise of the internet. in contrast, Latour 
and others developed the concept of actor- networks long before the in-
ternet as a means of avoiding the individual- society opposition and as a 
methodological blueprint for research in the sociology of science; only in 
recent years has Latour turned his attention to digital networks and have 
media researchers turned to Latour (see, e.g., turner, 2005; hemmingway, 
2008). i begin with Castells both because of his earlier link to media stud-
ies and because his framework lies somewhere between the macro- political 
economy models of habermas and bourdieu and the more micro- oriented, 
anti- structuralist, and epistemologically relativist approach of Latour.4
Castells’s Network Society
Castells’s admitted hesitation about the title of the first volume of his three- 
part, truly encyclopedic The Information Age is telling: his project is about 
a lot of things, and “network” per se is not necessarily at the center. in an 
analysis (similar to those of david harvey and others) emphasizing an ep-
ochal economic change since the 1970s from a fordist to a post- fordist, 
“flexible accumulation” capitalist order, Castells (2000, p. 695) argues that 
alongside this “new economy” there has also emerged a “new society”— “a 
society where the key social structures and activities are organized around 
electronically processed information networks.” for Castells, networks are 
“set[s] of interconnected nodes . . . flexible, adaptive structures that, pow-
ered by information technology, can perform any task that has been pro-
grammed in the network.” networks have long existed alongside “large, 
centralized apparatuses”; the rise of the internet simply provides a powerful 
technological boost for networks over other forms of social organization 
(p. 695). What thus sets Castells apart from geographers and critical politi-
cal economists like david harvey is his emphasis on technology, which at 
times approaches McLuhan- style technological determinism (though he 
rejects the label).
for Castells, media are increasingly central to the operation of power 
across the globe. this is so because of the convergence of previous forms 
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of media (radio, television, print) into the single medium of the internet. as 
Castells (2007) writes in one of his most compact and cogent essays:
[t]he ongoing transformation of communication technology in the 
digital age extends the reach of communication media into all do-
mains of social life in a network that is at the same time global and 
local, generic and customized in an ever- changing pattern. as a re-
sult, power relations, that is the relations that constitute the founda-
tion of all societies, as well as the processes challenging institution-
alized power relations are increasingly shaped and decided in the 
communication field. (p. 239)
inside this communication field or “media space,” Castells (1997, p. 
312) suggests politics is “structured” by the “logic” of electronic media, a 
logic defined as involving “computerized political marketing, instant poll-
ing as an instrument of political navigation, [and] character assassination 
as political strategy.”
Castells does an admirable job in documenting changes in political 
communication that are increasingly evident around the world, and despite 
his oft- stated view that states are losing power in relation to global capital, 
he cites and has helped publish a number of Western and non- Western na-
tional case studies that highlight cross- national variation in the function-
ing of the global “network society” (see Castells, 2004). Castells acknowl-
edges exceptions to a fault. the problem is that he doesn’t theorize them. 
Castells’s broad concept of “media space” cannot help explain why some 
political debates are more or less simplified, personalized, dramatized, or 
contextualized than others (for instance, he notes in passing that trust in 
government has not declined in scandinavia, but he doesn’t ask why; see 
Castells, 2007, p. 244).
Partially counter- balancing this (mass) media logic, a “new kind of me-
dia space” of “mass self- communication” (“horizontal networks of interac-
tive communication”) has also emerged on the Web (Castells, 2007). blogs, 
social media websites, and a range of other kinds of user- created media 
sites, increasingly connected to mobile telephony, are changing the way the 
internet is used and who uses it. While much of this horizontal network 
communication is apolitical, it is also linked to an increase in the number, 
range of types, and global reach of social movement activism. on the one 
hand, the internet makes it easier for activists to directly challenge corpo-
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rate power via “culture jamming . . . a strategy that turns corporate power 
against itself by co- opting, hacking, mocking, and re- contextualizing mean-
ings” by creating and circulating negative, often humorous messages or im-
ages about corporate brands (bennett, 2003). on the other hand, militant 
groups, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, have used the internet to create 
international support networks on behalf of battles against both national 
governments and (less effectively) global economic and political institu-
tions (Castells, 1997; russell, 2001).
even as “mass self- communication” potentially aids resistance move-
ments in developing countries, Castells (2007, p. 249) insightfully notes 
that “the development of the technology of self- communication is also 
the product of our culture, a culture that emphasizes individual auton-
omy and the self- construction of the project of the social actor,” thus 
suggesting that it could also serve as a form of u.s./european modern-
izing stealth power. Castells also emphasizes the ways in which capitalist 
media corporations have attempted to co- opt and gain access for adver-
tising and marketing research on various social networking websites, as 
evidenced by google’s ownership of youtube, yahoo inc!’s purchase of 
tumblr, and so on.
Castells’s use of theory of whatever sort is flexible, eclectic, and prag-
matic. if he has an explicit epistemology, he does not highlight it. his ob-
servations are tested in the crucible of continuous, often team- based em-
pirical research that draws on diverse primary and secondary sources.
Politically, like both habermas and bourdieu, his work emphasizes the 
progressive potential of social movement action. unlike bourdieu, he ac-
knowledges and seems to approve of “new” cultural and identity- based so-
cial movements as well as class- based activism. Castells (2007) differs from 
both habermas and bourdieu in his arguably more optimistic assessment 
of long- term political outcomes:
it is plausible to think that the capacity of social actors to set up 
autonomously their political agenda is greater in the networks of 
mass self- communication than in the corporate world of the mass 
media. While the old struggle for social domination and counter- 
domination continues in the new media space, the structural bias of 
this space toward the powers that be is being diminished every day 
by the new social practices of communication. (pp. 257– 58) (see also 
Castells 2012)
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Latour’s Actor- Network Theory
in contrast to Castells, who places contemporary economic and technolog-
ical transformations front and center in his work, Latour and other actor- 
network theory (ant) theorists claim that actor- networks are and have 
always been the fundamental building block of human societies: data col-
lection enabled by the internet simply make this aspect of human existence 
more “traceable” and visible (Latour, 2010).
While Latour’s work originated in his studies of scientists, and origi-
nally had the most impact in the field of science and technology studies, 
in recent years he has linked his project to that of the nineteenth- century 
french sociologist gabriel tarde on behalf of a broader effort to challenge 
what he has called the “sociology of the social” (that is, any analysis that 
conceives of society as a sui generis unit of analysis, separate from and 
larger than the sum of its individual human parts). for tarde, the repre-
sentative of this “social” approach was durkheim; for Latour, it is Pierre 
bourdieu. in contrast to the sociology of the social, a tardean/Latourian 
approach starts with the actor- network, that is an understanding of the hu-
man being (as well as non- human object) as constituted by its relations to 
other actors (both humans and non- human things) without any necessary 
link to a larger structure: “every actor is a network, every network is made 
up of actors” (Latour, 2010; see also Latour, 2005b).
at first glance, ant’s relational approach would seem quite close to 
field theory. they are both forms of “constructivism,” beginning from the 
premise that there is no unmediated knowledge of the real but rather that 
“principles of vision and division of the social world” (bourdieu) or “objects 
of concern” (Latour) are socially and discursively produced. both eschew 
abstract theorizing and are designed to be put to use in empirical research. 
bourdieu’s (1989) “structuralist constructivism,” however, effectively privi-
leges one construction over all others— that is, the reflexive sociologist’s 
construction of the historically shaped structure within which others act. 
ant’s strict constructionism is neutral to an extreme, providing only a flat 
account of others’ accounts without venturing any judgment on whose is 
closest to “reality.” as Michel Callon (1986, p. 4) puts it, “instead of impos-
ing a pre- established grid of analysis . . . the observer follows the actors in 
order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the dif-
ferent elements by which they build and explain their world, whether it be 
social or natural.”
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no human, animal, or thing is privileged above another, thus ant’s fa-
mous, or infamous, equation of humans and non- humans. for this reason, 
some ant theorists such as John Law (2007, p. 2) prefer the term “mate-
rial semiotics” to describe their approach. While ant theory would not 
deny that structures exist, it sees them as unstable, fragile, ephemeral, or, 
as philosopher Michel serres has put it, “patches of order in a sea of disor-
der” (Law, 2007, p. 5). Law portrays ant as “an empirical version of post- 
structuralism” with close affinities to gilles deleuze’s nomadic philosophy. 
according to Law (2007, p. 6), both “actor- network” and “assemblage” (a 
deleuzian term also used by Latour, Callon, and others) “refer to the pro-
visional assembly of productive, heterogeneous and (this is quite crucial) 
quite limited forms of ordering located in no larger overall order.”
the empirical relevance of such ant theory to global media studies 
may not be obvious. but i would like to venture some possible connections. 
first, how stable are structures of global media and cultural power? ant 
seems to lie at the extreme end of a range of theories that stress fluidity, 
uncertainty, impermanence. Castells moves in this direction, but does not 
let go of the notion of power as something that endures beyond the par-
ticular situation. at the february 2010 usC network theory conference 
(see endnote 3), Latour responded to Castells’s (2010) remarks by suggest-
ing that he abandon the notion of power and Castells “agreed to disagree 
completely.” similarly, arjun appadurai’s (1990) conception of the global 
cultural economy as a “complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, which can-
not any longer be understood in terms of existing center- periphery models 
(even those which might account for multiple centers and peripheries)” 
can be read as a rebuke, in advance, of habermas’s or bourdieu’s later writ-
ings on media power. yet appadurai’s insistence that he does not want to 
completely “elide the social referent” (p. 6, n2) and his very use of the 
structural- sounding suffix “scapes” suggests he would not go as far as La-
tour and company in stressing contingency and chaos. rather than decide 
the issue in advance, either in favor of fluidity/contingency or structure/
constrained agency, it seems more reasonable to suggest that there is more 
agency and contingency in some social realms than others and this can only 
be confirmed through empirical research.
how do we simultaneously study the “global” and the “local” and their 
complex inter- relations? for Latour, there is no global and no local, just as 
there is no macro and no micro; there are only network sites (Wall street 
trading rooms, scientific laboratories, legal offices, and so forth), with some 
being more “networky” than others, that is, approaching “a star- like shape 
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with a center surrounded by many radiating lines with all sorts of tiny con-
duits leading to and fro” (2005b, p. 177). as Latour (2005b) argues:
[a]s soon as the local sites that manufacture global structures are 
underlined, it is the entire topography of the social world that is 
being modified. Macro no longer describes a wider or a larger site in 
which the micro would be embedded like some russian Matryoshka 
doll, but another equally local, equally micro place, which is con-
nected to many others through some medium transporting specific 
types of traces. no place can be said to be bigger than any other 
place, but some can be said to benefit from far safer connections 
with many more places than others. (p. 176, italics in original)
a final potentially useful aspect of ant is in the analysis of technology. 
as tatnall and gilding (1999, pp. 57– 58, 63) argue, “ant deals with the 
social- technical divide by denying that purely technical or purely social 
relations are possible” and thus seeks to avoid both technological and so-
cial determinisms. fred turner provides the example of Jim romanesko’s 
media news column for Poynter online. the human being Jim romanesko 
is only part of what makes his media site influential; the digital technology 
is also an actor, in the sense that “any thing that does modify a state of af-
fairs by making a difference is an actor” (Latour, 2005b, p. 71). as turner 
(2005, p. 323) writes, “from a traditional point of view, new media simply 
offer new channels for the distribution of information. from the point of 
view of ant, however, they and their human partners collaborate in the 
creation of new socio- technical formations. digital media do not just offer 
professionals like romanesko a new voice; rather, they offer them the abil-
ity to build new linkages of institutions, individuals, and machines.” simi-
larly, emma hemmingway’s (2008) detailed ethnography of regional bbC 
television news highlights the way in which technologies (e.g., cameras 
and microphones, recording equipment) play an important role in shaping 
news production. she does so, however, not in a technological determinist 
vein, but rather in the ant fashion of tracing what she sees as unstable, 
highly contingent collaborations between humans and machines.
finally, ant would seem to be the most epistemologically and politi-
cally open and non- judgmental of the theories examined here, making it 
especially appropriate for Western research in non- Western societies. the 
injunction to treat equivalently all actor accounts, including that of the re-
searcher, provides assurance that both Western and non- Western perspec-
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tives, in all their diversity, will be presented and respected. and this extends 
to politics as well. if the good society is defined as what “assembles” people, 
then what works to assemble in one setting cannot be assumed to work in 
another. against the deliberative democratic dreams of habermas, Latour 
ventures “getting together might not be such a universal desire after all!” 
(2005a, p. 34). Latour argues (without documentation) that there are di-
verse worldwide attitudes toward basic Western notions such as “represen-
tation” (in the Japanese tradition, “the very word ‘representation’ strikes 
their ears as quaint and superficial”; ibid., p. 35) or “the idea of politics as 
speaking one’s mind in the middle of an assembly” (“the Chinese tradition 
seems to ignore it entirely”; ibid.). “Can we enlarge our definition of poli-
tics to the point where it accepts its own suspension?” Latour asks. “but 
who can really be that open- minded? and yet, do we have another course 
of action?” (ibid., p. 36). Latour takes comfort in the fact that in spite of the 
lack of any success in conceptualizing a politics (democratic or otherwise) 
that could unite peoples across so many diverse cultures, the fact is that in 
myriad ways, through “those makeshift assemblages we call markets, tech-
nologies, science, ecological crises, wars and terrorist networks,” we are 
already “connected”— “it’s simply that our usual definitions of politics have 
not caught up yet with the masses of linkages already established” (ibid., 
p. 37).
Conclusion
each of the terms (and their accompanying theoretical frameworks) dis-
cussed in this paper— public sphere, field, network (network society, actor- 
network)— has advantages and disadvantages for truly internationalized, 
de- Westernized, or trans- nationalized media research.
Public sphere is probably the most commonly used term for research 
extending beyond north america, western europe, australia, and new 
Zealand, but it is often used only descriptively rather than analytically. 
habermas’s “new” “core- periphery” public sphere model holds some 
promise as a framework for empirical research, especially if room is made 
for multiple cores and peripheries. even so, it suffers from the shortcom-
ings of habermas’s previous work in that it places too much weight on 
the periphery (or lifeworld) as the generator of emancipatory movements 
while simultaneously offering little guidance on how system components 
such as the media can effectively challenge concentrated political and eco-
nomic power. a strict interpretation of habermas’s project in “delibera-
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tive” terms (civil, reasoned, inclusive debate) imposes a normative standard 
that is inappropriate or irrelevant (at least in the short term) for much of 
the globe; on the other hand, the notion of communicative action oriented 
toward mutual understanding provides both a normative and epistemo-
logical bridge between east and West, north and south.
field theory is only beginning to be used in non- Western settings. as 
an empirical and epistemological model, it holds some promise. the basic 
framework points to social processes that are (potentially) at work in all so-
cieties, that is, relational processes of identity formation, unequal distribu-
tion of resources (capital), and especially the importance of symbolic as well 
as economic power. so far, the de- Westernizing and trans- nationalizing 
field- theory- inspired research i have encountered mostly ignores the issue 
of reflexivity (for the researcher) and only begins to tap the full potential of 
the empirical/conceptual toolkit.
Castells’s “network society” has the virtue of offering a loose and flex-
ible framework for empirical research related to the internet in a variety 
of Western and non- Western settings. network society theory highlights 
both technological and economic factors as well as the ongoing conflict 
between established power and new forms of counter- power. the virtue 
of the theory— its flexibility and comprehensiveness— can also be its weak-
ness. however vaguely or flexibly defined, Castells retains an interest in 
power and democratic politics. the same cannot necessarily be said for 
actor- network theory. does this make it the ideal theory for international-
izing media studies?
ant theory is similar to field theory in that it begins with a series of 
basic guidelines to help orient research, though the guidelines themselves 
are quite different. in ant, one should follow the actor, consider non- 
human objects and humans as equal partners in constituting networks, and 
look for nodes in the network that are mediators (which “transform, trans-
late, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed 
to carry”) as opposed to intermediaries (transporting meaning “without 
transformation”) (Latour, 2005b, p. 39). Moreover, rather than attempt-
ing to construct an objective portrait of the world with the help of re-
flexivity, and in so doing critically uncover relations of power, ant does 
not privilege one account— epistemological, ontological, or normative- 
political— over another. such extreme relativism seems antithetical to any 
truly critical project; behind the veneer of radical post- structuralism, ant 
arguably ends up being a rather conventional form of pluralist theory (see 
steven Lukes’s [2005] “first face” of power). even so, when Latour speaks 
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of re- assembling the social, he seems to be echoing elihu Katz’s impor-
tant concern with community (see, e.g., dayan & Katz, 1992). in an era 
of increasing ethnic, religious, and political strife, the virtues of such a 
community- mapping and building project should not be underestimated.
despite such differences, there may be ways that the aforementioned 
theories are complementary as well as antagonistic. Public sphere theory, 
when it goes beyond a narrow defense of rational- critical deliberation, 
forces us to think and rethink the contours and limits of democracy. even 
if a radical de- Westernizing in the spirit of silverstone (2006) or various 
post- colonial theorists as noted by thussu (2009) lies beyond the theory’s 
grasp, at least the question of how to achieve domination- free politics has 
been raised. field theory goes beyond the core- periphery model to show 
how power is structured relationally and involves both cultural as well as 
economic resources. although Latour has insisted that his sociology of 
associations is the antithesis of bourdieu’s sociology of the social, some 
scholars have suggested that only the two models together can provide a 
complete portrait of the social world: as bourdieu admits, the social space 
is not all fields, so perhaps actor- networks are the “spaces between” (eyal, 
2013). as for the network society, whether or not Castells is able to offer a 
fully coherent or consistent model, the synthesis of vast amounts of data is 
a significant contribution in its own right; through his voluminous books, 
articles, and edited volumes, and the output of his online journal Interna-
tional Journal of Communication, Castells has become the central node in 
an ever widening global network of empirical research with encyclopedic 
ambitions.
in sum, there is no reason why researchers can’t fruitfully draw upon 
any or all of these approaches, and there is every indication that they are 
doing so, either in direct dialogue with one another (e.g., volkmer’s [2003] 
use of Castells to develop a model of the global public sphere); in respect-
ful acknowledgment but limited engagement (e.g., dahlgren’s [2001] nod 
to Castells in an essay otherwise focused on habermasian concerns); or in 
succession, as when researchers draw on Castells for one project, bourdieu 
for the next, and so forth, depending on the case study and what it is that 
needs to be explained (e.g., russell’s [2001] network society analysis of the 
Zapatistas, followed by her [2007] field theory study of media coverage of 
the french urban riots).
Whether or not these theories have fully taken stock of their “West-
ern” biases, they all have the virtue of moving beyond abstract philosophi-
cal quandaries to help facilitate systematic research. habermas, bourdieu, 
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Castells, and Latour certainly do not exhaust the possibilities for interna-
tionalizing media studies. they suggest only a range of possible approaches 
upon which or against which future theorizing— both Western and non- 
Western— might fruitfully build.
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Notes
 1. neil fligstein, in a fascinating interview with the McGill Sociological Review 
1 (2010), pp. 59– 65, published online at http://www.mcgill.ca/msr/volume1/in-
terview/, speaks to field theory’s ambitions: “i think field theory is a huge break-
through. it cuts across the social sciences . . . . [sociologist and fellow field theorist] 
John Levi Martin and i have a standing joke that we’re working on the theory of 
everything. so we call it the toe when we’re hanging out together. that is a joke! 
but i think with field theory, you come back to what do human beings do and how 
they make collective action happen. . . . how groups of people and groups of groups 
do these kinds of interactions and watch other people and reference other people 
and take positions, a very generic level of social process.”
 2. While for reasons of space i focus in this paper on najjar’s work (2007), noha 
Mellor (2007) also makes extensive use of bourdieu (and habermas). unlike naj-
jar, Mellor is explicit that “Western theories developed to account for changes in 
Western societies cannot be used uncritically to analyze non- Western societies . . . 
rather, field theory is meant to serve as a building block” (p. 4). Mellor suggests 
some interesting modifications to field theory based on characteristics of arab me-
dia and their audiences. for instance, al Jazeera (and many other arab media) uses 
an elevated written variant of arabic yet its audience is more likely to be composed 
of low- income/low- education viewers than high- income/high- education viewers. 
this challenges bourdieu’s argument that there will tend to be “homologies” be-
tween media production and consumption (ibid., 4; see also benson & neveu, 2005 
for discussion of the possibility of such variations in the extent of homologies).
 3. see Monge & Contractor (2003) for a comprehensive review of the social net-
work literature. all of these strains of network theory are increasingly in dialogue 
with another, as evidenced by an international network theory Conference held 
19– 20 february 2010 by the usC- annenberg school of Communication featuring 
presentations by Manuel Castells, bruno Latour, noshir Contractor, Peter Monge, 
yochai benkler, and others (see http://ascnetworksnetwork.org/ann-conference for 
summaries and videos of presentations).
 4. van Loon (2000, pp. 109– 10) offers a similar analysis: “[W]ith the publication 
of Manuel Castells’s Rise of the Network Society (1996), network- theory became firmly 
established as a mainstream force in contemporary political economy. however, Cas-
tells’s almost uncompromising economism which is seductively intertwined with an 
ethos of technological determinism, made it difficult for those bending towards more 
cultural analytical orientations to engage productively with this concept. instead, refuge 
was being sought in the more elusive and complex deleuzoguattarian concept of as-
semblage. . . . somewhere between the political- economic notion of ‘network’ and the 
differentialist notion of ‘assemblage,’ we can find ‘actor networks.’ actor networks are 




Cosmopolitanism and  
International Communication
Understanding Civil Society Actors
Peter dahlgren
academic fields are (fortunately) never fully unified; there are always dis-
parate voices and challenges to what is perceived as the dominant main-
stream. this is intellectually healthy; internal contention in a field helps 
keep its participants alert. at this point in the history of international 
communication, however, it may be that we are seeing more than just the 
usual discussion and debate on the margins. there is a growing restless-
ness, a sense that the turbulent realities of the world over recent decades 
require some serious rethinking about what research in this field should be 
doing— and how it should be doing it. Proposing some new “paradigm” for 
international communication is far beyond the ambition of this chapter, 
however. What i wish to do instead, taking into account some of the com-
mon critiques of the field, is to explore one important trajectory that the 
study of international communication could incorporate, and to mobilize 
some of the key intellectual equipment that will facilitate that step. What 
i have in mind is the vast landscape of transnational civil society actors, 
and the alter- globalization movement in particular, with its use of online 
technologies. Moreover, i suggest that the analysis of these actors and their 
practices could be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of cosmopolitanism.
i build upon a number of central premises. first of all and on a very 
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general level, though he may overstate the case at times, i share the basic 
sensibility that Zygmunt bauman tries to capture in his use of the adjective 
“liquid,” in regard to globalized late modernity (see, among his many works 
on this theme, the overview he offers in bauman, 2007). this oft- cited 
term signifies the intensity of change and the seeming lack of permanence 
among structures and institutions at global and local levels, the fluidity of 
much of the cultural realm, as well as the growing challenges to maintain-
ing stable life courses and identities. it is clearly not a measurable concept, 
but it signals a temperament that is willing to focus at least as much atten-
tion on impermanence as on that which still seems firmly entrenched in 
the world.
further, i assume that among the key factors contributing to the rapid 
transformations we are seeing are the contemporary information and com-
munication technologies (iCts) and the uses to which they are put— by 
millions and millions of people all around the world. yet another premise 
is the importance of taking into account the evolving political landscape of 
the world, both in the established democracies and in the newer, emerg-
ing ones. (the recent insurrections against several authoritarian regimes 
are of course also highly significant, but lie beyond the limits of this pre-
sentation.) these changing political landscapes are facilitating increased 
communication across national boundaries. the upshot here is that today 
we have a much wider range of actors who are engaged in various ways 
in politics in the global arena. Moreover, the character of politics and the 
modes of participation are taking newer forms as a result of the affordances 
of the iCts.
i refer to these newer participants in politics in transnational contexts as 
civil society actors. While some of them and their activities may reinforce 
the older patterns of Western dominance of international communication, 
albeit in new ways, on other fronts we see new, non- Western actors and 
settings emerging. international communication research needs to seri-
ously engage with these developments if it is to keep up with changing 
global realities. in particular adding civil society actors to the existing ros-
ter of nation- states, private corporations, official international bodies, and 
major media organizations would be an important step.
if we seek to understand such actors analytically, the recent and some-
what sprawling literature on cosmopolitanism— if carefully selected— can 
help us get theoretical handles on the contexts and the modes of agency 
involved, as well as the subjective horizons and normative visions of the 
actors. this literature derives from various currents in moral and political 
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philosophy and from social scientific efforts at various levels of abstraction. 
While the social scientific efforts as yet remain in the minority, i would 
argue that we still have here a very fertile terrain that invites engagement 
from scholars in international communication. the theoretic horizon in 
turn needs to be complemented with empirical strategies, and if the cur-
rent critiques about the limitations that the traditional quantitative meth-
ods can offer are to be taken seriously, i would suggest that the terrain i am 
pointing to offers ample opportunity for using expanded methodological 
toolkits.
in what follows, i will first offer an overview of this perspective, situat-
ing it within the current discussions about international communication. 
from there i introduce the horizons of cosmopolitanism, and endeavour 
to establish its conceptual utility. then i take up the changing media land-
scape and look at some civil society actors— social movements engaged in 
alter- globalization campaigns— to exemplify my argument. i end with a 
few short reflections on research methodology.
Getting Our Bearings
The Force Fields of the Field
as in just about any field of inquiry, international communication has a 
number of tensions around what are suitable theories, concepts, method-
ologies, intellectual currents, in short: what the field is about. these dis-
cussions, in various versions, have been with us at least four decades and 
have in fact become quite “normal”— which we can take as a sign of health. 
indeed, too much complacency may signal that a field has reached its twi-
light years.
one, admittedly oversimplified, way of rendering the current tensions 
is to see them at expressing the ambivalence between defining the field 
in a narrow and neat way, thus providing clarity and certainty of mission, 
reducing ambiguity. the other is to take an expansive approach, probing, 
exploratory, seeing what new intellectual elements can be incorporated— 
with the risk of contributing to fuzziness, too much heterogeneity, and 
fueling factionalism. this chapter lands firmly on the side of the expansive, 
and advocates engagement with phenomena and literature that have not 
seen as part of the field’s mainstream.
as several of the authors in his volume discuss, international commu-
nication has found itself in the force field between several meta- theoretic 
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horizons, or paradigms, over the past decades. from development and 
modernization, to cultural imperialism and globalization, there has been 
a quest for an integrative analytic vision. even the most recent paradigm 
on offer, globalization, seems to fall short of delivering what is needed. 
globalization theories encompass a very broad range of elements, issues, 
and debates; there is no unified theory to culled from all this. the term 
thus remains at an abstract level, and is not directly useful as a paradigm 
for the field. however, it offers concepts and perspectives that interna-
tional communication studies can draw on. if globalization is theoretically 
too dispersed a concept, the various concrete historical— and empirical— 
developments that we associate with it remain of the utmost relevance.
the effort to establish an overarching paradigm should be abandoned 
since even its non- attainment serves a useful purpose of highlighting issues 
and clarifying positions. in the meantime, we also hear many calls, also in 
this volume, to continue with the de- Westernization of the field, open-
ing it up to more scholars and perspectives beyond the united states and 
europe. few would argue against this goal, though most will acknowledge 
the array of difficulties involved. yet it is a concrete aim that we all can 
share and strive for, and the perspective i offer here certainly points in that 
direction as well.
The Global Media Environment
returning to the theme of the concrete manifestations of globalization, 
tsan- Kuo Chang in his chapter underscores how the terrain of interna-
tional communication began to change rapidly in the 1990s as other chan-
nels began to follow Cnn’s model from the 1980s of 24/7 tv news. With 
their national or regional bases, they began to seriously compete with the 
established channel such as the bbC and Cnn, offering news and com-
mentary from their particular view of the world. this heterogenization of 
what he calls the “global media environment” has had a major impact on the 
character of contemporary international communications, with new actors 
injecting new social and political angles into the transnational symbolic mi-
lieux. from our present historical location we can see that this global media 
environment is now undergoing yet another dramatic change in the face 
of the widely accessible iCts and their affordances. this new era of digital 
communication allows actors all over the world to enter into international 
communication via a wide array of platforms and communicative modes on 
the internet and its ancillary technologies, such as mobile telephony.
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the sheer scale of this activity is altering the center of gravity of inter-
national communication, in the sense that the empirical realities of who is 
actually communicating what across national boundaries— and to whom, 
for what purpose, and with what effect— are undergoing profound trans-
formation. the communicative spaces of transnational settings are now 
populated by millions of actors who previously had no position or role 
in these contexts. even if we leave aside all the trans- border electronic 
communication that is essentially personal or private in character, we are 
still left with a huge range of individuals, groups, organizations, networks, 
and movements of many kinds whose communicative practices have to do 
with political, economic, social, or cultural realms and can in some way be 
described as “public.” all these actors and their practices defy easy clas-
sification, but as a first analytic step, however, let us speak of civil soci-
ety actors, signifying people and groups who operate beyond both formal 
nation- states and major economic entities.
Civil Society Actors and Alter- Globalization
transnational civil society actors vary greatly in their fundamental raison 
d’être. some are humanitarian in their orientation, and others are en-
gaged in social or cultural networking, for example diasporic or religious 
groups. Many of these actors are involved in various genres of advocacy, 
for themselves or as representatives of larger causes or interest groups. a 
good number of these actors work in tandem with large established inter-
national organizations such as the united nations or the european union, 
which actively consult with civil society organizations. Many such actors 
have become a significant factor at the level of policy making. there is a 
large range of explicitly political actors; some give voice to long- standing, 
protracted conflicts, others air newly emerged ones, while yet others are 
working politically to alter the behavior of governments, regulatory bod-
ies, or corporations based on normative visions of global change. for some 
political actors religion is a motivational force. Many civil society actors 
display healthy democratic profiles. others may have goals or use prac-
tices that are questionable, even from within the wide range of definitions 
and interpretations of democracy that circulate in the world today. hate 
groups, racists, and others with obviously anti- democratic and uncivil vi-
sions of the world (e.g., terrorist organizations) fall outside the definition 
of global civil society given that their ambitions run counter to the ideals 
of democracy. however, there will no doubt always be a definitional gray 
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zone here about who are legitimate actors in global civil society, precisely 
because the concept of democracy itself remains contested.
in terms of organization we encounter here the broad terrain of non- 
governmental organizations (ngos): non- profit organizations, activist 
networks, interest and advocacy groups of all kinds, including at times very 
amorphous social movements. even alternative journalistic organizations 
figure here, the most well known being indymedia. in short, there is an 
ever expanding domain of global civil society, where international com-
munication is taking place in a myriad of crisscrossing patterns. one of the 
striking features about all this civic and political international communica-
tion is that the range of actors and the breadth of the ideological spectrum 
visible in global public spheres has become so much larger than it was 
prior to the spread of digital itCs beginning in the mid- 1990s. thus, the 
rather unified and bounded view of international communication has be-
come more heterogeneous, as the field begins to incorporate the perspec-
tive of global civil society. some literature on these developments retains 
to a greater or lesser degree the framework of international communica-
tion, slotting global civil society into this tradition (e.g., Chandler, 2006; 
eberly, 2008; scholte, 2011), while other studies frame global civil society 
in terms of critical engagement with power relations on the transnational 
level. such contributions often have little interface with the field as such, 
yet are obviously dealing with phenomena that have to do with interna-
tional communication (e.g., drache, 2008; Keane, 2003; Keck & sikkink, 
1998; thörn, 2009; Walker & thompson, 2008).
for my purposes, i want to identify a particular strand of global civil 
society analysis that derives from this latter, critical approach and focuses 
on what has come to be known as the alter- globalization movement, also 
sometimes called the global justice movement. it is comprised of a variety 
of movements, networks, and organizations that focus on a set of themes 
or issues, such as economic fairness, especially for countries in the global 
south, the environment, human rights, gender issues, labor issues, protec-
tion of indigenous cultures, and so on. the alter- globalization movement 
is thus also large and diverse in itself, but within this corner of global civil 
society there is a basic conceptual unity. it has to do with the struggles to 
find counter- hegemonic alternatives to the present trajectory of neoliberal 
societal development.
these activists are politically on the left, but it is largely a reformist 
movement, seeking to mobilize public opinion and to influence both law-
makers at different levels and corporate actors who are perceived to be do-
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ing societal harm in transnational contexts. another unifying aspect is that 
almost all of these actors have some kind of presence on the internet; in 
fact, it could be argued that without these iCt affordances the movement 
would not be as developed as it has become. even the media themselves 
can become the focus of such activities, especially the attempts to develop 
alternative media practices and more democratic public spheres. (reports 
of such efforts, based on cooperation between activists and academics, are 
found in the two companion volumes by rodriguez, Kidd, & stein, 2010 
and stein, Kidd, & rodriguez, 2009.)
a further element that pulls together much of the alter- globalization 
movement is that there is a loose, overarching organization that has been 
operating for the past decade, the World social forum (Wsf)— which also 
has regional spinoffs, such as the european social forum.
With participants all over the world, and its roots in the global south, 
the Wsf has a strong non- Western profile. it holds a major annual meet-
ing, with tens of thousands participating; these began in brazil as a coun-
terpoint to the davos meetings of global political and economic elites. the 
meetings seek to globally coordinate, build alliances, share knowledge and 
experiences, and develop strategies. the alter- globalization movement 
generally, and the Wsf in particular, has been made academically visible in 
recent years; see, for example, acosta (2009); gills (2011); hosseini (2010); 
Maeckelburgh (2009); Pleyers (2011); sen & Waterman (2007); de sousa 
santos & rodriguez- garavito (2005); smith, della Porta, & Mosca (2007).
Just in passing, it should be mentioned that while the Wsf and global 
civil society generally have benefited enormously from the affordances of 
iCts and the networking they make possible (Castells, 2010), the impacts 
of technologies are always shaped by their interplay with social factors. 
the contingencies that make possible and delimit phenomena can never 
just be reduced to iCt’s. thus, analyses of international communication in 
this regard— and in fact more generally— must take into account the larger 
societal contingencies that come into play.
Cosmopolitanism and International Civic Communication
in another chapter in this volume, silvio Waisbord argues forcefully for 
an increased cosmopolitan character of media studies generally and inter-
national communication more specifically. by this he means “an analytic 
attitude open to multiple perspectives and developments beyond geogra-
phy. . . . at a time of unprecedented mobility of people, ideas, and goods, 
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as well as the porosity of political, economic, and cultural borders, world 
citizenship offers responses to critical issues and urgent needs.” i certainly 
concur, and would further assert that the theme of cosmopolitanism per-
tains not just to the character of the research and the researchers but also 
to the actors themselves and their practices, to those who are engaged in 
global civil society and alter- globalization, and what they do with their me-
dia. We find within the literature on cosmopolitanism a strong normative 
strain that offers an inspirational vision that “another world is possible” (to 
cite Wsf’s slogan).
but there is more: ethical ideals and value commitments are also an 
important foundation for civic transnational practices. Modes of personal 
and group identity that extend beyond one’s own nationality, ethnic, or 
religious group, have shown be crucial in such forms of international 
communication. thus, in the contemporary circumstances of globaliza-
tion, many actors are motivated by thought that has its roots in versions 
of cosmopolitanism. this is definitely not about “moralizing”; rather, this 
horizon suggests that if we are interested in exploring the motivational 
grounds for international communication with global civil society and the 
alter- globalization movement, cosmopolitanism offers us a potentially use-
ful analytic toolkit.
The Horizons of Cosmopolitanism
the notion of cosmopolitanism is of course quite old; even socrates fa-
mously claimed that he was not an athenian, nor a greek, but a citizen of 
the world. immanuel Kant gave the concept a strong ethical dimension in 
his modern version of the world citizen; this element remains prominent 
even today, as the concept is being reinvented. Cosmopolitanism has in re-
cent years become somewhat of a buzzword, but this does not per se make 
it useless or misleading. With the continuing integration of the world via 
the processes of globalization— albeit often in very uneven, unequal, and 
contested ways— the other, or rather the many others, come all the closer 
to us in our everyday lives. on one level we can see cosmopolitanism as an 
expression of concern for the other, transferred to global contexts. More 
specifically— and more useful for research— cosmopolitanism offers an 
analytic frame for approaching issues about social perceptions of and rela-
tions with distant others in the world. Morality, as the fundamental concep-
tions of right and wrong in human affairs— and ethics, as the application, 
or codification of morality into concrete norms of behaviour— constitute, 
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at bottom, the foundation of most human action, even if only implicitly. it 
thereby remains an important analytic angle of vision for understanding 
the social world, not least in the context of international communication.
it could be said that the actual status of cosmopolitanism in today’s 
world gets at best mixed reviews. yes, in the wake of globalization, many 
people across the globe have developed new horizons about themselves 
and the world they live in. We can note with enthusiasm that there is plenty 
of evidence that indicates a growth in engagement in transnational social 
realities and empathy for concrete human situations beyond one’s own na-
tional contexts. and yet . . . many contemporary circumstances make the 
picture more sombre; the inventory of global ills that contest the growth 
of cosmopolitanism is woefully long. not least, the media’s role in these 
contexts is often discouraging, if familiar: they serve all too often to cement 
the mental boundaries between “us and them.”
however, the enormous transnational difficulties that we face challenge 
us all the more to understand, to analyze, and this is evidenced in the ex-
tensive literature that has recently merged on cosmopolitanism. Much of 
it ranges over moral theory and political philosophy (breckenridge et al., 
2002; brock & brighouse, 2005; nussbaum, 2006), addressing the vision of 
a better, more democratic global political order (archibugi, 2008; gould, 
2004; held, 2010) or ethical order (e.g., sullivan & Kymlicka, 2007; ver-
non, 2010); the notion of citizenship, and the issues of rights and inclu-
sion in the contemporary global situation, not least in regard to the eu 
(e.g., benhabib, 2006; habermas, 2006). other interventions address the 
socio- cultural preconditions for cosmopolitanism or its subjective dimen-
sions (e.g., appiah, 2007; beck & Cronin, 2006; hannerz, 1996; Kendall, 
Woodward, & skrbis, 2009; robertson, 2010). a few authors engage with 
cosmopolitanism in a critical way, framing it in terms of a critique of neo-
liberalism (Cheah, 2006; dallmayr, 2003; delanty, 2009; harvey, 2009).
One or Many Cosmopolitanisms?
not surprisingly, all this diverse literature on cosmopolitanism encom-
passes a certain conceptual looseness. Kendall, Woodward, and skrbis 
(2009), in their extensive review, insist that the notion lacks clarity and risks 
becoming all things to all people. given that cosmopolitanism is framed 
in varying ways, the points of tension need to be made visible, even if they 
cannot always be resolved. these authors also note a certain degree of po-
litical naïveté in some of the literature, and in their view there is often an 
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implicit utopian drive to construct a new world of tolerant and responsible 
citizens, with little analytic insight on how to get there. not least some of 
the literature tends to ignore major global divides, a point also made by 
david harvey’s (2009) critical evaluation of several key authors. discus-
sions of cosmopolitanism would probabaly be more fruitful if the moral 
dimension were a bit more modest and if the concept could be developed 
more in an empirical manner.
in a recent publication, Corpus ong (2009) discusses how theorists in 
various disciplines view cosmopolitanism, which he takes to be an “open-
ness to the world.” he derives four basic categories, under which major 
authors are placed: closed (i.e., un- or anti- cosmopolitan), prestige (where 
status and privilege are closely associated with it), banal (an everyday, “or-
dinary” openness to otherness as an expression of one’s own identity), and 
ecstatic, a kind of visionary enthusiasm. such a map can no doubt help one 
navigate through the literature— and one will likely find that quite a few 
authors end up in the “ecstatic” category.
a more specific issue that abounds in the literature has to do with the 
basic tension between universalism and the particular (or local, or national). 
is there one set of cosmopolitan values and perceptions, a “one- size- fits- 
all”? the answers have political implications. in their introduction, breck-
enridge et al. (2002) propose that the concept be used in the plural, and not 
be associated with the unitary, privileged position of the european tradi-
tion, since the motivation and capacity to reflect on those beyond one’s 
own culture is to be found in all regions of the world. the chapters of the 
book explore modes of cosmopolitanism in different regions of the non- 
Western world.
on the other hand, bryan s. turner (2002) draws on the sixteenth- 
century writer Michel Montaigne to develop a sense of universal cosmo-
politan virtue. turner sees Montaigne as espousing what he calls the softer 
(feminine) values of mercy, compassion, and tenderness— in response to 
the horrors of the wars of his time. Cosmopolitan virtue basically encom-
passes pacifist values that preclude violence and promote human agency 
and dignity. turner argues that cosmopolitan virtue involves an opposition 
to suffering and “constitutes a standpoint that both transcends and unites 
different cultures and historical epochs” (p. xx). indeed, he asserts that the 
vulnerability of the human body provides a starting point for an account of 
human commonality and compassion as the basis for a cosmopolitan ethic. 
for him, the un declaration of human rights is obviously a very cosmo-
politan document, which he builds into his argument.
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thus, we can sense an unresolved ambivalence between  cosmopolitan-
ism as an expression of multiple empirical realities around the world and 
as a unitary global ideal, with universalist virtues. turner takes a clear stand 
against moral relativism: cosmopolitan virtue is not compatible with indif-
ference. however, one could respond that turner’s position is “easy”: to 
reduce physical suffering is perhaps not so controversial. in situations that, 
for example, have to do with expressions of minority community member-
ship in majoritarian cultural settings (e.g., apparel of religious expression), 
it may not always be so easy to identify an operable cosmopolitan ethic. 
and the espousal of universalism has not seldom stumbled into the terrain 
of ethnocentrism and cultural power.
The Power Dimension
thus, even if we cannot readily resolve this tension, in treating cosmo-
politanism as a dimension of culture we at some point have to touch base 
with the themes of history and power,  as harvey (2009) argues. Culture 
in today’s world is of course not some simple mirroring of the flow of eco-
nomic and political power from centres to peripheries, yet the history of 
colonialism makes it difficult to deny the importance of these mechanisms 
(and here of course the structures of the media and the patterns of their 
representation loom especially large). in short, if globalization constitutes 
the key contemporary condition for the actualization of cosmopolitan-
ism, then the prevailing power relations (and their historical origins) in 
the global arena would seemingly have importance for understanding the 
character and possibilities of cosmopolitanism.
yet, the horizon of power does not always appear in the literature on 
cosmopolitanism; as with the literature on globalization, most versions 
avoid this topic. global power can of course be approached from a number 
of angles, not least through the political economy of the world system, 
but the perspective of post- colonialism offers a significant cultural prism 
through which to view cosmopolitanism. Post- colonialism, in ways similar 
to cultural studies (with which it at times blends together), is sensitive to 
how culture and the production of meaning are always bound up in some 
way or other with relations of power.
it is interesting to note that in the past two decades or so that two key 
theoretic traditions— globalization (with its home largely in the social sci-
ences) and post- colonialism (hovering more in the humanities)— have had 
relatively little encounter with each other. they seemingly exist in par-
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allel universes, when in fact they should be very much entwined— even 
if this lack of interaction is beginning to be addressed (for example, see 
the collection by Krishnaswamy & hawley, 2008). for cosmopolitanism, 
post- colonialism can serve to help alert us to the historical antecedents 
of a vast array of aspects where power, especially cultural power, has rel-
evance: patterns of cultural influences, images of the other, identity pro-
cesses, integration/assimilation, language use, institution- building, and so 
on. Conceptually and empirically cosmopolitanism cannot be reduced to 
a mere function of power, yet neither can power be ignored. if it is not 
obviously manifest, then it is always hovering there— in both micro- and 
macro- circumstances. Power evokes counter- power, so it is not simply a 
case of unidirectional and deterministic mechanisms, even though hege-
monic positions are usually prevalent.
Media and Civic Cosmopolitanism
The Media Connection
oddly enough, the media have not figured extensively in the literature on 
cosmopolitanism. one major empirical effort to establish the contours of 
links between media use and cosmopolitan mind- sets is found in norris 
and inglehart (2009). generally, it seems that exposure to global media will 
promote cosmopolitanism. however, the authors underscore the research 
complexity of establishing causal relationships, and make the point that 
there also many non- media variables at work. More focused efforts are 
found in boltanski (1999), who addresses in a theoretic manner the theme 
of recognizing and identifying with distant others via news coverage of 
suffering; Chouliaraki (2006), who addresses this theme but in a more rig-
orously empirical manner; and robertson (2010), who takes a broader look 
at television news, its journalists/editors, and viewers around the world to 
elucidate the role of the media in fostering cosmopolitan horizons. Lai 
(2008) probes these themes from the horizons of the internet. this litera-
ture underscores the media’s importance for cosmopolitanism, while at the 
same time reminding us of the limits of our knowledge in these matters.
another angle on the media’s connection to cosmopolitanism is found 
in roger silverstone’s (2006) last major work. the book’s style is more 
essayistic than empirical, and has more of the normative character of the 
dominant literature on cosmopolitanism. however, it assumes that the me-
dia play a decisive role in the constitution of late modernity and its forms 
of globalization. it provides a useful starting point for some reflections on 
Revised Pages
Cosmopolitanism and International Communication •  293
international communication and cosmopolitanism, with a focus on their 
relationship to democracy. More specifically, i want to highlight his basic 
ideas with an eye toward cosmopolitanism as a necessary element for civic 
agency in the modern globalized world, and the character of the media as 
a precondition for such agency.
silverstone navigates carefully between optimism and pessimism, yet 
he clearly is conveying an ambitious vision. he also adroitly balances the 
tension between one or many cosmopolitanisms: he pushes strongly for 
a generalized shared ethics of responsibility for the other, but adamantly 
acknowledges that people’s actions and moral frameworks must be contin-
gent on their circumstances if they are to be meaningful and effective. he 
argues that media today have imposed conditions of cosmopolitanism on 
us: we can— and must— respond accordingly from the standpoint of our 
own lives. not least, he is very much aware of the significance of power 
relations, especially in regard to the institutions and functioning of the 
media. this ushers us into the realm of democracy and civil society actors. 
however, i will first backtrack a bit and summarize his main points.
The Mediapolis
in brief, silverstone observes that the media are becoming what he calls 
“environmental”: they no longer can be seen as simply discrete flows of 
messages or information, but rather take on the character of dense symbolic 
ecologies that penetrate just about every corner of our existence. What he 
terms the mediapolis is composed of the vast communicative space of me-
diated global appearances. it is via the media that the world appears to us 
and where appearance constitutes the world. it is through the media that 
we learn who we are— and who we are different from, and where relations 
between self and other are conducted in a global public arena. the media 
establish connections and relationships; they position us in the world.
the mediapolis is both a normative and an empirical term. empiri-
cally, it is something other than a rational habermasian public sphere; it 
is cacophonic, with multiple voices, inflections, images, and rhetoric— it 
resides beyond logic and rationality, and it cannot offer any expectation of 
fully effective communication. the communications dynamic that silver-
stone sees here he calls contrapunctual: each communicative thread gains 
significance at best only in relationship to others— together, the ensemble 
of tension- ridden, contradictory communicative interventions comprise 
the tumultuous whole.
normatively, however, despite differences in communicative and other 
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forms of power, the mediapolis demands mutual responsibility between 
producers and audiences/users, as well as a capacity for reflexivity on the 
part of all involved, including recognition of cultural differences. this 
moral response is expressed in our responsibility for thinking, speaking, 
listening, and acting. it of course raises issues of the kinds of reality created 
by the mediapolis, the kinds of publicness, who appears— and how— as well 
as who does not appear. there is clearly an element of media power here: 
definitional control lies most immediately with the media organizations, 
but silverstone emphasizes that there is still responsibility on all sides. 
Journalists, editors, and producers have a responsibility for the representa-
tions they offer, while audiences/users have an obligation to reflect on what 
they encounter and to respond in an ethical manner— both to the world 
portrayed and toward the media.
the notion of mediapolis is a thus a challenge, a challenge to ineq-
uities of representation, mechanisms of exclusion, the imbalances of me-
dia power (via both state and capital), and “the ideological and prejudicial 
frames of unreflexive reporting and storytelling” (silverstone, 2006, p. 37). 
the media, in their representations of the world, inevitably engage in what 
he calls boundary work: boundaries are constantly being drawn, reinforced, 
and altered between various constellations of “us and them.” in underscor-
ing the significance of morality and ethics, silverstone means that moral 
dimensions should become a focus of analytic concern, just as social, po-
litical, and cultural perspectives are part of our analytic approach to the 
processes of communication.
From Morality to Global Civic Engagement
in all this silverstone admits that we have an enormous difficulty to deal 
with. the public, as the aggregate of the audiences of mediapolis, is hardly 
an efficacious agent. thought, speech, and action are disconnected and 
compromised by absence of context, memory, and analytic rigour, and in-
creasingly, by the absence of trust, and  we witness patterns of withdrawal 
from the public realm into the private— in fact, precisely the major di-
lemmas confronting democracy. though he does not have much to say in 
concrete terms about political agency, silverstone’s political sensibility in-
dicates that the mediapolis is not only a site for moral response, but, poten-
tially, for practices. the cosmopolitan moral agent must move beyond the 
state of merely thinking about his or her responsibility; it must be enacted, 
embodied via some kind of action (which, in the context of the political, 
will often take some form of communication).
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such a proactive social ethics, which demands engagement with and 
responsibility for global others, points us toward cosmopolitan citizenship, 
which engages with the world not least via the mediapolis, in a manner that 
is strongly tied to some version of democracy. this link between cosmo-
politanism and democratic civic agency— i call it civic cosmopolitanism— 
involves translating the cosmopolitan moral stance into concrete political 
contexts that benefit not just our own interests but those of globalized 
others. Cosmopolitanism becomes thus an inexorable dimension of con-
temporary global civic virtue and agency.
it is here, in a sense at the outer edges of his work, where i would like to 
pick up his baton and run with it. i have previously grappled with how to 
understand civic agency, that is, to comprehend the subjective realities that 
can promote people’s engagement in politics and the role of the media in 
this regard (dahlgren, 2009). i sketched such themes as the globalization 
of citizenship, civil society, and political activism, as well as the relevant 
media circumstances. however, the transnational dimension remained un-
derdeveloped. there was really no conceptual connection between such 
agency and global moral responsibility. i find that silverstone’s book, with 
its promotion of cosmopolitanism and its normative anchoring, invites us, 
in a compelling manner, to better conceptualize those links.
in talking about the mediapolis, silverstone tends to foreground the 
mass media, but underscores how the internet and ancillary technologies 
are altering its basic parameters. he rightly points out that, in terms of 
publicness, the internet requires the mass media as a referent, a context, 
to avoid spiraling away into small isolated islands. (the internet itself has 
of course the character of mass mediated communication.) if we thus con-
nect his framework of the mediapolis with the realm of net- based global 
civil society in general, and the alter- globalization movement and Wsf 
in particular, we bring into focus a relatively specific and delimited group 
of actors who engage in international communication. We of course lose 
from sight the vast majority of people in online mediapolis who are not 
thus engaged, but in the interests of keeping an eye on possible research it 
is important to narrow our focus.
Researching the Civic Cosmopolitanism of Alter- Globalization
over the past decade and a half, a new generation of international com-
municators has been emerging across the globe, using iCts in new and 
imaginative ways. among these civil society actors is the alter- globalization 
movement, with the Wsf. these actors are motivated in strongly norma-
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tive terms; they have a variety of goals, all aimed at transforming the cur-
rent direction of global development. they meet live, face to face, on many 
occasions, but also make extensive use of the digital media. they are op-
erating in a mediapolis where they constitute counter- hegemonic voices 
to the dominant representations that support neoliberal mechanisms for 
driving society forward.
Empirical and Comparative Angles
there are two obvious and complementary lines of empirical research 
open here. one has to do with the nature of the international communi-
cation that flows from these groups. here we can distinguish that which 
is intended as internal communication— within and between groups, even 
across national borders. the other is communication directed to the out-
side world, to global publics, but even to decision makers, to power hold-
ers. i find the latter the more relevant one. a good starting place is the 
official website, www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/, which is available in 
Portuguese, english, french, and spanish. there are different kinds of in-
formation available, including journalistic news, organizational and mobi-
lizational information, including developments in preparation for the next 
annual World social forum meeting. one can follow links and pursue top-
ics, debates, and continue to the information made available by the vast 
number of specific participating networks, groups, and movements.
the other line of research has to do with the actors themselves, as in-
dividuals and members of collectivities. their backgrounds, motivations, 
perceptions,  organizational strategies, media use, and so on open up many 
avenues of possible research. the grounds for their civic identities and 
practices in particular, coupled not least to the cosmopolitan themes of 
global others, their moral horizons, offer fertile research possibilities.
such research is very much in its infancy. Lai (2008) offers some concep-
tual starts in regard to online activism; the work of de sousa santos (2005) 
offers a number of important concrete insights on the horizons of Wsf 
activists. uldam (2010) takes some important steps in such explorations in 
studying the identities, commitments, and strategies of two groups engaged 
in global justice issues in London. a general line of questioning can be built 
upon the extensive work already done in national contexts, exploring what 
factors promote and inhibit civic engagement and participation in social 
movement and political groups, and also how the media may (or may not) 
help generate civic cultures (see dahlgren, 2009 for an overview).
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in such research efforts directed towards the actor and their media 
practices, the comparative dimension should be a strong guide: one could 
study comparable groups and their communication practices in different 
geographical locations, or the interface between such alternative political 
communication and mainstream versions. how do such communications 
“travel” in the global mediapolis, what impact does it have, how does it re-
late to mainstream forms of communication on such topics, and what does 
all this mean for the character of international communication? Western 
and non- Western dimensions could figure prominently here. also, the on-
line world is in rapid transition, and alter- globalization efforts are increas-
ingly making use of popular platforms such as youtube to gain access to 
larger audiences (see askanius & gustafsson, 2010). how does this alter 
their communicative strategies and their identities? What are the impli-
cations of inserting politics into a media environment that is so strongly 
tilted toward popular culture and entertainment? Comparisons of strate-
gies in various sectors of the mediapolis and their political efficacy can be 
seen as a research theme of growing relevance. Possible data include the 
media productions of various groups, their coverage of events, and the dis-
cussions and comments that ensure.
there is of course an ethical dimension to such research: what mo-
tivates it, what knowledge will it generate, for whom will it be useful, 
and in particular what relationship and responsibility will one have to 
those one studies. such issues need to be clarified in advance of any such 
undertaking— for oneself as a researcher and for those that one wants to 
research. research on these actors and their practices can and should be 
incorporated into the broader development of the field of international 
communication, helping us to understand exactly in what ways it is evolv-
ing as a result of these developments.
Negotiating Methodology
Chin- Chuan Lee argues in his chapter that cultural meanings need to be 
taken more into account in the research of international communication. 
and Jan servaes, also in this volume, takes up the methodological issue of 
moving beyond the strict quantitative approaches that have characterized 
the field and underscores, among other things, the need for focusing in-
creased research attention on the power of culture. We need to understand 
agency from the point of view of the agents, from the meaning such action 
has for them. from my vantage point, these appeals direct us precisely 
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toward the importance of the normative and cultural frameworks of civic 
international communication actors, and these can be refracted at least in 
part through the prism of cosmopolitanism.
i find it unproductive to get locked into trench warfare over method-
ologies, since no one method is inherently privileged, no one approach a 
priori better or worse than any other. rather, it is the kinds of knowledge 
we are looking for, the research questions posed, and the kinds of materi-
als we have at hand that are ultimately decisive. having said that, it would 
seem that any effort to probe the self- perceptions, motivations, and iden-
tity of social actors will at some point have to mobilize qualitative meth-
ods. through depth interviews and onsite observations, processes of sense- 
making and reality construction can be illuminated. Likewise, in analyzing 
media products, the elucidation of meaning, the illumination of discourses 
mobilized, and not least the multi- media dimensions of much of the mate-
rials (visuals, sound, and text) suggest that qualitative methods are needed.
however, such approaches most definitely need not stand in opposi-
tion to quantitative procedures; the two have often been productively com-
bined. for example, a quantitative overview of specific media materials can 
often provide an important profile, and will function very well together 
with deeper qualitative analyses of selected portions. the two strategies 
become complementary. similarly, larger survey interviews of actors can 
serve well in relation to depth interviews with a more limited number. 
over the past decades we have seen “cultural turns” in the social sciences, 
and the growth of qualitative approaches aimed at analyzing the processes 
of social construction, by which people produce meaning and define the 
social world and their place in it. We have seen this not least in the area of 
media and communication research, with an increase of cultural theories 
and methods. it is hardly controversial, and it would be puzzling if inter-
national communication were for some reason to define itself as off limits 
for such procedures.
Quantitative methods per se should not be automatically equated with 
“positivism,” nor are qualitative approaches an automatic guarantee of 
research quality. rather, positivism has to do with what habermas once 
called “a refusal to reflect.” as researchers, we always have to be alert not 
only about what we are studying, we must also periodically question our 
own assumptions and pre- understandings. that way we develop not just 
our field of inquiry but also ourselves. the study of mediated civic cosmo-
politanism offers an opportunity to do both.1
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Postcolonial Visual Culture 
Arguments from India
arvind rajagopal
analysts of visual culture have only recently begun to reckon with the 
complexity of postcolonial visual culture in those regions where a history 
of semi- colonial or colonial rule remains important in understanding the 
period of national development thereafter. “Postcolonial” is a historical 
marker, therefore, and a reminder that where efforts at modernization 
were accompanied or preceded by struggles against foreign rule, a distinct 
set of conditions apply that need to be specified in any adequate attempt 
at historical analysis. for example, some or more aspects of modernization 
are usually perceived as a foreign import in postcolonial countries. given 
that nation- centered development is the modal political form of modern-
ization, the nation- state has to negotiate the differences between the forms 
of knowledge that existed previously and more modern forms of knowl-
edge. the authority of these new and more “modern” forms of knowledge 
seldom acquire the same status they have in the West, where two or more 
centuries span a similar process. images, as a privileged mode of communi-
cating knowledge in modernity, become a key site for negotiating and con-
testing authority. how this happens, and what we can learn from analyzing 
the visual culture arising in the process, is worth considering. Certainly 
it is clear that “international communications” as a field of study did not 
anticipate the new forms of visual communication that would arise across 
the world, or the effects such communication would have.
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recent work by scholars acknowledges that postcolonial media culture 
presents discontinuous temporalities and complex aesthetic forms that chal-
lenge routine ways of relating the history of media form to conventional 
historical processes (Curtin, 2007; fox & Waisbord, 2002; Jain, 2007; Lee, 
2003; Pinney, 2004; ramaswamy, 2010; servaes, 2008). for example, visual 
realism appears as only one among a range of options utilized by cultural 
producers in south, southeast, or east asia, to mention a few regional ex-
amples, despite extensive and sophisticated communications industries in 
those regions. technological sophistication does not always lead to the an-
nihilation of older aesthetic forms, but may instead provoke their renewal, 
whether martial arts film and their link to beijing opera traditions or myth-
ological epic traditions and their transformation in india and elsewhere.
for scholarship on earlier periods, by comparison, arguably a greater 
scholarly consensus prevails about the protocols of research and argument, 
and there exist more accessible archives. or else scholars have focused on 
specific crafts and technologies of visual culture such as painting, print, or 
film, deferring broader questions about the institutionalization of visual 
practices across media that socialize audiences into new habits of perception. 
image making in postcolonial society is now so extensive and multifarious 
however, and the questions they pose are so unpredictable, that the guide-
lines for inquiry available from nationalist historiography, art, and cultural 
criticism or from postcolonial social sciences are manifestly inadequate.
With the proliferation of media technology and of mediatic forms 
across print, cinema, television, mobile telephones, and the internet, south 
asia seems to have arrived at a communicative modernity in the space of 
barely two decades, or from the first gulf War onwards, when satellite tele-
vision was launched in the region. globally, south asia’s communicative 
modernity signaled a post– Cold War period defined by intensification of 
securocratic regimes of visual surveillance, and geopolitical alignments or-
ganized around islamic “terror” instead of the specter of communism.1 in 
india alone, the past two decades have witnessed a compressed series of de-
velopments. the long- delayed market prominence of indigenous language 
media in relation to english was closely followed by the ascendancy of an 
aggressive strain of hindu nationalism that has taken on a new intensity 
with the growth of privately owned media. on the other hand, the dense 
spread of television news coverage provides greater visibility to a host of 
actors and events, with diverse political agenda, from terrorists in Mumbai 
who use the media as surveillance aids to a growing Maoist campaign in 
defense of tribal land rights that is gaining public sympathy.2 hence to 
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simply associate increasing media density with growing support for any 
specific postcolonial ideology would be misleading. however, the larger 
context of india’s new economy within which both of the above problems 
have emerged suggests the need to historically situate questions of media 
visibility and density, and explore ways to produce multi- causal, or contin-
gent, models of explanation.
in south asia, greater communication has neither seen the reduction of 
violence nor an increase in political transparency in any simple sense. since 
the 1937 provincial elections in india, the authorities have tended to over-
look mass violence, while the culprits and their sponsors have tended to 
derive electoral capital from targeted acts of violence.  investigative jour-
nalism, including the release of “sting” videos, confirms the existence of 
institutionalized corruption and secrecy without altering them. hindu mil-
itant groups can paralyze the entire country, such as around the anticipa-
tion of violence over a court ruling on the demolition of a historic mosque. 
When the culprits are rewarded rather than punished, sober media com-
mentators celebrate the verdict for having thwarted further violence.
Clearly, visuality does not always work in the ways enlightenment 
thinkers assumed.3 greater visibility in public does not ensure more ratio-
nality, nor does a greater density of information flow assure less violence 
or more democratization. on the one hand there are those who assert the 
demystifying gaze of the modern imagination, according to which “seeing 
is believing.” on the other hand we can observe the enchantment or glam-
our in what millions behold, for which the opposite may be true, that is, 
“believing is seeing.” analysts of postcolonial visual culture would need to 
acknowledge both of these possibilities, while specifying what happens to 
each term in this reversible proposition, in this age of digital reproduction. 
south asia provides a useful site for such discussion given its manifestly 
heterogeneous visual practices alongside a growing homogenization of 
screen culture that introduces new regimes of surveillance and regulation.4 
the specific question this chapter will pose is whether postcolonial visual 
culture itself displays regularities over time that can illuminate the modes 
of political performance, while avoiding historicism, that is, the presump-
tion that historical context determines both media and meaning, as well as 
technological determinism.
Media as/and a History of the Senses
i take it for granted that the senses are interconnected, and that their 
separation occurs through technological means. technologically mediated 
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forms of sense perception recombine and acquire a prosthetic character 
with the growth of the apparatuses of communication. for instance, when 
sound and light from audio- visual media impinge on the observer, they 
convey or imply the sense of touch at the same time. here i draw on Mar-
shall McLuhan (1994), who theorized the media as the interface between 
the body and technology, correlating communication technologies with 
changing ratios of sense perception. McLuhan argued that audio- visual 
media require to be read not so much on the register of visual and auditory 
perceptions as on that of tactility. hence the immediate apperception from 
mass media, McLuhan argued, was one of intimacy rather than remoteness. 
the result was that rules of social distance reflecting understandings of hi-
erarchy or potency, that is, vis- à- vis class and gender differences, appeared 
to shift or erode due to media impact.
McLuhan provided an ingenious argument about the power of media, 
linking concerns about social order and the fear of the crowd to latent ap-
prehensions about the power of Communist ideology, with the possibility 
of utopian transcendence. if the medium was the message, it implied that 
propaganda, the feared weapon of the east bloc, would be neutralized by 
the character of modern media, which might in fact serve as silent allies of 
the West in the Cold War. the “global village” fashioned from the expan-
sion of communications could be a friendly and intimate space, he sug-
gested, in a distinctly north american conception of community.
McLuhan also provided a genealogy of the West that defined backward-
ness in terms of media literacy, but without overt condescension. electric 
media, McLuhan argued, “re- tribalized” Western man, and allowed him 
to overcome inherited, print- dominated forms of rationality. Modern me-
dia, he claimed, enabled forms of communication that were both more in-
dividualized and more communal, both “hot” and “cool.” the argument 
was difficult to follow, and perhaps ultimately incoherent, but it served 
an important purpose. it insisted that technology was not other to human 
beings, but altered their capacities in ways that quickly “became” them, 
although human beings might fail to recognize it. and technology could 
be used to order world history in a cumulative sequence of developments 
while acknowledging then- prevalent trends of cultural auto- critique. if 
mass media were the problem, more media, intelligently applied, could be 
the cure. the dominance of the West was thus simultaneously acknowl-
edged, criticized, and offered again as a possible overcoming of its previous 
limitations, provided the appropriate steps were taken.
McLuhan’s broad schema provided little room for sensory histories that 
were discrepant with his teleological argument, except to relegate them 
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as “old media.” new media, in this view, provide the form of all media; 
they defined the sense ratio of older media, until supplanted by newer me-
dia. he did not consider how uneven technological impact might result 
in highly contingent forms of individual and collective action that were 
not predicted by his schema. despite the global ambition of his theories, 
McLuhan’s imagination was itself more parochial, and showed the limits of 
its Western origins.
Media as Totality?
the assumption that the media could create a level playing field where 
society can effectively be unified gained enormous prestige, and was pro-
moted by u.s.- based think tanks and philanthropic foundations during the 
Cold War. a version of this assumption can be seen in daniel Lerner’s 
The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), where mass media, from print to 
radio, are believed to stimulate empathy for modernization, in an account 
that anticipates some elements of McLuhan. such assumptions align media 
with a normative conception of state power, hence their importance for 
projects of planned development across the world.
yet in contexts where the link between development and modernization 
was understood variously, the spread of technological communication was 
known to have unpredictable outcomes. Modern apparatuses of communi-
cation are argued to have transformed social interaction and its conception, 
from the hierarchical cosmologies of the medieval age to the anonymous, 
horizontal sodalities of print capitalism, in a rationalizing effect that is tac-
itly presumed to be ongoing. the underlying modernist conceit is that so-
cial interactions can be redrawn through the intervention of communica-
tions technology, and that there is, for all practical purposes, no “outside”: 
the media and society, it is held, map congruently onto one another. the 
deeper underlying supposition is that of knowability, or predictability. the 
growth of mass media can in this understanding be likened to the spread 
of light across a terrain, leading to the ability to cognitively apprehend and 
potentially control what occurs within it.
and yet the growth of mass media in postcolonial societies has mani-
festly not had such an effect. the joint presence of older and more re-
cent forms of fetishistic thinking, such as the alliance between devotional 
and ritualistic forms of worship with commodity culture, for example, or 
the ideals of modernization as initially embodied in the racial difference 
of colonial rulers and subsequently in postcolonial technocrats, points to 
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the creation of new and more complex communicational environments. if 
the practice of vision in south asia enfolded a tension between sight as a 
privileged access to divine truth and everyday life as profane, unimportant, 
or unreal, such understandings were consecrated in a visual culture that 
sharply distinguished between what was good to see and what ought not 
to be revealed.5
as a result, visibility does not always equate with acceptance or popu-
larity, while invisibility may signal secrecy rather than irrelevance in such 
contexts.6 hence, i suggest, the decades- long silence in india attending the 
large- scale killings accompanying the partition of the subcontinent after 
1947 (into india and Pakistan), and the unexpected rupture of this silence 
with the emergence in politics of the so- called angry hindu in the late 
1980s, or for that matter the 1984 massacre and rape of many hundreds of 
sikhs (to name only one such episode) that still awaits its moment of public 
reckoning and redress. in these contexts of violence the notion that the 
truth will set you free, or that power can be transparent, do not have much 
traction. such silences point to a complex and agonistic polity, the majority 
of whose members are excluded from the privileges of a civil society where 
their concerns can be aired and addressed.7
some of the mediatic underpinnings of this complexity are indicated 
by the continued growth of the press even as television expands, and the 
relegation of the english language media to a minority share of the mar-
ket even while it commands the highest advertising revenues. vernacular 
media, meanwhile, increase their audiences at historically high rates. there 
exists here a multilingual market both at regional and national levels. eng-
lish language media never question their status as the more global segment, 
however, thereby confirming their insularity vis- à- vis vernacular media, 
though the latter is the site where affective orders and social relations are 
being changed most rapidly and powerfully.8
new mass media are invariably accompanied by the utopian expecta-
tion that they can help re- imagine the world as unfettered and inclusive 
(rajagopal, 2005). radio, television, and digital media have each been ac-
companied by similar, heady expectations that are unlikely to be realized. 
after all, each medium enters a space already dense with pre- existing me-
dia forms and sedimented communicational practices that seek to define 
or domesticate new media rather than succumb to them. as a result, new 
media reactivate earlier media forms in unexpected ways, rather than erase 
or supplant them. the greater visibility of epic and mythological imag-
ery successively with print, cinema, and television provides a convenient 
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example of the way in which older image repertoires and symbol systems 
have been the vehicle for new communication technologies. for example, 
indian cinema and television gave the appearance, temporarily, of bringing 
audiences together across a public that the state split into more and less 
modern parts, for the purpose of development. however, the same division 
could appear with its polarity reversed due to the experience of nationalist 
mobilization, in terms of less versus more culturally authentic parts. this 
reversible formation, which indicates both the dynamism and instability 
of cultural formation in postcolonial contexts such as south asia, can be 
explained by the concept of a split public, wherein the provisions for the uni-
fication of the different components of the public are variously understood 
across its divisions. that is to say, the expansion of the media did not result in 
greater social unity so much as in greater visibility for existing social divisions.9
a postcolonial analytic of these emergent communication circuits and 
the synthetic forms they take can also make visible how such differences 
work across different domains in society. such an argument challenges the 
habermasian model of the public sphere where ideals of equality are re-
alized in a model of communication based on the contract, while power 
differences are bracketed by the exercise of tact.10 such a model of com-
munication is inadequate for addressing the deep divisions in postcolo-
nial societies. any adequate account of the postcolonial public sphere must 
accommodate not only rational- critical discourse but also contentious 
counter- discourse and political silences, acknowledging that the protocols of 
agreement are not in fact shared. in other words, publicity has to be under-
stood as a site for asserting power, and for power to be visualized.
Postcolonial Visuality
now, in the conventional account of modern society, power is invisible, 
contained in capabilities and in modes of discipline, in rules and institutions 
such as the bureaucracy and the market, rather than in persons, classes, or 
things. such an account was made possible by making invisible those acts 
that in their very operation demonstrated power, for example, the punish-
ment of criminals. one of the ways in which the present age understands 
itself as modern, we now know, is by relegating such activities out of sight 
to the public, and by making them secret.11
at the same time, however, modern modes of seeing presuppose a dis-
embodied gaze, a view “from nowhere” that produces data whose validity 
does not depend on the person who sees. this is because the mechanisms 
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of sight can be technologically reproduced in the absence of a physical 
observer. seeing in modernity therefore has a distinct socio- technical char-
acter. it implies knowing what to see and what not to see, and absorbing the 
rules by which the prevailing threshold of visibility operates, that is, how 
they are socially prescribed and technically reproduced.
Where such rules of vision cannot be assumed to operate, the prevailing 
forms of power tend to be signaled more explicitly by concrete symbols, 
objects, persons, and rituals. they exist to be seen, and in the case of hindu 
religious objects and persons, they are also, conventionally, bestowed with 
the capacity to see. forms of vision in this context confirm who is see-
ing and who is seen, in what has been called an “embodied gaze” (Pinney, 
2004). rather than providing a view from nowhere, the embodied gaze 
validates existing rules of social space rather than disrupts them, because 
the sense of space is not empty, homogeneous, or infinite; rather, it corre-
sponds to the presumption of a bounded, known universe.12
the contrast between these two ways of seeing could be read as the dif-
ference between, say, science and popular culture, or between secular and 
religious life. and the meeting of these different modes of perception could 
be described as an encounter of knowledgeable and naïve ways of seeing, 
but since this also reflects a social hierarchy, a more complete description 
should include the so- called naïve view of the powerful. i do not have the 
space to explore this problem in detail here, but clearly anticolonial na-
tionalism sought to incorporate this difference through charismatic and 
culturalist forms of mobilization, while also offering a program for modern 
economic development.
Communication associated with the former became relegated in na-
tionalist history to the popular level, or was accorded the status of a van-
ishing mediator, while the latter were understood to belong to official 
nationalism.13 and in postcolonial society, while communicational circuits 
are initially largely top- down, for developmental policy implementation, 
for example, the growth of media, especially indian language print and 
electronic media, introduces the possibility of bottom- up forms of com-
munication on a hitherto unprecedented scale.
What postcolonial society brings to collective awareness is the exis-
tence of plural ways of seeing and a form of sovereignty that is not singular 
but divided. With the emergence of a visual regime that cuts across dif-
ferent media platforms, the battle for hegemony between different modes 
of perception is itself a public one, and any attempt to erect one form of 
seeing as dominant cannot be tacit, rendered invisible, or relegated to the 
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corridors of power. the persistence of such contestations over both the 
content and the form of common knowledge, i suggest, ensure that the 
outcomes of postcolonial politics are unpredictable.
The Postcolonial Split Public
the category of the postcolonial remains relevant to mark the agonistic re-
lationship with Western media forms, whose developmental narrative oper-
ates as the standard of measure against which the specificity of postcolonial 
media must be situated. the former are typically ordered on the model of 
technological developments of euro- american provenance, such as print, 
radio, cinema, and television. the result is to relegate theory- generative 
phenomena outside the West to so many varieties of socio- technical imag-
inings, or iterations of media modularity, or as phenomena of interest to 
area specialists and intelligence experts at best. however, postcolonial mo-
dernity is inaugurated not only by submitting to the West but also, and 
crucially, by selectively resisting modernization (rajagopal, 2009).
a well- known argument has it that, to forge unity across their internal 
divisions against colonial power, anticolonial nationalists established their 
claim to sovereignty in the cultural domain, and demarcated it as a distinct 
arena from that of the external world, where the superiority of colonial 
power was undeniable at least for the moment. this result of a nationalist 
compromise arrived at toward the end of the nineteenth century, we are 
told, endures into the postcolonial period.14
the great insight in this argument is the development of a bipartite 
rather than a unitary model of sovereignty in anticolonial nationalism. 
such a model has effectively relegated religion and spirituality to the pri-
vate realm and matters of political economy to the public realm. but each 
of these spaces is characterized by communicative acts that both reify and 
challenge a structural dichotomy between private and public life. as such, 
we could think of each of these realms as, in fact, a “public.” and a commu-
nicative public is by definition something that is in a process of becoming, 
rather than a static element in a model.
the rules in these different publics (“religious” and “political”) diverge, 
but presume each other. for example, colonial power claimed to be a mod-
ernizing influence but relied on force. Meanwhile indigenous society, with 
the growth of nationalism, claimed cultural authenticity as the real seat 
of legitimacy. this split public, held together by coercion as well as by 
consent, was one in which neither segment of the public was transparent 
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to the other. each believed that its claims trumped those of the other’s, but 
the contest was not one that could be adjudicated in rational terms. Post-
colonial development extended this dynamic, by virtue of the demands of 
modernization, with the difference that voters could now elect who would 
govern them. the idea of a split public grasps this process of productive 
misrecognition as a key dialectic shaping and reshaping these agonistic 
spaces (rajagopal, 2001).
Spectacle, Commodity, and the Labor of Seeing
We have seen that the teleological thrust of most varieties of media stud-
ies order themselves by technology (e.g., print, radio, cinema, television). 
below, i speculate on what media, both as perceptual ensemble, and as 
furthering market logics, that is, as both technology and commodity, might 
reveal about emergent postcolonial political forms.
a noteworthy critical argument that theorized the shift in the character 
of visuality in late capitalism is guy debord’s Society of the Spectacle, a text 
that continues to resonate more than a half century after it was written. 
debord argued that everyday life had dissolved into a series of spectacles 
that claimed to unify the world through their representation of it. the 
spectacle was an extension of the commodity, he wrote, and as such was an 
expression of the alienation of expressive from productive life and of capi-
tal’s domination over living labor. however, the distinguishing feature of 
the society of the spectacle, as debord defined it, was that the commodity 
had succeeded in completely colonizing social life, so that commodifica-
tion was coterminous with the known world (debord, 1995).
debord’s argument linked knowledge and power as they manifested in 
the domain of perception. the spectacle claimed a fullness of representa-
tion, offering a transparent window onto the world. What the spectacle 
made visible was real, and what was invisible in the spectacle was neither 
real nor salient. the power of the spectacle was in fact that of regulat-
ing perception, of distinguishing between what was worth seeing and what 
could be ignored. Where the logic of commodification had extended to 
every sphere of life, what was excluded from the spectacle becomes insig-
nificant, in this argument.
debord’s argument embedded visual perception (which in the re-
naissance conception of seeing, presumed agency as a component) with a 
fairly durable epistemic regime where the scope for anyone to intervene 
was limited at best.15 this was because, according to debord, extensive 
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socio- technical apparatuses of communication already encoded the place 
of individual observers within them, and anticipated their response. truth 
or accuracy of depiction were less relevant criteria of perception than the 
extent to which existing circuits of communication “recognized” what was 
sought to be circulated, and assisted in the propagation of those elements 
that enhanced capital accumulation and reinforced “the spectacle.”
The Society of the Spectacle is a polemical rather than a dispassionate text. 
it presents an analysis whose totalizing force is more provocative than it 
is precise. it responded to a context, namely post– World War ii europe, 
which debord saw as pacified by americanization following the allied vic-
tory and the ensuing Marshall Plan. in this sense it was an early critical 
response to media globalization from within the West.16
a significant portion of the world’s population, however, lives outside 
a fully commoditized market economy, and relies for its sustenance on 
other sources such as land, or on non- market relations of charity, servi-
tude, welfare, and so forth. this is not to say that they are therefore alto-
gether insulated from the modern world, and from what debord calls the 
spectacle. the extensive reach of government agencies through a range 
of service and surveillance functions (including welfare), and the profu-
sion of both state and non- state communicational programs, for example 
in a country like india, from religious festivals and election propaganda to 
marketing campaigns, leave few if any untouched. in such contexts, images 
reproduced by various technological means have become familiar now, al-
though more so in urban areas, from cell phones to the cinema, television 
and video, to say nothing of billboards, periodicals, and posters (rajagopal, 
2010, pp. 209– 28).
the spectacle in such contexts is not so much an extension of commod-
ity logic as it is a site where heterogeneous factors are brought together 
to enhance the marketability of the commodity. here, the spectacle itself 
cannot adjudicate the contest between its constituent elements. the power 
of these elements vis- à- vis each other is decided externally, for example 
by frames of perception inculcated over time that separate what requires 
notice from what can be ignored, and through contingencies attending the 
image’s passage across society. Just as the circulation of commodities em-
phasizes exchange value over use value, and abstract labor over real labor, 
the circulation of the commodity image appears to absorb the real labor 
of seeing into the abstraction of consumers whose viewing time generates 
value.17 as we know, however, the reproduction of capital can be assumed, 
but that does not insulate it from the contingencies of history and politics, 
which in fact provide no guaranteed outcome.
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it is helpful here to disarticulate issues of perception and its effects from 
the political economic context, which for debord is the relatively undif-
ferentiated milieu of late capitalism. these topics are conflated in debord’s 
expansive use of his concept of the spectacle.
Wolfgang haug’s concept of the commodity image suits the purpose, 
signaling the interconnections between perception and political economy, 
but allowing them to be considered separately. in his argument, the com-
modity image is designed to enhance the commodity in an expressive space 
that is contiguous with the economic but not reducible to it. While haug 
posits a relation between commodity and image that is functional to capi-
talism, his concept of “commodity aesthetics” points to a cultural domain 
in which the rules of the economy apply, but not exclusively. debord’s ar-
gument about the spectacle aims to provide an account of late capitalism’s 
dynamics as secured through its governing mode of perception. as such, 
the term serves not only to index this theory but also works as a concept 
that applies to different levels of abstraction, such as, specific images or 
scenes and ideological frames sutured together by visuality.18 however, 
where images form an aspect of a still- emergent public sphere, where the 
meaning of “publicness” is uncertain, they may provide a domain where the 
rules about what it is to see, and what there is to see, are worked out.19 in 
Marxian terms, the labor of seeing and the value placed on visuality in an 
emergent market economy are not apparent at the start, but are negotiated 
over time, in ways that it would be necessary to trace.
in that sense it is worth asking precisely what is foreclosed by Marx’s 
understanding of commodity fetishism as the resignification of religious 
aura or affect. Marx argued, it will be recalled, that with the commodity 
taking on a life of its own, akin to a celestial being, human beings failed to 
realize that the economy was subject to human control, but instead granted 
it power over themselves.20 Let us look, however, to a different context, 
where religious imagery and the commodity form together secure value 
for the product, as the commodity- image is itself interpellated into places 
of commerce and worship both. this is important because, in the subcon-
tinent, religious imagery, commodity form, and public performance have 
long been allied.
the first images to be circulated on a large scale in south asia were god 
pictures, in advertisements for goods and services such as in calendar art.21 
When there were protests against the use of religious imagery, these were 
dismissed on the grounds that trade would suffer without the use of such 
representations.22 such portraits did not document the external world, 
nor in themselves depict goods and services being sold. rather, they ap-
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peared as religious fetishes with an auratic power that helped sell products. 
such aura added value to the commodity but also served to mystify it and, 
by so doing, visualized the commodity fetish. the spread of the commodity 
economy might have been eroding communal forms of production, but the 
commodity image was at the same time able to call up its prehistory, and 
in the process media technologies themselves acquired a magical aspect.
What this meant was that these technologies might have been seen as 
modernizing, but they were also imagined as providing access to the past, 
and to valorize a history that, if not already gone, was being erased as its 
idea was summoned and broadcast anew. the rapid growth of television in 
india following the telecast of hindu epics on doordarshan is perhaps the 
most dramatic recent example of this tendency, followed as we know by 
widespread attacks on Muslims and the ascendancy of overt hindu majori-
tarianism, albeit with internal contradictions (rajagopal, 2001). something 
very different from the foucauldian account of the modern optical regime 
occurs here. Communicative modernity is announced in the south asian 
context not by the withdrawal of violence but by its greater visibility.
in contrast to the kind of arguments Jonathan Crary has made about 
the emergence of both expert and popular practices that helped social-
ize the destabilization of visual perception, and the way professional and 
managerial discussions sought to contain the effects of this crisis, elsewhere 
such destabilization tends to reverberate upward and downward, yoking 
the existential together with the national- political (Crary, 2001). the most 
crucial distinction to be marked here is that the context Crary focuses on, 
the consolidation of Western nation- states and the governmentalization of 
their populations, is accomplished by the early twentieth century, at least in 
relation to the rest of the world, which remained under colonial rule dur-
ing the period he focuses on (mid- nineteenth to early twentieth centuries). 
elsewhere, changes in perception and in politics tend more directly to be 
read through each other. as a result, the crisis of the perceiving subject, 
in the different ways it is experienced outside the West, telescopes into 
more generalized crises of self- making and nation- building, that reverber-
ate with and compound each other. it is in the partial depiction and propul-
sion of this turbulence that any regularities of postcolonial visual culture 
must be found.
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Notes
 1. the term “securocratic regime” is from vieira, Martin, & Wallerstein (1992), 
p. 205. for a discussion of some of the cultural dynamics attendant on such a con-
text, see appadurai (2006).
 2. on the Mumbai terror attacks, see rajagopal (2008). for the most authorita-
tive recent survey of the Maoist issue, see dandekar & Choudhury (2010).
 3. hal foster distinguishes vision from visuality: the former refers to the mecha-
nism of sight and the datum of vision, the latter refers to its historical techniques 
and discursive determinations. see foster (1988), p. ix.
 4. on the most significant visual surveillance initiative in recent times, see 
“uidai strategy overview,” unique identification authority of india (uidai), 
Planning Commission, government of india, april 2010.
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 5. the internal variety within and among south asian ways of seeing is not as 
yet something about which a great deal has been written. for one of the few recent 
essays addressing the subject, exploring the question in relation to Muslims, see 
freitag (2007).
 6. for an argument about the pervasiveness of secrecy at the heart of publicity 
in relation to state- sponsored violence in indonesia, see siegel (1998).
 7. see Chatterjee (2004). Chatterjee does not explore the relationship between 
civil and political society, and thus ignores the existence of the many forms of con-
nection, including media circuits, that cut across the divide he argues for.
 8. see in this connection the interview with the poet arun Kolatkar in ramna-
rayan (2004).
 9. i have made this argument vis- à- vis television in rajagopal (2001). for a rel-
evant critical discussion, see benson (2009).
 10. Whereas the contractual agent engages in exchange out of interest, and is not 
personally modified by the act of exchange, the communicative act transforms the 
person engaging in discourse over time. habermas responds to this problem by 
arguing that personally transforming communication is intimate and remains in the 
private sphere, unlike rational- critical communication (habermas, 1991).
 11. in this context, see van der veer (2010). for a shift in the domain of etiquette 
corresponding to the new secrecy of punishment, see norbert elias on the growth 
of shame attending the display of hitherto “public” practices that began to be con-
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